The Armed Services Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate created a “Commission on the National Defense Strategy.” Eight people were appointed to the Commission by both parties in both committees. The Commission examined both the current and foreseeable threat environment facing the United States and the military preparedness of the United States to address that environment. The study makes grim reading.[1]
First, the threat environment is familiar. In first place is China; in second place is Russia; and in third and fourth places are Iran and North Korea. All are aggressive tyrannies. All devote a much larger share of their national resources to the military than does the United States. All have grown closer to each other—formal or informal allies—over the last few years. All are deeply aggrieved with the “rules-based order” fostered by the United States after the Cold War. “The good old rule sufficeth them, the simple plan, That they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can.”[2] One is already fully at war, one is using its proxies in war, and the others are using military power in an attempt to intimidate their neighbors, who are American allies. In short, “the United States faces the most challenging and most dangerous international security environment since World War II. It faces peer and near-peer competitors for the first time since the end of the Cold War.” Once upon a time, such actions would have met a powerful American response as a matter of policy.[3]
Now, “[the] consequences of an all-out war with a peer or near peer would be devastating. Such a war would not only yield massive personnel and military costs but would also likely feature cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure and a global economic recession from disruptions to supply chains, manufacturing, and trade.”
Why is this? The Commission finds American power much reduced and hobbled, all by our own doing. First, “The Commission finds that DoD’s business practices, byzantine research and development (R&D) and procurement systems, reliance on decades-old military hardware, and culture of risk avoidance reflect an era of uncontested military dominance.” As a result, “the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.”
Second, “the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB) is unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the United States and its allies and partners. A protracted conflict, especially in multiple theaters, would require much greater capacity to produce, maintain, and replenish weapons and munitions.”
Third, “today’s [DoD workforce and all-volunteer force ] is the smallest force in generations. It is stressed to maintain readiness today and is not sufficient to meet the needs of strategic global competition and multi-theater war.” “Recent recruitment shortfalls [for the all-volunteer force] have decreased the size of the Army, Air Force, and Navy.”
Fourth, we aren’t spending on–or raising money for–defense the way we used to when we were conscious of danger. On the one hand, defense spending as a share of GDP has roller-coastered: in 1965, 6.9 percent; in 1967, 8.6 percent; in 1979, 4.9 percent; in 1983, 6.8 percent; in 1999, 2.9 percent; in 2010, 4.7 percent; and in 2025 it is projected that the US will spend 3 percent. On the other hand, “Defense spending in the Cold War relied on top marginal income tax rates above 70 percent and corporate tax rates averaging 50 percent.”
The Commission concludes that “The lack of preparedness to meet the challenges to U.S. national security is the result of many years of failure to recognize the changing threats and to transform the U.S. national security structure and has been exacerbated by the 2011 Budget Control Act, repeated continuing resolutions, and inflexible government systems. The United States is still failing to act with the urgency required, across administrations and without regard to governing party.”
It offers a series of urgent recommendations that are well worth considering. But not for too long. Our enemies can see all these things. They may not wait.
[1] See: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/nds_commission_final_report.pdf The Report was brought to my attention by Walter Russell Mead, “U.S. Shrugs as World War II Approaches,” WSJ, 17 September 2024.
[2] William Wordsworth, “Rob Roy’s Grave.”
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