The Age of Revolt 1.

            Where did “Trumpism”–the political movement–come from?[1]  It arose out of the profits and losses from globalization.  The costs were born by one segment of American society while the profits flowed to another segment.  The beneficiaries were, first and foremost, the “political, cultural, and financial elite.”  Their right to lead rested upon the pursuit of the common good. 

In theory, the free-trade policies pursued by a whole series of American administrations after the Second World War would benefit Americans.  They would allow the American economy to shift jobs producing low-value goods offshore and to redeploy assets toward higher-value jobs and goods.  For a long time, these policies had no costs for Americans.  The American economy emerged from the war with a long-term competitive advantage over anyone else.  It could have not only butter and guns, but low-end butter and high-end butter.  By the Sixties, that advantage had eroded badly.  As foreign competition began to bite, it turned out that a lot of people depended on those low-value jobs for their living and found it difficult to shift into high-value jobs. 

Globalization began to take a more serious toll on the American working class in the wake of the “Oil Shocks” of 1973 and 1979.[2]  That seems incomprehensibly long ago to most journalists and politicians, so they just ignore the larger story.  Then the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994) reduced tariffs on trade with Mexico and Canada.  It accelerated the early wave of job-losses.  Already in the 1990s, Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot could run for president, if not win, on the loss of blue-collar manufacturing jobs.  At the same time, China’s abandonment of suicidal Maoist economic policies and its entry into the World Trade Organization (1990) greatly accelerated the loss of jobs.  Those job losses not only tossed many workers into unemployment, they also left whole communities hollowed out and unable to address human problems.  They not only tossed workers into unemployment, they undermined the value of the homes that formed an important asset of many workers.  They not only tossed workers into unemployment, they also foreclosed the possibility of the children of the workers finding steady work at a living wage anywhere near their parents. 

Globalization may have eroded manufacturing jobs, but it created enormous opportunities for the American financial services industry.  Industrializing countries needed capital and expertise.  Wall Street could provide both, not least because of the inflow of Chinese profits to New York banks and to the swelling 401(k) savings of the Baby Boomers.  Increasingly “cosmopolitan” in its outlook, Wall Street also became increasingly influential over national economic policy.[3] 

The year 2008 marked a turning point.  A great deal of elite foolishness and some guile created the 2008 financial crisis.  That, in turn gave rise to revolts on the right (Tea Party) and left (Occupy Wall Street); and to the invasion of the political system by “outsiders” like Barack Obama and Sarah Palin.  Donald Trump, the ultimate outsider, was just a heart-beat away. 


[1] Gerald F. Seib, “Where Trump Came From—And Where Trumpism Is Going,” WSJ, 16-17 January 2021. 

[2] “In the wake of” does not mean “solely caused by.”   For more of my peculiar view of this process, see https://waroftheworldblog.com/2015/03/02/american-union-stay-away-from-me-uh/  and https://waroftheworldblog.com/2015/12/17/the-new-economy/

[3] For one highly critical view of this process, see Simon Johnson, “The Quiet Coup,” The Atlantic, 5 May 2009. 

The Asian Century 18.

            How “hawkish” on China does President Biden want to be?  Between the election and inauguration, observers recognized that the Democratic foreign policy establishment is divided.  On the one hand, there is the global issues[1] faction that deprecates great power competition as a diversion from key future developments.  On the other hand, there are the traditionalists who see a strong United States as the leader in a movement to create a rules-based international order that can shackle “evil doers.”   China would provide a first test of which faction had the upper hand. 

            The Biden administration has moved quickly to confront the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC).[2]  It invited Taiwan’s chief diplomatic representative to Biden’s inauguration; it announced that it would sell weapons to Taiwan; it fended off a Chinese suggestion of talks in the near future by pleading the need to consult allies; it endorsed the Trump administration’s position that China’s Uighur minority art the target of genocide[3]; and allowed the voyage of a naval force to the South China Sea to go forward. 

            On the surface, there is much to like about Biden’s assertion of traditional forms of American power.  At the same time, previous practitioners would warn that it is all too easy to get into an escalating cycle of actions.[4]    

            If Zi wants tough action and not just tough talk, he could order some kind of military demonstration.  Perhaps China could whack the Indians along their common border, as they did in late January, or fly war planes into Taiwan’s air defense zone, as they also did.  The trouble is that such action might bring forth some new action by the Americans.  This, in turn, would require some further response.

The alternative of doing nothing but talk tough in response would be tricky for Zi Jinping.  It could signal weakness or uncertainty to people inside and outside China.  Zi could easily survive foreign perceptions, because he could calmly wait on the growth of Chinese power while looking for safe opportunities to demonstrate it.  Could he survive domestic perceptions of weakness?  Is he sure enough of his position?  Are his rivals sufficiently contained, his enemies imprisoned?[5]  In this case, a renewed round of domestic repression would serve a dual purpose.  On the one hand, it would offer a chance to weed out suspected weak links and dissidents.  On the other hand, human rights is now an entrenched American foreign policy concern.  So, domestic brutality would be both a way of shoring up Zi’s own position while openly defying one of American foreign policy’s stated goals.  What are the Americans going to do about it?  Sovereign countries can pretty much get away with doing whatever they want inside their own borders.  It’s one of the privileges of sovereignty. 

One might expect that Zi will opt for a policy of domestic toughness, notably against any “nationalists” who questions his toughness abroad.  Meanwhile, the US and the PRC probably will continue strengthening their positions.  Perhaps they will find a way out. 


[1] Climate change first of all, but then human rights, migration, and—now—pandemic disease. 

[2] Walter Russell Mead, “Can Biden Find Clarity on China and Russia?” WSJ, 14 December 2020; Mead, “Biden’s Opening Salvo on Beijing,” WSJ, date misplaced. 

[3] Biden had said the same thing on the campaign trail before his election. 

[4] For a scary, real-world example, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef7f9v2HEl0 

[5] In all fairness, it usually took a long series of reverses before a Chinese emperor was said to have lost the “Mandate of Heaven.”