At the end of the war in Europe, France posed the greatest problem for American diplomacy in Western Europe.  Wartime actions, such as the American policy toward the collaborationist Vichy regime, embittered post-war relationships.[1]  While the United States had recognized and maintained diplomatic relations with the governments-in-exile of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, the same recognition had not been granted to the movement led by Charles de Gaulle.  Instead, the United States had maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy government until November 1942.[2]  Even after breaking with Vichy, while the United States had used Lend-Lease to arm an ever-larger number of French troops, the United States had sought alternatives to De Gaulle.[3]  The chosen partners of the Americans, Admiral Darlan and General Giraud, had proved frail reeds.  On 3 June 1944, De Gaulle’s Committee of National Liberation declared itself the Provisional Government of France.  After the Normandy invasion began, increasingly large chunks of liberated France were transferred to the Provisional Government, rather than placed under an Allied Government of Occupied Territories, as the French professed to fear.  When French and American troops liberated Paris in August 1944, internal Resistance leaders demonstrated their support for de Gaulle.  The American position became untenable even in the eyes of President Roosevelt.  Only then, in October 1944, did the United States extend formal recognition to the Gaullist movement.  Even so, many foreign observers doubted that the new government possessed solid political backing over the long term.[4] 

Resolving one problem opened another problem.  Did recognition of the Gaullist movement as the government of France mean that France should be considered once again a “great power”?  The British thought so; the Russians thought not; and the Americans, heaving a sigh, agreed with the British.  In December 1944, de Gaulle went to Moscow to make his case and to sign an alliance treaty against Germany.  Stalin found de Gaulle “not very realistic” and made him watch American movies all one evening.  Nevertheless, Stalin agreed to assign to France one of the five permanent seats on the Security Council of the proposed United Nations.  Still, France did not receive an invitation to either the Yalta Conference (February 1945) or the Potsdam Conference (July 1945).[5]  It did, however, get an occupation zone in Germany[6] and membership in the Council of Foreign Ministers that would write the post-war peace treaties. 

Did France possess the real resources to act as a great power?  In 1945 the answer would have to be that it did not.  French population was low in comparison to Germany and population growth had stalled.  French industry had been backward before the war began and German exploitation during the Occupation had virtually ruined what still did exist.  Over the short-run, the French military depended upon free American arms and equipment; over the long-run, a large military clashed with the need for labor to rebuild the economy.  The French Empire, re-named the French Union as if that made a difference, threatened to become more of a drain on resources than a prop to French power.  In Indo-China, in Madagascar, in Syria, and in Algeria, French subjects looked very restive.  Hence, France might be a great power once again at some future date.  That would depend upon France’s ability to renovate its economy, society, and politics.  Foreign observers might be forgiven for thinking this an unlikely prospect.   

Worse, everyone seemed intent on shoving France down-hill.  At the July 1945 Yalta Conference, the “Big Three” had agreed that a Council of Foreign Ministers would write the post-war peace treaties.  However, the Russians had blocked France from having a voice in any peace settlement other than the Italian one.  In particular, this meant that France’s inter-war alliances in Eastern Europe had been declared null and void by the Russians.[7]  On a lesser scale, a September 1945 American proposal for a system of bases on islands in the Pacific included plans for a permanent base on French New Caledonia.  This plan did not go down well with any of the countries involved.  The French government announced that France would defend its possessions.[8] 

Then, Syria and Lebanon were eager for French troops to depart, but the French dragged their feet as they tried to think of some way to retain influence in the area.  This led to trouble in May 1945.  The British had to send troops to help the under-manned France forces restore “order.”  In December 1945, the French and British had made an agreement on the pace of the French withdrawal without bothering to consult the Syrians or the Lebanese.  When criticism rained down on the French and the British, both French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin offered weaselly responses.[9] 

In sum, the new French government would find it a hard struggle to rebuild France’s lost stature as even a European power. 

[1] John Campbell et al, The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947, hereafter USIWA (1947), p. 11. 

[2] In November 1942, the British and Americans had invaded French North Africa, the German troops had occupied the Southern Zone of France. 

[3] Franklin D. Roosevelt’s hostility to de Gaulle is as perplexing.  Perhaps the French general reminded the president of Douglas MacArthur. 

[4] USIWA, pp. 47-49. 

[5] USIWA, pp. 29, 49. 

[6] Carved out of the British and American zones from territory bordering on France. 

[7] USIWA, p. 64.  Those alliances had been with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.  Poland was thoroughly under Russian control.  Czechoslovakia preserved the fiction of a pro-Soviet free government until a Communist coup in 1948.  Indigenous Communists ruled Yugoslavia.   

[8] USIWA, p. 43.    

[9] USIWA, pp. 95-96.