Our War with Iran.

            There were reasonable arguments both for and against war with Iran.[1]  President Donald Trump chose war.  Trump has not offered a clear and persuasive argument for the war.  As is his wont, he has put forth multiple justifications wrapped in clouds of hyperbole.  It has been the same with his evaluations of how the war is progressing.[2] 

The war started well: a decapitation offensive killed much of the senior military, security, and political leadership; the air defenses were largely degraded; ballistic missiles, their launchers, and weapons stockpiles were hit very hard; and the Iranian Navy (such as it was) has been largely destroyed. 

Then, to the apparent surprise of President Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hogwallop, Iran did not surrender.[3]  Pre-war commentary often said that the original widespread revolutionary fervor among Iranians had long since waned.  Now, the ranks of the government were supposed to be filled with careerists mimicking enthusiasm in order to get and keep jobs.  Surely, someone would step up to say “enough is enough!”  This evaluation may have misread the situation.[4]  Rather like the “Black Knight” in “Monty Python and the Holy Grail,” Iran refused to concede defeat.  It kept on launching such missiles and drones as it still possessed at its oil-producing neighbors.  It declared the Straits of Hormuz closed.  Perhaps they can’t make good on that decree, but who wants to be on an oil tanker or natural gas container ship if they can?  So, the Strait is mostly closed. 

A two-week cease-fire has been agreed.  The terms are murky and disputed.  In all likelihood, the Iranian government is lying.  In the past, they have denounced as forgeries documents that they signed days before.  Peace-talks were held, but failed.  Now the United States has blockaded Iranian shipping.  Other preparations are undoubtedly underway as the cease-fire clock ticks down.  These preparations may even involve “boots on the ground.” 

            This is not an excuse for quitting on the war that has begun.  Better to see it through.  If we quit now, take some phony deal just to have an “off-ramp,” bad things will happen. 

            We will have run through a lot of our limited stock of munitions for absolutely no gain.  We will be less ready for whatever fight comes next. 

            Our enemies and our friends will see our weakness.  That weakness is in military power, but also in will.  Does anyone really want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons?  Does anyone really want China to seize Taiwan?  Does anyone really want Russia to defeat Ukraine?  Does anyone really want ALL of these things to happen, pretty much simultaneously? 

            Donald Trump started this war on his own, but he can’t be allowed to end it short of victory.  This is America’s war; this is OUR war. 


[1] See: The Argument for War with Iran. | waroftheworldblog ; and The Argument Against War with Iran. | waroftheworldblog 

[2] Not to excuse Trump’s “style,” but after ten years of this kind of thing, you’d think people would accept that it’s how he talks.  Discount the guff and focus on what is consistent.  Counting up all the times that he has over-stated, offended, or lied doesn’t get us anywhere.  Conservative commentators have argued that Progressives often confuse rhetoric with reality.  Acting like Trump is no solution to Trump. 

[3] Neither did Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan when they found themselves in an even worse situation in 1945. 

[4] Possibly, such a misreading could have been based on psychological “projection.” 

The Authoritarian Handbook–V.

The wars themselves, those of the third quarter of the century, had two faces.  Yes, they reshaped the relationships between the so-called “Great Powers.”  They broke the alliance between the arch-conservative powers Austria and Russia; they created two new nations in Italy and Germany; they sent the Austrian Empire spinning toward decay and collapse; and they put a stop to vexing French pretensions to dominate European affairs.  This will gladden the hearts of future historians obsessed by the traditional themes of “Great Men” and dramatic events.[1] 

No, they weren’t chiefly about re-making the balance of power.  Effective “authoritarians” saw that their road to the power to do other things ran through first satisfying a public desire for language-based communities.  That is, “Nationalism” had a powerful grip on the minds of many people.[2]  Some of the benefits of the victory of Nationalism were psychic, rather than material.  People felt pride in their nation.  People felt themselves part of some deeply-rooted and long-denied community.  Parades, flags, memorial columns, school lessons, the talk of older men who had once “done their bit,” and the language itself—salted with historical references and military analogies—all kept the victories of Nationalism alive in the minds of ordinary people. 

Certainly, “authoritarians” could fail of their goals.  Napoleon III gambled on war to shape Italian unification, then saw the Italians escape his leading-strings.  Napoleon III gambled on war to prevent Prussian domination of a unified Germany, then saw his country defeated, replaced by a mere republic that has become a by-word for ineffective government, personal self-indulgence, and scandals.  The Hungarians had wanted national independence, but had to settle for fifty years of partnership with the despised Austrians.  The ungrateful and stupid heirs of Tsar Alexander II never gave a thought to improving the lives of their people.  Their own psychological weakness led them to seek outward shows of authority.  These men were lath painted to look like iron.

So, neither Peace nor War alone guaranteed the survival of “effective authoritarianism.” 


[1] Editor’s Note.  Actually, this “democratizing” critique became a commonplace theme directed against diplomatic and military historians in later, more “progressive” times.  All the same, what are the “Iliad” or “King Henry V” or “War and Peace” about? 

[2] Why language should prevail over other identities—religion, gender, race, or social class—at this hour in history remains a mystery to us. These other forms of identity seem just as vital as does Nationalism.  They might yet provide the basis for a better organization of community.

The Authoritarian Handbook–IV.

We have spoken of the crimes of the “old authoritarians,” whether open or masked.  What of their achievements?  For these hold the key to understanding the “effective authoritarian.”  It can’t be just blood, toil, tears, and snot if the “authoritarian” regime is to last.  The years from 1850 to 1914 are a catalogue of “Dos” and “Don’ts” for “authoritarians” of our own day.[1] 

Who are the model “authoritarians” of the period?  The French Emperor Louis Napoleon III (r. 1850-1870).  The Russian Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855-1881).  The “German,” more accurately Prussian, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (g. 1863-1890).   These three men represent the highest plane of the modern pre-Great War “authoritarian.”  Other men of the time stand on a somewhat lower plane.  The Sardinian, then Italian, prime minister Camillo, Count Cavour (g. 1852-1861) is one.  The American President Abraham Lincoln (g. 1861-1865) is another.[2] 

There were many other “authoritarians” or “aspiring authoritarians.” As we will see, they were of the old type.  Some sought to rule without check on their power, but also without any larger purpose in mind.  Some sought to use modern methods to hold back necessary changes.  Their successes and failures need not detain us. 

What did “authoritarian” regimes achieve with their power? 

Peace, first of all.  Certainly not absolute or universal peace.  The 19th Century was drenched in blood.  It was mostly the blood of Africans and Arabs and Asians and the Wild Indians of North America.  The Civil War among the Americans offers a striking exception to this rule.[3]  Comparatively little blood fell on European battle fields.

In comparison to the frequent and lengthy wars of the 18th and early 19th centuries, the wars fought between 1815 and 1914 were few and of short duration.  In 1849, war pitted the Austrian and Russian Empires against the rebellious Hungarians; in 1855, France and Britain fought the Russians; in 1859, France and Sardinia attacked (and the French defeated) the Austrians; in 1863 Prussia and the Austrians defeated the Danes; in 1866, Prussia defeated the Austrians; and in 1870, Prussia and its German allies defeated France. 

Peace all the same.  War between the major European states halted. There was no general war, no prolonged war, no devastating war.  Particularly in the last third of the 19th Century and the first decade of our own century, disputes were settled in diplomatic conferences.  No wrecked cities, no grieving widows and orphans, no mangled veterans cadging tips on street corners.  These “no”s are the invisible monuments raised in every farm village and factory town.   


[1] Often is the question posed: “Why don’t people learn from History?”  This is nonsensical.  People DO learn from History.  They learn from their own History—that is, experience subjected to consideration.  What man has hit his thumb with a hammer more than two or three times?  People of experience try to convey “lessons” to others (often their bored progeny) in the form of maxims: “Never try to fill an inside straight”; “You hold a woman around the waist and a bottle around the neck, not the other way around”; “Work hard and save your money, it’s going to be a hard winter” (said in any season); “A gun is always loaded until you know it isn’t, so always check in the breech”; “Without Love and a little fun, life isn’t worth living”; and “If you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss stares into you.”  Thus, harsh experience teaches lessons to Individuals.  However, there is no mechanism for determining agreed “Lessons of History” for an entire community, nor for transmitting them from one generation to the next.  Everyone derives his own lessons. 

[2] It is to be admitted that Lincoln’s government drew much of its character from the necessities of a great war.  It is impossible to know what might have been if he had continued his presidency into a full second term or even a third.  Nothing in the American Constitution bars a president from seeking more than a second term. 

[3] In light of our thesis on the attributes of “authoritarian” government, it is interesting that this great struggle took place between two democracies. 

The Authoritarian Handbook–III.

We have looked at Authoritarianism Past. Let us consider Authoritarianism Present. 

The last century appeared to witness a rising tide of “liberal” governments.  The United States, France, and Great Britain (in that order) all created representative and “responsible” governments with regular elections, guarantees of civil rights, and a free press.[1]  Even here, however, universal manhood suffrage has been slow in coming.  It came soonest in the United States—for White men—by the 1830s.  It came to France after the Revolution of 1848, then became the basis for the “Second Empire” of Napoleon III.  It came to Britain by stages until 1884.  For a hopeless Optimist, these countries formed the vanguard of a world movement, or at least a Western movement.

Nothing could be further from the truth.  Other places moved in that direction, but stopped short at “false-front” parliamentary systems.  These were mere bones thrown to dogs.  In Europe, Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire exemplify the “false front” approach.  The right to vote was restricted and manipulated; the governments answered to the emperor, rather than the parliament; and other freedoms were restricted.  Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece have all reached only a primitive stage of even these repressive systems. 

Many other places remained fully “illiberal.”  Look at a map.  Where DON’T you want to go?  The farther East and South you move from London, the more backward and illiberal the economy, the society, and the government become.  Before the War, a novice British journalist asked the Prime Minister of Serbia about the state of industrialization his country.  The Prime Minister replied that “In my country, a match is a machine.”  (And lentil mush, served twice a day, is the only food in Serbian prisons.)  Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Manchu China were hulking giants of tradition and oppression.  Whips, hangman’s rope, and massacres—done either by government forces or at the behest of government agents—were and are common tools of “stable” government.  Good for foreign corporations, perhaps, but highly unpleasant for the people who eke out a living there.  Now they are all collapsed into revolution and civil war. 

Anywhere one looks in Latin America, such a false-front parliamentary system is the best that can be hoped for.   Everywhere there are long-serving “Presidentes” and be-medaled “caudillos.”  There are national police forces, but no national school systems.  In the Caribbean islands, government oppresses the poor on behalf of the rich until the poor descend into savagery themselves. 

There are gigantic cattle ranches, supplying beef and mutton to Europe. There are huge cotton plantations, crowding out the subsistence farms of humble peons. There are mines carving up mountains in search of every sort of metal. There are national railroad systems to carry all these commodities to seaports for export to “advanced” countries. All are financed by British capital. The rich few keep their wealth in foreign banks, rather than investing in their own countries. Why? Because they know that they live on the edge of a volcano that might explode beneath them at any moment.

The only hope for an ordinary person in any of these places is emigration to somewhere not good, but less bad.  It is a flight without end.[2] 

So, schools without teachers, hospitals without doctors, and elections without voters. This reality is prettied up by Western diplomats and Western journalists and Western travelers who consort with their own types in such countries. But, if one “rides the rails” or lives in rural villages for a time, one comes away with a more accurate understanding of “modern times.”


[1] Eventually, offshoots of Britain introduced the same systems for their own domestic management: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. 

[2] Editor’s Note.  Curiously, this is the title of a 1927 novel by Joseph Roth.  This may be pure coincidence.  It may also indicate that at least one of the authors knew Roth.  From 1916 to 1918, Roth served in the Austro-Hungarian army; from 1918 to 1920, he was a journalist in Vienna; and from 1920, he worked in Berlin.  Perhaps they picked up the phrase from Roth before he put it into use as a book title? 

The Authoritarian Handbook–II.

Editor’s Note: The pamphlet “The Authoritarian Handbook” survives only in scraps. I first learned of it while in graduate school in the 1980s. It was not to be found in major libraries or research collections. After much desultory searching, I found a package containing parts of the pamphlet in a barn/used book-store south of Cambridge, MD, on the Eastern Shore of the Chesapeake.

Editor’s Note: It has been impossible to identify the authors whose names appear on the title-page. This leads me to think that they are pseudonyms. They appear to have read a great deal in various areas of knowledge. As will be clear from other sections, they seem to know the life of soldiers, fugitives, and prisoners. They lived in troubled times of war, revolution, and social and economic upheaval.

Authoritarianism Past. 

If one seeks an “authoritarian handbook,” one has only to open a history book to any page.  Virtually all governments of the past were “authoritarian.”  There were kingdoms and empires.  Yes, the “Classical” Greeks invented, “Democracy,” but they also invented Oligarchy and Tyranny.[1]  The Roman Republic died in the bloody strife of men avid for personal power.  Then the Many gave way to the One, the “first among equals,” the Emperor. 

Later in Europe, and elsewhere in the world, there were kings who were “despotic” and kings who were “benevolent” or “enlightened.”  There were emperors in China, and Japan, and Inca Peru.  All were supreme rulers who were determined to defend their prerogatives.  There were “republics,” again.  In Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Venice, the term “republic” really signified an oligarchy that had escaped royal control.  All ruled with an iron fist. 

What were the parts of this “iron fist”?  There were aristocrats and bureaucrats; soldiers, priests, and informers. 

There were “subjects”—how expressive of the reality!—rather than “citizens.”  Subjects have duties; citizens have rights. 

This a key part of Authoritarianism.  Men need food and shelter.  They need safety, both of the economic sort and the law-and-order sort.  These are the material even animal, essentials of human life.  They may aspire to other, basically emotional, things once these essentials are achieved: community, a higher place in that community, and even a quest for a larger purpose in life.  But the animal, material needs are essential and primary.[2]  Without them, nothing else is possible.  Hence, these will always lie at the heart of any politics, whether it be “liberal” or “illiberal” or “authoritarian.”    

You will notice that we say nothing about Freedom.  Rarely do men crave actual Freedom.  History tells us of great revolts from below against the ruling classes.  The list always includes the “Servile Wars” of the Roman Republic, the peasant uprisings of the Late Middle Ages in England and France,[3] and the revolts of urban workers such as the “Ciompi” in Florence.  Then there are the many slave revolts in the Caribbean, with Haiti taking pride of place.  All of these revolts sprang from intense human misery that had finally been pushed beyond the point of tolerance.  Rents or labor requirements had been raised significantly by Medieval land owners, or piece-work wages reduced by urban employers.  Mere survival appeared threatened for many people.  Under these conditions, they revolted.  Aspirations to something like what political theorists of the present-day label “individual rights” or “freedom” had little to nothing to do with the revolts. 


[1] The Athenians put to death the suicidally melancholy public nuisance Socrates.  No one grieved, outside of his small group of followers. 

[2] Editor’s Note.  The authors here seem to anticipate the theories of Abraham Maslow by twenty to thirty years.  See: Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (1954). 

[3] Editor’s Note: The “Jacquerie” (1358) and “Wat Tyler’s Rebellion” 91381).    

The Authoritarian Handbook–I.

           Excerpt from “The Authoritarian Handbook,” by Lewis Galleani and Irwin Kern (1922). 

            What are some hallmarks of an Authoritarian regime? 

First, a “President for Life.”

Second, a cowed judiciary.

Third, a legislature with a pro-government majority engineered by a combination of the disfranchisement of a part of the population and urban political “machines” based on government patronage.

Fourth, a government bureaucracy eating away at the prerogatives of the legislature and the courts.

Fifth, an idealization of the simple and honest life found in rural populations, in contrast to the depravity of the big cities.

Sixth, the justification of radical departures from traditional policies by the invocation of “crisis” and “necessity knows no law.”

Seventh, in a severe crisis, the imprisonment without trial of alleged “enemies of the nation.” 

How This Might End.

            TRIGGER WARNING: This is just ignorance-based opinion, but it is firmly-held ignorance-based opinion. 

            Historically, the peoples of the Middle East have been pretty spineless and malleable.[1]  The Persians showed up, and people “Medized.”  The Greeks under that lunatic Alexander showed up, and people “Hellenized.”  The Romans showed up and it turns out that they had also kinda “Hellenized,” so people “Romanized.”  The Roman Empire become Christian, so people “Christianized.”  The Arabs-actually-from-Arabia showed up and people slowly abandoned Christianity and “Islamized.”[2]  Most recently, “Authoritarian” governments with tools borrowed from the West showed up.[3]  People “Authoritarianized.”  Someday, these places may “Democratize.”  Don’t hold your breath. 

            At least in modern times, the people of the Middle East aren’t a military people.  The armies of the Middle East haven’t been very good.[4]  This is explained by cultural factors, rather than being somehow genetic.  The enlisted men come from the peasantry, while the officers come from the idle rich.  The latter despise the former and don’t take their responsibilities seriously.[5]  HOWEVER, there is a very tough strand of fanaticism in Middle Eastern societies that is willing to fight to the last civilian, no matter how difficult the circumstances.  This trait has been on display in the Iran-Iraq War, the civil war in Iraq triggered by the American invasion, and the wars by Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel.  They just keep going no matter how hard the enemy pounds on them, no matter how many obvious defeats they suffer.  The current regime governing Iran may be cut from this same cloth. 

            Iran has engaged in massive, sustained deception while pursuing nuclear weapons for several decades.  So did Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.  Iran has been under severe economic sanction, off and on, for a long time.  Even when they make agreements, they don’t keep them.  Cyber-attacks, assassinations, and bombing don’t stop them.  They just sweep up the debris, cart off the bodies, and start work again. 

The outcome of “Trump’s War,” as the very cosmopolitan American media likes to refer to it, depends in part, on two things. 

First, Trump ordered the war, but the American military is waging the war.  How are they doing?  Iran’s air defenses have been largely destroyed.  Its ballistic missile and drone forces have been badly degraded, although not totally eliminated.  Its naval forces have been badly battered, with any vessels that could be used for laying mines in the sea lanes a primary target for attack.  Undoubtedly, American aircraft are relentlessly hunting any remaining missile forces and they are closely watching the long southern coastline of Iraq.  How far inland they have to watch depends on the effective range of whatever missile forces remain in Iran’s possession. 

Once these dangers are reduced to a tolerable level, then convoying of tankers can begin.  There would still need to be constant vigilance against Iran playing possum for a while, then starting to move new missiles down within range of the sea lanes.  Can land-based American aircraft in the Gulf States handle this mission?  In any event, the longer the war goes on, the more damaged Iran will suffer.  Maybe Iran will opt for a deal. 

Second, Donald Trump is a deal-maker.  He disliked the Obama administration’s deal with Iran,[6] so he tore it up in his first administration.  He put pressure on Iran to make a better deal.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  Joe Biden tried to revive the old agreement.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  In his second administration, Trump pressured Iran to make a deal.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  Trump joined Israel’s attack on the nuclear program.  Iran still wouldn’t deal, although they engaged in limited talks.  Trump launched the current attack.  He’s still looking for a deal. 

            What about “regime change”?  Trump doesn’t really want a US-imposed regime change.  No de-Bathification catastrophe on his watch.[7]  It’s difficult for Westerners to imagine that anyone in Iran supports this crazy, murderous dictatorship.  There is a good chance that many Iranians actually do support it, or fear the bloodshed of a civil war.  So, when Trump says he wants “regime change,” he really means “I want the regime to change” its behavior and course.  At least, that’s what he’ll claim afterward. 

What if he gets a deal?  Maximally or ideally, its terms should include no nuclear programs, no ballistic missiles, no support for proxies, no support for Russia in Ukraine, and co-operation with the United States on oil exports to China.  Minimally, its terms should be no nuclear programs.  No one can or should trust Iran to keep to any agreement.  There will have to be intrusive safeguards. 

What does Iran get?  An end to the bombing.  Maybe some sanctions relief depending on how much they change their behavior.  International inspectors all over the nuclear sites (broadly conceived) like a duck on a June-bug. 

What if Trump can’t get a deal?  Then finish up the bombing to clear the Straits of Hormuz, declare victory, and leave.  If Iran refuses a deal, the US can always come back and “mow the grass” (as Israel puts it) whenever necessary.  That’s cold, but a viable policy. 

For some time now, the United States has faced a loose coalition[8] of enemies: Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China.  American forces could defeat most (and maybe all) of them in a straight fight.  A war with any one of them would risk bringing all of them into a war, like a pack of wolves ganging up on an elk. The United States might have a hard time defeating all of them in a general war without going nuclear somewhere.  Now one of the coalition has been badly battered.  What are the larger implications of this short, brutal war? 


[1] Guy waving his arm at the back of the room: “What about all the gruesome stuff in the Old Testament?  That bastard Saul, for example.” 

[2] See the amusing anecdote about white silk socks in Robert Graves, Good-bye to All That. 

[3] Some are monarchical, some are republican; some are secular, some are Islamist.  All have secret police, information-control, and a “deep state” network of public and private power; sometimes they have a false-front and rigged representation of “the People.”    

[4] See: the Arab wars against Israel, the Iran-Iraq War, “Operation Desert Storm.”  

[5] After humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel in the “Six Days War” of 1967, the Egyptians asked the Soviet Union for help.  Russian military advisers told the leaders of the Egyptian Army to change course “or we are someone else finding to do job you are not doing, and you are maybe misfortunately getting shot, Da?”  The Egyptian Army then performed well in the October 1973 war.  After a while Henry Kissinger worked his magic and Egypt gave the Russkies the boot.  Egyptian soldiers then slid back into the comfortable old ways. 

[6] So did many other Republicans.  That’s why the agreement never became a treaty ratified by the Senate. 

[7] There’s been much discussion of the IRGC and the Basij paramilitaries as supporters of the regime.  There hasn’t been as much discussion of the Iranian Army.  If Israel does enough damage to the IRGC and the Basij, the army might be in a position to impose a change of course on the regime. 

[8] Germany, Italy, and Japan fought the Second World War as a loose coalition.  They all lost badly in the end.  They caused a lot of problems before they surrendered. 

My Weekly Reader 21 March 2026.

            Zionism is nationalism for Jews in places where Jews aren’t allowed to assimilate.  It began in the late Nineteenth Century and drew most of its followers from the anti-Semitic states of Eastern Europe.[1]  For the most part, Eastern European Jews preferred to emigrate to Western Europe or—best of all—the United States.  After the First World War, American immigration restrictions choked down on Eastern European immigrants of all varieties.  The Depression had much the same effect on Western Europe.  Then Hitler came to power in Germany.  Suddenly, British-ruled Palestine began to look attractive.  The British government “recognized” a Jewish Agency as the spokesman for the “Yishuv,” the Jews in Palestine. 

            Then came the Second World War.  Jewish emigration from Nazi-ruled Europe slowed to the occasional droplet.  Early German victories forced Britain to play offense from its back foot.  To this end, Britain had two “intelligence” organizations with a special interest in Nazi Europe.  The Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) fomented and supported resistance in occupied countries.  MI-9 tried to rescue the crews of downed British planes.  At first, they concentrated their work in Western Europe.  By 1944, they both had an interest in Eastern Europe. 

            While there were lots of agent candidates who knew Western Europe and its languages, equivalent people who were familiar with eastern Europe were thin on the ground.  Where to find people who could pass anonymously in Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia?   After a while, it occurred to someone that British Palestine had a bunch.  Here, the Jewish Agency had begun to learn of the Holocaust and wanted to know what might be done to help the besieged Jews.[2]  S.O.E., MI-9, and the Jewish Agency collaborated in recruiting 250 male and female volunteers; approving 150 of them for training; and sending 37 behind German lines.  They would be parachuted into Eastern Europe, where they would work with resistance movements, set up evasion lines for downed aircrew, and investigate the situation of the Jews. 

            By Spring 1944, the situation in the region had become highly unstable.  A revolt against the puppet-government of Slovakia was about to begin.  Traditional conservative nationalists struggled with fascists for control of Hungary.  The Red Army had made a dramatic advance westward in Spring and early Summer 1944.  If the Germans were pinned down by the Red Army, their allies in Hungary and Slovakia might be toppled.  Or not. 

            Most of the 37 parachuted in between March and September 1944.  Some fought with the Slovaks and some with the Yugoslav partisans, while some went to Budapest at the moment of the German coup to put the fascist Arrow Cross in power.  Twelve were captured and seven of these were executed.[3]  None of them accomplished their original missions.  Nevertheless, the effort has inspired interest.[4]  Why? 

            Perhaps because how we live our lives is more important than what we accomplish in them?  Courage and self-sacrifice are recurring themes in the world’s art, literature, and myth. 


[1] The Russian Empire, which then included most of Poland; Rumania; and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Subsequently, Poland and Hungary became independent states. 

[2] See: Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (1980) on the Yishuv’s incomprehension of the Holocaust. 

[3] Of the seven who were executed, the most famous is Hanna Szenes, a sort of Jewish Noor Inayat Khan. 

[4] Amos Ettinger, Blind Jump (1992); Judith Baumel-Schwartz, Perfect Heroes (2010); Taviva Ofer, Haviva Reick (2014); Matti Friedman, Out of the Sky (2026).   

The Argument Against War with Iran.

            Let’s leave aside the reflexive “If Donald Trump does it, then it must be the wrong thing,” response of many people.[1]  What are real arguments against attacking Iran?   

            War with Iran might be smacking a hornet’s nest with a stick.  Iran isn’t much of a threat to the United States at the moment.  Iran doesn’t have nuclear weapons; Iran’s vast stock of ballistic missiles only have the range to hit our regional allies or the US Navy in the northern Indian Ocean, not the heartland.  Iran made no significant response to the Israeli and American killing of its head terrorist, General Qassim Suleimani (2020), or to their attacks on nuclear sites in Summer 2026.  Nor did they do anything to support the Hamas fight inside Gaza or Hezbollah after the Israeli “pager” attack. 

These were limited attacks.  Iran’s rulers could see a huge attack, when combined with the mass protest demonstrations of recent months, and calls for regime change, as a mortal threat to the Islamic revolution.  This combination of threats could tip the regime over the edge into a wide ranging counter-attack.  This might combine attacks on American bases in the Middle East (and on the friendly governments that host those bases), a new “tanker war” to close the Straits of Hormuz oil-shipping lanes, and terrorism abroad.[2]  In short, we should be afraid, very afraid. 

            “Regime change” is going to be hard to do and the effort would have an uncertain  outcome.  On the one hand, airpower has been oversold from when it was just a twinkle in the eyes of Billy Mitchell and Arthur “Bomber” Harris.  The Second World War offers abundant proof that strategic bombing alone, whether of the “carpet” or “precision” variant, isn’t enough to win a war against a determined opponent.  Successfully attacking key Iranian nuclear sites in Summer 2025 didn’t budge the regime.  Do we want to commit ground forces to finish the job? 

On the other hand, Iraq (2003), Egypt (2011-2012), Libya (2011).  The United States intervened in all these places to change the regime.  Each adventure ended badly.  Foreign countries are just as complex societies as our own.  They are just as full of factions, conflicts, ambitions, and hatreds.  Dictatorships tend to repress these forces, while—alas—democracy allows them full play.  What if we pitch Iran from tyranny into civil war? 

            The Iranians have said that they will agree to never pursue nuclear weapons.  Why not take the win?  Declare victory and negotiate a mutually satisfactory form of words.  That form of words would include an Iranian commitment to never pursue nuclear weapons; to close its nuclear weapons sites (Fordo, Isfahan, Natanz); and to commit to not enrich uranium beyond a low level; all of it under close international supervision.[3]   

We should not run grave risks for very uncertain outcomes. 

This isn’t to say that we should do nothing.  The regime is unpopular with many Iranians.  The US can covertly support selected dissidents in hopes that Iran will have a better revolution. 


[1] It’s an understandable response, but not entirely correct. 

[2] The threat is not to be sneezed at.  It has been credibly alleged that Iran inspired the bombing of the US Marine and French Foreign Legion barracks in Beirut, the US Air Force residence in Saudi Arabia, and Jewish sites in Argentina.  See: Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq war and Western Security, 1984–1987: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (1987); James Risen and Jane Perlez, “Terrorism and Iran: Washington’s Policy Performs a Delicate Balancing Act,” The New York Times, 23 June 2001; and Daniel Politi, “Argentine Court Says Iran Was Behind Israeli Embassy and Jewish Center Attacks,” The New York Times, 12 April 2024. 

[3] See: Nicholas Kristof, “The Folly of Attacking Iran,” NYT, 1 March 2026. 

The Argument for War with Iran.

            Currently, 89 percent of world energy use comes from high-carbon sources like oil.[1]  Whenever the “green transition” comes to energy, it won’t be for a long time yet. 

            Until then, the world economy runs on oil.  World prosperity runs on oil.  The economic, social, and political effects of supply disruptions and/or price spikes can be very great.[2]  Stepping back a bit, the economic crisis of the 1930s wrecked political democracy in Germany, nearly wrecked it in France and the United States, and subjected it to great stress in Great Britain.  What did we get from that? 

            The Middle East is one of the several great centers of oil and natural gas production in the world.  Whatever one thinks of the people running the carbon-producing countries of that region, peace and political stability in that region are much to be desired.  There is no hiving it off from the rest of the world economy.  The world has a single global oil market.  What happens in one oil producing region affects the price everywhere. 

            Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has been a Shi’ite theocratic dictatorship.  It has been anti-Western, anti-Sunni Muslim, anti-Israel.  For historical reasons, it has been especially anti-American.[3]  It has long pursued nuclear weapons, built a huge arsenal of missiles, and created proxy military groups in the Middle East.[4]  Taken all together, for many years Iran has been the creator and sustainer of many aspects of a multi-layered regional crisis.  A nuclear-armed Iran could destroy Israel, hold all the oil states hostage, and deter the US from putting its forces at risk in the region.  It posed a mortal threat to regional stability and the world economy. 

            But what to do about it?  President Obama did a deal with Iran.  The agreement offered Iran relief from international economic sanctions in exchange for a time-limited reduction in its nuclear effort.  It did not permanently end Iran’s nuclear program, nor limit its ballistic missiles, nor restrain Iranian proxies.  President Trump withdrew from the executive agreement, and re-imposed economic sanctions.  He also ordered the killing of Iran’s head terrorist as a warning shot.  President Biden tried to revive the Obama agreement, but the Iranians refused to play ball.  They drove ahead with their nuclear program, while winding-up and arming up Hamas in Gaza.  The latter effort spilled over in October 2023. 

            In Summer 2025, with Trump president once again, the United States and Israel launched a joint attack that badly damaged Iran’s nuclear program.  Trump offered to negotiate.  He wanted Iran’s nuclear effort permanently stopped, but he scaled back the demands on the missiles and the proxies.  Those negotiations dragged on.  The Iranians wanted the nukes and—apparently—believed that they could get the Americans bogged down in talks. 

            The Islamic Revolution has mismanaged the economy for decades.  Many younger people reject the state’s strict social rules.  Demonstrations have broken out again and again. 

            Trump made them an offer they shouldn’t have refused.  Maybe the regime will fall. 


[1] See: Global Energy Tracker | Council on Foreign Relations 

[2] See: 1970s energy crisis – Wikipedia  This is a useful introduction to some events and their effects, but barely scratches the surface. 

[3] In 1953, an Anglo-American engineered coup put the Shah back in power.  The Shah pursued a socially-disruptive modernization of the country while also stomping all over any sign of dissent.  Throughout this process, the Americans turned a blind eye to the abuses and rising discontent. 

[4] In Syria, in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Gaza, and in Yemen.