“Globalization” means the trade in goods and services, the flow of capital, and the movement of workers across national boundaries with little or no national constraints. This is an old story in human history, but it accelerated dramatically after 1945 and it has moved at astonishing speed since 1990. Globalization has spawned disruptive costs that accompany its immense benefits. Much attention has focused on some of the costs more than on the benefits.
The political reaction against globalization commands the headlines. Examples include President Trump’s “America First” policies of tariffs and limits on migration; the British vote to leave the European Union (“Brexit”); and Angela Merkel’s suddenly precarious leadership of Germany. The most persuasive interpretations see this reaction as rising from two sources. One is the unequal distribution of both the benefits and costs of globalization. The other is the resulting discrediting of the elites as leaders in the eyes of everyone else as followers.
One can point to many flaws in democratic governance. However, part of the current problem is that democracy actually works. Donald Trump won the 2016 election; a narrow, but real, majority of British voters chose “Brexit”; Italian voters supported the current coalition of anti-immigrant, anti-EU parties that governs the country. Many of the reforms seem intended to blunt the responsiveness of politicians to the popular will. These include giving the president of the United States more authority to commit the country to treaties that could not pass the Senate; extending the time between elections to buffer politicians from the public moods; raising the pay of politicians so that a better class of person will go into politics; and instituting civic literacy tests for voters.
Trends that have nothing to do with globalization, but which will rock a globalized world economy get lost in the shuffle. For example, in Western countries, robots look like a mechanical version of China: low-cost, high-productivity workers. In developing countries, however, they are just as great a challenge. Hundreds of millions of people in China, India, and elsewhere have been pulled out of abject poverty by industrialization. Their jobs, too, are at risk. Developed countries will have no incentive to off-shore production and developing countries will have to compete with their own robots.
Then soon–but possibly not soon enough–a demographic shift will occur from low birth-low death to low birth-high death. The United States already depends upon immigration for its population growth (and the financial stability of Social Security). Japan and many European countries (Germany and Italy for example) are in much worse shape in terms of their young workers-elder retirees ratios. China will soon enter the ranks of countries this imbalance. How will different societies pay for their aged, non-working populations?
 After the Second World War, the United States led the construction of an open “Free World” economy through institutions like the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
 The collapse of the Soviet Union discredited centrally-planned, non-market economies in the eyes of previous true believers. Russia, the former “captive nations” of the Soviet Empire, and the Peoples Republic of China all adopted capitalist market economies. Many other leftist economies in the developing world (notably India) did the same thing.
 Dambisa Moyo, Edge of Chaos (2018).
 Ian Bremmer, Us vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism (2018).