Tag Archives: History

The Authoritarian Handbook–V.

Posted on by
Reply

The wars themselves, those of the third quarter of the century, had two faces.  Yes, they reshaped the relationships between the so-called “Great Powers.”  They broke the alliance between the arch-conservative powers Austria and Russia; they created two new nations in Italy and Germany; they sent the Austrian Empire spinning toward decay and collapse; and they put a stop to vexing French pretensions to dominate European affairs.  This will gladden the hearts of future historians obsessed by the traditional themes of “Great Men” and dramatic events.[1] 

No, they weren’t chiefly about re-making the balance of power.  Effective “authoritarians” saw that their road to the power to do other things ran through first satisfying a public desire for language-based communities.  That is, “Nationalism” had a powerful grip on the minds of many people.[2]  Some of the benefits of the victory of Nationalism were psychic, rather than material.  People felt pride in their nation.  People felt themselves part of some deeply-rooted and long-denied community.  Parades, flags, memorial columns, school lessons, the talk of older men who had once “done their bit,” and the language itself—salted with historical references and military analogies—all kept the victories of Nationalism alive in the minds of ordinary people. 

Certainly, “authoritarians” could fail of their goals.  Napoleon III gambled on war to shape Italian unification, then saw the Italians escape his leading-strings.  Napoleon III gambled on war to prevent Prussian domination of a unified Germany, then saw his country defeated, replaced by a mere republic that has become a by-word for ineffective government, personal self-indulgence, and scandals.  The Hungarians had wanted national independence, but had to settle for fifty years of partnership with the despised Austrians.  The ungrateful and stupid heirs of Tsar Alexander II never gave a thought to improving the lives of their people.  Their own psychological weakness led them to seek outward shows of authority.  These men were lath painted to look like iron.

So, neither Peace nor War alone guaranteed the survival of “effective authoritarianism.” 

[1] Editor’s Note.  Actually, this “democratizing” critique became a commonplace theme directed against diplomatic and military historians in later, more “progressive” times.  All the same, what are the “Iliad” or “King Henry V” or “War and Peace” about? 

[2] Why language should prevail over other identities—religion, gender, race, or social class—at this hour in history remains a mystery to us. These other forms of identity seem just as vital as does Nationalism.  They might yet provide the basis for a better organization of community.

The Authoritarian Handbook–IV.

Posted on by
Reply

We have spoken of the crimes of the “old authoritarians,” whether open or masked.  What of their achievements?  For these hold the key to understanding the “effective authoritarian.”  It can’t be just blood, toil, tears, and snot if the “authoritarian” regime is to last.  The years from 1850 to 1914 are a catalogue of “Dos” and “Don’ts” for “authoritarians” of our own day.[1] 

Who are the model “authoritarians” of the period?  The French Emperor Louis Napoleon III (r. 1850-1870).  The Russian Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855-1881).  The “German,” more accurately Prussian, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (g. 1863-1890).   These three men represent the highest plane of the modern pre-Great War “authoritarian.”  Other men of the time stand on a somewhat lower plane.  The Sardinian, then Italian, prime minister Camillo, Count Cavour (g. 1852-1861) is one.  The American President Abraham Lincoln (g. 1861-1865) is another.[2] 

There were many other “authoritarians” or “aspiring authoritarians.” As we will see, they were of the old type.  Some sought to rule without check on their power, but also without any larger purpose in mind.  Some sought to use modern methods to hold back necessary changes.  Their successes and failures need not detain us. 

What did “authoritarian” regimes achieve with their power? 

Peace, first of all.  Certainly not absolute or universal peace.  The 19th Century was drenched in blood.  It was mostly the blood of Africans and Arabs and Asians and the Wild Indians of North America.  The Civil War among the Americans offers a striking exception to this rule.[3]  Comparatively little blood fell on European battle fields.

In comparison to the frequent and lengthy wars of the 18th and early 19th centuries, the wars fought between 1815 and 1914 were few and of short duration.  In 1849, war pitted the Austrian and Russian Empires against the rebellious Hungarians; in 1855, France and Britain fought the Russians; in 1859, France and Sardinia attacked (and the French defeated) the Austrians; in 1863 Prussia and the Austrians defeated the Danes; in 1866, Prussia defeated the Austrians; and in 1870, Prussia and its German allies defeated France. 

Peace all the same.  War between the major European states halted. There was no general war, no prolonged war, no devastating war.  Particularly in the last third of the 19th Century and the first decade of our own century, disputes were settled in diplomatic conferences.  No wrecked cities, no grieving widows and orphans, no mangled veterans cadging tips on street corners.  These “no”s are the invisible monuments raised in every farm village and factory town.   

[1] Often is the question posed: “Why don’t people learn from History?”  This is nonsensical.  People DO learn from History.  They learn from their own History—that is, experience subjected to consideration.  What man has hit his thumb with a hammer more than two or three times?  People of experience try to convey “lessons” to others (often their bored progeny) in the form of maxims: “Never try to fill an inside straight”; “You hold a woman around the waist and a bottle around the neck, not the other way around”; “Work hard and save your money, it’s going to be a hard winter” (said in any season); “A gun is always loaded until you know it isn’t, so always check in the breech”; “Without Love and a little fun, life isn’t worth living”; and “If you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss stares into you.”  Thus, harsh experience teaches lessons to Individuals.  However, there is no mechanism for determining agreed “Lessons of History” for an entire community, nor for transmitting them from one generation to the next.  Everyone derives his own lessons. 

[2] It is to be admitted that Lincoln’s government drew much of its character from the necessities of a great war.  It is impossible to know what might have been if he had continued his presidency into a full second term or even a third.  Nothing in the American Constitution bars a president from seeking more than a second term. 

[3] In light of our thesis on the attributes of “authoritarian” government, it is interesting that this great struggle took place between two democracies. 

The Authoritarian Handbook–III.

Posted on by
Reply

We have looked at Authoritarianism Past. Let us consider Authoritarianism Present. 

The last century appeared to witness a rising tide of “liberal” governments.  The United States, France, and Great Britain (in that order) all created representative and “responsible” governments with regular elections, guarantees of civil rights, and a free press.[1]  Even here, however, universal manhood suffrage has been slow in coming.  It came soonest in the United States—for White men—by the 1830s.  It came to France after the Revolution of 1848, then became the basis for the “Second Empire” of Napoleon III.  It came to Britain by stages until 1884.  For a hopeless Optimist, these countries formed the vanguard of a world movement, or at least a Western movement.

Nothing could be further from the truth.  Other places moved in that direction, but stopped short at “false-front” parliamentary systems.  These were mere bones thrown to dogs.  In Europe, Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire exemplify the “false front” approach.  The right to vote was restricted and manipulated; the governments answered to the emperor, rather than the parliament; and other freedoms were restricted.  Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece have all reached only a primitive stage of even these repressive systems. 

Many other places remained fully “illiberal.”  Look at a map.  Where DON’T you want to go?  The farther East and South you move from London, the more backward and illiberal the economy, the society, and the government become.  Before the War, a novice British journalist asked the Prime Minister of Serbia about the state of industrialization his country.  The Prime Minister replied that “In my country, a match is a machine.”  (And lentil mush, served twice a day, is the only food in Serbian prisons.)  Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Manchu China were hulking giants of tradition and oppression.  Whips, hangman’s rope, and massacres—done either by government forces or at the behest of government agents—were and are common tools of “stable” government.  Good for foreign corporations, perhaps, but highly unpleasant for the people who eke out a living there.  Now they are all collapsed into revolution and civil war. 

Anywhere one looks in Latin America, such a false-front parliamentary system is the best that can be hoped for.   Everywhere there are long-serving “Presidentes” and be-medaled “caudillos.”  There are national police forces, but no national school systems.  In the Caribbean islands, government oppresses the poor on behalf of the rich until the poor descend into savagery themselves. 

There are gigantic cattle ranches, supplying beef and mutton to Europe. There are huge cotton plantations, crowding out the subsistence farms of humble peons. There are mines carving up mountains in search of every sort of metal. There are national railroad systems to carry all these commodities to seaports for export to “advanced” countries. All are financed by British capital. The rich few keep their wealth in foreign banks, rather than investing in their own countries. Why? Because they know that they live on the edge of a volcano that might explode beneath them at any moment.

The only hope for an ordinary person in any of these places is emigration to somewhere not good, but less bad.  It is a flight without end.[2] 

So, schools without teachers, hospitals without doctors, and elections without voters. This reality is prettied up by Western diplomats and Western journalists and Western travelers who consort with their own types in such countries. But, if one “rides the rails” or lives in rural villages for a time, one comes away with a more accurate understanding of “modern times.”

[1] Eventually, offshoots of Britain introduced the same systems for their own domestic management: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. 

[2] Editor’s Note.  Curiously, this is the title of a 1927 novel by Joseph Roth.  This may be pure coincidence.  It may also indicate that at least one of the authors knew Roth.  From 1916 to 1918, Roth served in the Austro-Hungarian army; from 1918 to 1920, he was a journalist in Vienna; and from 1920, he worked in Berlin.  Perhaps they picked up the phrase from Roth before he put it into use as a book title? 

The Authoritarian Handbook–II.

Posted on by
Reply

Editor’s Note: The pamphlet “The Authoritarian Handbook” survives only in scraps. I first learned of it while in graduate school in the 1980s. It was not to be found in major libraries or research collections. After much desultory searching, I found a package containing parts of the pamphlet in a barn/used book-store south of Cambridge, MD, on the Eastern Shore of the Chesapeake.

Editor’s Note: It has been impossible to identify the authors whose names appear on the title-page. This leads me to think that they are pseudonyms. They appear to have read a great deal in various areas of knowledge. As will be clear from other sections, they seem to know the life of soldiers, fugitives, and prisoners. They lived in troubled times of war, revolution, and social and economic upheaval.

Authoritarianism Past. 

If one seeks an “authoritarian handbook,” one has only to open a history book to any page.  Virtually all governments of the past were “authoritarian.”  There were kingdoms and empires.  Yes, the “Classical” Greeks invented, “Democracy,” but they also invented Oligarchy and Tyranny.[1]  The Roman Republic died in the bloody strife of men avid for personal power.  Then the Many gave way to the One, the “first among equals,” the Emperor. 

Later in Europe, and elsewhere in the world, there were kings who were “despotic” and kings who were “benevolent” or “enlightened.”  There were emperors in China, and Japan, and Inca Peru.  All were supreme rulers who were determined to defend their prerogatives.  There were “republics,” again.  In Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Venice, the term “republic” really signified an oligarchy that had escaped royal control.  All ruled with an iron fist. 

What were the parts of this “iron fist”?  There were aristocrats and bureaucrats; soldiers, priests, and informers. 

There were “subjects”—how expressive of the reality!—rather than “citizens.”  Subjects have duties; citizens have rights. 

This a key part of Authoritarianism.  Men need food and shelter.  They need safety, both of the economic sort and the law-and-order sort.  These are the material even animal, essentials of human life.  They may aspire to other, basically emotional, things once these essentials are achieved: community, a higher place in that community, and even a quest for a larger purpose in life.  But the animal, material needs are essential and primary.[2]  Without them, nothing else is possible.  Hence, these will always lie at the heart of any politics, whether it be “liberal” or “illiberal” or “authoritarian.”    

You will notice that we say nothing about Freedom.  Rarely do men crave actual Freedom.  History tells us of great revolts from below against the ruling classes.  The list always includes the “Servile Wars” of the Roman Republic, the peasant uprisings of the Late Middle Ages in England and France,[3] and the revolts of urban workers such as the “Ciompi” in Florence.  Then there are the many slave revolts in the Caribbean, with Haiti taking pride of place.  All of these revolts sprang from intense human misery that had finally been pushed beyond the point of tolerance.  Rents or labor requirements had been raised significantly by Medieval land owners, or piece-work wages reduced by urban employers.  Mere survival appeared threatened for many people.  Under these conditions, they revolted.  Aspirations to something like what political theorists of the present-day label “individual rights” or “freedom” had little to nothing to do with the revolts. 

[1] The Athenians put to death the suicidally melancholy public nuisance Socrates.  No one grieved, outside of his small group of followers. 

[2] Editor’s Note.  The authors here seem to anticipate the theories of Abraham Maslow by twenty to thirty years.  See: Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (1954). 

[3] Editor’s Note: The “Jacquerie” (1358) and “Wat Tyler’s Rebellion” 91381).    

How This Might End.

Posted on by
Reply

            TRIGGER WARNING: This is just ignorance-based opinion, but it is firmly-held ignorance-based opinion. 

            Historically, the peoples of the Middle East have been pretty spineless and malleable.[1]  The Persians showed up, and people “Medized.”  The Greeks under that lunatic Alexander showed up, and people “Hellenized.”  The Romans showed up and it turns out that they had also kinda “Hellenized,” so people “Romanized.”  The Roman Empire become Christian, so people “Christianized.”  The Arabs-actually-from-Arabia showed up and people slowly abandoned Christianity and “Islamized.”[2]  Most recently, “Authoritarian” governments with tools borrowed from the West showed up.[3]  People “Authoritarianized.”  Someday, these places may “Democratize.”  Don’t hold your breath. 

            At least in modern times, the people of the Middle East aren’t a military people.  The armies of the Middle East haven’t been very good.[4]  This is explained by cultural factors, rather than being somehow genetic.  The enlisted men come from the peasantry, while the officers come from the idle rich.  The latter despise the former and don’t take their responsibilities seriously.[5]  HOWEVER, there is a very tough strand of fanaticism in Middle Eastern societies that is willing to fight to the last civilian, no matter how difficult the circumstances.  This trait has been on display in the Iran-Iraq War, the civil war in Iraq triggered by the American invasion, and the wars by Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel.  They just keep going no matter how hard the enemy pounds on them, no matter how many obvious defeats they suffer.  The current regime governing Iran may be cut from this same cloth. 

            Iran has engaged in massive, sustained deception while pursuing nuclear weapons for several decades.  So did Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.  Iran has been under severe economic sanction, off and on, for a long time.  Even when they make agreements, they don’t keep them.  Cyber-attacks, assassinations, and bombing don’t stop them.  They just sweep up the debris, cart off the bodies, and start work again. 

The outcome of “Trump’s War,” as the very cosmopolitan American media likes to refer to it, depends in part, on two things. 

First, Trump ordered the war, but the American military is waging the war.  How are they doing?  Iran’s air defenses have been largely destroyed.  Its ballistic missile and drone forces have been badly degraded, although not totally eliminated.  Its naval forces have been badly battered, with any vessels that could be used for laying mines in the sea lanes a primary target for attack.  Undoubtedly, American aircraft are relentlessly hunting any remaining missile forces and they are closely watching the long southern coastline of Iraq.  How far inland they have to watch depends on the effective range of whatever missile forces remain in Iran’s possession. 

Once these dangers are reduced to a tolerable level, then convoying of tankers can begin.  There would still need to be constant vigilance against Iran playing possum for a while, then starting to move new missiles down within range of the sea lanes.  Can land-based American aircraft in the Gulf States handle this mission?  In any event, the longer the war goes on, the more damaged Iran will suffer.  Maybe Iran will opt for a deal. 

Second, Donald Trump is a deal-maker.  He disliked the Obama administration’s deal with Iran,[6] so he tore it up in his first administration.  He put pressure on Iran to make a better deal.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  Joe Biden tried to revive the old agreement.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  In his second administration, Trump pressured Iran to make a deal.  Iran wouldn’t deal.  Trump joined Israel’s attack on the nuclear program.  Iran still wouldn’t deal, although they engaged in limited talks.  Trump launched the current attack.  He’s still looking for a deal. 

            What about “regime change”?  Trump doesn’t really want a US-imposed regime change.  No de-Bathification catastrophe on his watch.[7]  It’s difficult for Westerners to imagine that anyone in Iran supports this crazy, murderous dictatorship.  There is a good chance that many Iranians actually do support it, or fear the bloodshed of a civil war.  So, when Trump says he wants “regime change,” he really means “I want the regime to change” its behavior and course.  At least, that’s what he’ll claim afterward. 

What if he gets a deal?  Maximally or ideally, its terms should include no nuclear programs, no ballistic missiles, no support for proxies, no support for Russia in Ukraine, and co-operation with the United States on oil exports to China.  Minimally, its terms should be no nuclear programs.  No one can or should trust Iran to keep to any agreement.  There will have to be intrusive safeguards. 

What does Iran get?  An end to the bombing.  Maybe some sanctions relief depending on how much they change their behavior.  International inspectors all over the nuclear sites (broadly conceived) like a duck on a June-bug. 

What if Trump can’t get a deal?  Then finish up the bombing to clear the Straits of Hormuz, declare victory, and leave.  If Iran refuses a deal, the US can always come back and “mow the grass” (as Israel puts it) whenever necessary.  That’s cold, but a viable policy. 

For some time now, the United States has faced a loose coalition[8] of enemies: Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China.  American forces could defeat most (and maybe all) of them in a straight fight.  A war with any one of them would risk bringing all of them into a war, like a pack of wolves ganging up on an elk. The United States might have a hard time defeating all of them in a general war without going nuclear somewhere.  Now one of the coalition has been badly battered.  What are the larger implications of this short, brutal war? 

[1] Guy waving his arm at the back of the room: “What about all the gruesome stuff in the Old Testament?  That bastard Saul, for example.” 

[2] See the amusing anecdote about white silk socks in Robert Graves, Good-bye to All That. 

[3] Some are monarchical, some are republican; some are secular, some are Islamist.  All have secret police, information-control, and a “deep state” network of public and private power; sometimes they have a false-front and rigged representation of “the People.”    

[4] See: the Arab wars against Israel, the Iran-Iraq War, “Operation Desert Storm.”  

[5] After humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel in the “Six Days War” of 1967, the Egyptians asked the Soviet Union for help.  Russian military advisers told the leaders of the Egyptian Army to change course “or we are someone else finding to do job you are not doing, and you are maybe misfortunately getting shot, Da?”  The Egyptian Army then performed well in the October 1973 war.  After a while Henry Kissinger worked his magic and Egypt gave the Russkies the boot.  Egyptian soldiers then slid back into the comfortable old ways. 

[6] So did many other Republicans.  That’s why the agreement never became a treaty ratified by the Senate. 

[7] There’s been much discussion of the IRGC and the Basij paramilitaries as supporters of the regime.  There hasn’t been as much discussion of the Iranian Army.  If Israel does enough damage to the IRGC and the Basij, the army might be in a position to impose a change of course on the regime. 

[8] Germany, Italy, and Japan fought the Second World War as a loose coalition.  They all lost badly in the end.  They caused a lot of problems before they surrendered. 

My Weekly Reader 21 March 2026.

Posted on by
1

            Zionism is nationalism for Jews in places where Jews aren’t allowed to assimilate.  It began in the late Nineteenth Century and drew most of its followers from the anti-Semitic states of Eastern Europe.[1]  For the most part, Eastern European Jews preferred to emigrate to Western Europe or—best of all—the United States.  After the First World War, American immigration restrictions choked down on Eastern European immigrants of all varieties.  The Depression had much the same effect on Western Europe.  Then Hitler came to power in Germany.  Suddenly, British-ruled Palestine began to look attractive.  The British government “recognized” a Jewish Agency as the spokesman for the “Yishuv,” the Jews in Palestine. 

            Then came the Second World War.  Jewish emigration from Nazi-ruled Europe slowed to the occasional droplet.  Early German victories forced Britain to play offense from its back foot.  To this end, Britain had two “intelligence” organizations with a special interest in Nazi Europe.  The Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) fomented and supported resistance in occupied countries.  MI-9 tried to rescue the crews of downed British planes.  At first, they concentrated their work in Western Europe.  By 1944, they both had an interest in Eastern Europe. 

            While there were lots of agent candidates who knew Western Europe and its languages, equivalent people who were familiar with eastern Europe were thin on the ground.  Where to find people who could pass anonymously in Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia?   After a while, it occurred to someone that British Palestine had a bunch.  Here, the Jewish Agency had begun to learn of the Holocaust and wanted to know what might be done to help the besieged Jews.[2]  S.O.E., MI-9, and the Jewish Agency collaborated in recruiting 250 male and female volunteers; approving 150 of them for training; and sending 37 behind German lines.  They would be parachuted into Eastern Europe, where they would work with resistance movements, set up evasion lines for downed aircrew, and investigate the situation of the Jews. 

            By Spring 1944, the situation in the region had become highly unstable.  A revolt against the puppet-government of Slovakia was about to begin.  Traditional conservative nationalists struggled with fascists for control of Hungary.  The Red Army had made a dramatic advance westward in Spring and early Summer 1944.  If the Germans were pinned down by the Red Army, their allies in Hungary and Slovakia might be toppled.  Or not. 

            Most of the 37 parachuted in between March and September 1944.  Some fought with the Slovaks and some with the Yugoslav partisans, while some went to Budapest at the moment of the German coup to put the fascist Arrow Cross in power.  Twelve were captured and seven of these were executed.[3]  None of them accomplished their original missions.  Nevertheless, the effort has inspired interest.[4]  Why? 

            Perhaps because how we live our lives is more important than what we accomplish in them?  Courage and self-sacrifice are recurring themes in the world’s art, literature, and myth. 

[1] The Russian Empire, which then included most of Poland; Rumania; and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Subsequently, Poland and Hungary became independent states. 

[2] See: Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (1980) on the Yishuv’s incomprehension of the Holocaust. 

[3] Of the seven who were executed, the most famous is Hanna Szenes, a sort of Jewish Noor Inayat Khan. 

[4] Amos Ettinger, Blind Jump (1992); Judith Baumel-Schwartz, Perfect Heroes (2010); Taviva Ofer, Haviva Reick (2014); Matti Friedman, Out of the Sky (2026).   

The Argument for War with Iran.

Posted on by
Reply

            Currently, 89 percent of world energy use comes from high-carbon sources like oil.[1]  Whenever the “green transition” comes to energy, it won’t be for a long time yet. 

            Until then, the world economy runs on oil.  World prosperity runs on oil.  The economic, social, and political effects of supply disruptions and/or price spikes can be very great.[2]  Stepping back a bit, the economic crisis of the 1930s wrecked political democracy in Germany, nearly wrecked it in France and the United States, and subjected it to great stress in Great Britain.  What did we get from that? 

            The Middle East is one of the several great centers of oil and natural gas production in the world.  Whatever one thinks of the people running the carbon-producing countries of that region, peace and political stability in that region are much to be desired.  There is no hiving it off from the rest of the world economy.  The world has a single global oil market.  What happens in one oil producing region affects the price everywhere. 

            Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has been a Shi’ite theocratic dictatorship.  It has been anti-Western, anti-Sunni Muslim, anti-Israel.  For historical reasons, it has been especially anti-American.[3]  It has long pursued nuclear weapons, built a huge arsenal of missiles, and created proxy military groups in the Middle East.[4]  Taken all together, for many years Iran has been the creator and sustainer of many aspects of a multi-layered regional crisis.  A nuclear-armed Iran could destroy Israel, hold all the oil states hostage, and deter the US from putting its forces at risk in the region.  It posed a mortal threat to regional stability and the world economy. 

            But what to do about it?  President Obama did a deal with Iran.  The agreement offered Iran relief from international economic sanctions in exchange for a time-limited reduction in its nuclear effort.  It did not permanently end Iran’s nuclear program, nor limit its ballistic missiles, nor restrain Iranian proxies.  President Trump withdrew from the executive agreement, and re-imposed economic sanctions.  He also ordered the killing of Iran’s head terrorist as a warning shot.  President Biden tried to revive the Obama agreement, but the Iranians refused to play ball.  They drove ahead with their nuclear program, while winding-up and arming up Hamas in Gaza.  The latter effort spilled over in October 2023. 

            In Summer 2025, with Trump president once again, the United States and Israel launched a joint attack that badly damaged Iran’s nuclear program.  Trump offered to negotiate.  He wanted Iran’s nuclear effort permanently stopped, but he scaled back the demands on the missiles and the proxies.  Those negotiations dragged on.  The Iranians wanted the nukes and—apparently—believed that they could get the Americans bogged down in talks. 

            The Islamic Revolution has mismanaged the economy for decades.  Many younger people reject the state’s strict social rules.  Demonstrations have broken out again and again. 

            Trump made them an offer they shouldn’t have refused.  Maybe the regime will fall. 

[1] See: Global Energy Tracker | Council on Foreign Relations 

[2] See: 1970s energy crisis – Wikipedia  This is a useful introduction to some events and their effects, but barely scratches the surface. 

[3] In 1953, an Anglo-American engineered coup put the Shah back in power.  The Shah pursued a socially-disruptive modernization of the country while also stomping all over any sign of dissent.  Throughout this process, the Americans turned a blind eye to the abuses and rising discontent. 

[4] In Syria, in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Gaza, and in Yemen. 

Some American Opinion in Summer 2025.

Posted on by
Reply

            In late June 2025, 80 percent of Americans supported using vaccines to prevent diseases.  “Only” 20 percent opposed vaccines.[1]  Twenty percent still seems like a lot.  In September 2025, the figures remained essentially the same: 78 percent versus 22 percent.  In the September 2025 poll, the spectrum ranged from 93 percent of Democrats to 72 percent of Independents to 67 percent of Republicans.[2]  That’s a 26-point difference between Democrats and Republicans, so a yawning crevasse between the two major parties. 

On the one hand, the great majority of Americans approve of vaccines, regardless of party.  Arguably, RFK, Jr.’s crusade against vaccines is going to get him canned after the November 2026 mid-terms, if not before.  On the other hand, there’s a 21-point differences between Democrats and Independents as well as a 5-point difference between Independents and Republicans.  In short, Democrats ae near-unanimous on vaccines. Independents and Republics have a lot more unbelievers.  So, there’s the Democrats and there’s everyone else. 

            Since 2001 we’ve had the dot.com bubble, the housing bubble, the Perdue Pharma Oxycontin scandal, and the “China Shock.”   In 2021, 60 percent of Americans still had a favorable view of Capitalism.  Since then we’ve had the economic upheavals caused by Covid, AI, and a nasty bout of inflation.  Today only 54 percent view Capitalism favorably.[3]  That means that 46 percent disapprove of Capitalism or Don’t Know what they think. 

As with vaccines, there is a marked partisan divide.  Almost three-quarters (74 percent) of Republican have a favorable view of Capitalism, while only 42 percent of Democrats have a favorable view.  What’s the theoretical alternative to Capitalism?  Socialism!  Well, 57 percent of Americans disapprove of Socialism,[4] compared with 39 percent who take a favorable view. 

            Playing with the numbers a bit.  A little over half (54 percent) take a favorable view of Capitalism and almost the same share (57 percent) disapprove of Socialism. So, that’s one block.  It is largely Republican.  At the same time, 26 percent of Republicans either don’t approve of Capitalism (at least in its present form) or Don’t Know what they think.  How can you be a Republican and NOT approve of Capitalism?  Well, you could be a Republican for cultural issues that are more important to you than the economic system.  Say, on abortion or illegal immigration. 

In contrast, 42 percent of Democrats have a favorable view of Capitalism, while 58 percent have an unfavorable view or Don’t Know what they think.  It may be reasonable to conjecture that there is a big overlap between that 58 percent of Democrats who don’t have a favorable view of Capitalism and the 39 percent of Americans who have a favorable view of Socialism.  That leaves 19 percent who don’t approve of either Capitalism or Socialism. 

            It may mean that many Democrats and some Republicans favor a “reformed” Capitalism, rather than its present form.  That doesn’t mean that they support Socialism.  

            In any event, vaccines are more credible than is Capitalism.  You don’t see that much in the news.  Bound to be younger people who believe in Socialism.  The Future belongs to Them. 

[1] NBC News poll, reported in “Poll Watch,” The Week, 4-11 July 2025, p. 17. 

[2] NBC News poll reported in “Poll Watch,” The Week, 19 September 2025. 

[3] Gallup poll reported in “Poll Watch,” The Week, 19 September 2025, p. 17. 

[4] NO, that doesn’t mean that people who live in New York City aren’t Americans. 

The French War in Indochina, 1946 to 1954 Part 1B

Posted on by
Reply

The Backwater in a Global War. 

Developments in French Indochina depended on the course of the Second World War, in which the French colony played no important part.  In Summer 1940, Germany defeated France and drove the British off the Continent.  In this moment of crisis, the French Third Republic gave way to the “Vichy Regime.”  Germany held the whip hand over Vichy: the Germans occupied two-thirds of the country (and eventually all of it); retained hundreds of thousands of French P.O.W.’s; and ruthlessly exploited the French economy.  At home, Vichy pursued a “National Revolution,” while simultaneously trying to defend its overseas empire.  The latter proved to be difficult.  Dissident and colonial nationalists sought to engage the “Anglo-Saxons.”  Eventually, French possessions in the Levant, the South Pacific, and Africa all fell under the control of anti-Vichy forces. 

A variety of this larger pattern arose in French Indochina.  There, the colonial administration declared for Vichy.  Almost immediately, predators gathered.  In this case, it was Japan.  Japan had been at war in China since 1937.  As the Japanese campaign had bogged down short of a Chinese surrender, Japan had sought to cut off the sources of external aid to China.  These ran through British-ruled Burma and French-ruled Indochina.  The rise of German power in Europe came to pre-occupy British and French leaders.  Painfully aware of their own weaknesses, Britain and France increasingly sought to accommodate Japan in the Far East. 

Only meager French forces defended the colony.  The “Colonial Army” consisted of French soldiers of the all-volunteer force (sometimes called “Marines”) and regiments of indigenous troops under French officers.  In addition, there were three battalions of the Foreign Legion.  The regiments of indigenous troops—“Tirailleurs”–numbered about 48,000 men, the French and Legion troops numbered about 17,000 men.  Neither supplies nor new recruits reached Indochina after France’s defeat in 1940.  French air forces in Indochina totaled only about 100 planes, many of them obsolete.  The French Navy ships in Indochina consisted of a light cruiser and at least four corvettes. 

In July 1940, Governor Admiral Jean Decoux signed an agreement with Japan under duress.  It allowed Japan to station forces in Indochina and to transit through the territory for other operations.  Then Japan exploited France’s subordination to Japan’s ally Germany to extract more substantial concessions.  In September 1940, Japanese troops marched into the northern territory of Tonkin; less than a year later, in July 1941, they moved into southern Indochina.  Just as Vichy served as Germany’s puppet in the metropole, so did the French colonial administration serve as a Japanese puppet in Indochina.  Thereafter, French troops still manned the defenses; French bureaucrats still handled the pettifoggery; French businessmen and planters still managed the economy.  All was done under the suspicious gaze of the Japanese.[1] 

Already in control of much of China, from late 1941 to mid-1942, Japan’s military over-ran a vast swath of territory belonging to the Western powers.  British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the American Philippines, and a host of islands to the south and east all passed under Japanese rule.  French Indochina lay isolated at the center of the Japanese empire.  Then the tide of Japanese victory began to ebb, as did that if its ally Germany.  By Summer 1944, the final outcome of the war seemed as certain as can be in anything so risky and surprising as war.  The Anglo-Americans liberated France and joined the Soviet Union in the direct assault on Germany.  A long string of American victories in the Pacific had destroyed Japanese naval power and brought American bombers within range of the Home Islands. 

A footnote to these great events appeared in the effort by the government of liberated France to assert its control over French Indochina.  In 1940, Winston Churchill had ordered the creation of a new organization to assist anti-German resistance movements in Europe.  This “Special Operations Executive” (S.O.E.) then added a Far Eastern element (Force 136) to work against the Japanese.  In later 1944 and 1945, Force 136 airdropped 40 French “Jedburghs”[2] into northern Indochina.  These men had exciting adventures, but made little difference on the ground. 

More importantly, Governor Admiral Decoux grew restive under Japanese control as Japan’s own doom drew near.  He made contact with the new government in France; he began to prepare an uprising against the Japanese; and he refused to turn over to the Japanese American Navy fliers downed during a carrier raid in the South China Sea. 

The carrier raid into the South China Sea alarmed the already-edgy local Japanese commander.[3]  He feared an imminent American invasion of Indochina and had some knowledge of Decoux’s preparation for a French uprising.  The Japanese Army began moving troops from surrounding areas into Indochina, almost doubling the size of the occupation force by the end of February 1945.  They spread out to key positions around the country.  On 9 March 1945, after obtaining permission from the government in Tokyo, Japanese troops in Indochina swarmed over the French garrisons around the colony.  The French fought in a number of places, but all resistance had ended by mid-March 1945.  As often had been the case during the Japanese offensive wave of 1941-1942, victories were accompanied by massacres of their defeated opponents. 

            The Vietnam Famine of 1944-1945.[4] 

            The global war weighed heavily upon political events in Indochina.  The same can be said of other, non-political events.  So, too, did other larger forces. 

            Coastal Vietnam had long suffered from droughts, floods, and typhoons.  All of these threatened the food supply.  Before the French arrived, the government had created rice storehouses.  French construction of a north-south coastal railroad drew part of its motivation from the desire to move food from the Mekong in the south to the central coast and mountains.  The French also built substantial flood control and irrigation infrastructure.  During the Depression of the 1930s, the French colonial administration had encouraged the cultivation of cash crops.  This did not seriously harm food production. 

The war seriously disrupted the rice market.  For one thing, the French government had imposed a mandatory government purchasing system which fixed a price paid to producers for the rice.[5]  The producer price remained fixed, while the sale price of rice on the market soared.  Ordinary peasants could not purchase enough rice to feed their families or plant for the next season.[6]  For another thing, the Japanese Army fed itself off local food production.  The presence of an eventual total of 140,000 Japanese troops meant that there were many more mouths to feed.  Moreover, the Japanese had the determination and the means to see that their troops got adequately fed, regardless of who else did not.  The food supply available for civilians shrank, while the market price rose.  Military factors compounded the difficulties.  The Japanese commandeered all sea vessels of more than 30 tons displacement.  Off and on, American planes attacked coastal shipping and the north-south railroad.  These attacks further disrupted the shipment of food to the hardest-hit areas.  Famine became widespread in the north during 1945. 

            The “Empire of Vietnam.” 

            A knock-on effect of the Japanese coup against the French came in the creation of a new “puppet state,” this one led by Vietnamese.  It marked the first play of the nationalist card as a device to maintain outside control.  It would not be the last. 

On 11 March 1945, two days after the Japanese “coup” began, the Emperor Bao Dai read a speech prepared for him by a minor[7] Japanese official.  He declared independence for the “Empire of Vietnam,” with himself as the head of state.  Two chief tasks preoccupied the emperor for the next six months.  First, the political structures of the new nation had to be created.  Second, Tonkin and Annam remained administratively separate from Cochinchina.  His government pursued national unification. 

As a first order of business, Bao Dai appointed Tran Trong Kim as his prime minister.[8]  Tran, in turn, began assembling a cabinet.  It would be considered a cabinet of “technical experts,” rather than a collection of representatives of any particular political outlook.[9] 

The work of the brief Tran Trong Kim government reminds one of the “Professors’ Parliament” of Germany during the Revolution of 1848-1849.  At the same time, they had no knowledge of future external events that would shape political developments.  For them, the cliché “the fog of war” was very real.  All the war news brought ill-tidings for Japan.  Who could tell when the roof would fall in?  On the other hand, France had been wrecked by the war and the Vietnamese had seen the French in Indochina humbled.  Real independence might well be within reach, particularly if it had the support of the Americans and the Nationalist Chinese.  What was worth doing that might set the stage for future developments?  The emperor, his prime minister, and the cabinet spent several months figuring out what to try to do in the very uncertain conditions. 

By the second half of June 1945, they were ready to take the next steps.  The Emperor created four committees: a “National Consultative Committee”; a committee on a constitution; a committee on basic administrative systems (administrative reform, legislation, and finance); and a committee on education.  They also worked on fostering a sense of national identity.  They designed a flag and  they renamed the country’s regions.  The set up a committee to pick national heroes for inclusion in a “Temple of Martyrs,” city streets were renamed from the French colonial names.  In some places French statues were torn down to remove a reminder of French triumphalism over the indigenous population. 

The Justice Minister amnestied some of the political prisoners held by the French.  They proclaimed freedom of the press.  A tide of anti-French publications flowed in.  Later, the criticism would turn against the emperor’s government.  The government, made up of middle-aged men, sought to mobilize “Youth” for the national cause.  Physical training and small-group organization presaged the formation of military units.  Sometimes “Youth” had other ideas.  Very soon the university at Hanoi became a hotbed of political activism. 

The second axis of effort for the “Empire of Vietnam” lay in creating territorial unity.  The French had established a “colony” in Cochinchina in the far south; then had established “protectorates” over Annam in the center and Tonkin in the north.  When the Japanese had prompted the declaration of independence by the “Empire of Vietnam” in March 1945, they had allowed Bao Dai authority over only Tonkin and Annam.  Cochinchina, far closer to the approaching enemy, remained under direct Japanese control.   Bao Dai insisted that the Japanese engage in negotiations to complete the unification of the country. 

In May and June 1945, Bao Dai’s Foreign Minister Tran Van Chuong eroded the Japanese resistance.  Eventually, in July, the Japanese yielded.  They agreed to begin the process of uniting Cochinchina with Annam and Tonkin.  Under normal conditions, this would have been a substantial victory for Indochinese nationalism.  Conditions weren’t normal. 

Most importantly, the famine entered its most severe stage in late 1944 and continued to wreak havoc through mid-1945.  Committees, flags, and formalities of diplomacy disappeared in significance when people could see the streets littered with emaciated corpses.  The inability of the “Empire of Vietnam” to respond effectively undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of many Vietnamese. 

This is not to say that the government stood around with its hands in its pockets.  However, the government’s response was confused.  The government liberalized the regulations on the rice trade to encourage entrepreneurs to buy and transport rice and the Minister of Supply was ordered to Saigon to co-ordinate famine aid.  It also worked against liberalization by imposing new controls on prices and stockpiles and it created a “Northern Economic Intelligence Service” to crack-down on smuggling.  The crux of the matter lay in the fall off in the rice harvest combined with the Japanese primacy in feeding their troops.  Eventually, the crisis eased, but not from government efforts.  Good harvests returned in May and June 1945, and—as a result of the famine–there being many fewer mouths left to feed.  Estimates vary between half a million and two million deaths during the famine.  Fairly or unfairly, the “Empire of Vietnam” bore much of the blame in the eyes of ordinary people. 

The “Empire of Vietnam” held no monopoly on organizing for the future.  When the Japanese overthrew French rule, the Viet Minh took action.  Hanoi and the port of Haiphong in the north, Saigon in the south, and Hue in the center formed the essential Japanese goals.  Japanese forces had little presence in the countryside beyond guarding lines of supply.  Beyond that, they wanted things quiet at a low cost to themselves.  They expected the “Empire of Vietnam” to maintain orderly government that did not interfere with Japanese activities.  For the Viet Minh, opportunity knocked. 

In a meeting in Hanoi in the third week of April 1945, the Viet Min’s Tonkin Revolutionary Military Conference struck a militant nationalist pose that set it apart from the cautious gradualism of the “Empire of Vietnam.”  They made a rhetorical call for resistance—an uprising, guerrilla war–against the Japanese. 

The Viet Minh had no real military force to speak of.  Much attention has focused on the group of soldiers from the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) who parachuted into northern Vietnam on 16 and 29 July 1945.  The set about creating a training program for Viet Minh recruits.  They also provided the weapons for several hundred Viet Minh soldiers.  However, they only remained in Vietnam until the end of August.  In all likelihood, much more help came from several hundred Japanese soldiers, either prisoners or deserters from the Japanese Army, who served with and advised the Viet Minh.  In any event, the Viet Minh didn’t do much fighting against the Japanese.  They didn’t have the forces for it. 

The real focus of their efforts lay toward the future.  They called for independence from France.  They denounced the “Empire of Vietnam” as a Japanese puppet.  They created seven military districts.  The countryside lay open before them.  Faced with famine, the Viet Minh led peasants in the seizure and distribution of the contents of 75-100 warehouses full of rice.  They intimidated tax collectors.  None of this did much to ease the famine, but it was dramatic and visible.  In contrast, the actions of the government were bureaucratic and veiled.  Many a peasant must have said “At least the Viet Minh did something!”  Peasant recruits began to come in.[10]  Like Bao Dai’s government, the Viet Minh wanted to lay the foundation for action in the near future. 

[1] The Japanese left it to the French to stamp out local revolt (Cochinchina, November-December 1940).   

[2] There are several academic books on the ”Jeds,” but you’re best served by consulting David Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Center for Military History, 1992).  See: Wayback Machine 

[3] On the raid, see: South China Sea raid – Wikipedia 

[4] Geoffrey Gunn, Rice Wars in Colonial Vietnam: The Great Famine and the Viet Minh Road to Power (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014) is deeply researched. 

[5] This was an extension of the wartime farm price purchasing system adopted in metropolitan France.  There it led to an extensive black market. 

[6] The government price for 1943 was 1.4 piastres/10 kilograms.  The market price rose to 6-7 piastres in mid-1944.  During the height of the famine in 1945, the market price rose to 60-70 piastres/10 kilograms. 

[7] Minor in the scheme-of-things.  I’m sure that Yokoyama Seiko, the Minister of Economic Affairs at the Japanese diplomatic mission, gloried in his elevated position. 

[8] On Tran, see: Tran Trong Kim – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 

[9] The article on Tran, Tran Trong Kim – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, lists the cabinet members with links to the biographies in the Vietnamese Wikipedia. 

[10] There is another aspect to the famine that is worth exploring.  What social and psychological effects did the famine have on the worst-hit area? The famine was concentrated in the north.  This area became the base of the Viet Minh.  Doubtless, much of this depended upon proximity to China.  The Chinese Communist Party could offer some support and shelter to Indochinese Communists.  Covert travel to Annam and Cochinchina would be much more difficult.  Still, the failings of the Bao Dai government’s response would have been stark in the north, less so in the south.  Moreover, all the deaths would have torn apart families and villages.  Networks of social and intergenerational support—and obligation or duty—would have broken down.  Parents, wives, siblings, children would have died.  Perhaps many young men lost all the ‘hostages to fortune” that held them in place in their village.  Why not go to the forests and find a Cause for which they could fight?   From starvation to depression: unveiling the link between the great famine and late-life depression – PMC 

The First Indochina War, 1946-1954. Part 1C

Posted on by
Reply

            Introduction. 

            The First Indochina War (1946-1954) sprang from the collision between Indochinese desires and French whim.  On the one hand, there existed a long-standing and deeply-rooted desire among the people of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) for independence from French rule.[1]  Many elements divided the people of Indochina about what to put in place of French rule.  They disagreed about whether to seek complete independence or membership in a “French Union”; whether to fight or to negotiate; whether to create a Communist or a non-Communist state.  These questions had not been resolved in 1945 and would not be resolved for many years. 

On the other hand, the French emerged from the Second World War humiliated and confused about what the future held for their country.  They clung to empire as a way to not be shoved further downhill, while also fumbling toward a new and different France.[2] 

The war began in a haphazard and improvised kind of way.  As the Second World War drew to a sudden end in Summer 1945, the British, Americans, and Soviets had agreed that France was to be restored to power in Indochina.  It would be hard to do.  Japanese troops occupied Indochina.  The Japanese had replaced the French colonial system with several puppet-states.  The most important of these was the “Empire of Vietnam” led by the compliant Emperor Bao Dai.  The French military had been disarmed.  Indochinese nationalist groups of various stripes had been tolerated.  It would take time for the French to get even modest forces to Indochina.  In the meantime, foreigners—China and Britain–had to assume responsibility for the immediate occupation of French Indochina.  Neither country wanted to be embroiled there for long.  Each had their own attitudes toward European empires.  The realities opened a window of opportunity for the nationalists.  Blood soon flowed.  

Potsdam. 

In July-August 1945, the British, American, and Soviet leaders met in Potsdam, Germany to confer on important post-war matters.[3]  The fate of French Indochina did not rise to the level of an “important” matter.  However, the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff did devote some attention to the question.  The French had offered to send two army Divisions to the Far East.  The Chiefs agreed to accept this offer.  It would take some time to move the troops to Asia.  If the war were to end before their arrival, the Combined Chiefs agreed that troops from the Army of Kuomintang China would move in to accept the Japanese surrender north of the 16th Parallel, while troops from the British-led Southeast Asia command would do the same south of the 16th parallel.[4] 

            From Plans to Action, August 1945. 

On 6 August 1945, the Americans atom-bombed Hiroshima; on 8 August, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and immediately invaded Manchuria; and on 9 August the Americans atom-bombed Nagasaki.  On 15 August 1945, Japan’s resistance ended with the Emperor Hirohito’s announcement of Japan’s surrender.  American troops began arriving in Japan on 28 August.  The formal surrender took place on 2 September 1945. 

Japan’s “surprise surrender” ended the war, but it caught the Allies before they had all of their preparations for Indochina completed.[5]  While they hastened to launch their occupation of the two zones, local actors took matters into their own hands.  Among them was Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Communist-dominated Viet Minh.[6] 

In early August 1945, only a tiny handful of people in the United States and Britain knew the technology of the “atom bomb” and hundreds of thousands of Japanese knew the reality of it.  Most people remained in the dark.  They did know that something terrible had been done to the Japanese.  That, combined with the Soviet entry into the war, was driving Japan toward surrender.  In southeast Asia, the end of the war would come within a few days or a few weeks. 

Ho Chi Minh meant to make the most of the ending of Japanese command in Indochina before the French could return to power.  Even before Japan had announced its surrender (and probably before he knew anything of the decisions taken at the Potsdam Conference, Ho had begun preparations to seize power in as much of Indochina as possible.  Here he built upon the steps taken in response to the Japanese occupation of March to August 1945. 

As a first step, Ho sought to rally all the Indochinese nationalist groups under a single banner.  On 13 August 1945, representatives of several groups joined the Viet Minh at Ho’s headquarters in Tan Trao, in the mountains north of Hanoi.  They had a busy few days: on 14 August 1945, they created a “National Insurrection Committee” dominated by the Viet Minh; over the next few days they called for a national uprising, convened a “National People’s Congress,” and created a “National Liberation Committee” with Ho as its chairman.  Realizing (or at least suspecting) that foreign power might assist the French in re-establishing their power. Ho argued for rapid action.  He wanted to both seize urban centers of power and to mobilize the peasantry. 

Ho and the others had to maneuver around certain realities.  First, there remained a large French population in the major cities.  The French in Indochina had been abandoned by Vichy France.  Their army had been soundly defeated by the Japanese, who had taken over the administration of the country.  The Japanese had created an Indochinese puppet regime under Bao Dai, but had tolerated some activity by other nationalist groups.  Humiliated and enraged by their wartime experiences, the local French would welcome the return of French troops and French power with open arms.  They were spoiling for a fight to watch. 

Second, the Japanese Army remained a potent military force if they cared to use it and for some limited time to come.  The Japanese forces were, like the French, defeated, humiliated, demoralized, and eager to go home.  They were not necessarily anti-Viet Minh, so they might be a help to the Viet Minh.  They were to be disarmed.  Could the Viet Minh get possession of some of their weapons in order to arm themselves?  At the same time, the Japanese were a powerful irritant of Indochinese nationalism.  At least limited conflict with the Japanese could bolster the Viet Minh’s nationalist credentials. 

Third, the Viet Minh was much stronger in Tonkin in the north than in Cochinchina in the south.  In the south, a complex mix of royalists and religion-based groups rivaled the Viet Minh for leadership of the nationalist cause.[7]  They had, so far, resisted all the Viet Minh’s blandishments.  They were far away from the Viet Minh’s base of power.  Ho didn’t want a civil war if it could be avoided.  The Viet Minh might lose. 

Ho opted to roll the dice.  The Viet Minh went into action all across Tonkin and wherever they could manage in Annam and Cochinchina.  What followed came to be called the “August Revolution.”  On 19 August 1945, Viet Minh troops marched into Hanoi, seizing key sites.  Other Viet Minh troops seized other places around Tonkin.  On 20 August, at Thai Nguyen, north of Hanoi, they got into a fight with Japanese troops.  Thai Nguyen had a fort built by the French and now garrisoned by the Japanese.  The Viet Minh were too lightly armed to make headway against the fortifications or its well-armed defenders.  At the same time, no one on the Japanese side wanted to be the last man killed in a lost war.  After five days of desultory skirmishing, the two sides reached an agreement.  The Japanese would confine themselves to the fort and the Viet Minh would take control of the rest of the town.  The Viet Minh publicized this as a Japanese “surrender” and a Viet Minh “victory.” 

Elsewhere, the Viet Minh appeared to have the wind at their back.  On 22 August, in Saigon, the Japanese commander told two representatives of the Viet Minh that Japanese forces would not interfere with their actions.  On 23 August, in the old imperial capital of Hue, the Viet Minh seized power.  On 25 August, Bao Dai abdicated, transferring power to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.  He became a “counselor” to Ho.  That is, he was a captive and a puppet. 

Viet Minh leadership had the least sure grip in Cochinchina.  There, multiple anti-communist nationalist groups had deeper roots and more support.  These included two religious movements with political objectives, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai.[8]  Although the Viet Minh had claimed power in Hanoi, it wasn’t clear that they could hold onto it. 

On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed a new “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” and declared independence from France.  This first-draft of the DRV would soon be scribbled-out by more powerful forces.  However, it showed Ho’s speed of action when he saw an opportunity.  The future would give evidence for his tenacity. 

[1] David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925. (University of California Press, 1971); William Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941 (Cornell University Press, 1976). 

[2] Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 (Cambridge University Press, 1989). 

[3] Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton University Press, 1960); Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  On Feis, see: Herbert Feis – Wikipedia 

[4] See: Historical Documents – Office of the Historian; Historical Documents – Office of the Historian; Historical Documents – Office of the Historian; Historical Documents – Office of the Historian.     

[5] Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia (Random House, 2007), pp. 73-137, provides a first-rate scholarly analysis of events in Southeast Asia and particularly of French Indochina.   

[6] Biographies of Ho include Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography (Random House, 1968); William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life (Hyperion, 2001); and Pierre Brocheux, Ho Chi Minh: A Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 

[7] A small group of Trotskyists also existed chiefly in the south.  There could be no serious bargaining with these people.  They would have to be killed. 

[8] On these groups, see: Bernard Fall, “The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam,” Pacific Affairs, v. 28, #3 (September 1955), pp. 235-253; David W. P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: revolution and social change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975 (M.E. Sharpe, 2003).