Tag Archives: Ukraine

Puzzled.

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Are we doing too much to support our ally Israel? First, by launching and tenaciously continuing a war that Hamas cannot win, Hamas is at least as responsible as Israel for the massive death toll in Gaza. Still, have we erred by supplying Israel with so much ordnance? That’s without me knowing just how much ordnance we have supplied to Israel. Second, by attacking Iran’s key nuclear-weapons development facilities, we are entering a war whose long-term course is unknowable. (The same is true of any war, as Desmond Morton observed.) Israel is right to fear Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, given Iran’s professed desire to destroy Israel. Are we right to be concerned about the destruction of Israel to the point where we take military action?

Are we doing too little to support our friend, if not ally, Ukraine? Vladimir Putin has repeatedly professed his desire to destroy Ukraine as an independent state. So far, the United States and the Europeans have supplied a great deal of military hardware and training to support Ukraine’s self-defense effort, along with financial aid to keep the Ukrainian civil economy afloat. There is such a demographic imbalance between the opposing forces, that I wonder if armaments alone will enable Ukraine to survive. Should we be concerned about the destruction of Ukraine to the point where we take military action with our own forces?

Then there’s Taiwan.

What is the “right” amount of support to supply to an ally or friend at war? How do we tell what is the “right” level? Are Israel and Ukraine the same or are they apples and oranges?

EDC.

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            In the wake of the Second World War, Western European countries pondered some form of “unity.”  At first, this meant unity “at the peak”: countries surrendering some measure of sovereignty to form a “European” government.  This went nowhere.  So, attention turned to unity “at the base”: create specialized “European” institutions and let it cook.  This approach soon gave birth to the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC, Schuman Plan).  It worked once, so try it in other areas (Common Market, Euratom). 

            The “wake of the Second World War” broadly overlapped the “dawning of the Cold War.”  The Americans and the Europeans shared an interest in preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe.[1]  Eventually (1947-), this led to the Marshall Plan and some CIA meddling in French and Italian elections.  Still, what if the Red Army marched west?  Military security rose up as an issue.  One part of the answer came in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  The United States would keep troops in Europe as a “trip wire.”[2] 

            In dealing with these problems, “Europe” faced three problems.  First, the British didn’t want to join.[3]  Second, how were countries to reconcile with the Germans?  Third, Many American officials disdained the Europeans.  The purpose of Marshall Plan aid was “to get the Europeans on their feet and off our back.” 

            Then, in June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea.  The “Cold War” wasn’t just going to be an economic and political struggle in Western Europe.  It could also be a military struggle.  American troops might have to be sent to the Far East or the Middle East.  So, Western Europeans would have to bulk-up their military forces.  In September 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed re-arming West Germany.  The European responded with dismay.[4] 

            The “European integration” and American military themes soon came together.  In October 1950, French Defense Minister Rene Pleven suggested the creation of a “European Defense Community” to create a “European Army.”  West German troops would be raised, but would not be formed into units larger than battalion.  The German battalions would be mixed with troops from other countries and the higher commands would be held only by non-Germans.  The Americans reluctantly agreed if this was the only way to get West German troops. 

            Negotiation of the treaty dragged on for a year and a half.  The size of the German units rose to divisions, not battalions; and the European Army would be under the American commander of NATO, rather than independent.  After signatures (May 1952), the treaty went back to the national parliaments for ratification.  In the meantime, the context changed.  The Korean War ended in a truce; Joseph Stalin died and was succeeded by more moderate seeming men.  The EDC seemed less urgent.  The French parliament rejected the treaty (August 1954). 

            Afterwards, NATO admitted West Germany (and its army).  Europe enjoyed American nuclear “extended deterrence.”  Eventually, the Soviet Union fell.  Who needed armies now?[5] 

[1] Not much could be done about Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe what with the Red Army being what it was. 

[2] If Red Army troops attacked American troops, then nuclear weapons could come into play. 

[3] The British—understandably, labored under the illusion that they ranked among the “victors.”  In fact, Britain had suffered the ruin of its economy and loss of will to hold its empire.  Which is what Neville Chamberlain had feared. 

[4] See Category:Nazi war crimes in France – Wikipedia 

[5] European defense spending has fallen from 3.76 percent of GDP (1960) to 1.56 percent (2022).  That’s 58 percent.  European Union Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2025 | MacroTrends   

Ukraine Crisis.

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            The military situation of Ukraine continued to decline.[1]  Russian ground forces have been making steady progress against Ukrainian forces in the east of the country.  Hoping, perhaps, to stave off a Ukrainian defeat until the Biden administration had left office, “Biden”[2] agreed to allow Ukraine to fire American-supplied “ATACMS” missiles into Russia itself.  The prickly, humorless Vladimir Putin saw this as another of “NATO’s aggressive actions against Russia.”  He argued that Russia had the right to hit not only Ukraine itself, but also countries “that allow their weapons to be used against our facilities.”  He didn’t say that Russia would do that, just that it had the right.  The incremental increases in Western military aid, always modulated by the United States, has been a long-running grievance for Putin.  Putin hasn’t wanted to come into a direct conflict with the West, any more than the West has wanted a direct conflict with Russia. 

What Putin did do was to order the bombardment of Ukraine with swarms of drones and a few new ballistic and nuclear-capable missiles.  Ukraine’s Volodymir Zelensky described the ballistic missile attack as an “escalation” that should be countered by the delivery of American more air defense artillery (like the HIMARS system). 

            War weariness is taking hold in Ukraine.  The share of the population that favors a negotiated peace has risen from 25 percent a year ago to over 50 percent now.  Why would Putin agree to negotiate or take less than his maximum aims?  It isn’t clear that Putin would have agreed to negotiate two years ago, when things were going badly for him.  Why would he negotiate now, when the boot is on the other neck?  Russian soldiers are fighting and dying, Vladimir Putin is not. 

            What does Putin want?  Some Western observers think that he will settle for possession of the Donbas and all the other territory acquired in the war.  Some think that Ukraine will now settle for remaining a sovereign state with most of its pre-war territory still in its possession. 

            What is NATO willing to do for a non-member under an unprovoked attack?  What NATO countries have done so far has not been enough to turn the tide.  Russia possesses a considerable numerical advantage over Ukraine. Providing weapons doesn’t create trained forces to use those weapons on the battlefield.  There is a degree of theater here. 

            There is one final, awful thing to consider.  The historian John Lewis Gaddis usefully renamed the “Cold War” as the “Long Peace.”  That peace was assured by deterrence based Mutual Assured Destruction.  The Indian-Pakistani nuclear rivalry has been based on a similar deterrence.  The American refusal to exploit its nuclear monopoly against Russia prevented the Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949 from becoming a one-sided nuclear war.  However, we’ve also seen what can happen when one country possesses nuclear weapons and its opponent in war does not.  Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

            How would the United States—under either Biden or Trump—respond to a nuclear attack on Ukraine? 

[1] “Russia gains ground as U.S. rushes aid to Ukraine,” The Week, 6 December 2024, p. 5.  See: Ukraine down the drain. | waroftheworldblog 

[2] Within quotation marks, the term refers to whatever group of people (perhaps Antony Blinken, Lloyd Austin, Avril Haines) is conducting American foreign and defense policy behind the façade of the man in the Biden-Trump debate. 

Ukraine down the drain.

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            In November 2022, about a year into the Russo-Ukraine War, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, said publicly that neither side could win a decisive victory.  He argued that a negotiated peace offered the best hope for peace.[1] 

            This was emphatically not the advice that people wanted to hear.  The Biden administration chose a different course.  In essence, the United States has provided (and has encouraged European allies to provide) arms that could be used in a struggle to recapture the territories lost to Russia since the initial Russia seizure of Ukrainian territory in 2014. 

However, for most of the last two years the Biden administration has rejected any measures that would put the United States at risk of a war with Russia.  Ukraine would not be admitted to NATO.  Biden refused repeated requests from Ukraine for long-range weapons that would allow it to strike Russian forces and military sites within Russia itself. 

Now the Russians are driving the Ukrainians back in parts of the front lines.  Now they have been joined by 8-10,000 North Korean “volunteers.”  Now Ukraine has lost about 57,000 dead and many others wounded.  Now the Ukrainian army is finding it hard to replace such losses.  Now the danger of a collapse by the exhausted and increasingly demoralized Ukrainian army grows.  Essentially, events have proved General Milley correct.  A negotiated peace, or at least a cease-fire, is the logical step if Vladimir Putin will settle for half a loaf.  

            As Biden’s term staggers to a close, some administration defense and foreign policy officials have suggested that the United States do what it has not done so far.  Specifically, they have allowed Ukraine to use longer range missiles; they have committed to provide Ukraine with anti-personnel mines[2] to shore up the sagging front; and they are pushing the remaining authorized military aid out the door before President Trump can stop them.   The weapons “are unlikely to change much on the battlefield” and “it will be difficult for Ukraine to regain the ground that Russia has steadily seized over the past few months” authorized leakers in the intelligence community told the New York Times. 

So why do it?  Administration sources offer the rationale that better terms for a cease-fire or peace can be obtained if Ukraine can slow the Russian advance and punish Russia in the final stage of the war.  Moreover, any cease-fire or peace will be at risk of violation by Russia.  Building up a strong defensive capacity could deter or defeat any new Russian attack. 

This seems nonsensical.  If Russia is exhausting the Ukrainians now, why not keep going until they totally collapse?  NATO membership is the only thing that might deter Russia. 

At the same time, the despised Trump administration looms.  The Biden administration is hurrying to issue $2.1 billion worth of contracts for arms to be delivered to Ukraine.  They have two months to go before the Trump administration takes office, although “normally” it takes four to nine months to issue such contracts.[3]

Is the Biden administration trying to encumber the path of the new administration?    

[1] Helene Cooper, Andrew E. Kramer, Eric Schmitt, and Julian Barnes, “Trump’s Vow Leaves Kyiv With Few Options,” New York Times , 22 November 2024. 

[2] Neither the United States nor Russia have signed the Ottawa Treaty outlawing landmines, but Ukraine has signed and ratified the treaty.  List of parties to the Ottawa Treaty – Wikipedia  Who could blame them for breaking it? 

[3] It is good news that one can cut all the red tape at the Pentagon if you want to cut it.   

Decisions.

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            “War is pure Hell.  You cannot refine it.”—William Tecumseh Sherman.  Peace in the Russo-Ukraine war is desirable.  Under the right terms. 

Under what terms is “peace” with Russia desirable for Ukraine?  Should Ukraine give up the territory that Russia already holds in exchange for peace?[1]  Should they try to keep fighting with whatever aid the European Union can provide, even if the United States does a bunk?  Should they try to extract commitments for the West in exchange for ceding territory to Russia and halting the fighting?  Such commitments might involve reconstruction aid, modern arms for a post-war Ukrainian military, and membership in the European Union and NATO.  What if Russia’s terms include demands for Ukraine’s “neutralization” and disarmament so as not to “threaten” Russia in the future? 

Under what terms is peace desirable for Russia?  It would take extreme pressure to make Russia give up its territorial gains.  Vladimir Putin’s long-term goal appears to be the reassembly of the Soviet Union.  Any peace that leaves Ukraine functionally independent marks a defeat.  In terms of manpower, Russia has a big edge.  At the moment, it profits from an alliance of convenience with China, North Korea, and Iran.  Putin may calculate that he can keep the pressure on Ukraine until the front lines cave in.  If that happens, Russia could be in a position to take much more than anyone else is contemplating at this moment. 

Under what conditions is peace desirable for the United States?  This question involves asking other questions.  First, where does Ukraine figure in America’s global strategy?  The United States faces multiple dangers simultaneously.  The Far East is the most important of these challenges.  Then there is the Middle East.  The key concerns here are the oil, Iran’s forward policy, and Israel.  Then there’s Europe.  Putin’s ambitions pose an eventual danger to the former “satellite states” and to the Baltic countries.  How soon would it become an actual danger?  Russia’s attack on Ukraine has prompted a revival and expansion of NATO.  Putin’s “allies” all have a strong interest in keeping the eyes of the world focused on Ukraine (and Gaza).[2]  At the same time, a consciousness of danger is poking the Europeans to look to their own defenses.  This will take time to develop. 

Second, to what extent can the United States make good its global commitments?  It operates from a weakened position compared to the past.  The United States military’s command structure has ossified, the defense industrial base has eroded for decades, and the human manpower base is in poor shape.[3]  It is by no means guaranteed that the United States can fight and win multiple simultaneous wars.  Rearmament is going to take time and cost money even IF the political will exists to rearm. 

            What’s best for Ukraine?  Only they can decide. 

            What’s best for the United States?  Only they can decide. 

            What’s best for Russia?  Only Putin can decide. 

            Where, if at all, do those decisions overlap? 

[1] See: 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine – Russo-Ukrainian War – Wikipedia 

[2] Someone once observed that Bismarck was the kind of guy who would set fire to your barn so that he could sleep through the night. 

[3] The country has a high rate of obesity, with attendant illnesses.  Wegovy in boot camp? 

“God is on the side of the big battalions”–Voltaire.

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            Russia and Ukraine have been “at war” since 2014.  Russia seized the Crimean peninsula and supported “rebellion” in two majority Russian “oblasts” in eastern Ukraine.  Then, in February 2024, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.  They missed their punch.  Since then, the Russians and Ukrainians have been engaged in a prolonged war of attrition.  Recently, a Ukrainian offensive ground to a halt without reaching its ambitious goals.  Since then, the Russians have mostly been grinding away on the Ukrainian lines in the Donbas.  Western observers predicted that the Ukrainian defense would hold as Russian bodies piled up in “No Man’s Land.”  Moreover, the Ukrainians launched their own minor counter-offensive in the Kursk region.  The intent was to seize Russian territory and force the Russians to shift soldiers from the Donbas, blunting the Russian offensive. 

The West has provided Ukraine with far more “lethal” aid since February 2022 than it did before then.  That aid has come with restrictions however.  In particular, Western governments seem to have wanted Ukraine to bleed Russia white until Vladimir Putin would agree to negotiate a reasonable settlement.  On the other hand, they didn’t want Ukraine risking an expansion of the war toward a threshold where Putin might use nuclear weapons.  So long-range weapons that could reach deep into Russia have been off the table.  Ukrainian President Zelensky has kept asking all the same. 

The trouble is that there are more Russians than Ukrainians.  Specifically, there are 143 million Russians and 38 million Ukrainians.  The Russians have suffered between 400,000 and 600,000 military casualties dead and wounded since the invasion began almost three years ago; Ukraine has lost perhaps as many as 80,000 dead and 400,000 wounded.[1]  However, the Russians have managed to dredge up 25,000-30,000 replacements per month.  Now they have managed to recruit 8,000 North Korean soldiers.  (There may be more to come.)  In contrast, Ukraine is just running out of soldiers.  It is the one being “bled white.” 

As a result, Russians managed to contain the incursion near Kursk while still attacking in the Donbas.  Now the Russians are moving forward against the Ukrainian defenses in both the Donbas and Kursk.  On the Ukrainian side, the fighting men are becoming exhausted and “morale is eroding.” 

People sympathetic to Ukraine ask “Why must Ukraine keep fighting with one hand tied behind its back?”[2]  Because NATO countries do not want to go to war with Russia directly.  Hemingway has one of his characters explain how he went broke: “Gradually and then suddenly.”[3]  The same thing is true for Ukraine now.  Ukraine is going to have to make a deal with Russia.  Shrewd, realistic thinking says that Ukraine will have to accept the loss of the territory that the Russians have conquered.[4]  Ukraine will have to settle for some guarantee of its future security, coupled with financial aid for reconstruction.  Membership in NATO, or just fair words and promises from Putin, may be that guarantee.

[1] See: Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War – Wikipedia 

[2] The Observer, quoted in “Ukraine: A grim reality sets in,” The Week, 15 November 2024, p. 15.

[3] Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises (1926).  And Jackson Browne counsels “don’t think it won’t happen just because it hasn’t happened yet.”  The Road and the Sky (Remastered) 

[4] Richard Haas, quoted in “Ukraine: A grim reality sets in,” The Week, 15 November 2024, p. 15. 

“The System Is Blinking Red” 2.

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The Armed Services Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate created a “Commission on the National Defense Strategy.”  Eight people were appointed to the Commission by both parties in both committees.  The Commission examined both the current and foreseeable threat environment facing the United States and the military preparedness of the United States to address that environment.  The study makes grim reading.[1] 

First, the threat environment is familiar.  In first place is China; in second place is Russia; and in third and fourth places are Iran and North Korea.  All are aggressive tyrannies.  All devote a much larger share of their national resources to the military than does the United States.  All have grown closer to each other—formal or informal allies—over the last few years.  All are deeply aggrieved with the “rules-based order” fostered by the United States after the Cold War.  “The good old rule sufficeth them, the simple plan, That they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can.”[2]  One is already fully at war, one is using its proxies in war, and the others are using military power in an attempt to intimidate their neighbors, who are American allies.  In short, “the United States faces the most challenging and most dangerous international security environment since World War II.  It faces peer and near-peer competitors for the first time since the end of the Cold War.”  Once upon a time, such actions would have met a powerful American response as a matter of policy.[3] 

Now, “[the] consequences of an all-out war with a peer or near peer would be devastating.  Such a war would not only yield massive personnel and military costs but would also likely feature cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure and a global economic recession from disruptions to supply chains, manufacturing, and trade.” 

Why is this?  The Commission finds American power much reduced and hobbled, all by our own doing.  First, “The Commission finds that DoD’s business practices, byzantine research and development (R&D) and procurement systems, reliance on decades-old military hardware, and culture of risk avoidance reflect an era of uncontested military dominance.”  As a result, “the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.” 

Second, “the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB) is unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the United States and its allies and partners. A protracted conflict, especially in multiple theaters, would require much greater capacity to produce, maintain, and replenish weapons and munitions.” 

Third, “today’s [DoD workforce and all-volunteer force ] is the smallest force in generations. It is stressed to maintain readiness today and is not sufficient to meet the needs of strategic global competition and multi-theater war.”  “Recent recruitment shortfalls [for the all-volunteer force] have decreased the size of the Army, Air Force, and Navy.” 

Fourth, we aren’t spending on–or raising money for–defense the way we used to when we were conscious of danger.  On the one hand, defense spending as a share of GDP has roller-coastered: in 1965, 6.9 percent; in 1967, 8.6 percent; in 1979, 4.9 percent; in 1983, 6.8 percent; in 1999, 2.9 percent; in 2010, 4.7 percent; and in 2025 it is projected that the US will spend 3 percent.  On the other hand, “Defense spending in the Cold War relied on top marginal income tax rates above 70 percent and corporate tax rates averaging 50 percent.” 

The Commission concludes that “The lack of preparedness to meet the challenges to U.S. national security is the result of many years of failure to recognize the changing threats and to transform the U.S. national security structure and has been exacerbated by the 2011 Budget Control Act, repeated continuing resolutions, and inflexible government systems. The United States is still failing to act with the urgency required, across administrations and without regard to governing party.” 

It offers a series of urgent recommendations that are well worth considering.  But not for too long.  Our enemies can see all these things.  They may not wait. 

[1] See: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/nds_commission_final_report.pdf  The Report was brought to my attention by Walter Russell Mead, “U.S. Shrugs as World War II Approaches,” WSJ, 17 September 2024. 

[2] William Wordsworth, “Rob Roy’s Grave.” 

[3] Bing Videos

Ukraine and a Larger Crisis.

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            Walter Russell Mead argues American and European aid for Ukraine is neither “a charity project,” nor a distraction from the even-more-important Indo-Pacific region.[1]  Instead, it is “a golden opportunity” that we should seize “with both hands.”  He spells out some of what he means and leaves it to readers to understand other parts.  Not all of his argument is persuasive, but it is worth considering. 

Mead argues that Putin’s war against Ukraine “has ignited a national awakening.”  Post-war Ukraine, he predicts, “will be a formidable new force in Europe whose interests and outlook place it firmly in alignment with the U.S.”  Maybe, but also maybe not. 

            He seems to be on target about the “national awakening.”  Two qualifications need to be made.  First, that revival began well before the Russian invasion in February 2022.  The 2013-2014 “Euromaidan” grass-roots protests evicted the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych.[2]  Russia’s reoccupation of Crimea and its sponsorship of pro-Russian movements in the Donbas followed.  Second, that revival has two fronts.  In 2019, voters elected Volodymyr Zelensky as President in a revolt against the endemic corruption in post-Soviet Ukraine.  Russia’s out-right invasion has diverted attention from the corruption issue, but some Ukrainian oligarchs don’t seem to have felt the same nationalist pride coursing through the veins of ordinary Ukrainians. 

            Mead may or may not be on target about a “formidable” post-war Ukraine.  He foresees a country with a “battle-tested army” that will “join Poland, the Baltic republics, and the Scandinavian countries” in a barricade against Russian expansion. 

Any future event can become the focus of present hopes and fears.  So all predictions should be taken with a grain of salt.  In the case of a formidable post-war Ukraine, other examples drawn from history urge caution.  In 1783, the new United States emerged from the War for Independence exhausted and with its people eager to turn their attention to other pressing concerns.  After the Second World War, the British people voted for domestic reforms, rather than the preservation of empire.  Defense spending fell sharply.  “Battle-tested armies” shrank mightily in both cases. 

Ukraine’s army largely consists of patriotic volunteers who rushed to the colors when Russia attacked.  They’re going to want to go back to civilian life when the war ends.  Americans estimate Ukrainian military casualties at 20,000 killed and 130,000 wounded; civilian deaths are estimated above 40,000.[3]  Much of the country has been physically devastated into the bargain.  Bouncing back from such losses will not be easy. 

            How will this redound to the benefit of the West elsewhere?  In two ways.  First, an exhausted, perhaps even defeated Russia will be no useful partner to Xi Jinping.  Mead argues that the Eastern bloc in NATO and the European Union will resist any post-war (or wartime, come to that) appeasement of Russia by the Western Europeans. 

            A defeat for Russia will revive the credibility of an American alliance, eroded by decades of mismanagement.  South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and countries in Southeast Asia may all take heart in facing the Chinese danger.  Americans shouldn’t take a victory lap.  We’re just starting. 

[1] Walter Russell Mead, “Putin’s War Is America’s Opportunity,” WSJ, 30 May 2023. 

[2] See: “Winter on Fire: Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom” (dir. Evgeny Afineevsky, 2015).  Excellent documentary. 

[3] See: Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War – Wikipedia 

Some Ukrainian Background.

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The first “Russian” state was Kievan Rus, created by conquering Vikings.[1]  In the 13th Century the Mongols showed up and put a stop to that.  “Independent” Russia came to mean a small territory around Moscow.  Over the following centuries, Ukraine became a contested ground between empires: the “Golden Horde” of the Mongols, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the rising Austrian Empire, and an expanding Romanov Russia.  By the end of the 18th Century, the Austrians held Galicia, while the rest of the Ukraine belonged to Russia.

As was the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe in the second half of the 19th Century, local nationalism began to burn.  Tsarist Russia repressed this just as it did every other form of non-Russian nationalism.  Still, Ukrainian nationalism survived.  When the First World War wrecked the Austrian and Russian Empires, Ukraine declared its independence (1917).

Tragedy followed for Ukrainians: the territory and its people were savaged by Poles with an expansive definition of “historical” Poland; and by “Whites,” “Reds,” and a variety of crazy people like the Anarchist anti-semite Nestor Makhno during the Russian Civil War and the Russo-Polish War.  Then Ukraine fell under the hammer during Josef Stalin’s collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s.  About 3.5 million Ukrainians were starved to death during this “Harvest of Sorrow.”[2]

During the drive for industrialization that followed close on the heels of the “terror famine,” Stalin moved in millions of Russians to eastern Ukraine.  Their descendants still form a large part of the population of Ukraine.  Then the Second World War brought both massive suffering and deep divisions, as Ukrainians fought on both side.

In 1954, possibly trying to make amends to the Ukraine for the whole unfortunate “terror famine” thing, the Soviet Union transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine.  This remained something of a sore spot for the ethnic Russians of Crimea.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine held a referendum on independence.  Overall, 90 percent of those who voted supported independence.   However, voter participation varied a good deal throughout Ukraine.  The Russians weren’t happy with this secession, but there wasn’t much they could do about it because Russia itself was in massive turmoil.

The post-independence history of Ukraine has not been a happy one.[3]  Corruption is endemic.  Mismanagement is widespread.  Bureaucracy is pervasive and stifling.  Investment in productive capacity fell far short of needs.  Where banks did lend, they often made bad loans.  Business law and an incompetent (or corrupt) judiciary make property insecure.  Investors don’t want to risk their capital.  By 2014, Ukrainians were among Europe’s poorest people.

In 2004, Viktor Yanukovych won election as president amidst charges of massive fraud and interference by the Soviet Union.  An “Orange Revolution” turned him out of office.  His “Orange” successors then mismanaged things on a grand scale.  Eventually, in 2010, Yanukovych managed to win election as president without charges of massive fraud.  In late 2013 he suddenly rejected a long-prepared economic agreement with the European Union.  This act sparked a new round of demonstrations that ended with Yanukovych chased from office once again (February 2014).

After that, things got even worse.  By 2015, the conflict with Russia cut Ukrainian-Russian trade by half.  Inflation and unemployment both rose.  Foreign-exchanges reserves at the central bank sank to their lowest point in a decade.  Experts estimated that the country would need $40 billion in financial assistance over the next four years.  In early February 2015, the International Monetary Fund granted Ukraine a $17.5 billion credit.

It was against this background that the Obama administration, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund began pressuring Ukraine to root out corruption and address a host of other problems.

[1] “In Russia’s shadow,” The Week, 14 March 2014, p. 11.

[2] Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (1986); Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalin’s War on the Ukraine (2017).

[3] David M. Herszenhorn, “Economic Woes Will Test Kiev, Even if Truce Holds,” NYT, 14 February 2015

A tale of two occupied cities.

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Recently, the Wall Street Journal ran two stories in one day on the problems of “occupied territories” in two wars. The stories cast some light on possible future developments.

Since seizing Mosul in June 2014, ISIS has provided a sort of good government to the captured city of 1-1.5 million people.[1] Roads have been repaired and are well-maintained. The street lights are working far better than they did under the old regime. Theft of electricity through improvised wiring has ended. You can walk down the street without navigating around kiosks and barrows. Littering has come to a stop. All men wear beards and all women are fully covered. You don’t feel offended all the time by people scrolling through their Smart phones because the cell towers and Internet have been turned off.[2] ISIS drove out the Christian minority from the city. Now churches host garage sales. ISIS blew up the Shi’ite shrines that once dotted the city. One way to ensure compliance with government orders is to kill anyone who violates them.

The recapture of Mosul has been a loudly-proclaimed goal of the American—I mean Iraqi—strategy against ISIS. So far, most of the heavy lifting has been done by the Kurds, who have made advances around the western, northern, and eastern flanks of the city. However, the fall of Ramadi in Anbar province has put a spoke in the wheel of that strategy for the moment.

The Sunni majority in the city fears both the reconquest by the Shi’ite-dominated government and what might follow at the hands of the “liberators.”

It isn’t at all clear that Petro Poroshenko’s Ukraine government expects—or even wants—to recover the rebel territories in eastern Ukraine.[3] A cease-fire worked out in February 2015 has greatly reduced casualties among civilians. However, Poroshenko’s government has been tightening controls on movement between the two parts of Ukraine. One estimate is that trade across the cease-fire line has fallen by perhaps 70 percent since the cease-fire was implemented.[4] The Poroshenko government argues that the economic and political integration clauses of the cease-fire agreement have to wait on the military aspect of the cease-fire being “fully ensured.” The distinction seems intended to punish the residents of the eastern zone. Delays at the Kiev government’s check-points have extended a round-trip between Donetsk and neighboring towns in Ukraine proper from two hours to twelve hours. Furthermore, the Ukrainian border guards regularly demand hefty bribes—in effect a government tax on exports—from truckers. Food and medical supplies from Ukraine have begun to dwindle as the border guards refuse to allow their passage. The Kiev government has begun denying pension benefits to anyone living permanently in the rebel-held regions. The Russians have not taken up the slack. Yet. This policy runs the risk of driving many people in eastern Ukraine who do not support “independence” under the Russian thumb into the arms of the rebels. One frustrated traveler said “”Give me the opportunity to work and live peacefully and I don’t care who is in power.”

Clearly, conditions in Mosul are far worse than in eastern Ukraine. The occupation of Mosul by ISIS seems likely to end in a horrific fashion, while Ukraine will be partitioned.

[1] Nour Malas, “Year of Islamic State Rule Transforms Mosul,” WSJ, 10 June 2015.

[2] That doesn’t mean that no news reaches the city. Residents seem well aware of the reports of very destructive fighting, looting, and retribution killings by Shi’ite militias in the re-capture of Tikrit.

[3] Laura Mills, “In Ukraine, Anger Grows as Border Tightens,” WSJ, 10 June 2015.

[4] That is, much more trade took place while the fighting was still going on at a high pitch.