Russia’s reclaiming of Crimea and its support for breakaway groups in eastern Ukraine led to American-led economic sanctions. Putin’s sudden increased support for the Assad regime in Syria helped turn the tide in the civil war against American proxies. Putin’s intervention in the American presidential election to the disadvantage of Hilary Clinton, led, first, to the expulsion of a number of Russian “diplomats” and, now, to the passage of further sanctions.
Vladimir Putin wanted Donald Trump elected president of the United States. This is the gist of much of the explanation of the Russian intervention in the 2016 presidential election. Trump had said many positive things about Putin, especially in comparison to President Barack Obama. As President, Donald Trump would take a softer line toward Putin’s effort to get Russia back on its feet. In particular, Putin hoped for an easing of the sanctions imposed after the Crimean and Ukrainian initiatives.[1] “That bet has now backfired spectacularly.” A huge majority in Congress supported the new sanctions. Putin responded by ordering 755 American “diplomats” out of Russia.
That order has been portrayed as a dramatic further step in a downward spiral of Russo-American relations. However, there is a certain dissonance between the American and Russian discourse on these developments. Putin’s public announcement of the reductions “was free of bombast,” said one White House official. Putin’s order on staff reductions doesn’t take effect until 1 September 2017. So, there’s time to talk. Then the staff reductions could be accomplished in a number of ways. David Sanger calculates that there are 1,279 people employed at the American embassy in Moscow and three consulates. Cutting 755 people from 1,279 would leave 524 people. Of the 1,279 current total staff, 934 are “locally employed” people (i.e. Russians in non-sensitive areas). That would leave 345 “diplomats” in place along with 119 over-weight, chain-smoking cleaning ladies. Then there are all sorts of other American government employees from non-diplomatic agencies.
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former American intelligence official and now director of intelligence and defense projects at the Belfer Center of the Kennedy School of Government, took a dispassionate approach. He told Sanger that “We’ve been in a new Cold War for some time now.” In his view, on the American side, “emotions took over the [Russo-American] relationship” late in the Obama administration. First “fear,” and now “anger” drive American policy toward Russia. “The Russians would have preferred not to head down this path, but Putin didn’t feel he had a choice but to respond in the classic tit-for-tat manner.”
In contrast, the American discourse emphasizes grave dangers. Angela Stent argues that “One of Putin’s greatest goals is to assure Russia is treated as if it was still the Soviet Union, a nuclear power that has to be respected and feared.” Dan Coats, the former Republican senator and current Director of National Intelligence (DNI), says that Russia is “trying to undermine Western democracy.” James Clapper, predecessor to Coats as DNI, warned of “the very aggressive modernization program they’re embarked on with their strategic nuclear capability.”
Putin is wicked, but he doesn’t seem stupid. He seems to hate Hilary Clinton, but he couldn’t have her killed. So, he settled for trying to harm her chances of becoming president. He could hardly have supposed that Russian intervention in the American election would not be discovered. So, he was willing to suffer the consequences. Where do we want the Russo-American relationship to go from here?
[1] For one recent example, see David Sanger, “Putin’s Hopes for Relief Under a Trump Presidency Backfire Spectacularly,” NYT, 31 July 2017.