From 1756 to 1763, Britain fought France for command of eastern North America. Britain won, but then had troubles with its Indian and Anglo-American allies in that war. The British government found itself ruling a multi-lingual, multi-racial empire in America. French-speaking Catholic Canadians and Native Americans were suddenly joined with the English-speaking Atlantic Americans. Were the Atlantic Americans to be the favored constituency or should the imperial government try to hold the ring between three equally valuable groups? The latter made the most sense from a Justice perspective, and economic rationality supported Justice. The fur trade with the interior regions generated wealth, while new wars would load the British government with more debt. However, the Atlantic Americans bucked against imperial limits on their Westward drive, as they did against resistance from the Native Americans.
Trying to bring the territories of the Ohio Valley (western Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky) under effective control, in 1768 the British signed the Treaty of Fort Stanwix with the formidable Iroquois Confederacy. The Treaty didn’t hand over to the British any lands actually occupied by the Iroquois. It handed over lands used by the Shawnee and others as a common hunting ground. The Iroquois had beaten all of these Native American peoples into submission in the many days ago. The Shawnee didn’t like this deal (who would?) and weren’t anywhere as near afraid of white settlers or British soldiers as they were of the Iroquois. So, trouble brewed, needing only an incident to set off a real war.
Incidents began to accumulate from late 1773. More and more Atlantic Americans crossed the Appalachians in search of trade, then of land. A few of them bore names that ring out in American history: Daniel Boone, George Rogers Clark. Most, though, are known only to specialist historians: Michael Cresap (1742-1775), Ebenezer Zane (1747-1811), John Gibson (1740-1822), and the awful Daniel Greathouse (1752-1775). The migration led to conflicts in which the Native Americans got rather the better of it.
In 1774, the royal governor of Virginia, John Murray, Lord Dunmore, responded by launching two columns of militia totaling about 2,500 men into the Ohio country. The basic, usually effective, strategy consisted of marching cautiously toward the home villages of the Indians; hoping that they would retreat to save their families; and then burning down the villages, burning any food stores, and burning the crops in the field. The Indians then could starve at their leisure. This kinda-sorta worked in what came to be called “Lord Dunmore’s War.” The Shawnee took advantage of the separation of the two militia columns to try to destroy the enemy in detail by concentrating against first one, then the other.
On 10 October 1774, at Point Pleasant in what is today West Virginia, the Shawnee attacked. The Shawnee did a lot of damage to the militia column, but could not defeat it. The day ended in a victory for the American militia. On 19 October 1774, faced with the prospect of a militia advance on his villages, the Shawnee chief signed over most of his lands.
“Lord Dunmore’s War,” as it came to be called, opened the country south of the Ohio River to settlement. At the same time, it did nothing to settle the question of the country north of the Ohio. It also offered another warning to the Native Americans that their future could not be reconciled with that of the Atlantic Americans. Future wars loomed.
 Glenn F. Williams, Dunmore’s War: The Last Conflict of America’s Colonial Era (2017)
 It certainly worked a lot better than did two later expeditions by the U.S. Army in 1790 and 1791. Both of those ended in disastrous defeats. See: https://waroftheworldblog.com/2017/07/14/my-weekly-reader-14-july-2017/