Relations between France and the United States in 1945.

At the end of the war in Europe, France posed the greatest problem for American diplomacy in Western Europe.  Wartime actions, such as the American policy toward the collaborationist Vichy regime, embittered post-war relationships.[1]  While the United States had recognized and maintained diplomatic relations with the governments-in-exile of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, the same recognition had not been granted to the movement led by Charles de Gaulle.  Instead, the United States had maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy government until November 1942.[2]  Even after breaking with Vichy, while the United States had used Lend-Lease to arm an ever-larger number of French troops, the United States had sought alternatives to De Gaulle.[3]  The chosen partners of the Americans, Admiral Darlan and General Giraud, had proved frail reeds.  On 3 June 1944, De Gaulle’s Committee of National Liberation declared itself the Provisional Government of France.  After the Normandy invasion began, increasingly large chunks of liberated France were transferred to the Provisional Government, rather than placed under an Allied Government of Occupied Territories, as the French professed to fear.  When French and American troops liberated Paris in August 1944, internal Resistance leaders demonstrated their support for de Gaulle.  The American position became untenable even in the eyes of President Roosevelt.  Only then, in October 1944, did the United States extend formal recognition to the Gaullist movement.  Even so, many foreign observers doubted that the new government possessed solid political backing over the long term.[4] 

Resolving one problem opened another problem.  Did recognition of the Gaullist movement as the government of France mean that France should be considered once again a “great power”?  The British thought so; the Russians thought not; and the Americans, heaving a sigh, agreed with the British.  In December 1944, de Gaulle went to Moscow to make his case and to sign an alliance treaty against Germany.  Stalin found de Gaulle “not very realistic” and made him watch American movies all one evening.  Nevertheless, Stalin agreed to assign to France one of the five permanent seats on the Security Council of the proposed United Nations.  Still, France did not receive an invitation to either the Yalta Conference (February 1945) or the Potsdam Conference (July 1945).[5]  It did, however, get an occupation zone in Germany[6] and membership in the Council of Foreign Ministers that would write the post-war peace treaties. 

Did France possess the real resources to act as a great power?  In 1945 the answer would have to be that it did not.  French population was low in comparison to Germany and population growth had stalled.  French industry had been backward before the war began and German exploitation during the Occupation had virtually ruined what still did exist.  Over the short-run, the French military depended upon free American arms and equipment; over the long-run, a large military clashed with the need for labor to rebuild the economy.  The French Empire, re-named the French Union as if that made a difference, threatened to become more of a drain on resources than a prop to French power.  In Indo-China, in Madagascar, in Syria, and in Algeria, French subjects looked very restive.  Hence, France might be a great power once again at some future date.  That would depend upon France’s ability to renovate its economy, society, and politics.  Foreign observers might be forgiven for thinking this an unlikely prospect.   

Worse, everyone seemed intent on shoving France down-hill.  At the July 1945 Yalta Conference, the “Big Three” had agreed that a Council of Foreign Ministers would write the post-war peace treaties.  However, the Russians had blocked France from having a voice in any peace settlement other than the Italian one.  In particular, this meant that France’s inter-war alliances in Eastern Europe had been declared null and void by the Russians.[7]  On a lesser scale, a September 1945 American proposal for a system of bases on islands in the Pacific included plans for a permanent base on French New Caledonia.  This plan did not go down well with any of the countries involved.  The French government announced that France would defend its possessions.[8] 

Then, Syria and Lebanon were eager for French troops to depart, but the French dragged their feet as they tried to think of some way to retain influence in the area.  This led to trouble in May 1945.  The British had to send troops to help the under-manned France forces restore “order.”  In December 1945, the French and British had made an agreement on the pace of the French withdrawal without bothering to consult the Syrians or the Lebanese.  When criticism rained down on the French and the British, both French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin offered weaselly responses.[9] 

In sum, the new French government would find it a hard struggle to rebuild France’s lost stature as even a European power. 


[1] John Campbell et al, The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947, hereafter USIWA (1947), p. 11. 

[2] In November 1942, the British and Americans had invaded French North Africa, the German troops had occupied the Southern Zone of France. 

[3] Franklin D. Roosevelt’s hostility to de Gaulle is as perplexing.  Perhaps the French general reminded the president of Douglas MacArthur. 

[4] USIWA, pp. 47-49. 

[5] USIWA, pp. 29, 49. 

[6] Carved out of the British and American zones from territory bordering on France. 

[7] USIWA, p. 64.  Those alliances had been with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.  Poland was thoroughly under Russian control.  Czechoslovakia preserved the fiction of a pro-Soviet free government until a Communist coup in 1948.  Indigenous Communists ruled Yugoslavia.   

[8] USIWA, p. 43.    

[9] USIWA, pp. 95-96. 

The Basis of French Politics in the First Half of the Twentieth Century.

    

            One could look at the historical and institutional experiences to see their political effect. 

            It had taken centuries of hard, often bloody work to create a unified “France.”  Memories of war and civil war, of resistance and rebellion remained strong.  So did regional and religious and class identities.  Most importantly, after 1789 France divided between the supporters of Freedom//the Republic/”Movement” and the supporters of Authority/Property/”Order.”  Both groups felt threatened by the other, so they presented all their own actions as a defense against the aggression of “Them.”[1]  So French politics was (and is) often about some other issue(s) than the formal one under discussion.  Any attempt to sort out an issue through discussion could go South quickly.  In the words of the sociologist Michel Crozier, the French developed a “horror of face-to-face discussion.”[2] Instead, they kicked things upstairs to authorities.  But they didn’t trust those authorities either.[3]   

For one thing, government seems impermanent.  There have been frequent changes of regime ever since the Revolution.[4]  The Republic, “One and Indivisible”; the Napoleonic Empire; the Bourbon Restoration Monarchy and the Orleanist July Monarchy[5]; the Second Republic; the Second Empire; the Third Republic; the Vichy Regime; the Fourth Republic[6]; and the Fifth Republic.  The United States has had one constitution over the same period. 

Then, depending on one’s political tribe, there was the hope or danger that a soldier would take power.  Napoleon I, General Patrice MacMahon (the first President of the Third Republic), General Georges Boulanger, and Field Marshall Philippe Petain were soldiers who had seized or tried to seize power from republican government.  Highly attuned to the problem of ambitious, autocratic soldiers, the centrist politicians of the Fourth Republic saw General Charles de Gaulle in this light.[7]   

No one could put much trust in a government might disappear. 

If the politicians were unreliable, the bureaucracy was not.  Napoleon I had created a powerful and centralized government machinery; it had only grown stronger with the passage of time.  The bureaucracy continued to exist whatever regime held power.  It could be abused by politicians, or be manipulated by representatives of interest groups.[8]  More prosaically, the face of the State in villages and towns were the dreaded tax collector and the recruiting sergeant. 


[1] Philip Williams, Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic (1958), p. 7.   

[2] See: Dreyfus dinner party: Caran-d-ache-dreyfus-supper – Dreyfus affair – Wikipedia  In panel one, the host says “No talking about the Dreyfus case.”  In panel two the caption says “They talked about it anyway.” 

[3] Williams, Crisis and Compromise, p. 5. 

[4] See: Peintures Soudee Advert J Sennep Vernis Soudee Villejuif Seine pc unused S811 | eBay UK  The ad says “Republics pass; Soudee paint lasts.”  The ads were in the Paris Metro stations.  I think that the company got a lot of flak because the Fourth Republic actually was tottering at that time. 

[5] Two branches of the same family fighting over whether the monarchy should be backward-looking or forward-looking. 

[6] The raffish, scandal-plagued Fourth Republic (1944-1958) resembled the “Directory” period of the late First Republic. 

[7] Williams, Crisis and Compromise, p. 8.

[8] Williams, Crisis and Compromise, pp. 1-2. 

Cubism 90 miles from our shores.

            Communism failed in Cuba long ago.  From early on, the Cuban “Revolution” had to be subsidized by the Soviet Union.  That covered over many of the economic failings of a centrally-planned mono-crop agricultural economy.  The political failings were covered over by prisons and forced emigration.  Then the Soviet Union collapsed, the subsidies ended, and Cuban went into a downward spiral.  Conditions of life for ordinary Cubans have grown worse and worse.  All sorts of things were going wrong before President Trump’s recent blockade: rice production was falling; the electricity generation was falling, causing rolling blackouts; the predominance of sugar cultivation limited how much food farmers could produce.  Only an oil subsidy from Venezuela kept anything functioning.[1] 

            President Donald Trump is a lame-duck.  That means he’s free to try anything he wants.[2]  With regard to Cuba, he seems to want the Communist regime gone.  He got the successors to Maduro in Venezuela to turn off the oil tap.  Now, Cuba has run out of diesel and fuel oil, and gas stations are closed.  Garbage trucks can’t collect, so piles of trash line the streets in Havana and elsewhere.  Most of the electricity is turned off for most of the day to most of the people.  “Communism has ended light pollution!” 

            The director if the Central Intelligence Agency, John Ratcliffe, paid a call on the Cuban government.  The US would give Cuba $100 million in aid.  There was a catch: “new people” have to be put in place to carry out “meaningful reforms.”  That is, “y’all need to bolt to Spain and right quick.”  He got no takers. 

            Hamas in Gaza, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chavez and Maduro in Venezuela, and Cuba: dictatorships are willing to allow intense harm to their “citizens” so long as they can hold onto power. 

            If Communism could collapse from a mere lack of popular support, it would have done so many years ago.  It is likely to collapse from an upsurge of public anger and action over the failures of the Revolution.  Should the United States be trying to hustle forward that collapse?   The collapse might be preceded or accompanied by a gigantic boatlift of refugees.  That would not accord with closing the southern border.  In Madrid cafes, Cuban Communists are going to blame the US for all their problems anyway, so why not?  Progressives will argue that overthrowing Cuban Communism creates a moral obligation to help on the part of the United States.  Moral obligation probably isn’t the first thought to occur to the Trump Whitehouse. 

            Viewed from an international relations perspective, Trump appears to be pursuing a “spheres of influence” approach.  He has yarded Nicholas maduro (and his wife) out of their palace in their jammies in order to put them on trial in New York.  He’s been trying to (and maybe succeeding) put the fear of God and the United States into Mexican President Claudia Scheinbaum over government complicity in the drug trade.  Now he seems ready to bulldoze Cuba over the brink.  All Western hemisphere countries.  Meanwhile, he’s less forthright in support of Ukraine and Taiwan.  They’re in Eastern Europe and the Far East.  Perhaps that’s forcing things into a pattern that doesn’t exist. 


[1] “Cuba: Barely holding on as Trump turns out the lights,” and “Cuba: Trump’s next takeover target,” The Week, 29 May 2026, pp. 14, 17. 

[2] He doesn’t seem deeply concerned abut the impact of his actions on the electability of other Republicans. 

To the victor belong the spoils.

            The title comes from a quote attributed to Senator William Marcy (D-NY).  It refers to the idea that loyalty to and support for a political candidate should receive material reward if the candidate is elected.[1]  American politics was rife with it from the Colonial period onward.  Perhaps its best-known practitioner was President Andrew Jackson (1767-1845, President 1829-1837).  “Old Hickory” richly reward his “friends,” whether personally known or unknown to him.  This “spoils system” continued to staff the federal, state, and city bureaucracies well past the end of the Civil War.  As someone later said, “Power grows from the barrel of a pork.” 

            As time passed, a reaction took place.  More and more people grew unhappy with the services of a government manned by idiot nephews and political hacks.  The campaign for a merit-based system took a while to achieve success.  In the meantime it was derided as “snivel service reform.”  The first breakthrough came with the Pendleton Civil Service Act (1883).  OK, this took a demented office-seeker (Charles Guiteau[2]) shooting President James A. Garfield.  Thereafter, reformers continued their campaign at the federal, state, and local levels of government.  The United States ended up with a professional, merit-based civil service which was the envy of many places in the world.[3] 

            Donald Trump and “Trumpism” bear more than a passing resemblance to Andrew Jackson and “Jacksonianism.”[4]  During his first term, Trump refused to release his tax returns.  No law required him to do so, and tax-payer information is required to be kept confidential by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  However, it had become a custom for presidential candidates to release such information in the name of “transparency.”  Liberal journals of opinion[5] severely criticized Trump’s refusal.  Then someone in the employ of the IRS leaked some of Trump’s tax returns.  These were published and analyzed. 

            Then came Trump’s contesting the election results of 2020, 6 January 2021, and the attempted prosecution of Trump and associates on charges of election-interference, paying “hush money,” retaining official documents, and fraud. 

            Jump ahead to Trump’s second term.[6]  He sued the IRS for $10 billion over the leaked tax returns.  Then he agreed to settle the matter with his own Justice Department.  There are two parts to the settlement.  First, creation of a tax-payer funded settlement fund to pay people who were victims of “lawfare” by the Biden administration.  Neither the president nor his family may receive money from the fund.  The value of the fund is patriotically-valued at $1.776 billion.  Second, the IRS can’t pursue “any and all” pending tax claims against the president, his family, or his businesses. 

            The fund has not been well-received by Democrats and many Republicans.  Some critics lambast the possibility of the 6 January rioters getting “compensated.”  Others point out that Trump’s money-making in office uses the same shady practices he’s often used in business. 

            We have laws because good judgement and common decency often are lacking. 


[1] Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (1961). 

[2] Like many people in history, Guiteau was too strange for fiction. 

[3] But not Britain, Germany, or France. 

[4] The Worst President Ever 5 July 2019. | waroftheworldblog 

[5] The Opinion section of the NYT, Stephen Colbert, etc.  Alas, George Carlin was dead.  Our loss. 

[6] “Outrage erupts over Trump’s ‘slush fund’ for allies,” The Week, 29 May 2026

The Authoritarian Handbook–V.

The wars themselves, those of the third quarter of the century, had two faces.  Yes, they reshaped the relationships between the so-called “Great Powers.”  They broke the alliance between the arch-conservative powers Austria and Russia; they created two new nations in Italy and Germany; they sent the Austrian Empire spinning toward decay and collapse; and they put a stop to vexing French pretensions to dominate European affairs.  This will gladden the hearts of future historians obsessed by the traditional themes of “Great Men” and dramatic events.[1] 

No, they weren’t chiefly about re-making the balance of power.  Effective “authoritarians” saw that their road to the power to do other things ran through first satisfying a public desire for language-based communities.  That is, “Nationalism” had a powerful grip on the minds of many people.[2]  Some of the benefits of the victory of Nationalism were psychic, rather than material.  People felt pride in their nation.  People felt themselves part of some deeply-rooted and long-denied community.  Parades, flags, memorial columns, school lessons, the talk of older men who had once “done their bit,” and the language itself—salted with historical references and military analogies—all kept the victories of Nationalism alive in the minds of ordinary people. 

Certainly, “authoritarians” could fail of their goals.  Napoleon III gambled on war to shape Italian unification, then saw the Italians escape his leading-strings.  Napoleon III gambled on war to prevent Prussian domination of a unified Germany, then saw his country defeated, replaced by a mere republic that has become a by-word for ineffective government, personal self-indulgence, and scandals.  The Hungarians had wanted national independence, but had to settle for fifty years of partnership with the despised Austrians.  The ungrateful and stupid heirs of Tsar Alexander II never gave a thought to improving the lives of their people.  Their own psychological weakness led them to seek outward shows of authority.  These men were lath painted to look like iron.

So, neither Peace nor War alone guaranteed the survival of “effective authoritarianism.” 


[1] Editor’s Note.  Actually, this “democratizing” critique became a commonplace theme directed against diplomatic and military historians in later, more “progressive” times.  All the same, what are the “Iliad” or “King Henry V” or “War and Peace” about? 

[2] Why language should prevail over other identities—religion, gender, race, or social class—at this hour in history remains a mystery to us. These other forms of identity seem just as vital as does Nationalism.  They might yet provide the basis for a better organization of community.

The Authoritarian Handbook–IV.

We have spoken of the crimes of the “old authoritarians,” whether open or masked.  What of their achievements?  For these hold the key to understanding the “effective authoritarian.”  It can’t be just blood, toil, tears, and snot if the “authoritarian” regime is to last.  The years from 1850 to 1914 are a catalogue of “Dos” and “Don’ts” for “authoritarians” of our own day.[1] 

Who are the model “authoritarians” of the period?  The French Emperor Louis Napoleon III (r. 1850-1870).  The Russian Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855-1881).  The “German,” more accurately Prussian, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (g. 1863-1890).   These three men represent the highest plane of the modern pre-Great War “authoritarian.”  Other men of the time stand on a somewhat lower plane.  The Sardinian, then Italian, prime minister Camillo, Count Cavour (g. 1852-1861) is one.  The American President Abraham Lincoln (g. 1861-1865) is another.[2] 

There were many other “authoritarians” or “aspiring authoritarians.” As we will see, they were of the old type.  Some sought to rule without check on their power, but also without any larger purpose in mind.  Some sought to use modern methods to hold back necessary changes.  Their successes and failures need not detain us. 

What did “authoritarian” regimes achieve with their power? 

Peace, first of all.  Certainly not absolute or universal peace.  The 19th Century was drenched in blood.  It was mostly the blood of Africans and Arabs and Asians and the Wild Indians of North America.  The Civil War among the Americans offers a striking exception to this rule.[3]  Comparatively little blood fell on European battle fields.

In comparison to the frequent and lengthy wars of the 18th and early 19th centuries, the wars fought between 1815 and 1914 were few and of short duration.  In 1849, war pitted the Austrian and Russian Empires against the rebellious Hungarians; in 1855, France and Britain fought the Russians; in 1859, France and Sardinia attacked (and the French defeated) the Austrians; in 1863 Prussia and the Austrians defeated the Danes; in 1866, Prussia defeated the Austrians; and in 1870, Prussia and its German allies defeated France. 

Peace all the same.  War between the major European states halted. There was no general war, no prolonged war, no devastating war.  Particularly in the last third of the 19th Century and the first decade of our own century, disputes were settled in diplomatic conferences.  No wrecked cities, no grieving widows and orphans, no mangled veterans cadging tips on street corners.  These “no”s are the invisible monuments raised in every farm village and factory town.   


[1] Often is the question posed: “Why don’t people learn from History?”  This is nonsensical.  People DO learn from History.  They learn from their own History—that is, experience subjected to consideration.  What man has hit his thumb with a hammer more than two or three times?  People of experience try to convey “lessons” to others (often their bored progeny) in the form of maxims: “Never try to fill an inside straight”; “You hold a woman around the waist and a bottle around the neck, not the other way around”; “Work hard and save your money, it’s going to be a hard winter” (said in any season); “A gun is always loaded until you know it isn’t, so always check in the breech”; “Without Love and a little fun, life isn’t worth living”; and “If you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss stares into you.”  Thus, harsh experience teaches lessons to Individuals.  However, there is no mechanism for determining agreed “Lessons of History” for an entire community, nor for transmitting them from one generation to the next.  Everyone derives his own lessons. 

[2] It is to be admitted that Lincoln’s government drew much of its character from the necessities of a great war.  It is impossible to know what might have been if he had continued his presidency into a full second term or even a third.  Nothing in the American Constitution bars a president from seeking more than a second term. 

[3] In light of our thesis on the attributes of “authoritarian” government, it is interesting that this great struggle took place between two democracies. 

The Authoritarian Handbook–III.

We have looked at Authoritarianism Past. Let us consider Authoritarianism Present. 

The last century appeared to witness a rising tide of “liberal” governments.  The United States, France, and Great Britain (in that order) all created representative and “responsible” governments with regular elections, guarantees of civil rights, and a free press.[1]  Even here, however, universal manhood suffrage has been slow in coming.  It came soonest in the United States—for White men—by the 1830s.  It came to France after the Revolution of 1848, then became the basis for the “Second Empire” of Napoleon III.  It came to Britain by stages until 1884.  For a hopeless Optimist, these countries formed the vanguard of a world movement, or at least a Western movement.

Nothing could be further from the truth.  Other places moved in that direction, but stopped short at “false-front” parliamentary systems.  These were mere bones thrown to dogs.  In Europe, Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire exemplify the “false front” approach.  The right to vote was restricted and manipulated; the governments answered to the emperor, rather than the parliament; and other freedoms were restricted.  Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece have all reached only a primitive stage of even these repressive systems. 

Many other places remained fully “illiberal.”  Look at a map.  Where DON’T you want to go?  The farther East and South you move from London, the more backward and illiberal the economy, the society, and the government become.  Before the War, a novice British journalist asked the Prime Minister of Serbia about the state of industrialization his country.  The Prime Minister replied that “In my country, a match is a machine.”  (And lentil mush, served twice a day, is the only food in Serbian prisons.)  Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Manchu China were hulking giants of tradition and oppression.  Whips, hangman’s rope, and massacres—done either by government forces or at the behest of government agents—were and are common tools of “stable” government.  Good for foreign corporations, perhaps, but highly unpleasant for the people who eke out a living there.  Now they are all collapsed into revolution and civil war. 

Anywhere one looks in Latin America, such a false-front parliamentary system is the best that can be hoped for.   Everywhere there are long-serving “Presidentes” and be-medaled “caudillos.”  There are national police forces, but no national school systems.  In the Caribbean islands, government oppresses the poor on behalf of the rich until the poor descend into savagery themselves. 

There are gigantic cattle ranches, supplying beef and mutton to Europe. There are huge cotton plantations, crowding out the subsistence farms of humble peons. There are mines carving up mountains in search of every sort of metal. There are national railroad systems to carry all these commodities to seaports for export to “advanced” countries. All are financed by British capital. The rich few keep their wealth in foreign banks, rather than investing in their own countries. Why? Because they know that they live on the edge of a volcano that might explode beneath them at any moment.

The only hope for an ordinary person in any of these places is emigration to somewhere not good, but less bad.  It is a flight without end.[2] 

So, schools without teachers, hospitals without doctors, and elections without voters. This reality is prettied up by Western diplomats and Western journalists and Western travelers who consort with their own types in such countries. But, if one “rides the rails” or lives in rural villages for a time, one comes away with a more accurate understanding of “modern times.”


[1] Eventually, offshoots of Britain introduced the same systems for their own domestic management: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. 

[2] Editor’s Note.  Curiously, this is the title of a 1927 novel by Joseph Roth.  This may be pure coincidence.  It may also indicate that at least one of the authors knew Roth.  From 1916 to 1918, Roth served in the Austro-Hungarian army; from 1918 to 1920, he was a journalist in Vienna; and from 1920, he worked in Berlin.  Perhaps they picked up the phrase from Roth before he put it into use as a book title? 

The Authoritarian Handbook–II.

Editor’s Note: The pamphlet “The Authoritarian Handbook” survives only in scraps. I first learned of it while in graduate school in the 1980s. It was not to be found in major libraries or research collections. After much desultory searching, I found a package containing parts of the pamphlet in a barn/used book-store south of Cambridge, MD, on the Eastern Shore of the Chesapeake.

Editor’s Note: It has been impossible to identify the authors whose names appear on the title-page. This leads me to think that they are pseudonyms. They appear to have read a great deal in various areas of knowledge. As will be clear from other sections, they seem to know the life of soldiers, fugitives, and prisoners. They lived in troubled times of war, revolution, and social and economic upheaval.

Authoritarianism Past. 

If one seeks an “authoritarian handbook,” one has only to open a history book to any page.  Virtually all governments of the past were “authoritarian.”  There were kingdoms and empires.  Yes, the “Classical” Greeks invented, “Democracy,” but they also invented Oligarchy and Tyranny.[1]  The Roman Republic died in the bloody strife of men avid for personal power.  Then the Many gave way to the One, the “first among equals,” the Emperor. 

Later in Europe, and elsewhere in the world, there were kings who were “despotic” and kings who were “benevolent” or “enlightened.”  There were emperors in China, and Japan, and Inca Peru.  All were supreme rulers who were determined to defend their prerogatives.  There were “republics,” again.  In Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Venice, the term “republic” really signified an oligarchy that had escaped royal control.  All ruled with an iron fist. 

What were the parts of this “iron fist”?  There were aristocrats and bureaucrats; soldiers, priests, and informers. 

There were “subjects”—how expressive of the reality!—rather than “citizens.”  Subjects have duties; citizens have rights. 

This a key part of Authoritarianism.  Men need food and shelter.  They need safety, both of the economic sort and the law-and-order sort.  These are the material even animal, essentials of human life.  They may aspire to other, basically emotional, things once these essentials are achieved: community, a higher place in that community, and even a quest for a larger purpose in life.  But the animal, material needs are essential and primary.[2]  Without them, nothing else is possible.  Hence, these will always lie at the heart of any politics, whether it be “liberal” or “illiberal” or “authoritarian.”    

You will notice that we say nothing about Freedom.  Rarely do men crave actual Freedom.  History tells us of great revolts from below against the ruling classes.  The list always includes the “Servile Wars” of the Roman Republic, the peasant uprisings of the Late Middle Ages in England and France,[3] and the revolts of urban workers such as the “Ciompi” in Florence.  Then there are the many slave revolts in the Caribbean, with Haiti taking pride of place.  All of these revolts sprang from intense human misery that had finally been pushed beyond the point of tolerance.  Rents or labor requirements had been raised significantly by Medieval land owners, or piece-work wages reduced by urban employers.  Mere survival appeared threatened for many people.  Under these conditions, they revolted.  Aspirations to something like what political theorists of the present-day label “individual rights” or “freedom” had little to nothing to do with the revolts. 


[1] The Athenians put to death the suicidally melancholy public nuisance Socrates.  No one grieved, outside of his small group of followers. 

[2] Editor’s Note.  The authors here seem to anticipate the theories of Abraham Maslow by twenty to thirty years.  See: Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (1954). 

[3] Editor’s Note: The “Jacquerie” (1358) and “Wat Tyler’s Rebellion” 91381).    

How This Might End.

            TRIGGER WARNING: This is just ignorance-based opinion, but it is firmly-held ignorance-based opinion. 

            Historically, the peoples of the Middle East have been pretty spineless and malleable.[1]  The Persians showed up, and people “Medized.”  The Greeks under that lunatic Alexander showed up, and people “Hellenized.”  The Romans showed up and it turns out that they had also kinda “Hellenized,” so people “Romanized.”  The Roman Empire become Christian, so people “Christianized.”  The Arabs-actually-from-Arabia showed up and people slowly abandoned Christianity and “Islamized.”[2]  Most recently, “Authoritarian” governments with tools borrowed from the West showed up.[3]  People “Authoritarianized.”  Someday, these places may “Democratize.”  Don’t hold your breath. 

            At least in modern times, the people of the Middle East aren’t a military people.  The armies of the Middle East haven’t been very good.[4]  This is explained by cultural factors, rather than being somehow genetic.  The enlisted men come from the peasantry, while the officers come from the idle rich.  The latter despise the former and don’t take their responsibilities seriously.[5]  HOWEVER, there is a very tough strand of fanaticism in Middle Eastern societies that is willing to fight to the last civilian, no matter how difficult the circumstances.  This trait has been on display in the Iran-Iraq War, the civil war in Iraq triggered by the American invasion, and the wars by Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel.  They just keep going no matter how hard the enemy pounds on them, no matter how many obvious defeats they suffer.  The current regime governing Iran may be cut from this same cloth. 

            Iran has engaged in massive, sustained deception while pursuing nuclear weapons for several decades.  So did Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.  Iran has been under severe economic sanction, off and on, for a long time.  Even when they make agreements, they don’t keep them.  Cyber-attacks, assassinations, and bombing don’t stop them.  They just sweep up the debris, cart off the bodies, and start work again. 

The outcome of “Trump’s War,” as the very cosmopolitan American media likes to refer to it, depends in part, on two things. 

First, Trump ordered the war, but the American military is waging the war.  How are they doing?  Iran’s air defenses have been largely destroyed.  Its ballistic missile and drone forces have been badly degraded, although not totally eliminated.  Its naval forces have been badly battered, with any vessels that could be used for laying mines in the sea lanes a primary target for attack.  Undoubtedly, American aircraft are relentlessly hunting any remaining missile forces and they are closely watching the long southern coastline of Iraq.  How far inland they have to watch depends on the effective range of whatever missile forces remain in Iran’s possession. 

Once these dangers are reduced to a tolerable level, then convoying of tankers can begin.  There would still need to be constant vigilance against Iran playing possum for a while, then starting to move new missiles down within range of the sea lanes.  Can land-based American aircraft in the Gulf States handle this mission?  In any event, the longer the war goes on, the more damaged Iran will suffer.  Maybe Iran will opt for a deal. 

Second, Donald Trump is a deal-maker.  He disliked the Obama administration’s deal with Iran,[6] so he tore it up in his first administration.  He put pressure on Iran to make a better deal.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  Joe Biden tried to revive the old agreement.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  In his second administration, Trump pressured Iran to make a deal.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  Trump joined Israel’s attack on the nuclear program.  Iran still wouldn’t deal, although they engaged in limited talks.  Trump launched the current attack.  He’s still looking for a deal. 

            What about “regime change”?  Trump doesn’t really want a US-imposed regime change.  No de-Bathification catastrophe on his watch.[7]  It’s difficult for Westerners to imagine that anyone in Iran supports this crazy, murderous dictatorship.  There is a good chance that many Iranians actually do support it, or fear the bloodshed of a civil war.  So, when Trump says he wants “regime change,” he really means “I want the regime to change” its behavior and course.  At least, that’s what he’ll claim afterward. 

What if he gets a deal?  Maximally or ideally, its terms should include no nuclear programs, no ballistic missiles, no support for proxies, no support for Russia in Ukraine, and co-operation with the United States on oil exports to China.  Minimally, its terms should be no nuclear programs.  No one can or should trust Iran to keep to any agreement.  There will have to be intrusive safeguards. 

What does Iran get?  An end to the bombing.  Maybe some sanctions relief depending on how much they change their behavior.  International inspectors all over the nuclear sites (broadly conceived) like a duck on a June-bug. 

What if Trump can’t get a deal?  Then finish up the bombing to clear the Straits of Hormuz, declare victory, and leave.  If Iran refuses a deal, the US can always come back and “mow the grass” (as Israel puts it) whenever necessary.  That’s cold, but a viable policy. 

For some time now, the United States has faced a loose coalition[8] of enemies: Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China.  American forces could defeat most (and maybe all) of them in a straight fight.  A war with any one of them would risk bringing all of them into a war, like a pack of wolves ganging up on an elk. The United States might have a hard time defeating all of them in a general war without going nuclear somewhere.  Now one of the coalition has been badly battered.  What are the larger implications of this short, brutal war? 


[1] Guy waving his arm at the back of the room: “What about all the gruesome stuff in the Old Testament?  That bastard Saul, for example.” 

[2] See the amusing anecdote about white silk socks in Robert Graves, Good-bye to All That. 

[3] Some are monarchical, some are republican; some are secular, some are Islamist.  All have secret police, information-control, and a “deep state” network of public and private power; sometimes they have a false-front and rigged representation of “the People.”    

[4] See: the Arab wars against Israel, the Iran-Iraq War, “Operation Desert Storm.”  

[5] After humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel in the “Six Days War” of 1967, the Egyptians asked the Soviet Union for help.  Russian military advisers told the leaders of the Egyptian Army to change course “or we are someone else finding to do job you are not doing, and you are maybe misfortunately getting shot, Da?”  The Egyptian Army then performed well in the October 1973 war.  After a while Henry Kissinger worked his magic and Egypt gave the Russkies the boot.  Egyptian soldiers then slid back into the comfortable old ways. 

[6] So did many other Republicans.  That’s why the agreement never became a treaty ratified by the Senate. 

[7] There’s been much discussion of the IRGC and the Basij paramilitaries as supporters of the regime.  There hasn’t been as much discussion of the Iranian Army.  If Israel does enough damage to the IRGC and the Basij, the army might be in a position to impose a change of course on the regime. 

[8] Germany, Italy, and Japan fought the Second World War as a loose coalition.  They all lost badly in the end.  They caused a lot of problems before they surrendered. 

My Weekly Reader 21 March 2026.

            Zionism is nationalism for Jews in places where Jews aren’t allowed to assimilate.  It began in the late Nineteenth Century and drew most of its followers from the anti-Semitic states of Eastern Europe.[1]  For the most part, Eastern European Jews preferred to emigrate to Western Europe or—best of all—the United States.  After the First World War, American immigration restrictions choked down on Eastern European immigrants of all varieties.  The Depression had much the same effect on Western Europe.  Then Hitler came to power in Germany.  Suddenly, British-ruled Palestine began to look attractive.  The British government “recognized” a Jewish Agency as the spokesman for the “Yishuv,” the Jews in Palestine. 

            Then came the Second World War.  Jewish emigration from Nazi-ruled Europe slowed to the occasional droplet.  Early German victories forced Britain to play offense from its back foot.  To this end, Britain had two “intelligence” organizations with a special interest in Nazi Europe.  The Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) fomented and supported resistance in occupied countries.  MI-9 tried to rescue the crews of downed British planes.  At first, they concentrated their work in Western Europe.  By 1944, they both had an interest in Eastern Europe. 

            While there were lots of agent candidates who knew Western Europe and its languages, equivalent people who were familiar with eastern Europe were thin on the ground.  Where to find people who could pass anonymously in Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia?   After a while, it occurred to someone that British Palestine had a bunch.  Here, the Jewish Agency had begun to learn of the Holocaust and wanted to know what might be done to help the besieged Jews.[2]  S.O.E., MI-9, and the Jewish Agency collaborated in recruiting 250 male and female volunteers; approving 150 of them for training; and sending 37 behind German lines.  They would be parachuted into Eastern Europe, where they would work with resistance movements, set up evasion lines for downed aircrew, and investigate the situation of the Jews. 

            By Spring 1944, the situation in the region had become highly unstable.  A revolt against the puppet-government of Slovakia was about to begin.  Traditional conservative nationalists struggled with fascists for control of Hungary.  The Red Army had made a dramatic advance westward in Spring and early Summer 1944.  If the Germans were pinned down by the Red Army, their allies in Hungary and Slovakia might be toppled.  Or not. 

            Most of the 37 parachuted in between March and September 1944.  Some fought with the Slovaks and some with the Yugoslav partisans, while some went to Budapest at the moment of the German coup to put the fascist Arrow Cross in power.  Twelve were captured and seven of these were executed.[3]  None of them accomplished their original missions.  Nevertheless, the effort has inspired interest.[4]  Why? 

            Perhaps because how we live our lives is more important than what we accomplish in them?  Courage and self-sacrifice are recurring themes in the world’s art, literature, and myth. 


[1] The Russian Empire, which then included most of Poland; Rumania; and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Subsequently, Poland and Hungary became independent states. 

[2] See: Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (1980) on the Yishuv’s incomprehension of the Holocaust. 

[3] Of the seven who were executed, the most famous is Hanna Szenes, a sort of Jewish Noor Inayat Khan. 

[4] Amos Ettinger, Blind Jump (1992); Judith Baumel-Schwartz, Perfect Heroes (2010); Taviva Ofer, Haviva Reick (2014); Matti Friedman, Out of the Sky (2026).