Soldiers Become Governors.

Modern war is about destroying the enemy’s army and seizing control of his territory.  Even when it can be achieved, victory still brings problems.  If Army officers wanted to be civilian bureaucrats they wouldn’t have gone into the military.  Yet civilian bureaucrats lack the means to effectively govern conquered territory.  Both civilians and soldiers agree to ignore this reality in what one scholar labels the “denial syndrome.”  Unfortunately, scholars have a lot of evidence with which to work in sorting out good practice from bad.[1]  People can’t help but compare the successful occupations of Germany and Japan after the Second World War with the disastrous aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  What went right with the earlier occupations?  What went wrong with the later occupation?

After victory in the Second World War, the American military occupied huge territories of the defeated enemies.  Those countries acknowledged that they were beaten and that the war was ended.  The military had created immense global logistical systems that enabled it to move supplies to the conquered areas.  It had very large military forces available to support and enforce American military government.  The desire to avoid any renewed military danger from Germany or Japan inclined Generals Lucius Clay (Germany) and Douglas MacArthur (Japan) to sort out the conquered people, not just to punish them.  The suddenly developing Cold War with the Soviet Union motivated Americans (and the Germans especially) to not want a break-down of civil affairs.

Very different conditions prevailed in Iraq.  The war plan assigned far too few soldiers to occupation duty, then American forces were further drawn down.  Very quickly, the George W. Bush administration transferred authority in Iraq to what proved to be an inadequate Civilian Provisional Authority.  Iraqis did not acknowledge that they were beaten and that war had ended.  Instead, Sunni-Shi’ite-Kurdish conflicts broke out into the open.  Shi’ites looked to neighboring Iran for support, while Iran sought to undermine the American and Sunni positions.  While Germans had feared the Soviet Union, many Sunni embraced the insurgency that quickly became associated with the radical Islamists of Al Qaeda.

One—depressing—“lesson of History” might be that people fail to learn from History.  The George W. Bush administration failed to study the “good occupations” of Germany and Japan.  The Obama administration continued the same chaotic occupation policies launched by the Bush administration.  One reason for this failure may lie in the clash between any “lessons” History teaches and what people want to believe.  Lost in the adulation of the occupations of Germany and Japan is the reality that Americans raised in an environment of inter-war isolationism were only constrained to embark on internationalism by harsh necessity.

Also lost in recent accounts is the reality that Rome wasn’t built in a day.  By focusing tightly on the brief periods of military administration, then jumping ahead to the long-term outcomes, it is easy to attribute change to military government.  This analysis falls short of a real explanation.  On the one hand, civilian governments by the defeated peoples took decades to create democratic political cultures.  They wanted to avoid repeating the errors of the past.  On the other hand, Germany became a democracy because the victors in the Second World War partitioned the country, then parked 20,000 tanks on top of the place for almost half a century.

[1] Susan L. Carruthers, The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace (2016); Nadia Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (2017).  In a typically American solipsism, the authors ignore the contemporaneous British experience with the government of conquered territories.

To Europe by land and sea.

Lots of people in Sub-Saharan Africa want to go to Europe.  As of late June 2017, 72,000 immigrants have completed the journey this year.  For the most part, they are fleeing poverty above all else.  Population growth dramatically exceeds economic growth in these countries.[1]  The poverty is particularly serious in rural areas.  “We have no machinery to cultivate the land [and] no rain,” one person told a New York Times reporter.[2]  However, “fleeing poverty” has a larger meaning here.  In the absence of any social security system or local pathway to an adequate income, sons are expected to support their parents.  Often this means leaving home in search of work elsewhere.  Many are pulled to the capital city of Dakar, where there is more opportunity and lower poverty levels.  Other go to Gabon or Congo to work in mines.

Best of all is to reach Europe.  Sons who have made it to Europe and found work send home part of their earnings.  Even a share of the meager earnings of those working in Europe pay for “luxuries” in West Africa: concrete block houses instead of mud huts; iPhones and satellite dishes (and the electricity to power them); sometimes a car instead of a bicycle.[3]  Parents or spouses often encourage men with small future prospects to migrate in search of work.

For those living in West Africa, the route generally takes them east along Route 5 of the Trans-Africa Highway system.[4]  That route passes from Dakar (Senegal) through Bamako (Mali), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Niamey (Niger), and Kano (Nigeria), to N’Djamene (Chad).  In its longest extent, this is a journey of about 2,700 miles.  That’s like driving from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to Reno, Nevada.  Without the Rockies, but also without much in the way of paved roads.  From there they join Highway 3 as it runs north across the Sahara to Tripoli (Libya).  From Tripoli and other Libyan ports, they “take ship” for Italy.

Almost every leg of the journey is dangerous.  Human traffickers organize much of the migration in order to prey upon the migrants.  Travelers can find themselves extorted for further payments or abandoned en route.  Africa’s transportation infrastructure is in poor condition.  It’s one thing if you’re a rich Westerner (but I repeat myself).  Airlines connect European capitals with important cities endowed with comfortable hotels.  For ordinary people, travel is more difficult.  Some roads are unpaved dirt tracks.  Many paved roads haven’t been maintained for a long time.  The few railroads mostly haul freight, with infrequent or no passenger service.  There aren’t enough vehicles of any kind, so overloading is common-place.  So are vehicle break-downs.  The vast distances pose another challenge.

The sea passage is worst of all.  Most of the deaths come in the crossing from Libya to Italy.  Vessels starting the sea-crossing are over-loaded, under-powered, and badly crewed/captained.  In the first half of 2017, an estimated 2,100 migrants have drowned in ship-wrecks on the Mediterranean.  In April 2015, one terrible disaster killed more than 800 migrants.

Yet people—those who go and those who urge them to go—rarely understand the dangers involved.  “We only heard success stories” said the mother of two sons drowned at sea.  Death lists are sometimes published in Europe, then reported by those who made it to relatives at home.  Yet still the migrants come.

[1] According to the World Bank, almost half (47 percent) of Senegalese live in poverty.

[2] Dionne Searcy and Jaime Yaya Barry, “Leaving Home, One by One, Along “Deadliest Route” to Europe,” NYT, 23 June 2017.

[3] But not more farmland or tractors?  Well, perhaps.  Some of the emigrants sell their land to raise the money for the trip.  So, someone is buying.

[4] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-African_Highway_network

Memoirs of the Addams Administration 22.

It will be difficult for future historians to make sense of the commentary on the second, European, leg of President Trump’s first foreign trip.  The “usual subjects” of Mainstream Media (MSM) decried his hectoring of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to pay more toward the common defense while refusing to make an explicit commitment to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.[1]  Europeans themselves seemed aghast at his sharp tongue (and in the case of the prime minister of Montenegro, his sharp elbows).[2]  German Chancellor Angela Merkel affirmed that “we have to fight for ourselves.”  She called for European nations to “shoulder emotionally charged challenges such as a common defense and security policy.”

There is reason to doubt the value of all this talk.  On the one hand, a clear-eyed assessment of American vital interests would show that non-Russian Europe and “off-shore Asia” (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines) are vital trading partners and allies of the United States.  It doesn’t matter what President Trump says or fails to say.  If Push comes to Shove, the United States will have to defend those areas.  In contrast, neither Russia nor radical Islam poses an existential threat to the United States.[3]  On the other hand, the European Union (EU) lacks the means and probably the will[4] to provide for its own defense against foreign foes.

In May 2017, a second version of the Trump/RyanCare squeaked through the House of Representatives.  Since then Republican Senators have been trying to sort out a better version.  The Congressional Budget Office then issued an evaluation saying that under the House plan 23 million more Americans would be without health insurance and that premiums would rise for those who are old and sick.  The first part of this isn’t troubling: at least two-thirds of the “uninsured” would be people who never wanted the insurance (let alone the premiums) in the first place.  The second part reflects what the plan itself said: older and sicker people consume a lot more health care than do the young and healthy, so they should pay for it.  Republican senators are divided over the plan.  Public opinion leans against the House plan.[5]

The appointment of former FBI Director Robert Mueller to investigate the “Russia scandal” (including how his friend, protégé, and successor at the FBI James Comey came to be fired by President Trump) means that the investigation could run on for quite some time.  People will know nothing definitive until that investigation is completed.  However, it appears than anything illegal (like collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russian government hackers who revealed all sorts of inconvenient truths about Hillary Clinton) would have to have taken place before the election of President Trump in November 2016.  Wikileaks published the stolen e-mails on 22 July 2016.  The names of Kellyanne Conway (joined Trump campaign on 1 July 2016) and Steve Bannon (joined Trump campaign in August 2016) have not so far appeared among the list of FBI targets.  Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn—who had a history of legal contacts with the Russians–tried to open a back-channel contact with the Russian government in December 2016.  Maybe, just maybe, this dog won’t hunt.

[1] “Trump in Europe: A frayed alliance,” The Week, 9 June 2017, p. 6.

[2] “How they see us: Europe loses faith in America,” The Week, 9 June 2017, p. 14.  See also: “Russia: Cheering Trump’s NATO policy,” The Week, 9 June 2017, p. 15.

[3] Russia possesses nuclear weapons, but is deterred from using them by American nuclear weapons.  Vladimir Putin has had to make do with “little green men” and cyber-attacks.   Radical Islam doesn’t seem able to conquer anywhere vital to the United States.  Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey all have the means to resist radical Islamists.

[4] See: https://waroftheworldblog.com/2015/06/17/die-for-danzig-marcel-deat-mourir-pour-danzig-loeuvre-4-may-1939/

[5] “Republican health-care plan struggles in the Senate,” The Week, 9 June 2017, p. 5.

My Weekly Reader 3 June 2017.

It is characteristic of the long-running funk into which many Western societies have fallen that there have been many “decline of the West” books published in recent decades.  They offer varying analyses shaded by varying clouds of pessimism.  Some focus on economic issues, some on misguided international policies, and some on cultural factors (with rotten schools in the forefront).  Many are inspired by China’s challenge to societies that otherwise could remain complacent.  Some are compelling, many are not.  One recent example come from the former editor of the Economist, Bill Emmot.[1]

Thirty years ago Mancur Olson investigated the rapid revival of the devastated German and Japanese economies after the Second World War and the slower growth of the Western victors in that war.[2]  He found the answer in the role of intermediate groups–political as well as economic–in the different societies.  By intermediate groups he meant both labor unions and businessmen’s association, but also intrusive government regulators.  These groups entrenched established organizations at the expense of newcomers.  They entrenched established procedures at the expense of innovation.  Dictatorship, war, defeat, and foreign occupation had destroyed these intermediate groups in Germany and Japan.  This left individual entrepreneurs free to do what they wanted in a dynamic fashion.  (“And all that implies.”—“The Iron Giant.”)  Elsewhere, the intermediate groups survived the war and sometimes even tightened their grip.

It’s possible to find many examples of dysfunction in Western societies.  Take both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States for example.  Or the low labor participation rate in the United States as men have fled to disability programs as an alternative to lost familiar work.  Or Japan’s descent from Olsonian prime example of success into a barnacle-encrusted sampan.  Or the domination of the American—and perhaps “Western”–political economies by the banks.  In Japan that has meant a “lack of entrepreneurship or corporate investment” needed for growth.  In the United States, it has meant exploiting a public safety-net to cover imprudent risk.  This has resulted in “rising inequality, distortion of public policy, and [the] generation of collective economic pain and anger.”  And now the dreaded “populism.”

Much later on, several different countries sought to scrape these “barnacles” off the hull. Sweden “reduc[ed] taxation and deregulat[ed] all manner of industries” in pursuit of “more freedom of choice and creativity.”  Switzerland adopted an openness to immigration and also deregulated its labor market to get the right mix of workers to the right industries.  Britain’s embrace of the “Thatcher Revolution,” joined with membership in the European Union allowed Britain to reap both a “brain gain” and a “brawn gain.”[3]

What does Emmott offer by way of possible solutions?  Refreshingly, he does not glom every unpleasant surprise into one whole.  Thus, Putin’s Russia and Islamist terrorism pose no existential threats to Western civilization.  They can be mastered with a coherent effort.  Similarly, “Brexit” is a bad idea but not a rejection of Western values or most Western institutions.  In contrast, he over-states the real danger posed by the Donald Trump administration.  Trump speaks neither for mainstream Republicans nor for Democrats, and his administration will not last beyond his first term.  Then it will be back to business as usual.

Emmott has less to say about solving the real danger: Olson’s intermediate groups.  Appeals for “openness” in discussion isn’t likely to suffice.  It may take a real crisis, alas.

[1] Bill Emmott, The Fate of the West: The Battle to Save the World’s Most Successful Political Idea (2017).

[2] See: https://waroftheworldblog.com/2016/06/18/the-rise-and-decline-of-nations/

[3] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_Plumber.

EUwwwww.

The First World War, the Great Depression, the collapse of most European democracies, the Second World War: a continent in ruins and—with the Cold War—a divided continent at that.  What to do?  One answer came in a movement toward Western European unity.[1]  In 1949 came the European Coal and Steel Community (France, West Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries); in 1957 came the European Economic Community (same countries with a common external tariff, but no tariffs within the EEC); in the 1970s and 1980s came new members (Britain for example); in 1992 came the Maastricht Treaty that committed the members to ride the process as far as they could go; and the collapse of the Soviet Union’s empire in Eastern Europe.  The European Union (EU), as it is now called, started out with 6 member countries; now it has 28 members.  It also added various institutions of government.  These included a European Commission representing the member countries, a European Parliament, a Council of Ministers, a European Court to settle conflicts between national laws and EU laws, a President and a Foreign Minister, and a kinda-sorta common currency called the “Euro.”

Did it work?  Yes it did.  First, no wars have been fought between member states since 1945.[2]  Second, incomes have risen for ordinary Europeans: a recent estimate reported that the per-family income effect over just ten years has been a $6,000 increase.

So, people are in love with the European Union, right?  Well, no.  No?  Well, why not?

First, because the French used to count for a lot more than they do today,[3] so they had a large voice in designing the institutions.  These institutions bear a certain resemblance to the constitution of the first French Empire created by the military dictator Napoleon I.  The European Commission, with one appointed representative for each country, writes legislation.  The Commission then sends the proposed legislation to the popularly elected European Parliament. The Parliament can amend legislation or it can approve it or it can reject it, but it cannot initiate any legislation.  Legislation approved by the Parliament must then be ratified by the Council of Ministers, which is made up of more appointed representatives of the member states.  So, elected governments take forever bargaining with one another to achieve a moderately acceptable outcome.

Second, the EU’s government often fails to take action, but the “Eurocrats” issue regulations all the time.  Hundreds of thousands of them.  The regulations create common standards across all member states.  The European Court regularly decides that these regulations are superior to the laws of any protesting country.  To take one really absurd example, EU regulations banned bananas with “abnormal curvature.”

Third, because the Europeans have never settled the conflict over who they want to be.  On the one hand, many people see themselves as “Europeans-all-in-this-together.”  On the other hand, many people see themselves as, for example, “British-first-and-Europeans-second.”  The EU created a community where goods and services, but also people and money, moved around inside the community without any national boundaries.  Citizens of EU countries don’t need a passport to travel anywhere or work anywhere inside the EU.  Younger people often like this, but it freaks-out older people who still feel patriotism.

[1] “The endangered European Union,” The Week, 19-26 August 2016, p. 11.

[2] OK, you wouldn’t want to try to jump ship on the French Empire, but otherwise..

[3] Back in the day, the West Germans felt bad—or pretended to—about the whole unfortunate Nazi thing.  So, “working their passage” back to international respectability involved the Germans putting up with a lot of guff.  Now, they’re over it.

The Rise and Decline of Nations.

Back in the day–as young people used to say before they moved on to some other expression up with which I have not caught—I was going to be an economic historian. I came across a book by Mancur (Man-Kur or Man-Sur, depending on who your listening to) Olson.[1]  It’s a remarkable book, although—like many another remarkable book—long forgotten.

At the core of the book is a puzzle.  Germany and Japan lost the Second World War big time, while the United States won big time.  So how come the post-war German and Japanese economies were so dynamic, while the American economy slowed down?

Olson’s answer is one that will be obvious to sailors.[2]  You leave the boat in salt-water and it will pick up barnacles.  It also will be obvious to heart surgeons.  You have too many double bacon cheeseburgers with the twisty fries covered in BBQ sauce and your arteries will get clogged with sludge.  In either metaphor, the system gets loaded with stuff that slows down its operation.

What, in economic terms, are these barnacles/sludge?  They are the various interest groups that grow up around an established way of doing things: unions, government regulators, tax collectors, and business monopolies and cartels.  They grow up with—well, slightly behind– any new industry.  They figure out how the system works.  They figure out how to work the system.  They’re opposed to change because they know how to work the existing system.[3]  They fight over shares of the existing pie, rather than over how to expand the pie.  Eventually, the contending groups reach agreement on how to divvy-up the pie.  These agreements Olson labels “distributional coalitions.”  They are the “masters of the crossroads.”[4]

The thing is that the Second World War destroyed all these “distributional coalitions”—the barnacles, the sludge, the interest groups, the barriers to new technology and new relationships–in Germany and Japan.  War “emergencies” caused the German and Japanese governments to break down established relationships from the pre-war era.  Then the American and British occupations banned many regime-associated groups.  In contrast, the victor nations institutionalized their own “distributional coalitions.”  American and British unions foreswore strikes, while lots of leading businessmen took “dollar-a-year” jobs with the government.[5]  Subsequently, many interest groups dug-in to established positions.  So, Germany and Japan were able to achieve rapid economic growth, while the United States merely chugged along and Britain soon fell behind the countries against which it had fought from the first day of the Second World War to the last.

In a sense, then, catastrophic defeat in war serves as a kind of social and economic angioplasty.[6]  Obviously, Olson was talking only about already advanced industrial economies.  I doubt that anyone expects Iraq to be the next “economic miracle.”

Trite observation though it is, the same analysis might be applied to any organization.  For example, colleges facing severe competition either ruthlessly adapt or wither.

[1] Mancur Olson, The Rise and Fall of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (Yale UP, 1984).

[2] Nevertheless, will all the non-sailors please spare me the abusive remarks about me wearing pink—“salmon” in the imagination of my brother-in-law—pants, blue Polo shirts, and Topsiders?  Please?

[3] Big Carbon—coal and oil—has a lot more drag with the gummint than does Not-So-Big Renewables.

[4] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papa_Legba  See also: Madison Smartt Bell, All Souls’ Rising (1995); Master of the Crossroads (2000); and The Stone That the Builder Refused (2004).

[5] See, for example, Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War  (1995). 

[6] Curiously, this is how mainstream economists saw a business-cycle recession before the Great Depression.

The Pornography Industrial Complex 1.

Intellectuals “theorize” what ordinary people need no theory to explain or justify.[1]

Both Christianity and bourgeois capitalism deprecated sex.[2]  They built a great civilization on impulse-repression.  Arguably, though, that civilization left people psychologically maimed.  Sexual repression produced “moodiness” in men.  The solution?  Widespread resort to brothels.  Sexual repression produced “hysteria” in women.  The solution?  Manual manipulation of the afflicted area by gynecologists.  Later, the electric-powered vibrator became a favored household appliance.[3]

Not everyone cared to play along.  If enough specialist history books are consulted, it soon becomes apparent that lots of men and women liked sex.  They also didn’t care what “high” culture said on the subject.[4]  The written evidence for this is patchy.  One has to imagine the milk-maids and swineherds in Meissen going for a roll in the porcelain hay.  Surely some of them did.  In the 18th Century, the English “Hell Fire Club” engaged in all sorts of depravity.  Late in the 18th Century, a “quack sexologist” named James Graham[5] created an electrified “celestial bed” that was supposed to facilitate conception.  In the 19th Century, sexual dissidence went hand in hand with political radicalism.  “Owenites,” “Fourierists,” and the myths of Brook Farm all spread stories of “free love” early in the 19th Century, while Havelock Ellis and Edward Carpenter provided a scientific rationale at the end of the century.

One of the dissidents was Wilhelm Reich.  Soon after the end of the First World War, Reich got the idea that what we are most ashamed of—sex in all its variety–might actually be the thing that could heal our psychic wounds.[6]  Later Reich used the term “sexual revolution” to express a causational link between sexual emancipation and political change.  (Subsequently, the German Communist Party expelled Reich for his sexual militancy and the International Psychoanalytical Association expelled Reich for his political militancy.)

The slow percolation into a broader society of Reich’s ideas helped set off the “sexual revolution” of the post-war period.[7]  Blindly, Alex Comfort’s The Joy of Sex (1972) ratified a belief that sexual liberation began in the Sixties.

In fact, “sexual revolution” did not bring political revolution.  Probably this is an example of “sensualism” (the satisfaction of short-term physical desire) diverting people from revolutionary activity, just as Bolsheviks feared that “economism” (the satisfaction of short-term material wants through union bargaining) would divert the working class from revolution.[8]

Again and again, change-agents are appalled by what they have wrought.  Reich ended his days as a Republican.

[1] Ariel Levy, “Novelty Acts,” The New Yorker, 19 September 2011.

[2] For an illustration of this, see Brian Moore, Black Robe (1985).  The Stone Age hunting and gathering Indians are sexually promiscuous, while the Iron Age French colonists are materially secure and frustrated.

[3] See Rachel Maines, The Technology of Orgasm (2010).

[4] Inevitably, historians have fastened on the more talky and twisted among them.  People like Richard Burton (the explorer). Algernon Swinburne, and Dante Gabriel Rossetti tend to hog the limelight.

[5] Graham was a one-time resident of Philadelphia, but I find no statues to his memory.

[6] You got a bad back?  That’s a different story.  And for God’s sake, never try to do it in the driver’s seat of a Camaro.

[7] Yes, yes, everyone wants to believe that the sexual revolution began in the Sixties (or—for Catholics—in the Seventies and Eighties).  However, it actually began much earlier and is related to post-war housing construction and the urban job market as much as to “the Pill.”  All of these things empowered women to define their own lives.  See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_m67JbGjWnc

[8] For an example of this with contemporary applications, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4y_mXLYh_PA