Riffing on Edward Gibbon, Walter Russell Mead judges that “At the beginning of the 21^st Century, the world seemed more peaceful and American power more solidly entrenched than ever before.”[1]  With the Soviet Union defeated and its empire dissolved, with the whole laughable idea of Communism discredited even in the eyes of leftist academics, the Western leaders tried to understand the new world.  Mead argues persuasively that American leaders believed that “traditional forms of great-power competition and balance-of-power diplomacy” had done their duty, had their day, and now could take up the rocker at some Old Soldiers’ Home,[2] to be wheeled-out only for July 4^th celebrations.  America appeared the unchallenged and unchallengeable leader of the world, the “last man standing.”  So it would always remain. 

In place of the “long twilight struggle”[3] against aggressive tyrannies, other issues had to be addressed.  The nation-state, it was argued, served well for the solution of national problems.  New problems, however, were trans-national.  The climate know no borders.  If global warming continues unchecked, we may all fry like eggs.  Population and wealth imbalances between the Global North and the Global South spur large-scale migration that can test, even overwhelm, traditional national boundaries.  Western liberal ideals have always been universal in their claims.[4]  Now the duty of American foreign policy lay in seeing these rights extended to all peoples.[5]  Finally, the means to all these ends lay in the creation of ever more powerful international institutions and ever-more comprehensive international law. 

Then things blew up in the Middle East with the 9/11 attacks, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and Iranian assertiveness. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the invasions morphed into attempts at nation-building that merely set off gory civil wars between American clients and American opponents.  Then American leaders failed to act in any effective way against Vladimir Putin’s effort to resurrect Russian power in the former Soviet Empire.  On top of this, the same leaders grossly misjudged the future development of China.  They appear to have believed that China, could be integrated into an American-designed global economy as a willing partner.   

Mead sees in all of this a “disastrous mix of mission creep and strategic incompetence.”  He wants foreign policy elites to have a “road to Damascus” experience.  He wants them to turn back to great-power politics.  There is a lot of good sense in this analysis.  However, the Afghan and Iraq wars have been wound up with Americans now (hopefully) vaccinated against more nation-building.  Putin is one man, not a global movement, and nuclear weapons alone make Russia a serious power.  The truth is that both China and climate change are grave problems that demand global solutions.  Those solutions can be both great-power politics and international action. 

[1] Walter Russell Mead, “A Feckless Foreign Policy’s Legacy,” WSJ, 19 July 2022.  See Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. I, Chapter One, “The Extent of the Empire in the Age of the Antonines,” Introduction. 

[2] Said home to be located in coastal South Carolina, close to excellent golf courses. 

[3] I know, at this point your cliché-o-meter is running wild.  Sorry.   

[4] “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,…”. 

[5] One very real blessing of our liberty has been the continual extension of rights to marginalized groups and in the expansion of the list of rights.  So I’m OK with flying the gay flag outside city hall.  Whether we should fly it over the US embassy in a conservative foreign country is another issue. 

            Different national cultures extend beyond welfare provision.  Historically, the American government paid unemployment benefits directly to displaced workers, rather than to companies experiencing a down-turn in business.  Europe, in contrast, tended to pay companies to retain their workers during a down-turn.  From some sort of bird’s-eye view, the very dynamic American economy tended to shift assets from dying industries to growing industries, while the European economy labored under the burden of assets trapped in old industries.[1] 

            The Covid pandemic imposed an odd sort of shock on the world economy.  The disruption did not spring from serious economic problems.[2]  Serious economic problems sprang from the virus and from government responses to the emergency.  The economies could rebound once adequate responses had developed (vaccines, testing).  In the meantime, governments pumped in money.  In Europe, this took the form of governments paying companies which “furloughed” their workers.  In the US it mostly took the form of expanded and extended unemployment benefits, along with Economic Impact Payments. 

The American stock markets soared.[3]  Since, just over half of Americans own stock (mostly through their retirement plans), net worth and market income increased for many people.  For a bunch of older, but still working-age Americans, an early retirement beckoned.  Many others built up their savings to the point where they could ride out extended unemployment.  On top of this, the United States suffered a much worse hit per capita from Covid than did Europe, Japan, or Canada.[4]  This may have made many Americans skittish about going back to work if they don’t absolutely have to.  Many others got sick and had to call in sick to work. 

In any event, America’s labor participation rate has not recovered as well as have either other economic indicators or the participation rates in other countries.  With a booming economy, American employers are not able to find enough workers to fill the jobs that need doing. 

What to do?  First, work the people you do have longer and harder.  The number of hours worked actually increased from late 2019 to mid-2021.  Second, they have raised the pay for those who do work in hopes of pulling more workers back into paid work.  Labor costs have risen more in the United States than in other countries.  Third, one would expect employers to pursue mechanization as much as possible.  Will this close off the possibility of return to work for many of the now-unemployed?  Or will economic growth and innovation provide new jobs for those who want them? 

In the meantime, while excess money creation provides the basic force driving the inflation,[5] the supply-chain disruptions, the war in Ukraine, and labor shortages are making worse that basic inflation.  In turn, the inflation is providing ammo for those who oppose plans for a further expansion of the social safety net to more closely resemble that of Europe. 

[1] Greg Ip, “The Mystery of Low U.S. Labor Participation,” WSJ, 5-6 February2022. 

[2] Like, say, the collapse of a housing bubble with a devastating impact on financial systems. 

[3] I realize that I’m supposed to refer only to the S&P, but the Dow went from 26,000 in July 2020 to 36,000 in January 2022. 

[4] The death rate per 100,000 people: US, 311; Italy, 281; UK, 269; France, 233; Germany, 172; Canada, 114; and Japan, 25.  See: Mortality Analyses – Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (jhu.edu) 

[5] The basic money supply, the M2, rose from about $15 trillion in 2020 to about $22 trillion in 2022. 

In arguing for his Social Security program, Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that taxes paid by all beneficiaries would “give contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions.”  Americans once accepted that rationale.  Does that rationale still command assent?[1] 

            The welfare state grew by stages in response to new developments in society.  It can be said to have begun in the later 19^th Century when European industrial societies responded to a combination of new needs and political conditions.[2]  The crises of the Great Depression and the Second World War generally led to an expansion of services provided to citizens and a more aggressive management of the economy to achieve high employment.  A third great expansion began in the 1960s and 1970s to both share out increased prosperity and to respond to new issues.[3]  In the course of the second and third waves of the welfare state, significant differences emerged between the United States and other “advanced” nations. 

            Many “advanced” countries had a problem with child poverty.  They addressed the problem with direct government payments to families with children.  Many “advanced” countries had a problem with what to do when pregnant women left the work force.  They addressed it by paying for a median of sixteen weeks of maternity leave.  Many “advanced” countries accepted the need to provide day-care (so that women could return to work) and early childhood education.  On average, they pay about $5,200 per child per year. 

            In contrast, among “advanced” countries, the United States spends the third lowest share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on direct benefits to families with children; the US doesn’t offer paid maternity leave; the temporary Covid emergency was the first time the US offered paid sick leave; and US public spending on child-care and early education is about half of the median in “advanced” countries.  It’s probably not a coincidence that the US has a high child-poverty rate and a lower rate of female participation in the economy. 

            How do other “advanced” countries pay for this generous social provision?  Ordinary people pay far higher taxes than is the case in the United States.  In Germany, Italy, and France, it is 47-49 percent of total compensation.  Other countries tax consumption through a Value Added Tax (V.A.T.).  On top of this, most “advanced” countries impose carbon taxes.[4]   In the United States, people pay 30 percent of total compensation in taxes.  At the national level, the US doesn’t tax consumption.  The US doesn’t tax carbon emissions.   

            Perhaps one explanation lies in the different economic histories of the US and Western Europe.  In Western European countries, much of the welfare state came into being after the Second World War.  Shared hardships and the general discrediting of conservative political parties allowed the European left and center to forge new institutions.  In contrast, the US enjoyed widely shared prosperity until the 1980s.  So the US is only now trying to figure out the issues.  It is doing after decades of a high-consumption, low-responsibility, weak solidarity mind-set. 

[1] Greg Ip, “Echo of Europe’s Benefits, Not Taxes,” WSJ, 30 November 2021. 

[2] The historian John McKay called this the “responsive national state.”  Its common features included public schools, urban reconstruction, and social insurance for the industrial working class. 

[3] For example, medicine made dramatic advances, but the fruits of those advances could be too expensive for the individual to pay.  So, Medicare and Medicaid. 

[4] Ip describes carbon taxes as “the most efficient way to curb fuel use and spur increased investment in renewables.” 

            “The question of whether there was communication or coordination between the far-right groups that helped storm the Capitol and Mr. Trump and his aides and allies is among the most important facing the Jan. 6 investigators.”[1] 

            On 12 December 2020, a pro-Trump rally took place in Washington, D.C. Members of the “Proud Boys” took part in the rally.[2]  “Leftist activist” counter-demonstrators confronted the Trump supporters.  Fighting broke out and one of the “Proud Boys” was stabbed.  Later, some of the “Proud Boys,” led by Enrique Tarrio, tore down a “Black Lives Matter” banner hanging from the front of a Black church.  They burned it in the street. 

            On 19 December 2020, President Donald Trump tweeted that a “Stop the Steal” rally would be held in Washington on 6 January 2022.  “It will be wild.” 

            On 30 December 2020, the chairman of the “Proud Boys,” Enrique Tarrio tele-conferred with some of his most trusted colleagues.  The conference lasted a little over an hour and a half.  President Trump’s “Stop the Steal” rally in Washington, D.C., was one week away.  First, Tarrio told them that they were now members of a special leadership group for the rally.  He called it the “Ministry of Self-Defense.”  Second, he told them to keep apart from the “normies” (normal Trump supporters) at the rally and to respect police lines.  “We’re never going to be the ones to cross the police barrier or cross something in order to get to somebody.”  He also warned then against drinking too much.  Third, apparently, a “Proud Boys” meeting does not resemble dinner with Ward and June.[3]

            On 4 January 2021, Enrique Tarrio returned to Washington for the rally.  Washington police promptly arrested him for his part in the seizure and burning of the “Black Lives Matter” banner on 12 December 2020.  He made bail, but the judge required him to leave Washington.  Hence, Tarrio was not present at the rally or the attack on the Capitol. 

            According to Cassidy Hutchinson, on 5 January 2021, President Trump instructed Mark Meadows, his chief of staff, to contact Roger Stone and Michael Flynn.  Stone, in particular, has had ties to the “Proud Boys.”  Hutchinson could not say if Meadows followed that order; Meadows refuses to say, and Stone denied any contact.[4]  In any case, contact them to what end? 

            Good help is hard to get: the “Proud Boys” at the rally on 6 January 2021 ignored (to put it mildly) any orders to respect police lines and engaged in abundant “riling up the normies.” 

            In the view of one New York Times reporter assigned to the hearings, “there is no direct evidence — at least not yet — that their [Trump-adjacent figures like Stone or Flynn] ties to extremist groups were put to use in any planning for the violence on Jan. 6.”[5]  In short, “at least so far [emphasis added] there is no smoking gun laying out a detailed plot to storm the Capitol.” 

            What if there wasn’t one?  What if it was just the last chaotic episode of a chaotic term? 

[1] Alan Feuer, “Jan. 6 Panel Explores Links Between Trump Allies and Extremist Groups,” NYT, 29 June 2022. 

[2] Alan Feuer, “Proud Boys Ignored Orders Given at Pre-Jan. 6 Meeting,” NYT, 26 June 2022. 

[3] Feuer notes with disgust that the video conference was “foul-mouthed.”  He goes on to describe the attendees as using “blatantly misogynistic, homophobic, and antisemitic language.”   

[4] In 2019 Stone was convicted of obstruction of an official proceeding, making false statements, and witness tampering. 

[5] Blake Hounshell and Alan Feuer, “January 6 and the Search for Direct Trump Links,” “On Politics” Newsletter, NYT, 13 July 2022.   

            Organized religion can be understood as human-created systems of order and community.  Theology can be understood as human-created systems of philosophy grafted onto the initial ethical codes of early religions.  What the members of a faith, especially any clergy, make of these systems in particular historical circumstances gives them their character. 

            When Western Liberalism and Marxism were young, organized religions often sided with conservatives.  Hence, both movements tried to fence-in religion.[1]  At an extreme, Communism sought to repress religious belief and practice.  Given the immense repressive powers of dictatorships, that should have been the end of that.  Except that, in China, it wasn’t.  While many people in any society seem to live well enough without religion, many other do not.  They often feel a desire for spirituality.  They also desire some formal ethical standards.  Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, and Catholic and Protestant branches of Christianity all have followers in China.  Forty years ago, the Communist Party adopted a more tolerant policy.[2] 

            Xi Jinping turned out to be an early adopter of religious tolerance.  For one thing, Marxism had begun as a religious faith offering a promise of a “heavenly” future to its adherents.  That faith dimmed among the survivors of the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution.”  The Party inquisitors could keep open dissent at bay.  They could not stimulate enthusiastic belief.  Some alternative would be needed.  Xi is a big advocate of “virtue” in the individual and in society.[3]  So he found a lot to like in Confucianism and in Buddhism.  Perhaps to his surprise, there also are an estimated 60 million Protestants.  Given China’s economic progress and the emergence of a middle class of strivers, that may be no coincidence.[4] 

            If Max Weber explored connections between religion and capitalism, there also can be connections between religion and nationalism.  Xi appears content with religion that matches well with the goals of the Communist Party.  He is less happy with religion linked to challenges to Chinese power.  Such is the case in the province of Xinjiang.  It’s a huge province in China’s Far West.  Many people in Xinjiang had converted to Islam, but different groups fought.  These quarrels drew-in the Qing Dynasty during the Nineteenth Century.[5]  After this conquest, China’s many troubles in the Twentieth Century encouraged separatist revolts. 

If the surface of Xinjiang is barren, it’s sub-surface is rich in carbon (oil, coal).  China has steadily tightened control and encouraged migration by ethnic Chinese.  None of this calmed the province.  Along the way, Islam has become identified with nationalist resistance to China.  Since 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Russo-Chechen wars, any Islamic activism in Central Asia can be cast in a hostile light.[6]  In this case, Islam cannot be bent to government purposes.  The brutal repression in Xinjiang arouses Western sympathy.  As once did the fate of the schoolgirls of Chibok, Bosnians, and whales. 

[1] Thus, both the American and French Revolutions legally separated Church and State.  European Liberals often moved on to aggressive anti-clericalism.  Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity fought back by linking themselves more tightly to political conservatism. 

[2] Ian Johnson, The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao (2017). 

[3] In this he resembles Maximilien Robespierre.  That doesn’t mean that I’m predicting a Chinese Thermidor. 

[4] See: Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-1905). 

[5] For the sake of simplicity, Chinese imperialism is left out of textbook discussions of the “New Imperialism.” 

[6] See the very unhelpful Tunku Varadarajan, “How to Delete a Culture,” WSJ, 16-17 July 2022.