Diary of the Second Addams Administration 17.

Posted on April 23, 2025 by jsh54

Has the post-Second World War period of ever-increasing “globalization”[1] come to an end? If it has, then what will replace it? Will it be a return to widespread “protectionism”?[2] Will it be a restricted and managed globalization within large economic blocs protected by a high common external tariff?

Some will attribute the troubled state of international affairs to President Donald Trump’s rash and unsteady imposition of tariffs on anyone who crosses his line of sight. In this view, “more trade is better, especially for the United States.”[3] Trump’s tariffs will push up prices for consumers while slowing down economic activity. It will make it “more costly for U.S. manufacturers to source vital parts and machinery.” The result may be “stagflation” (stagnation plus inflation), such as what beset America in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[4]

One could also attribute the smoldering crisis to a long-running combination of Chinese aggression with American complacency.

Chinese aggression should and does strike fear in the hearts of men. China has used hard work, the mobilization of national talents, the repression of consumption below what might have been, the conversion of a vast population of under-employed peasants turned into tireless industrial workers, borrowed Western expertise, intellectual property theft on a grand scale, manipulation of the international trade regime, the repression of individual liberty by an autocratic state, and appeals to national pride. Economic power has been transformed into military and diplomatic power. China has begun to throw its weight around in the Far East and beyond. The goal seems to be to evict the United States from the Western Pacific. That would be a first step to establishing Chinese hegemony over South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.[5] On the other hand, there’s a particularly American character to China’s policy. As the political philosopher George Washington Plunkitt once said, “I seen my opportunities and I took ‘em.”[6]

The manifestations of American complacency appear in the triumphalism following victory in the Cold War;[7] the misinterpretation of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man Standing; the combination of a long decrease in defense spending to yield a “Peace Dividend”; and the cornucopia of material benefits unleashed by ever more free trade. Toy shops and coffee shops and retirement savings will now suffer. Nobody wants discomfort.

[1] Defined as progressive rounds of reducing barriers to trade, finance, and migration.

[2] Defined as individual nations or blocs of nations raising up tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, combined with restrictions on the movement of capital and people.

[3] Republican Yoda Karl Rove in the Wall Street Journal, quoted in “Global order: Goodbye to the age of free trade?”, The Week, 18 April 2025, p. 34.

[4] Tom Orlik in Bloomberg, quoted in ibid.

[5] Strategists refer to Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines as the “First Island Chain.” South Korea and Vietnam can be considered the mainland anchors of this chain. Together, they provide the geographic positions from which to limit Chinese power projection. The loss of that island chain to Chinese domination would cripple both American trade relations with those countries and power projection. For some idea of how the United States reached this advantageous position, see Evan Mawdsley, Supremacy at Seas: Task Force 58 and the Central Pacific Victory (2025).

[6] “I Seen My Opportunities and I Took ‘Em.”: An Old-Time Pol Preaches Honest Graft

[7] Queen – We Are The Champions (Live Aid 1985)

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 16.

Posted on April 22, 2025 by jsh54

The United States and China continued hammering each other in mid-April 2025. Both countries raised their tariffs on each other (the US to 145 percent and China to 125 percent). China barred is airlines from taking delivery of Boeing jets and its rare-earth and magnet producers from exporting to the United States; while the United States tightened the screws on AI technology exports to China. The United States showed some interest in negotiating, but China wouldn’t bite.[1]

The incoherence of the Trump administration’s tariff policy with regard to the rest of the world flooded into the China policy. President Donald Trump said that there would be no “carve-outs,” then crawfished again. There would be only a 20 percent tariff on cell phones, laptops, and modems. Then he crawfished again: new tariffs on electronics and semi-conductors would soon be announced.

Regardless of their incoherence, the main point in the eyes of some critics lay in the pain that they inflict on ordinary Americans. Tariffs will force up prices and disrupt supply-chains. “Mom-and-pop shops that rely on Chinese imports” will suffer.[2] “Mom-and-Pop! Their lives of hard work and service to the local community wrecked by Trump’s tariffs!” Well, actually, most of the Mom-and-Pop stores got destroyed decades ago by Walmart and Amazon. This is just evoking a nostalgic image for lack of a good argument.

Other critics warned that the tariffs will just make China mad. It will retaliate in ways that hurt Americans and America. China can restrict exports (as with rare earths and high-end magnets); China can blacklist American firms, driving down their profits and the value of their stocks; China could sell off a part or all of its $760 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds.

They aren’t drawing the logical conclusion. First, we’re very vulnerable to Chinese pressure and, to some degree, dependent upon Chinese good will to fend off disaster. So we should make nice? How about we remember the old adage that “If I owe you $100, then I have a problem; if I owe you $1 million then you have a problem”?

Rare earths and magnets are described as “critical to manufacturing everything from cars and planes to drones and weapons systems.” So we are dependent on our chief rival for these goods? In case of open conflict, or even just tense bargaining over important issues, China could boycott their export to the United States? With what effect on our ability to produce “cars and planes… drones and weapons systems”? OK, suppose we got into a dispute not with China, but with China’s ally Russia? I know that’s far-fetched, but give me some rope here. Say Russia attacked Ukraine. Would fear of China withholding key resources cause us to support Ukraine less fully than we could do and might want to do? In any case, would it be a good idea to try to regain our technology industrial independence?

Second, the United States isn’t really hammering China with tariffs. Almost alone and in his usual rabbity fashion, Donald Trump is hammering China. Lots of right-thinking people are trying to distance themselves from a president engaged in a trade war with our deadly enemy in economy and international relations. Who do you think Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Australia would want to win that one, if they have to choose? Who would you choose?

[1] “Trade war with China threatens U.S. economy,” The Week, 25 April 2025, p. 5.

[2] New York Post, quoted in “Trade war with China threatens U.S. economy,” The Week, 25 April 2025, p. 5.

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 15.

Posted on April 22, 2025 by jsh54

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has led the way in the construction of an international economic system based on “relatively free trade bound to relatively predictable governance and the rule of law.”[1] Along the way, according to some critiques, America’s trading partners have exploited the system to America’s disadvantage. Now, President Donald Trump has alleged that many of America’s trading partners engage in “unfair trade practices.”[2] In early April 2025, Trump imposed a 10 percent basic tariff on all imports, plus additional tariffs as high as 50 percent on other countries.[3]

The reaction to this announcement got ugly: the stock market lost $10 trillion; China imposed a retaliatory 84 percent tariff on imports from America; and all sorts of people howled. JPMorgan said the tariffs would probably cause a recession; and Lawrence Summers, the former Secretary of the Treasury and former President of Harvard University known for giving it with the bark on, predicted such a recession would cost 2 million Americans their jobs. Other critics argued that the tariffs would dismantle the American-led international economic system. Who will profit? China will profit, because all the countries bruised by American tariffs and incoherence might look to China as a new leader. Xi Jinping “is unlikely to miss the priceless opportunity Trump has given him.” Really? China will abandon its long-running policy of repressing domestic consumption and conquering foreign markets in order to replace the Americans as the world’s leading consumer-nation?

Then Trump abruptly crawfished, suspending the implementation of his “additional” tariffs on most countries for 90 days. For these countries, the administration was willing to negotiate, if they wanted to do so. However, he jacked up the tariff on Chinese goods to 125 percent in retaliation for China’s retaliation for Trump’s initial tariff increase. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that trade negotiations had been the plan all along.[4]

Critics on left and right belabored the incoherence of the tariffs. Acknowledging that criticism to be on-target still leaves a question.[5] Is it useful to distinguish between Trump’s tariffs policy toward China and Trump’s tariff policy toward the rest of the world? Trump has flip-flopped on everyone except China. With China, he has doubled-down. That country produces many goods that were invented in America and are important consumer goods, like cell and computers.

What is wrong-headed about Trump’s tariff war is that he has not offered a coherent plan to rally the rest of the world against the Chinese export giant while negotiating tariff equality with America’s other trading partners. China has been steam-rolling many countries. There is a lot of fear and resentment directed at China abroad in the world. The makings are there for a better American-led system.

[1] Tom Rogan, Washington Examiner, quoted in “Trump dials down tariffs, but not for China,” The Week, 18 April 2025, p. 4. On the institutional structure of the American-led, rules-based order, see: Bretton Woods system – Wikipedia; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – Wikipedia ; and World Trade Organization – Wikipedia

[2] If he means that other countries impose higher tariffs on American goods than America imposes on goods from those countries and/or they raise up other “non-tariff barriers,” then he’s pretty much right.

[3] “Trump dials down tariffs, but not for China,” The Week, 18 April 2025, p. 4.

[4] Pee-wee’s Big Adventure (3/10) Movie CLIP – I Meant to Do That (1985) HD

[5] I’m willing to stipulate that it is an ignorant, probably stupid, question. But I want to ask it all the same.

Not the Country We Once Were 2.

Posted on April 21, 2025 by jsh54

Why are bond-holders retreating from U.S. Treasury bonds now? The huge deficits and growing national debt have been around for a while. The willingness and ability of the United States government to pay the interest on the debt is no different now than it was a year ago or—in all likelihood—a year from now. How is the sell-off to be explained?

Peter Goodman of the New York Times,[1] has raked up a variety of explanations. They require some interrogation.[2] Goodman doesn’t necessarily connect the explanations, but they can be read to point in one direction.

“An erosion of faith in the governance of the world’s largest economy appears at least in part responsible for the sharp sell-off in the bond market in recent days.” President Trump’s tariffs, he reports, have “shaken faith in that basic proposition [that the US will properly manage the global environment and maintain its creditworthiness], challenging the previously unimpeachable solidity of U.S. government debt.” Goodman quotes Professor Mark Blyth of Brown University for support. “The whole world has decided that the U.S. government has no idea what it is doing.” He adds that “[o]ne reason [for the bond sell-off] appears to be an effective downgrading of the American place in global finance, from a safe haven to a source of volatility and danger.” Purportedly, the tariff war with China, in particular, creates the danger of a global recession and undermines the role of the U.S. as the manager of the world’s “peace and prosperity.”

I can believe the first half of this, but the second half is less credible. Nothing fiscal is threatening the creditworthiness of the United States right now. Why do tariffs disturb the bond market? Similarly, bonds are commonly regarded as a hedge against stock fluctuations and in recession. So, fear of a recession is making people sell bonds, rather than buy them?

Goodman mentions other possible factors:

“Hedge funds and other financial players have sold holdings as they exit a complex trade that seeks to profit from the gap between existing prices and bets on their future value.” This sounds very much like “financial players” are dumping bonds now to force the government to raise the yield on bonds.[3] Today’s sellers will then buy back the bonds at a higher rate tomorrow. Similarly, “[s]ome fear that China’s central bank [which holds $761 billion] in U.S. Treasury debt, could be selling as a form of retaliation for American tariffs.”

What are the effects of investors selling bonds now? In early April 2025, “the yield on the closely watched 10-year Treasury bond soared to 4.5 percent from below 4 percent—the most pronounced spike in nearly a quarter century.” Raising interest rates to attract borrowers “tends to push up interest rates throughout the economy, increasing payments for mortgages, car loans and credit card balances.” This will hurt ordinary Americans. They will howl.

Are Wall Street and China pressuring President Trump to lay off his incoherent tariff policy? If so, is that who we want to surrender to? It won’t be the last time.

[1] Peter Goodman, “Trump Tariffs Shake Faith In the Safety of U.S. Bonds,” NYT, 14 April 2015.

[2] Pin on The Far Side

[3] “Speculators have been unloading bonds in response to losses from plunging stock markets, seeking to amass cash to stave off insolvency.” Does this mean that other “financial players” are in danger of getting gored as collateral damage?

Not the Country We Once Were 1.

Posted on April 21, 2025 by jsh54

For quite some time now, United States government bonds were a global safe-haven when conditions got rocky somewhere else in the world. This rested upon the belief that the US government could and would pay its IOUs.[1] It has been easy for the United States to find lenders willing to buy Treasury bonds at lower rates of interest than might otherwise have applied.

The consequences have been good or bad depending on how you look at it. Various benefits for the United States flowed from the belief in the reliability of American public credit. For one thing, the willingness to lend has eased the cost of the big deficits and growing national debt. Americans have not had to strike a balance between taxes and spending.

Furthermore, for those individuals who rely upon credit purchases, buying a car, or a house, or a lot of stuff at Walmart has been cheaper. The reverse of the medal here is that all those foreigners who wanted dollar-denominated bonds raised the value of the dollar relative to the currencies of those other countries. These “strong” dollars made imports cheapish. This, too, eased the cost of consumption.[2] OK, where did these foreigners get the dollars to buy Treasury bonds? They got them by selling cheap goods to Americans. Then they buy US Treasury bonds, which raises the value of the dollar, which makes their goods cheaper for Americans and American goods more expensive for everyone.

Along the way, all those cheap imports first undercut, then destroyed, much of America’s manufacturing base. If all it had done was wreck the American production of teddy-bears, we could live with that. However, many of the goods now produced abroad are things like pharmaceuticals, computers, information/communications technology, and automobiles. Since joining the World Trade Organization in 2000, China has been the main predator stripping the bones of the non-financial and non-entertainment sectors of the American economy.[3]

As the national borrowing has increased, the size of the debt has grown to very high levels. The debt can be regarded as solid so long as the United States has the will and the means to pay the interest, at least, on it. The share of the interest payments in government spending has grown in recent years. Partly, this reflects the sheer volume of the debt; partly, it reflects the higher interest rates charged to control the inflation.

However, what if the debt or the interest rate on the debt grow so large, that the interest payment exceeds what Americans are willing and able to pay? This has been a continual and growing theoretical concern among economists and investors for many years. People will lend so long as they believe that they will be paid back.[4] If they lose confidence, then they will try to get rid of their government I.O.U.s.[5] (I don’t recall hearing any of this discussed in presidential debates.) It is possible that the recent “retreat” from bonds is the first tremor of an earthquake.

Or perhaps not. A large share of the small group controlling global business and financial resources (countries, companies, banks) really dislike the current American economic policies. So is also possible that this is just a warning shot. Will people attend to the warning?

[1] Peter Goodman, “Trump Tariffs Shake Faith In the Safety of U.S. Bonds,” NYT, 14 April 2015.

[2] Just for fun, go through all your stuff, from underwear to lap-tops and make a list of where everything comes from.

[3] How do you fight a war with fictional “super heroes” dressed in Spandex and piles of money?

[4] They will lend even when they suspect that they will not be paid back in full. Under these conditions, they charge a “risk premium’ in the form of higher interest rates still. Argentina, a notorious bad bet, pays high rates.

[5] Maybe something like this. Fire sale – Margin Call (2011)

An Episode of Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Pact, June 1935 4.

Posted on April 15, 2025 by jsh54

Having decided to accept the German proposal for talks on a naval agreement, the government spent the next few months quietly setting the stage. First, in January 1935, the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, informed King George V that an agreement might help get Germany back into “the comity of nations.” In February 1935, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald met with the then very anti-German French Prime Minister Pierre Laval. The “communique” afterward expressed their hope that talks with Germany would lead to enhanced security in Europe. In late March 1935, Simon had a preliminary meeting with Hitler in Berlin. The German dictator told Simon that he was done with the arms limitations imposed by Versailles Treaty. Germany would expand its army from the 100,000-man limit imposed by Versailles to 500,000 men, begin conscription, and build an air force. However, Hitler would make commitments to Britain to limit naval forces. Hitler also announced that Joachim von Ribbentrop, a Nazi schemer, rather than an experienced diplomat, would lead the German delegation in such talks.

Yet no talks began. The British foreign policy-makers were divided in their attitudes. Sir Robert Vansittart, the chief British diplomat, believed that Hitler meant to conquer all of Europe, so the best solution was a strong alliance with France, Italy, and even the Soviet Union if necessary. Anthony Eden, the second-ranking political figure at the Foreign Office, wanted British commitment to Western Europe, but would abandon Eastern Europe; he also put more stock in the League of Nations than in an Italian alliance. Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, had no views of his own and went where Vansittart pushed.

The British were busy negotiating the “Stresa Pact” with France and Italy. Signed on 14 April 1935, it committed Britain, France, and Italy to resist any future German violations of the Versailles Treaty. The Stresa Pact” could not be squared with a bilateral Anglo-German agreement to violate the naval limits in the treaty.

At the end of April 1935, the Germans prodded the British by informing them that they had launched new U-Boats and had begun construction of 12 more. They meant “We’re going ahead; with or without you.” This got the British moving. On 29 April 1935, Simon told the House of Commons that Germany had begun building U-Boats; on 2 May 1935, Prime Minister MacDonald told the Commons that he would seek a naval agreement with Germany.

Things moved fast. Ribbentrop came to London on 2 June 1935. On 4 June, he told the British that Germany would accept the 35 percent ratio, but nothing less, and that the British had a few days to decide. Simon, the Foreign Secretary, walked out in answer to such rude behavior. Stil, on 5 June the government accepted Ribbentrop’s proposal. Two days later, Simon left the Foreign Office and Sir Samuel Hoare became Foreign Secretary. During further discussions, the Germans accepted the British requirement that the German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy. The two parties signed the completed agreement on 18 June 1935.

The Anglo-German agreement enraged the French. Britain had not consulted the French or the Italians. The agreement of the British and Germans to “legalize” a violation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty could not be squared with the “Stresa Pact.” It appeared to fall into the tradition of “Perfidious Albion.” It’s hard to form an alliance against a common danger when the parties don’t trust each other. That’s part of the story of appeasement.

An Episode of Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 3.

Posted on April 11, 2025 by jsh54

Adolf Hitler’s view of Britain wavered between implacable foe and natural partner in a division of the world. In Mein Kampf (1925), he castigated Imperial Germany for pursuing a pointless fleet-building program that forced Britain into alliance with its traditional colonial enemies France and Russia. In the “Hossbach Memorandum” (1937) he described both France and Britain as “hate-filled” opponents who would never accept Germany’s revival. In 1934-1935 he still had hopes of winning over Britain, if only to disrupt the emerging Franco-British-Italian common front.

In November 1934, the Germans told the British that they wanted to reach a bilateral agreement that would allow the Germany navy to rise to 35 percent of the British navy.[1] The offer simultaneously attracted and disturbed the British. The Germans seemed bent on rearming in defiance of the Versailles Treaty in any case. The British most feared German bombing of cities. An agreement on navies could lead to an agreement on air forces. So, the German offer deserved consideration.

Several questions had to be resolved. First, could Britain tolerate ANY German naval rearmament? The Royal Navy had to be dispersed to meet its global responsibilities, while a German fleet would be concentrated in the North Sea and North Atlantic. Could Britain defend itself in Europe against a fleet one-third the size of the Royal Navy?

Second, would it be best to shape that rearmament to the kind of German fleet would be easiest to deal with? Would such a German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy (in battle ships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines)? Or would it be a “lighter” fleet organized for attacking merchant shipping (lots of submarines and light cruisers, but few battleships)?

Third, British rearmament would prioritize the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, while German rearmament was already prioritizing the Army (Wehrmacht) and the Air Force (Luftwaffe). Both the British Army and the Germany Navy got the leftovers. Expert opinion held that the Germany Navy would not reach 35 percent of the present Royal Navy until 1942. By that time the Royal Navy would have been greatly expanded. The Germans would never really catch up. Seen from this perspective, a naval agreement might be a strategically meaningless concession while perhaps improving the climate of relations between the two countries. A more meaningful agreement on air forces might follow.

Fourth, the agreement could create diplomatic problems with the French. Britain and France were working up a common front with Italy to check further German violations of Versailles.[2] A bilateral agreement to end the naval disarmament conditions of the multi-lateral Versailles Treaty would be understood in France as both slimy and a betrayal.

Committees considered the issues. They concluded that a German fleet 35 percent the size of the Royal Navy marked the maximum that could be accepted, but it could be accepted. It would be best to insist upon a symmetrical fleet to short-stop one organized for a “guerre de course.” A naval agreement should be followed by pursuit of an agreement on air forces. Finally, “the French be damned” went unspoken, but not unthought.

[1] Joseph Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: Appeasement and the Origins of

the Second World War in Europe (1998).

[2] See No more coals to Newcastle. | waroftheworldblog

An Episode in Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 2.

Posted on April 11, 2025 by jsh54

Various “truths” emerged from the early histories of the origins of the First World War. Prominent among them: arms races lead to war, so—by implication–disarmament would lead to peace. The reasoning behind this “truth” ran something like the following. Military equality led to stability. Military inequality led to instability. Military inequality could emerge from either countries creating larger armies or from new technologies. Imbalances of either sort created a sense of insecurity on the weaker side and aggressive behavior on the stronger side. Building up one’s own power to restore stability became an entrenched response. Mutual fear and suspicion became entrenched, building up psychological tension. Linked to this idea of a spiral of power and fear, was a belief that the “Merchants of Death” (MOD) winding-up governments and publics in order to increase their profits. Corrupt politicians and journalists served the MOD as the agents of influence. After the war, disarmament became one chief purpose of diplomacy.

Therefore, naval armaments remained a live subject after the First World War. The Washington Naval Conference (1922) had agreed on a ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 in the number of battleships and battlecruisers between Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. The Geneva Naval Conference (1927) tried and failed to strike an agreement on the size and number of cruisers. The American and British concepts could not be reconciled.[1] The issues were revived, and this time agreed upon, in the London Naval Treaty (1930). The countries compromised on different classes of cruisers, while also limiting submarines and destroyers.[2]

Germany participated in none of these conferences because its navy had been severely limited by the Versailles Treaty. The Versailles Treaty did allow Germany to replace existing ships once they were at least 20 years old. The oldest of its battleships had been built in 1902, so by the mid-Twenties, Germany designed a new type of ship, the “Panzerkreuzer” (or “pocket battleship”). When the wartime Allies learned of these ships, they tried to prevent their construction. Germany offered to not build the ships in exchange for admission to the Washington naval treaty with a limit of 125,000 tons. The Americans and British were willing to appease German demands, but the French refused.

Meanwhile, Germany argued that either all countries should disarm or Germany should be allowed to rearm to the level of other countries. The League of Nations and many right-thinking people took this argument at face value, so it sponsored a World Disarmament Conference (1932-1933).

Mid-stream, Hitler came to power, abandoned the Disarmament Conference (October 1933), and announced that Germany would rearm in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. On the one hand, this tipped Britan toward a policy of gradual rearmament (1935-1939).[3] On the other hand, it led to the creation of the Stresa Agreement (14 April 1935) between Britain, France, and Italy to resist future German violations of Versailles. Could the “allies” maintain solidarity? Yet no British leader wanted war. Could Germany be either deterred or appeased?

[1] The British wanted more light cruisers for protecting imperial trade routes, the Americans wanted fewer, but heavier cruisers. The Japanese wanted a ratio of 70 percent of the American fleet, not the same 5:5:3 ratio of 1922.

[2] One effect of the naval treaties combined with the Great Depression appeared in the collapse of the British shipbuilding industry. Beating arms into breadlines, so to speak.

[3] British rearmament in the Thirties. | waroftheworldblog

Missak Manouchian.

Posted on April 10, 2025 by jsh54

Off and on, the Ottoman Empire persecuted Armenians. Many of the victims sought greener fields outside the empire. Wherever they went, the emigres stayed in touch with other emigres and with their families at home. In 1905, some of them established the Armenian General Benevolent Union. The AGBU raised money to send seeds and farm equipment to Armenians still inside the Empire. Then came the Ottoman Empire’s terrible genocide of the Armenians. The AGBU provided much humanitarian aid at the time, but then also established orphanages to care for the hordes of children who had lost their parents. Later, they paid for the higher education of talented Armenian orphans.

Missak Manouchian (1909-1944) benefitted from the help of the AGBU. He lost his parents in the genocide (must have been about 6 years old), grew up in an orphanage in French-ruled Lebanon, and went to France (1925) in search of work. Eventually, he became a lathe-operator at Citroen near Paris. Naturally, he joined the Confederation General du Travail (CGT), a trades union group. He lost that job when the Depression hit France in the early Thirties. Disappointed, like almost everyone else, in capitalism and parliamentary democracy, he joined the French Communist Party in 1934.

He also had literary and intellectual aspirations. From 1935 to 1937, the Party put him to editing an Armenian-language literary magazine, and working on a Party-inspired Relief Committee for Armenia.

The Hitler-Stalin Pact (August 1939) led the French government to ban the Communist Party when war broke out a few days later. Manouchian was one among many communists who were arrested. Like others, he was then released for military service. Assigned to a unit remote from the front lines, Manouchian was discharged after Germany defeated France in Summer 1940. He went back to Paris; got arrested by the Germans; got released. Then there is a gap in what is known of his life. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Communist Party went to war in a serious way. Manouchian seems not to have been involved or involved much in any Resistance work. The most likely thing is that he did some writing for clandestine newspapers.

Things changed in February 1943. Boris Milev, a Bulgarian Communist living in France, recruited Manouchian for the group being led by Boris Holban.[1] In Summer 1943, Manouchian replaced Holban as head of the group. In September 1943, Manouchian ordered a team to kill an SS General in Paris. They did and Heinrich Himmler demanded action. He got it. Holban had worried that the group’s many young men were careless about security. He had wanted to back off for a while and increase security. He had been right. The Vichy police had already identified some of the group, who led them to many others. The French arrested 22 members of the group in November 1943. They were turned over to the Germans, tried and executed in February 1944.

Much later, an ugly quarrel over responsibility took place in the media.[2]

Resistance movements were (and are) vulnerable. They attracted enthusiasts who often were not suited by maturity or temperament or life experience to secret work. Security services often have the bulge in all these areas, along with superior resources. It can be a martyr’s game.

[1] Boris Milev – Wikipedia

[2] See: Affiche Rouge – Wikipedia and Missak Manouchian – Wikipedia. These people deserved better.

A Piece of Resistance.

Posted on April 10, 2025 by jsh54

Nationalism preaches that all the people speaking the same language should be grouped together in one independent country. Nationalism came to Rumania in the later 19^th Century, when part of it escaped from the Ottoman Empire to form the new country. However, many Rumanian-speakers still lived outside the country. After Russia collapsed into revolution and civil war during the First World War, Rumania grabbed the mostly-Rumanian territory of Bessarabia (1918).

Anti-Semitism walked in daylight in Rumania.[1] Jews had no rights and could not be citizens. Most lived in miserable poverty. A large Jewish community lived in Bessarabia, so the change of borders brought them under Rumanian rule. In 1923, a new constitution—imposed by the Western powers—granted Jews citizenship. Nothing else changed. Many Jews pined for the Soviet Union which they believed to be a socialist utopia where religion didn’t matter.

Baruch Bruhman (1908-2004) began life as a Jewish Russian subject in Bessarabia; then became Rumanian.[2] He rejected everything about the Rumanian state: he joined the illegal Communist Party (1929); went to jail for it (1930); deserted from the army during compulsory service (1932); went to jail for it; did organizational work for the Communist Party; fled to Czechoslovakia one step ahead of the police (1936); went to France to join the International Brigades fighting in the Spanish Civil War (1938), but arrived too late; worked for the French Communist Party (PCF) for a year; and enlisted in the French Foreign Legion under the name Boris Holban when the Second World War broke out (1939).[3]

The Germans captured Holban in June 1940, but he escaped in December 1940 and returned to Paris. In June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. All foreign Communist parties were ordered to attack the Germans to divert troops from the Russian front. The PCF knew that the Germans would shoot a lot of French civilian hostages in reprisal. Holban had spent his life on the run and had been to war. The PCF set him to recruiting immigrant workers to kill Germans. Holban found Rumanians, Hungarians, Poles, and Italians willing to fight the Germans. Most were Jews and veterans of Spain. If Germany won, they were doomed.

From August 1942 to June 1943, Holban’s group derailed trains, attacked factories, and killed 83 Germans on the streets of Paris. Both the Germans and the French police hunted the “terrorists.” Holban fell out with his PCF bosses. They wanted more attacks; he wanted to slow down while concentrating on security. In July 1943, Holban was replaced by Missak Manouchian, who accelerated attacks. Then Manouchian was caught. The PCF brought Holban back to run a rat-hunt for whoever had betrayed the group (December 1943).

Returning to now-Communist Rumania after the war, Holban soon fell into the whirlpool of the Stalinist purges. Many years later, after he had re-settled in France (1984), he was accused of betraying Manouchian. A storm followed, but Holban was proved innocent.

A puzzle: Was this Jewish resistance or Communist resistance or French resistance?

[1] Even if vampires did not. See: Bram Stoker, Dracula (1897); “Nosferatu” (dir. F. W. Murnau, 1922).

[2] Renee Poznansky, Jews in France during World War II (2001).

[3] This is very significant. In August 1939, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin did a deal with German dictator Adolf Hitler. The Soviet Union would remain neutral in any war between Germany and other countries. All foreign Communist parties were ordered to oppose their own nation’s war effort. Bruhman/Holban was defying orders.

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