Tag Archives: Biden Administration China policy

The Asian Century 19.

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            The Trump Administration decided to deal with the puzzle of how to manage the ascent of the Peoples Republic of China by hammering the living daylights out of China.[1]  China runs a big trade surplus with the United States, so Trump slammed on heavy tariffs.  The payment asymmetry meant that the Chinese could never hurt the United States as much by reciprocating. 

China has long-standing claims on Taiwan, now a more or less democratic and economically successful country of its own.  The Trump Administration diverged from long-standing American policy on Taiwan by warming up to it. 

China has been extending claims over the South China Sea, notably by turning reefs into fortified islands, then claiming the airspace overhead.  The Trump Administration challenged these claims, but also pressed Congress to build up the Navy. 

China has engaged in a long-running struggle for American hearts and minds.  The Trump Administration turned the FBI and Department of Justice loose on Chinese theft of intellectual property; then did the same on China’s efforts to cultivate agents of influence in academia and media. 

            However, the most effective Chinese agents of influence, during the Trump Administration and long before, were American businessmen who profited from the China trade.  They have always argued for “moderation” and “dialogue” in China policy.  Sometimes, President Trump listened to them, as did many of his predecessors.  At times, he seemed to be seeking a “Grand Bargain” with China in which China would mend its ways in return for the United States easing up its pressure.  Any such hopes crashed on the rocks of the Covid-19 pandemic and Trump’s re-election campaign.  The “Kung Flu” line allowed him to blame China for the pandemic without acknowledging his own lackluster response.[2]  American policy on China got tougher during 2016. 

            Tougher didn’t mean more effective.  The Peoples Republic of China continues on the same path as before.  That leaves the Biden Administration with an array of important decisions.  Is “Get Tough With China” the wrong policy?  In that case, one could expect an abandonment of coercion in favor of a return to older policies.  Is “Get Tough With China” the right policy, but it hasn’t had enough time to work yet to change the behavior of such a formidable rival?  In that case, one could expect a continuation of the path we’re on, dressed up with rhetorical distancing from the Trump Administration.  Is “Get Tough With China” the right policy, but the Trump Administration didn’t go far enough?  In that case, one could expect the addition of tight controls on further American investment in China, ugly quarrels in various international organizations, and port-calls by the U.S. Navy all over the region. 

            Other questions naturally follow.  How much stress can either country take?  Does Zi Jinping represent a consensus of Chinese leaders?  If not, how solid is his grip on power? 

[1] Josh Rogin, Chaos Under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the Twenty-First Century (2021), reviewed by Dan Blumenthal, WSJ, 12 May 2021. 

[2] Yet uncertainty remains whether Trump was entirely wrong about the origins of the pandemic.  See: Michael Gordon, Warren P. Strobel, and Drew Hinshaw, “Report on Wuhan Lab Fuels Covid-19 Debate,” WSJ, 24 May 2021; Jeremy Page, Betsy McKay, and Drew Hinshaw, “The Wuhan Lab Leak Debate: Disused Mine at Center Stage,” WSJ, 25 May 2021. 

The Asian Century 18.

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            How “hawkish” on China does President Biden want to be?  Between the election and inauguration, observers recognized that the Democratic foreign policy establishment is divided.  On the one hand, there is the global issues[1] faction that deprecates great power competition as a diversion from key future developments.  On the other hand, there are the traditionalists who see a strong United States as the leader in a movement to create a rules-based international order that can shackle “evil doers.”   China would provide a first test of which faction had the upper hand. 

            The Biden administration has moved quickly to confront the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC).[2]  It invited Taiwan’s chief diplomatic representative to Biden’s inauguration; it announced that it would sell weapons to Taiwan; it fended off a Chinese suggestion of talks in the near future by pleading the need to consult allies; it endorsed the Trump administration’s position that China’s Uighur minority art the target of genocide[3]; and allowed the voyage of a naval force to the South China Sea to go forward. 

            On the surface, there is much to like about Biden’s assertion of traditional forms of American power.  At the same time, previous practitioners would warn that it is all too easy to get into an escalating cycle of actions.[4]    

            If Zi wants tough action and not just tough talk, he could order some kind of military demonstration.  Perhaps China could whack the Indians along their common border, as they did in late January, or fly war planes into Taiwan’s air defense zone, as they also did.  The trouble is that such action might bring forth some new action by the Americans.  This, in turn, would require some further response.

The alternative of doing nothing but talk tough in response would be tricky for Zi Jinping.  It could signal weakness or uncertainty to people inside and outside China.  Zi could easily survive foreign perceptions, because he could calmly wait on the growth of Chinese power while looking for safe opportunities to demonstrate it.  Could he survive domestic perceptions of weakness?  Is he sure enough of his position?  Are his rivals sufficiently contained, his enemies imprisoned?[5]  In this case, a renewed round of domestic repression would serve a dual purpose.  On the one hand, it would offer a chance to weed out suspected weak links and dissidents.  On the other hand, human rights is now an entrenched American foreign policy concern.  So, domestic brutality would be both a way of shoring up Zi’s own position while openly defying one of American foreign policy’s stated goals.  What are the Americans going to do about it?  Sovereign countries can pretty much get away with doing whatever they want inside their own borders.  It’s one of the privileges of sovereignty. 

One might expect that Zi will opt for a policy of domestic toughness, notably against any “nationalists” who questions his toughness abroad.  Meanwhile, the US and the PRC probably will continue strengthening their positions.  Perhaps they will find a way out. 

[1] Climate change first of all, but then human rights, migration, and—now—pandemic disease. 

[2] Walter Russell Mead, “Can Biden Find Clarity on China and Russia?” WSJ, 14 December 2020; Mead, “Biden’s Opening Salvo on Beijing,” WSJ, date misplaced. 

[3] Biden had said the same thing on the campaign trail before his election. 

[4] For a scary, real-world example, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef7f9v2HEl0 

[5] In all fairness, it usually took a long series of reverses before a Chinese emperor was said to have lost the “Mandate of Heaven.”