The doctor reports satisfactory completion of the laboratory stage of the project. The substantial conceptual and practical problems of vaccine development have been overcome.
The delivery component remains under development. However, the doctor is confident that this essential step will be overcome “in the near future.” He is very grateful for the generous support so far provided.
Human trials will then begin. Necessarily this may take an uncertain amount of time. I have communicated to the doctor the urgency of arriving at a viable treatment.
Commander of Sipo-SD Lange, Theresienstadt, Madagascar, Standartenfuhrer.
 “Operation Erfurt.” Erfurt is a city in Germany. Code names are most often randomly selected. However, at one time the addressee, Lange, commanded the security services in Erfurt. Nostalgia?
Garrett Mattingly Papers; Rare Book and Manuscript Library, 6th Floor, Butler Library, Columbia University, 535 West 114th Street, New York, New York.
Professor Garret Mattingly
Department of History
Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University
New York, NY USA
Dear Professor Mattingly,
Coincidentally, October 2015 will mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of Germany’s victory in the Second World War.
In light of this anniversary, the Editorial Board of the Encyclopedia Germanica wishes to formally commission an article by you on the history of postwar Europe. (The board is particularly impressed by your previous works, Sea Lion and Reformation Diplomacy.) If you accept this commission, please be sure to deal with the following topics.
European political and economic integration under German auspices.
The social welfare, educational, and immigration policies of “Europe.”
Relations between “Europe” and the former Soviet Union, the English-speaking world (Britain, the Commonwealth and Empire, the Free Trade Area of the Americas), the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the national homeland for the Jewish people on Madagascar.
The fate of the colonial empires.
The impact of generational change in the mid-Sixties and the early 21st Century.
Please append a brief bibliography of, say, five key books for understanding Nazi Europe.
We are in a position to pay an honorarium of DM 5,000. Alas the currency policies of Europe do not allow the exchange of these funds for dollars. However, you would be free to spend the money within Europe or even in one of the Klub Med resorts overseas.
“Notes on the Varieties of Zionism,” by Dr. Emmanuel Ringelblum.
Submitted to General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski at his request.
“Zionism” is the idea that Jews alone should not be the only civilized people without a nation-home of their own.
From the late Roman period through the 18th Century, European Jews had labored under many legal disabilities. The subsequent legal emancipation of European Jews came soonest where nationalism triumphed. It came later and more haltingly where multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multi-religious empires resisted nationalism as the price of their survival. Whenever it came, Emancipation allowed the assimilation of Jews into the various European nations, if they chose to assimilate. Judaism itself split into several currents.
Legal emancipation ran ahead of social acceptance. “Anti-Semitism” remained a powerful force. Sometimes it was water flowing underground in the form of snobbery, stereotypes, and social exclusion. Sometimes it broke out in the open in judicial persecution, or noisy street movements, or even in political parties. Occasionally it turned violent.
Historians commonly tell one another that “You’re right, but it goes back much farther than that.” The same is true of Zionism. During the 17th, 18th, and 19th Centuries, schemes for a “return to Zion” appeared and disappeared like soap-bubbles. In the 1890s, however, Theodore Herzl (1860-1904) became the founder the movement called “Zionism.” Repulsed by the overt political anti-Semitism in Austro-Hungarian Empire, Herzl devoted his great abilities and energy to the creation of a Jewish state in the ancestral homeland of Palestine. He died before the Great War, the “Balfour Declaration,” the partition of the Ottoman Empire that put Palestine in British hands, and the Arab “Awakening.” It fell to his followers to make “Zion” a reality.
These followers were of several minds about the practical problems. Much Zionist thought amounted to applications of European ideas of the pre-1914 period. On the one hand, “Labor” Zionism and “Liberal” Zionism represented the left wing of European politics: socialist, communalist, reformist, democratic, tolerant of religious differences, and hopeful of a peaceful resolution of disputes over land with the Arabs. These forms of Zionism appealed to the best in the Jewish community: idealistic, educated, compassionate, and “practical.”
On the other hand, “Revisionist Zionism” represented those harsher times that came after the Great War. It’s prophet, the fanatic Ze’ev Jabotinsky (1880-1940), argued that “Zion” could only be built by a strong state with a strong army that could, first, define a territorially-large country, and second, force the Arabs to accept it. “Zionism is a colonising adventure and it therefore stands or falls by the question of armed force. It is important to build, it is important to speak Hebrew, but, unfortunately, it is even more important to be able to shoot….” This movement developed a wide appeal in the former Poland. It had a group, “Betar,” that tried to instill military virtues in the young. It attracted many ruthless, rigid minds.
All these debates have been put to rest by our migration to this place.
 For Pity’s sake, even the Rumanians have a country!
 Or, alternatively, “You’re right, but that’s not true in Breslau.”
Is Zi Jinping a conventional/traditional “Marxist” leader, bent upon using China’s immense power to advance the world revolution? Or is Zi Jinping a conventional/traditional Chinese emperor, bent upon using China’s immense power to shatter the American-created international system? Does it matter? It is an axiom that you plan for the capabilities of other players, not for their intentions.
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been the most powerful and most influential nation in Asia. That power and influence has rested on military superiority, economic dynamism, the sheer appeal of America’s values in comparison to those of its rivals, and strategic alliance-building. Chief among these allies have been Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
The murkiest of these alliances has been the alliance with Taiwan. When the Communists won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, many of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT or “Nationalist”) supporters retreated to the island of Taiwan. Long a Chinese possession, it had been conquered by Japan in one that country’s early forays into imperialism. Still, at first it seemed that the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) would soon complete the reconquest of territory lost to imperialist during the dark hours of China’s impotence. After the Korean War began, the United States recognized Taiwan as an independent state. The KMT created a separate Chinese state, then build a prosperous industrial economy, and eventually moved toward democracy. In sum, Taiwan is far more of a legitimate state than it was in 1949. Richard Nixon’s “opening” to China pushed the US-Taiwan relationship into “strategic ambiguity.” China has always intended to retake Taiwan, just as it intended to retake Hong Kong. The United States had an interest in Taiwan remaining independent. The US and China had a big stake in not coming to blows over Taiwan. So all sides let things sit. See what shook out.
What shook out was Zi Jinping. China’s “Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative, military build-up, and the forced change in status of Hong Kong illustrate his determination to reshape the Asian order to China’s advantage. Now alarm bells are ringing over Taiwan.
By what means might China seek to establish control over Taiwan? Would it begin by fomenting some kind of low-intensity conflict? Would it just cut to the chase by staging an out-right invasion with overwhelming force? Would the Taiwanese fight? Do they have the means to mount an effective resistance? How would the United States respond? Would it huff and puff, then accept Chinese conquest as happened with Hong Kong? Would it adapt the same policy as it has done with Ukraine: supplying arms, money, and intelligence while avoiding direct involvement? Would it decide that Taiwan is the Czechoslovakia “of our time”? If the United States did fight, what would be the outcome? Could it win a “conventional” (i.e. non-nuclear) war in the Western Pacific and Far East? How great is the danger that a conventional war could slide into a nuclear war—of uncertain magnitude?
Is there an alternative? Perhaps, but anything that looks like or amounts to backing down would most likely have a devastating impact on America’s other alliances in Asia.
Stories of individual historical events, the more dramatic the better, command the attention of readers. Yet those striking events always happen in some larger context that includes cause, effect, and related events happening elsewhere. Stepping back from the individual event to see the context in which it occurred provides greater understanding. The farther one steps back, the more the dramatic events recede as the larger patterns emerge. Always there is a trade-off and the question of where to strike the balance.
During the Nineteenth Century, the West rapidly industrialized and international trade grew by leaps and bounds. These advances required an improved system of reliable and fair international payments. Answering this need, the Gold Standard set an exchange rate against gold for every country’s national currency. So nations acquiring gold got piled on top of the eternal human quest for “the color.” Fortunately for the developing world economy, there were major gold strikes in California (1848), Australia (1851), and South Africa (1886) among many other places. Gold greased the wheels of economic growth, while creating individual fortunes.
They also created unanticipated effects. The lure of gold drew in many immigrants from distant parts. Westerners were not alone in seeking their fortunes in a new land. In the mid-Nineteenth Century, a gigantic civil war racked Qing China. The “Taiping Rebellion” spread death, starvation, disease, and poverty throughout the empire. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese migrated all over the Pacific. Some went to the United States, some went to Australia, many went to other places. Later, others would attempt to go to South Africa.
All these were White-ruled societies busily resting control of the lands’ resources from indigenous inhabitants. They both needed cheap labor and despised the Asian immigrants who would provide it. Appearance, language, religion, and culture all set the two groups apart from one another. The white working class and middle class took an especially harsh view of the “coolie labor” that they believed undermined their own efforts at self-enrichment. Anti-Chinese violence followed in many places. Both seeking to profit from this hatred and to restore order, politicians stepped forward to give voice to the concerns of the working man. The American “Chinese Exclusion Act” (1882-1943), the South African Asian exclusion policy (1880s-1980s), and the “White Australia” policy (1901-1973) all manifested this fear of Chinese competition.
All this happened in the distant past and most vestiges of the age in laws have been removed. Yet people still fear Asian states when they become economically powerful, as has been the case with Japan in the Seventies and China today. The competition is seen as “unfair.”
 The first two essays in Gerhard Weinberg, World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II (1981) provide a clear and concise introduction to the essential strategic problems of the war. Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century (1958) uses a small event—the Sicilian massacre of occupying French troops—to examine the complex politics of Medieval Europe, the Papacy, and the Byzantine Empire.
 As Montgomery Burns chortled, “We’ll be rich as Nazis!”
 My great-great grandfather had left his family home in Rhode Island for the “West” of the 1830s and 1840s, the Ohio River valley. When news came of the gold strike at Sutter’s Mill, he hot-footed it to California.
 Mae Ngai, The Chinese Question: The Gold Rushes and Global Politics (2021). Reviewed by Andrew Graybill, WSJ, 12 August 2021.
 Herman Kahn, The Japanese Challenge (1979); Rush Doshi, The Long Game (2021).
Henry Picker, editor, Heydrich’s Table-Talk (1973). (My translation.)
Gruppenfuhrer Klein (extract): “Well, you know, he wasn’t prone to run on at the mouth. Not like some people, as I’m sure you know. Not likely to surround himself with suck-ups either, who would put up with harangues. Much more terse. More like those Spartan fellows I’ve read about. Laconic.
Still, sometimes over brandy after dinner he would say things after Lina [Mrs. Heydrich] had taken the ladies away. Once, I don’t remember the date, he said something like “Perhaps the Fuhrer was wrong. To let them go, I mean. They are still very powerful in Britain. Even more so in America. No, we have not finished with the struggle.” Something like that anyway. Then we rejoined the ladies. Generally for singing. He loved music.”
Sailors were the first Americans to reach the Pacific and the Far East: fur traders in Nootka Sound, tea clippers in China, whalers in the South and Central Pacific, and Commodore Perry’s squadron “opening” Japan to the West. All this happened while the rest of the country was pre-occupied with other matters: industrialization, immigration, urbanization, civil war, and territorial expansion across the continent. The two strands came together at the end of the Nineteenth Century. The Spanish-American War (1898) made the United States a territorial power in the Pacific and Asia (Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines). American Christian missionaries joined those of Western European nations. The “China Market” became an even more attractive lure for American industry. Still, American interests and ideals combined to oppose anyone ripping China to shreds. Instead, the United States defended the idea of the “Open Door.” All nations should have an equal right to trade in China, while the Chinese Empire should preserve its territorial integrity.
During the Twentieth Century, the central question in the Far Eastern policy of the United States became how to prevent any one power from dominating Asia to the detriment of the United States. At first, this meant opposing Imperial Japan’s expansionist appetite. That appetite seemed to grow over time, from the “Fifteen Demands” levied on China during the First World War to the seizure of Manchuria to outright invasion of China to the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” of the Second World War.
Then the United States shifted to opposing Communist expansionism in Asia. At the time, many disasters befell American military policy: the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, fighting to a draw in Korea, being defeated in Vietnam. Over time, however, a different strand of American policy succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of its exponents. The U.S. supported societies engaged in rapid economic development. As time passed, and in uneven measure, they became democracies. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have become important American partners in the Far East. Mot striking of all, since the Nixon Administration’s “opening” to the Peoples Republic of China, Beijing has profited enormously from the American-led system.
More recently, that system has appeared to be in decay. First, a series of poor presidents with deficient understanding of foreign affairs left the American system badly led for almost thirty years. Second, the 9/11 attacks required a devastating response against Islamist terrorism, but the decisions to extend that riposte into a long-run nation-building operation in Afghanistan and a disastrous invasion of Iraq soaked up American blood, treasure, and attention. Third, the United States has been undermined by prolonged economic and social crises that defy easy solution. The current evening news broadcasts showing the United States Air Force flying advanced weapons to Ukraine and flying foreign baby formula to the United States nicely captures some of our issues. In any event, it isn’t difficult to understand why American leadership has come under challenge from Russia and China first and foremost, but also by lesser countries which once consulted Washington.
The Biden administration has now announced steps to reform the post-war American international system to better address the challenge from China. Declaring that the 2020s will be a “decisive decade,” Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced that the United States will work hard to rebuild economic and diplomatic bonds with long-time allies. The proposed revival falls short on some details and will take time to implement. Moreover, it is beyond Blinken’s authority to offer a plan for addressing the underlying problems of America. Nevertheless, partly from preference for the American system and partly from fear of China, there seems to be a deep well of support in the Indo-Pacific region for an American return.
 Bill Clinton (1992-2000), George W. Bush (2000-2008), Barack Obama (2008-2016), and Donald Trump (2016-2020). Three normal children and one feral child.
 This subject could fill and book and has. Many, actually. For social issues, see: https://bookriot.com/100-must-read-books-understanding-u-s-social-policy/ It is perhaps telling about the nature of the crises that it is much easier to find a long list of books on contemporary social problems than it is to find a similar list about American economic problems. In other words, Americans are better informed about their social problems (almost always to be solved by throwing money at them) than they are about their economic problems (which is where the money will come from).
 Or perhaps I just sent too much time watching the recent George Carlin documentary.
 Notably Israel and Saudi Arabia, but now the Solomon Islands as well.
 Walter Russell Mead, “Blinken’s Indo-Pacific Blueprint,” WSJ, 31 May 2022.
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Files. House of Representatives Files.
Series 01.1. Boston Office General Correspondence, 1947-1952. Box 0002. Folder: “Cape Cod: South Wellfleet: Extension of Gunnery Area.” [NB: Evidently misfiled.]
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
J. Edgar Hoover, “Personal Files.”
October 3, 1951.
I had a marvelous time! Where do you find them?
Talked it over with Bobby. He’s very enthusiastic. Trying to get rid of the perverts matches well with the anti-Commie thing that you and the Senator have been working. I’ve got my own list already, starting with Offie and that snotty writer who’s tangled up—somehow—in the whole Bouvier-Auchincloss mess.
Just between you and me, I get the feeling that the Birdman feels the same way about this. I’ll probably get a lot of backing on this from Hoover as well. He’s ferocious on the subject. I tried calling him today, but Gandy said he was out of the office.
Also, it gives me something distinct of my own to run on. I won’t be just feeding off the Senator’s work. Which reminds me. Have you read Agar’s new book The Price of Union? Wonderful! It set me to thinking about those brave men who have defied their party and the whole political system to follow their conscience. Maybe I’ll write something on that theme. If I do, count on the Senator being included.
Best regards, Jack.
 Carmel Offie (b. 1909): Department of State, 1931-1948; Central Intelligence Agency, 1948-1950.
“Troubled people” abound in any advanced society. The vast majority do not engage in mass-killings. So far, we have not found a way to predict which “troubled people” will turn into mass murderers. Therefore, while more spending on mental health issues would be welcome, it isn’t a serious solution to the problem at this time. What would be “common sense” solutions in the here and now? “Sick of Massacres? Get Rid of the Guns” wrote the New York Times columnist Gail Collins on 18 May 2022. Same thing goes for the vastly more numerous “ordinary’ gun homicides and suicides.
The United (for the moment) Kingdom suffered mass shootings in 1987 and 1996. After the first, it banned assault-style rifles; after the second it banned most hand-guns. The firearm ownership rate has fallen to 5/100 people and the gun homicide rate is at 0.7/million people. Australia suffered a series of mass-shootings which culminated in a particularly bad one in 1996. The country imposed a mandatory gun buy-back, then melted down about a million weapons. The gun buy-back was not universal: it required the surrender of semi-automatic rifles and certain kinds of shotguns. This reduced the stock of weapons in private hands by 20-30 percent. Those policies have been followed by a near-absence of mass-shootings. Canada had long required the licensing and registration of hand-guns. After a mass killing in 1989, these procedures were extended to rifles and shotguns. The same thing happened in Norway.
American gun control advocates emphasize that in the wake of mass murders, people willingly surrendered or agreed to do without firearms. They seem to count upon the intense emotional revulsion that follows these crimes. Make no mistake: these countries have engaged in a large-scale disarmament of the population. That is what it takes to drive down both gun homicide rates and mass killings. American gun-rights advocates understand this, even if gun-control advocates will not come right out and say so. For example, a recent “Interpreter” article in the New York Times described the mass weapons bans as merely “tighten[ing] gun control laws.” Is it possible that gun-owners believe that a) gun control advocates are liars and that b) accepting any controls on guns will just lead to a near-complete ban on all guns?
The Canadian restrictions on rifles and shot-guns only came into effect six years after the mass killing and were repealed in 2012. Norwegian restrictions on semi-automatic rifles came into effect seven years after the mass killing. Australian gun-ownership rates and gun-related homicides have all begun to rebound (at least for the moment) in spite of the restrictions. There have been two terrible mass killings in Britain since the restrictions.
One common feature of the gun restrictions in the wake of mass shootings is that they were pushed by conservative governments. Legal gun-owners in America seem to be one-party voters in the same way as Blacks are one party-voters. Already, a large majority of Americans favor restrictions on access to guns. One of these days, the political balance is going to tip. When that happens, the nightmares of legal gun owners are going to come true. If the Republican Party could fashion a package of “common sense” reforms to gun ownership, they might be able to bargain. Let the ATF off the leash to cut access to firearms by those who do most of the “ordinary” killing (and dying), and raise the legal age for gun-ownership.
 Max Fisher, “After Mass Shootings, Other Countries Acted To Change Direction,” NYT, 26 May 2022.
Future historians may one day write about the “Trump Revolution” in foreign policy. President Trump broke with cajoling and complaining to China about its predatory economic policies. He chose tariffs, the harassment of major Chinese corporations, and a diplomatic warm-up with Taiwan. The Biden administration has, so far, stuck with those policies or even extended them. President Trump broke with just trying to coerce North Korea through decades of ineffective economic sanctions. He chose to talk to the North Korean dictator after North Korea demonstrated that it had acquired both inter-continental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons in spite of those sanctions. He did this in spite of much expert opinion that the barbarian Kim should not have been allowed an audience with the emperor without having made some kind of offer of tribute. Now, President Biden has expressed a willingness to meet with Kim. President Trump openly disparaged the value of NATO (as opposed to Britain) and behaved rudely when Angela Merkel came to call. President Biden leads a revived NATO not because Vladimir Putin launched a war of aggression in Ukraine, but because the Ukrainian people chose to fight and have a leader of commanding moral authority.
The Biden administration and those that come after it will have to deal with the Trump legacy, but also with current and future problems. Covid, the troubles of global supply-chains, pressures to shift off Russian energy exports, and now Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian food exports look to have unpredictable long-term consequences as well as harsh short-term ones.
One lesson for all concerned might be that advanced countries that depend upon imported energy sources (oil, natural gas) give hostages to fortune. At the moment, that energy comes from Russia (in the case of Central and Western Europe) and the Persian Gulf (in the case of China). That dependence opens energy-importers to pressure from the exporters. Over the long-run, European countries that substitute American energy sources for Russian ones merely make those countries vulnerable to American pressure. While the Messiah tarries on “green” energy, it is possible that nuclear power will become the energy source of choice for those desiring national or regional independence. Chernobyl, Fukushima, and Three Mile Island offer alarming examples of what can go wrong, but that doesn’t mean that people will not find solutions.
American politics seems to have been tilting toward protectionism since the Trump administration. Yet protectionism clashes with the American-sponsored international economic system created since the Second World War. Individuals in many foreign countries are powerfully attracted by American democracy and economic opportunity. Hence the tide of immigration that is one force troubling American policy. That isn’t the same as many foreign countries being attracted by those things. This matters because a dynamic American economy that is open to foreign goods plays a vital role in holding other countries to American leadership. Most of America’s current economic troubles—chiefly inflation—will pass in a few years. Will the United States still be a pro-free trade nation afterward?