Shooting Dogs.

David Belton went to Rwanda in 1994 as a reporter for the BBC.  After the killings began, he and the other whites were evacuated by Western military forces.   These Westerners left behind many Rwandans they had known, but carried with them terrible memories of things they had witnessed.  Belton went back to making documentaries for the BBC.  Rwanda stayed on his mind.

One of the stories from Rwanda which Belton heard concerned Father Vjekoslav “Vjeko” Ćurić (1957-1998).  Ćurić had been born in the Artist Formerly Known as Yugoslavia.  He became a Catholic priest and, in 1983, went to Rwanda as a missionary.  He got posted to a small town in the provinces.  Ćurić turned out to be a missionary priest out of some 1940s Hollywood movie: moral without being moralistic, and devoted to his flock and beloved by them.   When the genocide began, he refused to be evacuated.  He worked hard and courageously to help victims from among both Hutus and Tutsis.  He survived the genocide, but someone shot him dead a few years later under murky circumstances.[1]

David Wolstonecraft (1969- ) was born in Hawaii, but ended up living in Scotland at a young age.  He went to Cambridge (where he got a BA in History, so there).  He got a job writing for British television shows.  Television is a small world.  Belton and Wolstonecraft ran into each other.  Together, they wrote the script for “Shooting Dogs,” inspired by what Belton had seen in Rwanda and centered on a version of the story of Father “Vjeko” Ćurić.

They pitched the story to BBC Films.  Approaching the ten-year anniversary of the genocide, lots of people were thinking back to it and what it had meant.[2]  BBC Films agreed to produce it.  They put Michael Caton-Jones (1957- ) in as director, hired some not-quite stars to act, and decided to film the movie in Kigali, Rwanda.  So, lots of what you see in the movie is what Kigali actually looks like, and most of the extras are Rwandans.

None of the Rwanda movies does a good job of explaining the context.  In brief compass, a recent insurgency by Tutsis against the Hutu government had resulted in a truce.  The UN has sent in a bunch of Belgian soldiers to “monitor” the truce.[3]  Then the Hutus began to repent their moderation.  Meanwhile, the US didn’t want to get involved in another Somalia.[4]  The French didn’t want the potentially pro-Anglophone Tutsis to defeat the actually Francophone Hutus.  So, the two countries resisted calling what happened “genocide” or intervening to stop it.

The story centers on the “Ecole Technique Officielle” (The Official/Public Technical School), a sort of technical middle school.  A priest, Father Christopher (played by John Hurt),  runs the school.  He is assisted by a young Englishman, Joe Connor (played by Hugh Dancey, who has come to Africa for a while to do some good in the world.  The school also provides a base for a bunch of the Belgian soldiers.  Then, there is Marie (played by Clare-Hope Ashitey), the Tutsi student who may have a crush on Joe.  Around this human core of the story circle a BBC reporter and her cameraman, who symbolizes the media and what the world knows; a Belgian army officer, who symbolizes the ineffectiveness of the UN; and a bunch of killers with machetes and clubs.  What are any of these people—or us–supposed to do?

[1] It could have been an armed robbery or it could have been some kind of retribution for his actions in 1994.  Or it could have been something else entirely.

[2] Curiously, at the same time another Anglo-American team of writers was working on a different story about Rwanda.  Keir Pearson and Terry George wrote the script for “Hotel Rwanda.”  It came out the same year as “Shooting Dogs” and just buried it.  Too bad: it isn’t a better movie, just a more up-beat one.

[3] That is, they are not there to “enforce” or even “keep” peace.  They’re just watchers.  Voyeurs really.

[4] See “Black Hawk Down” (dir. Ridley Scott, 2001).

A lovely day in the neighborhood.

Social scientists contend that the location in which a child grows up correlates with their adult fate.[1]  On the one hand, there is adult income.[2]  One experiment that ran from 1994 to 1998 offered people living in public housing the opportunity to enter a lottery.[3]  Winners in the lottery received vouchers to help pay the rent if they moved to other areas.  The children of lottery winners (if they moved early enough) far outpaced the children of losers in subsequent earnings.[4]

The sequential demolition of the vast Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago between 1995 and 1998 displaced both those who did want to move and those who did not want to move.  All had to go and all received housing vouchers.  Comparing those who moved—willingly or unwillingly—with those who remained behind, economists have found that a) those who moved were 9 percent more likely to be employed than those who remained behind; and b) they earned 16 percent more than those who remained behind.

Then there is life-span.[5]  Rich people have lived longer than poor people for quite a while.  At the start of this century the average billionaire lived 12 years longer than the average street-person.  Today the gap has widened to 15 years.  Social scientists (and, for all I know, anti-social scientists or just the John Frink, Jr.s of this world) have documented that there is a very uneven distribution of extra years among poor people.  The poor in some places live almost as long as the rich, but they die young in other places.  On average, poor men in New York City live for 79.5 years; poor men in Gary, Indiana live for only 74. 2 years.

The studies suggest that altering the habits and attitudes of poor people in the blighted areas could extend lives.  First of all, in the housing-voucher lottery, only one-fourth of the people who were offered the chance to join the lottery did so.  Those who did apply have been characterized as “particularly motivated to protect their children from the negative effects of a bad neighborhood.”  This means that three-quarters of the people offered the chance to join the lottery were not “particularly motivated to protect their children.”

Then, moving to a better neighborhood increased likelihood of being employed by only 9 percent.  That’s better than nothing, but it isn’t much of a bump.  Moving to a better neighborhood increased lifetime earnings by 16 percent.  How much is that in dollar figures?  It’s $45,000.  Spread over a possible 40 year working life, that’s $1,125 a year and about $0.55 per hour.  Is it worthwhile for a family to leave behind everyone they know, a “system” that they know how to navigate, for this kind of money?

Second, the rich live in healthier ways than do some poor people.  They eat better, they exercise more, they are less likely to be obese, they usually don’t smoke, and they are unlikely to use opiods.  Even demanding, stressful jobs don’t make them feel more stressed than do poor people.  Poor people often eat a poor diet, smoke, and don’t exercise (it’s hard running 5 miles if you’re a smoker). Diet propaganda, parenting education, anti-smoking campaigns, and adult exercise programs could make a big difference.

To an uncertain extent then, poverty is volitional, a choice.  See: Juan Williams.

[1] That raises a question: does the neighborhood itself cause this effect or do people with other characteristics and experiences just end up in certain kinds of neighborhoods?

[2] Given social class segregation, it isn’t readily apparent why this isn’t the same as saying that the social class in which a child grows up has a large effect on their adult income.  Maybe it’s just NewSpeak.

[3] Justin Wolfers, “Bad Neighborhoods Do More Harm Than We Thought,” NYT, 27 March 2016.

[4] However, another experiment found virtually no difference in outcomes between winners and losers.

[5] Neil Irwin and Quoctrung Bui, “Where the Poor Live in America May Help Determine Life Span,” NYT, 11 April 2016.

World Have Your Say 1.

Recently, President Obama stated that the failure to plan for the “day after” in Libya constituted his “worst mistake.”[1]  He does not regret overthrowing Gaddafi, but he does regret not having given any thought to what would happen afterward.

How have commentators responded?  According to the BBC’s “World Have Your Say” comment page on the story, informed opinion shapes up like the following.

The three most approved comments were:

HugoFrost remarked thatThis is what happens when you “take out” leaders like this in the middle east. It leaves a huge power vacuum for terrorists to exploit.  Gaddafi, Hussein, and to an extent Assad. These were the front liners holding back a much worse fate, which is what we’re seeing in Europe at the moment.  307 Positive versus 10 Negative = Plus 297.

The Big Fish argued that “the only way you can run such countries is with a dictator. It’s always tribe first, religion second. And any interference is always perceived as being against the religion and simply fuels the propaganda against the so-called West.  Stay out, even if they do have oil.” 229 Positive versus 9 Negative = Plus 220.

Fishermans_Enemy observed that “Yet he is a Nobel Prize winner… Libya’s troubles are far from over, frankly, some say they are just beginning.  Still, Obama is following on from this Libya mistake by trying to topple another leader in Syria but this time arming Al Qaeda aligned ‘rebels’ to fight Assad whereas a few years ago prior they were terrorists.  The problem isn’t so much Obama but US supremacy in general.”  165 Positive versus 16 Negative = Plus 149.

Conversely, the three least approved comments were:

U16440316 believes that [Obama’s] “worst mistake was running for president in the first place. He had the chutzpah to say that 10 Trillion Dollars of debt was UNPATRIOTIC.THEN HE DOUBLED IT. The man is a disaster.  Yet the left wing media treat him like some god.  That’s leftism for you.”  108 Positive versus 192 Negative = minus 84.

Gary H argued that “The Middle East need[s] dragging up to Western standards, out of the dark ages. Even their own people don’t want to live there.  Do we care when they stone their own people to death? We prefer to leave it that way?  Shame on us every time we turn our backs.  It’s our duty.”  10 Positive versus 37 Negative = Minus 27.

Mike from Brum said that “I’ve said it before. Go to Israel, tell them they have a month when no one is looking and to sort them out. By the time the Israelites are finished, the whole region with be devoid of anything but tumbleweed. Good riddance.”  12 Positive versus 36 Negative = Minus 24.

The top three Positive comments equal + 666.  The bottom three Negative comments equal – 135.

Thus, there is a lot more consensus on the Positive comments than on the Negative comments.  Among the Positive comments, there is a belief that the Middle East [and other places outside the West] needs dictators to keep dangerous forces in line.  This is a repudiation of President Obama’s embrace of the “Arab Spring.”

In contrast, the Negative comments are more varied, from attacks on President Obama as a leader to a plea for intervention in benighted places to a belief in violence as a solution.

If leaders are listening to thinking citizens, then they will be very cautious in the future about toppling authoritarian regimes.  That doesn’t mean that they will not do it.  Perhaps they will prepare better for the consequences.  Or time will pass and they will forget.

[1] See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703

Look at what I almost stepped in.

Western European countries needed extra workers during the great economic boom that took off after the Second World War.[1]  They imported these workers from the old empires and other developing areas.  Then the European Union allowed a considerable mobility of the immigrants after they arrived.  Generally, these countries didn’t give any thought to the assimilation of the immigrant “guest workers.”  Either it was assumed that they would go home after working in Europe or the possibility of problems didn’t occur to any government official.  So, all countries now have a problem with the descendants of the immigrants who never went home and—often—did not assimilate.

Belgium brought in lots of Turks and Moroccans.  Today there are about 640,000 Muslims living in Belgium, where they make up about 5 percent of the population.  Belgium turned out to be a particularly difficult country for assimilation.  It is, in a sense, a “made-up” country created for the convenience of other countries back in the 19th Century.[2]  It is divided between French-speaking Walloons and Dutch-speaking Flemings.  Efforts to pacify the factions produced competing and overlapping government bureaucracies. Quarrels between the two groups continue, so no one gave much thought to the immigrants and the immigrants had no clear national identity to try to join.

Then the oil shocks of the 1970s heralded a period of economic troubles that included the dying of the coal and steel industries in which the immigrants and many native Belgians labored.  The immigrants and their descendants adapted less well to the changes than did the native Belgians.  Poverty and isolation compounded each other.  Now Belgium has a large population of citizens who are considerably angrier with their country than are the supporters of Donald Trump.  Many of them turned to petty crime and drugs.  In these miserable conditions, street preachers arose and won followers by preaching that their victimization arose from their faith.  An uncertain share of them has embraced radical Islam.[3]  Even when not violent activists themselves, many Belgian Muslims are so estranged from Belgian society that they are willing to turn a blind eye to the violent among them.

Then came the Islamic State.  Some 560 Belgian Muslims are believed to have gone to fight for the Caliphate. Belgian cops were glad to see them go.  Belgium’s counter-terrorism forces are under-staffed and overwhelmed.  Maybe the Islamists would get killed.  Many did die in all likelihood.  Now, some 120 of the veterans have returned.  They have been at the heart of the recent spectacular terrorism: the guns for the January 2015 “Charlie Hebdo” attack came from Belgium; the November 2015 Paris attack was planned in Belgium; and the March 2016 attack in Brussels was carried out by Belgian-born Islamists.[4]

Now Belgium is trying to make up a lot of lost ground in both security and assimilation.

NB: The title to this piece is the punch-line to a French “Belgian joke,” equivalent to the one-time Polish or Blonde jokes in the United States.

[1] In Germany it’s called the “wirtschaftwunder” (the Economic Miracle); in France it’s called “Les trente glorieuse” (the Glorious Thirty [Years].”

[2] The Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) redrew the map of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars.  To guard against a resurgence of French imperialism, the Congress tried to strengthen the countries on France’s northeastern and southeastern borders.  In one case this meant adding the Catholic former Austrian Netherlands (today Belgium) to the Protestant Kingdom of Holland.  The Catholics rebelled against Protestant rule in 1830.  Rather than  resist this by force or partition the territory between France and Holland, the Great Powers accepted independence.  Ooops.

[3] See: http://www.warpoetry.co.uk/brooke3.html

[4] “Belgium’s jihadi problem,” The Week, 8 April 2016, p. 11.

Republican Opinion.

In late March 2016, 52 percent of Republicans opposed the party trying to prevent Donald Trump from getting the nomination, while 36 percent favored such an effort.[1]  A week later, a majority (54 percent) of Republican and Republican-leaning voters thought that Trump should get the Republican nomination if he gets the majority of delegates—even if he doesn’t get the required number of delegates.  Again, about a third of Republican and Republican-leaning voters want someone else—anyone else, even Ted Cruz—to get the nomination.[2]

In early March 2016, a clear majority (58 percent) of Americans thought that the Senate should vote on a Supreme Court nominee to replace the late Antonin Scalia.  Slightly more than a third (38 percent) opposed even holding hearings, let alone voting.  That left only 4 percent of Americans who are undecided.  However, two-thirds of Republicans opposed holding hearings or voting until after the presidential election.[3]  (Still, that means that one-third of Republicans disagree.  By late March 2016, opinion had shifted slightly   The great majority (61 percent) of Americans think that the Senate should hold hearings on President Obama’s nominee.[4]  Only about a third (36 percent) thinks that the seat should remain vacant until after the next presidential election.

What do Americans think about the proposal from Senator Ted Cruz that the police patrol “Muslim neighborhoods”?[5]  They are pretty much evenly divided: 45 percent agree with Cruz; 40 percent disagree; and 15 percent don’t know.   The party positions are markedly different, however: 75 percent of Republicans agree; while “only” 57 percent of Democrats agree; and 37 percent of Independents agree.[6]

What might these numbers indicate?  First, Trump has been winning an average of 39 percent of the Republican vote in the primaries, but 54 percent think that he should get the nomination if he has the most delegates.  So, people who don’t want Trump, still think that he should get the nomination if he wins the most delegates.  Most Republicans believe that the Senate should go ahead and vote on the Supreme Court nominee, regardless of what Mitch McConnell says.  The Constitution says that the President shall nominate and the Senate shall advise and consent [or reject] the nominee.  So, a bunch of Republicans think that the Constitution trumps what Mitch McConnell wants to do.  That doesn’t mean that they want conservative predominance on the Supreme Court lost.  It just means that they want the proprieties observed.[7])  In short, the spirit of fair play is not dead among Republicans.

Second, Donald Trump isn’t the only candidate pushing anti-Muslimism.  Moreover, this is an issue that resonates with a majority (54 percent) of Democrats.  To the extent that Hillary Clinton (and the less likely nominee Bernie Sanders) rejects such policies, this may cost them votes.  “Reagan” Democrats aren’t likely to buy into Cruz’s social views.  They might well feel drawn to Trump.

Finally, under the heading of false data as news: Donald Trump’s supporters are almost twice as likely (99 percent) to film themselves having sex than are Hillary Clinton’s supporters.  However, most Clinton supporters are older Americans and predominantly women.  What 60 year-old person is a) going to film themselves having sex, or b) watch it afterward?  None, that’s who.  Unless, you know, there are a lot of Clinton supporters who like watching all that cottage cheese swaying around in poor lighting.  Yuck.  So, really, the Trump supporters aren’t significantly more depraved (at least in this area) than are the Clinton people.[8]  It just makes for a good headline.  Are people really surprised that no one pays attention to the “news” anymore?

[1] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 1 April 2016, p. 17.

[2] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 8 April 2016, p. 17.

[3] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 4 March 2016, p. 19.

[4] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 1 April 2016, p. 17.

[5] Discretely hang out in the hallal section in the Shop-Rite at the corner of Rte. 309 and Cheltenham Avenue, keep track of who—other than me—is buying goat.

[6] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 8 April 2016, p. 17.

[7] The whole issue of how the courts and especially the Supreme Court came to be so politicized bears further investigation.

[8] “Noted,” The Week, 19 February 2016, p. 18.

The Trump Narrative.

The standard liberal interpretation of supporters of Donald Trump is that they are angry, poorly-educated, older, working-class white men.[1]  How true is this stereotype?  A recent chart in the Wall Street Journal may offer some insight.[2]

So far in the primaries, Trump has won an average of 39.1 percent of the Republican vote.  If the various munchkins who were running for the Republican nomination had gotten out of the way early-on in favor of one candidate, then the “The Donald” might refer to a specialty deli sandwich[3] right now.

The demography of the Trump vote.

There is no polling data on “angry.”  Just channel Robin Williams.[4]

Education.

High school or less:     46.1 percent.

Some college:              42.5 percent.

BA                              34.6 percent.

Post-grad.                    27.0 percent.

Income.

<$50K                         44.0 percent.

$50K–$100K              36.6 percent.

>$100K                       35.4 percent.

Gender.

65+                              39.8 percent.

45-64                           39.6 percent.

30-44                           35.1 percent.

17-29                           30.2 percent.

Gender.

Male                            42.0 percent.

Female                         33.5 percent.

Location.

Rural.                                      40.9 percent.

Suburban.                    37.9 percent.

Urban.                         32.7 percent.

How Conservative?

Somewhat.                  40.0 percent.

Mod./Liberal.              37.3 percent.

Independent.               35.2 percent.

Very.                           35.1 percent.

In sum, Donald Trump does draw many votes from just the group described in liberal media.  However, he also draws a lot of support from the antithesis of the stereotype.  It would appear that Trump is also the candidate of a significant share of the well-educated, the well-off, the younger, and the female among Republicans.  Apparently, lots of them are angry too.[5]

[1] Or “rednecks” as my sister-in-law phrased it.

[2] Aaron Zimmer, “Inside the Trump Coalition,” WSJ, 25 March 2016.

[3] I’ll let you figure out the ingredients.  Probably a lot of ham on an onion loaf to begin with.

[4] See, for example, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qM-gZintWDc

[5] See  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=we_D3X1Jliw

More Young People.

If we look at the history of the last quarter century, we see two dominant and inter-related trends.  Radical Islam isn’t one of them.  First, the collapse of Soviet Communism inspired other followers to abandon the controlled economy for participation in the world market.  Second, information technology destroyed many old barriers.  Upheaval and opportunity resulted.   Currently, about a quarter of all the people in the world are aged 10 to 24.[1]  That is, they were born between 1992 and 2006.  The world in which they have grown up is that same world that older people have often found so disorienting.   Now young people face their own problems.

Those billions of young people are not equally distributed around the world.  They account for only 17 percent of the population in economically developed countries; for 29 percent in less-developed countries, and 32 percent in the least developed countries.  In the United States, the median age is 37; in Russia, 39; in Germany, 46.  In Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, the median age is 18.  China offers a particularly interesting case of a transition.  Faced with a swiftly rising population, China declared a one-child policy for married couples.  It worked so well that the youth base of the population narrowed to a frightening degree.  A shortage of workers to replace those who are approaching retirement loomed.  At the same time, young couples found themselves providing care for up to four aging parents, while trying to work and raise their own child.  Recently, the government ended to one-child policy.

A disproportionate share of young people lives in the countries least well able to provide them with either an adequate education or a decent standard of living.  Take the example of India.  There are more than 420 million Indians between the ages of 15 and 34.  The median age is 27.  Desperate measures to expand primary education have had mixed results.  Although almost all Indian children now attend primary school, half of fifth graders can neither read at a second grade level nor do subtraction.[2]

Then, India needs to create 12-17 million new jobs every year to absorb the population growth.  In India and in other countries in similar dire straits, young people are forced into spotty, badly-paid just to get any jobs at all.  India’s reluctance to end the carbon-burning that drives economic growth in that country is easier to understand in light of that imperative.  The here and now weighs more heavily in the balance of decision-makers than does the future.[3]

Migration from “young” countries to “aging” countries might offer a solution.  However, there are several big barriers here.  First, even in the developed countries there is a problem of youth unemployment: in the United States, almost 17 percent of people between 16 and 29 are not in school and not working; in the European Union the youth unemployment rate averages 25 percent.[4]  It will be difficult to make the case for expanded immigration of young people when a country cannot even provide work for its own young people.  Second, the poor quality of education in many developing countries means that only some people will be viable migrants.

Even so, migration from the Lands of Inopportunity to the Lands of Opportunity may be inevitable.  There are 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States.  The current refugee crisis in Europe shows just how difficult it can be to keep out hordes of determined people.

[1] Somini Sengupta, “The World’s Big Problem: Young People,” NYT, 6 March 2016.

[2] The wretched state of education can be glimpsed in Aravind Adiga, The White Tiger (2008), and Mohsin Hamid, How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia (2013).

[3] A third problem is anti-female sex selection.  There are 17 million more Indian males than females aged 10 to 24.

[4] Sengupta argues that the high European rate results from a combination of a slow economy and the absence of economically valuable skills.  The same may be true in the United States, although some economists would argue that the skills-deficit argument is false.

Young People These Days.

Barack Obama cleaned up among voters aged 18 to 29.  In 2008, he won 66 percent of them; in 2012 he won 60 percent of them.[1]  Now, a series of polls suggest that many young people don’t like Donald Trump.[2]  In one poll, people under 35 preferred Hillary Clinton (52 percent) to Trump (19 percent).  Another poll reported that people under 40 preferred Clinton over Trump by two-to-one (roughly 60 percent to 30 percent).

However, the situation is more complicated than that.  A generational divide appears in the polls.  For one thing, the Democratic advantage among young people is dropping.  It has fallen from 66 percent in 2008 to 60 percent in 2012 to at best 52 percent in 2016.  Indeed, one poll reported that among people aged 19 to 26, while a mere 9 percent preferred Trump, only 11 percent preferred Clinton.[3]  Young people want “that hopey-changey thing.”   Either failing to deliver on it or looking like you don’t believe in it in the first place can hurt a candidate.

The same poll reported that 31 percent preferred Bernie Sanders.  Young people lean left.  Their big concerns appear to be related to the distribution of benefits from the economy: the cost of college; student debt that results from that cost, and the “economic inequality” that makes it difficult to pay off that debt.  The poll that reported Bernie Sanders drawing 31 percent of those aged 19 to 26 years, also reported that 58 percent saw socialism as a more humane system than capitalism, while 33 percent saw capitalism as a more humane system than socialism.  That’s bad for Republicans without being good for mainstream Democrats.  Yet another poll reported that Trump was favored over other Republican candidates by 26 percent of the 18 to 34.  (OK, the poll didn’t report how many Republicans are 18 to 34.)

This preference could have long term consequences when looking forward.  At least one study suggests that the most important period for setting political preferences comes between the ages of 14 and 24 years of age.  “Events”—impressions, really—that happen at age 18 are three times as influential as things that happen at age 40.  So, would a Donald Trump candidacy sink the Republican Party for a whole generation by alienating young people?

However, the same theory can be applied looking backward.  One poll showed that Clinton and Trump running a dead-heat among voters over 40 years of age.  If their formative political experiences came between ages 14 and 24, then, for those aged:

40-50: born 1965-1975; formative experiences from 1979-1999.

50-60: born 1955-1965; formative experiences from 1969-1989.

60-70: born 1945-1955; formative experiences from 1959-1979.

If any of this is true, then—at least in psychological terms–there is a good chance that the election of 2016 will be about our troubled past.  To seek the dark cloud around any silver lining, this might mean that the election will be about flunked wars; unsettling technological change  that never seems to work to the advantage of the country that creates so much of it; economic upheaval that profits the few; scandal-plagued presidencies; now-ancient grievances; and big talk from politicians that rarely turns into effective action

            Despite the rhetoric about a “great America,” it will not be about the possible futures of our children.  They will not thank us.  Nor should they.

[1] Why the drop in support of almost 10 percent among this age group?  Did a bunch of them age-out and become more conservative?

[2] Toni Monkovic, “Lasting Damage for G.O.P.?  The Young Reject Trump,” NYT, 24 March 2016.  Well, Trump’s got a thick hide.  He’ll survive.

[3] So, pretty much a dead heat.  Just in a race for the bottom.

The Marriage Encouragement Act of 2017.

Back in the 1960s, the rough-around-the-edges, but “Harvard-trained” Daniel Moynihan argued that single-parenthood condemned an increasingly large share of the African-American community to poverty.[1]  Subsequently, Moynihan was tarred with the brush of working for Richard Nixon.  Still, the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama administrations all encouraged marriage.

Decades of social science research has shown that Moynihan was right to have worried.  Single-parent households are worse for children than are two-parent households.  Children raised in single-parent households are poorer than children in two-parent households; they more likely to engage in “risky” behavior; they are more likely to have “contact” with the police and the criminal justice system; and they are more likely to drop out of school before getting even a worthless diploma.  That in itself is an employment  death sentence.

So, should the government encourage poor people to get married?  My God, NO!  You’ll just get lots of kids born into poverty!  Oh, wait, we already have lots of kids born into poverty by “unwed”[2] mothers.  Currently, about 40 percent of mothers are unmarried and 20 percent of white children, 25 percent of Hispanic children, and 50 percent of African-American children live in a household headed by a single woman.

Eduardo Porter argues that efforts to promote marriage are a “waste of resources and time.”  In comparison with married couples, parents who have children outside of “holy deadlock” tend to have less education, worse-paying jobs, and more mental health problems.  Very often they guys are losers by any standard.  So, says Porter, these people “would have a tough time raising children in a healthy environment even if they stayed together.”

Beyond this, Porter has two points to make.  First, women get pregnant because they don’t understand that sex leads to pregnancy,[3] and because they don’t have access to contraceptives.  Second, trying to turn back the clock to some golden age makes less sense than trying to off-set the ill-effects of single-parenthood as it exists.

In a refreshing confession of the failures of typical liberal reforms, Porter frankly admits that “government has no clue how to” encourage couples to get married.  Still, he doesn’t shrink social engineering.  If women had easy access to “long term” contraception[4]; if unmarried co-habitation was socially acceptable; if the State paid more generous benefits to mothers, then s ingle-parenthood would be less catastrophic for the kids.

Some of this is puzzling.  First, Porter argues that fathers are often losers, but then argues that globalization and technological change have wiped out many blue-collar jobs that enabled these men to support families.  So, once upon a time these same men or men like then were functional fathers?  Second, he implies that being an unwed mother carries a social stigma in America.  Really?  Then why has the rate risen?  Third, Porter argues that women may not marry the fathers of their children because the men cannot provide for their families.  Or do they not marry because the State can provide better than can the men?

[1] Eduardo Porter, “Push Marriage?  Not for the Sake Of the Children,” NYT, 23 March 2016.

[2] “Unwed” mothers and “undocumented” immigrants.  Soon we’ll be referring to Donald Trump as “untactful.”

[3] Implicit in this argument is that 20-25 percent of white and Hispanic women don’t understand that sex can lead to pregnancy and that 50 percent of black women don’t understand that sex can lead to pregnancy.  Normally, this would result in a charge of racism.  However, Porter writes for the NYT, so—by definition—he isn’t saying anything racist.

[4] The rate of unmarried mothers has been rising, so at some point in the past unmarried birth rates were much lower.  Does this mean that one generation of mothers and fathers forgot to tell their own children that sex can lead to pregnancy?  Or did condoms just fall out of fashion?  Probably should look at STD rates.

The Count 2.

Nowruz (aka Newroz, Nevroz) is the first day of Spring in the Iranian calendar.  Lots of other cultures in the region took up the celebration in the many days ago.  Among them were the Kurds, who see Nevroz as the most important holiday of the year.[1]  The holiday has assumed a nationalist form as cultural associations and veiled political parties sponsor events at which “young men wave flags of green, yellow and red, the colors of the Kurdish people.”

            Far away from Kurdistan, both in distance and in culture, is Istanbul’s Istiklal Avenue.  The street is in “Pera” or “Beyoğlu,” across the “Golden Horn” from the main part of the old city.  You pass the cheery chaos of the ferry dock; you walk across the Galata bridge; you wander through little streets that mount the hillside; and you arrive at the Galata tower.  It is the “European” part of the city with cafes, restaurants, art galleries, and many Westerners living in apartments with a bad plumbing and an excellent view of the Bosphorus.  Nearby is Taksim Square.

            Turkey might be described as having played a “bad boy” role in the recent migration crisis.  However, it has other pressing concerns as well.  On the one hand, the government is assaulting its restive Kurdish minority.  In July 2015 a truce broke down and the government turned loose its forces in southern Turkey.  On the other hand, it has belatedly engaged ISIS in neighboring Syria.  Under heavy pressure from the United States, Turkey has finally clamped down in the flow of foreign fighters through Turkey to Syria.  As a result, Turkey has been under attack by suicide bombers in recent months. ISIS has been blamed for bombings in Ankara (October 2015, 103 dead) and Istanbul (10 dead, January 2016).  For their part, Kurds have been blamed for a suicide bombing in Ankara (March 2015, 37 dead).

            On 19 March 2016, a suicide bomber blew himself up on Istiklal Avenue in Istanbul, killing three Israeli tourists[2] and an Iranian,[3] and wounding thirty-six.  Five of the wounded were Palestinians.  (There may have been an interesting conversation in whatever group they belonged to, or perhaps just a studied silence.)  The Israelis were, it seems, a bunch of “foodies” sampling the fare of Istanbul.[4]

This bombing, too, is attributed to ISIS.  The bomber has been identified as Mehmet Ozturk, but little about him has appeared in print.  He was born in 1992 in Gaziantep (which is both a city and a province).  Gaziantep, in turn, is a part of Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolian Region, which runs along much of the border with Syria.  Gaziantep is a very old city (by American standards anyway).  It has a thriving machine carpet-weaving industry and is surrounded by groves of olives, pistachios, and grapes.  It also is home to a number of high schools and universities.  However, it is also on the main route from Turkey to Syria for foreign fighters trying to join ISIS.  According to one report, his parents reported him as missing after he went to Istanbul in 2013.  Pretty quickly after the attack the Interior Ministry identified him as the bomber and confirmed it through DNA.  His father had provided the DNA for the comparison.

ISIS is now targeting tourists in Istanbul; and it has a bomb-maker there.  The hunt is on.

Turkish officials now have banned Nevroz celebrations this year.

[1] Apparently, Kurds don’t believe in Santa.  Them being Muslims and all.

[2] Two of whom held dual Israeli-American citizenship.

[3] Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Istanbul Suicide Bomber  Linked to Islamic State,” NYT, 21 March 2015.

[4] The NYT reports that one was from Dimona (the site of Israel’s “secret” nuclear weapons program); another was from Herzliya (a generally wealthy beach town near Tel Aviv, named for the Zionist leader Theodor Herzl).