The Authoritarian Handbook–IV.

We have spoken of the crimes of the “old authoritarians,” whether open or masked.  What of their achievements?  For these hold the key to understanding the “effective authoritarian.”  It can’t be just blood, toil, tears, and snot if the “authoritarian” regime is to last.  The years from 1850 to 1914 are a catalogue of “Dos” and “Don’ts” for “authoritarians” of our own day.[1] 

Who are the model “authoritarians” of the period?  The French Emperor Louis Napoleon III (r. 1850-1870).  The Russian Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855-1881).  The “German,” more accurately Prussian, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (g. 1863-1890).   These three men represent the highest plane of the modern pre-Great War “authoritarian.”  Other men of the time stand on a somewhat lower plane.  The Sardinian, then Italian, prime minister Camillo, Count Cavour (g. 1852-1861) is one.  The American President Abraham Lincoln (g. 1861-1865) is another.[2] 

There were many other “authoritarians” or “aspiring authoritarians.” As we will see, they were of the old type.  Some sought to rule without check on their power, but also without any larger purpose in mind.  Some sought to use modern methods to hold back necessary changes.  Their successes and failures need not detain us. 

What did “authoritarian” regimes achieve with their power? 

Peace, first of all.  Certainly not absolute or universal peace.  The 19th Century was drenched in blood.  It was mostly the blood of Africans and Arabs and Asians and the Wild Indians of North America.  The Civil War among the Americans offers a striking exception to this rule.[3]  Comparatively little blood fell on European battle fields.

In comparison to the frequent and lengthy wars of the 18th and early 19th centuries, the wars fought between 1815 and 1914 were few and of short duration.  In 1849, war pitted the Austrian and Russian Empires against the rebellious Hungarians; in 1855, France and Britain fought the Russians; in 1859, France and Sardinia attacked (and the French defeated) the Austrians; in 1863 Prussia and the Austrians defeated the Danes; in 1866, Prussia defeated the Austrians; and in 1870, Prussia and its German allies defeated France. 

Peace all the same.  War between the major European states halted. There was no general war, no prolonged war, no devastating war.  Particularly in the last third of the 19th Century and the first decade of our own century, disputes were settled in diplomatic conferences.  No wrecked cities, no grieving widows and orphans, no mangled veterans cadging tips on street corners.  These “no”s are the invisible monuments raised in every farm village and factory town.   


[1] Often is the question posed: “Why don’t people learn from History?”  This is nonsensical.  People DO learn from History.  They learn from their own History—that is, experience subjected to consideration.  What man has hit his thumb with a hammer more than two or three times?  People of experience try to convey “lessons” to others (often their bored progeny) in the form of maxims: “Never try to fill an inside straight”; “You hold a woman around the waist and a bottle around the neck, not the other way around”; “Work hard and save your money, it’s going to be a hard winter” (said in any season); “A gun is always loaded until you know it isn’t, so always check in the breech”; “Without Love and a little fun, life isn’t worth living”; and “If you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss stares into you.”  Thus, harsh experience teaches lessons to Individuals.  However, there is no mechanism for determining agreed “Lessons of History” for an entire community, nor for transmitting them from one generation to the next.  Everyone derives his own lessons. 

[2] It is to be admitted that Lincoln’s government drew much of its character from the necessities of a great war.  It is impossible to know what might have been if he had continued his presidency into a full second term or even a third.  Nothing in the American Constitution bars a president from seeking more than a second term. 

[3] In light of our thesis on the attributes of “authoritarian” government, it is interesting that this great struggle took place between two democracies. 

The Authoritarian Handbook–I.

           Excerpt from “The Authoritarian Handbook,” by Lewis Galleani and Irwin Kern (1922). 

            What are some hallmarks of an Authoritarian regime? 

First, a “President for Life.”

Second, a cowed judiciary.

Third, a legislature with a pro-government majority engineered by a combination of the disfranchisement of a part of the population and urban political “machines” based on government patronage.

Fourth, a government bureaucracy eating away at the prerogatives of the legislature and the courts.

Fifth, an idealization of the simple and honest life found in rural populations, in contrast to the depravity of the big cities.

Sixth, the justification of radical departures from traditional policies by the invocation of “crisis” and “necessity knows no law.”

Seventh, in a severe crisis, the imprisonment without trial of alleged “enemies of the nation.” 

Turk’s Head Knot 2.

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic by Mustapha Kemal, the military has been the guardian of the secular, Western-oriented policy laid down by “Ataturk.”  On many occasions, most recently in 1997, this has led to military coups against elected leaders.  When Recep Tayyip Erdogan first came to power in Turkey in 2003, he presented himself as the champion of a democratic Islamism.[1]  However, he took care to cripple the ability of the military to intervene in politics.  His efforts included what is now recognized to have been a faked prosecution of military leaders for planning a supposed coup in 2008.  After 2011, je also supported the Egyptian Islamist Mohammad Morsi of Egypt, another democratically elected leader.  Morsi had faced down Egypt’s military dictatorship for a time.  When, in 2013, the Egyptian generals overthrew Morsi, Erdogan had to give thought to his own desperate position.  Since 2013, Erdogan has been on a rampage as he sought to shore up his claim on power.

In mid-July 2015, some members of the military of the Turkish Republic got fed up with President Erdogan and tried to overthrow him.  They missed their punch.  Not the least part of the key to Erdogan’s survival came in the support he received from pro-democracy opposition parties.  Ever since, there has been Hell to pay.

The failed coup will have a tremendous impact within Turkey.  Erdogan has launched a sweeping purge that targets the military, the bureaucracy, the schools, and the kinda-free media.  Alleging involvement in the coup, Erdogan has either dismissed from employment or arrested thousands of people.  He has bruited it about that his one-time ally Fethullah Gulen conspired in the coup.  The American reluctance to extradite Gulen on what may well be specious charges adds fuel to the fire of Erdogan’s rising hostility to the United States.  Turkey is in danger of becoming a “normal” Middle Eastern country.

What impact will these events have in the region?  Since 2011, Erdogan has opposed Bashar al-Assad of Syria.[2]  Turkey has provided the chief conduit for foreign-fighters of all ideological commitments to reach Syria.  Turkey has provided the main road for supplies from elsewhere (i.e. Saudi Arabia) to reach those who are willing to fight against Assad.  This seems to have included many people bound for the ISIS caliphate.

Erdogan has turned even more emphatically against Turkey’s Western allies.  He had already unleashed a tidal wave of Syrian (and other) refugees on Western Europe in order to extract various concessions from the Europeans.  Even more dramatically, Erdogan’s government has accused the United States of complicity in the failed coup.

Furthermore, Erdogan has shifted his stance on the civil war in Syria.  He has sought to mend fences with the Russians.  The Turkish air force pilots who shot down a Russian strike-fighter over a penny-ante invasion of Turkish air space in November 2015 have suddenly found themselves accused of involvement in the coup.  Erdogan’s sweeping purge of the military leadership has dragged down the commander of the Second Army, which controls the border with Syria and Iraq, along with many of his subordinates.

The Assad government might hope that the Turkish supply route for fighters may be closed, while the anti-Assad government might fear that their main supply route would be cut.  So, the Russo-Assad alliance took heart.  They launched a long-prepared assault to cut the last life-lines into Aleppo.  In desperation, many of the rebel groups combined to launch their own counter-attack.  It continues, with little chance of success.

[1] Yaroslav Trofimov, “Political Foes Stood by Leader,” WSJ, 18 July 2016.

[2] Yaroslav Trofimov, “Upheavals in Turkey Threatens Rebels in Syria,” WSJ, 5 August 2016.