Tag Archives: History

Scalawag.

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            During the post-Civil War “Reconstruction” of the defeated Southern states, Democrats referred to local Whites who had become Republicans as “scalawags.”[1]  One such was John W. Stephens (1834-1870) of North Carolina.[2]  Stephens had grown up in difficult circumstances[3] and with none of the advantages enjoyed by the middle and upper ranks of Southern society.  He spent some time hawking religious tracts, then found work as a tobacco trader in South Carolina.  Along the way he became a husband, father, and widower with a young child in his care, then once again a husband and father.  He was back in North Carolina when the war began.  With two young children to support, he did not join the rush to the colors.  He spent the war commandeering horses for the army; then worked as an “impressment agent” collecting draftees.  By 1865, there were probably many people in the area who thought ill of Stephens. 

            After the war, Stephens went back to tobacco trading.  However, tumultuous change filled the post-war years.  The Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery (1865); the Reconstruction Acts imposing federal controls on former rebel states (1867); the Fourteenth Amendment, granting full citizenship to the freed people (1867); and the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing the right to vote (1869), fell as hammer blows on Southern White beliefs.  Democrats responded by organizing the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) to roll back Black voting rights and the Republican party.  Many murders occurred in the Piedmont area. 

Stephens cast his lot with the new order.  He joined the Republican party and the Union League,[4] then got a job with the Freedmen’s Bureau.  He worked at organizing the freedmen to vote Republican and gained a reputation as a barn-burner.[5]  This turned him from a much disliked figure of ridicule and into an outright enemy of most Whites.  Like other White Republicans, Stephens suffered ostracism and threats, and went everywhere armed.

            In 1868 the freedmen he had been organizing elected him to the North Carolina state Senate.  That election was contested: the Democrats claimed that their candidate had been elected, while the Republican-dominated state Senate gave the seat to Stephens.  In all this he formed a part of the political machine assembled by Republican Governor William Holden.[6] 

In May 1870, Stephens–foolishly or provocatively–attended a Democratic nominating meeting in his home county.  Lured away by one of the members, Stephens was isolated, over-powered, and murdered.  Governor Holden responded by putting two counties under martial law and sending in reliable militia.  While a host of arrests followed, convictions did not.  Juries would not convict, judges directed trials.  Holden himself was impeached.  Power shifted more and more to Democrats, who eventually went on to impose White supremacy. 

The life and death of Stephens illuminate the reasons for an incomplete Reconstruction.   

[1] Scalawag – Wikipedia casts at least some light on the origin of the epithet. 

[2] Drew A. Swanson, A Man of Bad Reputation: The Murder of John Stephens and the Contested Landscape of North Carolina Reconstruction (2023). 

[3] His father was a tailor with five children who died in 1848. 

[4] Essentially an arm of the Republica party.  There’s an academic study: Michael W. Fitzgerald, The Union League Movement in the Deep South: Politics and Agricultural Change During Reconstruction  (1989). 

[5] Not a reference to his political oratory.  He was believed to be organizing the nighttime burning of the barns of former Confederates.  See: the short story by William Faulkner, “Barn Burning” (1939). 

[6] See: William Woods Holden – Wikipedia 

The Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937.

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            After the Second World War, the victors grabbed up all the surviving Nazi leaders and put them on trial at Nuremberg.  In the mass trial, one piece of evidence introduced by the prosecutors was the so-called “Hossbach Memorandum.”  They argued that the document from late 1937 demonstrated Hitler’s determination to wage aggressive war.  It’s worth taking a look at the essentials of the document to understand the international situation in Europe during the run-up to war in 1939. 

What is the source of the document? 

Documents on Germany Foreign Policy 1918-1945
Series D, Volume 1: From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937 – September 1938)
(Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1949.)[1] 

What is the Hossbach memorandum? 

            It is NOT a complete transcript of what was said at the meeting.  Instead, the secretary, Hitler’s adjutant Colonel Hossbach, took rapid fire notes, then cleaned up and fleshed out those notes for the archive.  That doesn’t mean that it is unreliable.  The ability to take such notes and produce a generally acceptable summary of the meeting formed one of the qualifications for someone in Hossbach’s position.  The archives of governments are full of such documents. 

When?  November 5, 1937, FROM 4:15 to 8:30 P.M

Who was present? 

The Fuehrer[2] and Chancellor.

Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister.
Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army.   
Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy.
Colonel General Goring, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe.  [NB: The only Nazi other than Hitler.] 
Baron [Konstantin] von Neurath, Foreign Minister.  
Colonel [Friedrich] Hossbach.  Secretary. 

What was the context of the conference?

1919-1924: France creates a system of alliances in Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia) to sorta replace the lost Russian alliance. 

1933-34: Hitler comes to power and consolidates the Nazi dictatorship.  

1934-1935: Political turmoil in France resulting from the Stavisky Scandal and the events of 6 February 1934.  Sharp divide between Left and Right. 

1935: Germany begins rearmament. 

1935: Britain begins rearmament, but chiefly with the hope of deterring German aggression. 

1935: Stresa Front.  Britain, France, and Italy agree to oppose any further German violations of the Versailles Treaty. 

1935: Italian invasion of Ethiopia led to a split with France and Britain, which raised the possibility of a war in the Mediterranean. 

1936: Germany re-occupies the Rhineland. 

1936: Popular Front [NB: alliance of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties] comes to power in France.  Economic turmoil and political polarization follows.  NB: The Radicals were middle-class and basically conservative.  The usual joke is that “they had their hearts on the left and their wallets on the right.” 

1936: Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).  Germany and Italy aid the rebels led by Franco; Russia aids the Republic’s government; Britain and France try to stay neutral. 

1937: Japanese invasion of China.  Threatens Western possessions and trade rights.  Australia, New Zealand, and Canada alarmed.  This raises the prospect of a war in the Far East. 

Brief exposition of Hitler’s ideas of race and living space. 

            Race: Basically, Aryans versus Latins and Slav “untermenschen.”  Doesn’t get into his thoughts on Jews. 

            Space: The borders of Germany created by Bismarck (1866-1871) were a temporary compromise.  Now they were insufficient to German needs for a resource base.  Britain had a vast overseas empire; Russia and the United States had whole continents.  Germany needs land and natural resources to stand on a level with these other empires. 

Discussion of “Autarky.”  (Isolation from the world economy.) 

Participation in the world economy.  (Alternative to autarky.) 

            Britain and France: two hate-inspired powers.  NB: They aren’t going to share. 

“Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. The campaigns of Frederick the Great for Silesia and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had involved unheard-of risk, and the swiftness of the Prussian action in 1870 had kept Austria from entering the war. If one accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remain still to be answered the questions “when” and “how.” In this matter there were three cases [Falle] to be dealt with.” 

Three cases:

Case 1: Period 1943-1945.  Germany would decline relative to other powers after this time.  Therefore, Germany had to take action by this period. 

Case 2: Civil war in France.  That would keep the French from interfering in German action. 

Case 3: France at war with some other power, like Italy. 

In case of war with France, Germany’s first step must be to over-throw Czechoslovakia and Austria to remove the danger of an attack if things began to go badly for Germany in the west.  That would also insure that the Poles remained neutral. 

Looking forward to 1943-1945, Hitler foresaw the following. 

“Actually, the Fuehrer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question could be cleared up in due course by Germany.”  NB: Munich Conference, September 1938. 

“Military intervention by Russia must be countered by the swiftness of our operations; however, whether such an intervention was a practical contingency at all was, in view of Japan’s attitude, more than doubtful.”  NB: Japanese leaders debated attacking South (Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, French Indo-China) OR attacking North (Russian Far East). 

“Should case 2 arise -the crippling of France by civil war- the situation thus created by the elimination of the most dangerous opponent must he seized upon whenever it occurs for the blow against the Czechs.” 

“The Fuehrer saw case 3 [i.e. war between France and Italy] coming definitely nearer; it might emerge from the present tensions in the Mediterranean, and he was resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938.”  NB: Spanish Civil War provides one possible cause of war between France and someone else, but the Italians were winding up Arab nationalists in French-ruled Syria and Tunisia.  Germany occupied French attention, but what if a fit of Gallic vivacity caused the French to decide to sort out Mussolini? 

“If Germany made use of this war [between Italy and France-Britain] to settle the Czech and Austrian questions, it was to be assumed that Britain -herself at war with Italy- would decide not to act against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany was not to be expected.” 

How did the German generals respond to this exposition?

“In appraising the situation Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Fritsch repeatedly emphasized the necessity that Britain and France must not appear in the role of our enemies, and stated that the French Army would not be so committed by the war with Italy that France could not at the same time enter the field with forces superior to ours on our western frontier.  NB: The French could bust up the Italians without much effort.  Enjoy it too. 

General von Fritsch estimated the probable French forces available for use on the Alpine frontier at approximately twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on the western frontier, with the role, according to the German view, of invading the Rhineland. In this matter, moreover, the advanced state of French defense preparations [Mobilmachung] must be taken into particular account, and it must be remembered apart from the insignificant value of our present fortifications -on which Field Marshal von Blomberg laid special emphasis- that the four motorized divisions intended for the West were still more or less incapable of movement.

In regard to our offensive toward the southeast, Field Marshal von Blomberg drew particular attention to the strength of the Czech fortifications, which had acquired by now a structure like a Maginot Line and which would gravely hamper our attack.” 

“Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume.” 

Hitler responds:

“To the Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume, the Fuehrer put the summer of 1938 as the date which seemed to him possible for this.  [NB: How far away is that?] 

In reply to considerations offered by Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch regarding the attitude of Britain and France, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France against Germany.  NB: “These are not the Britain and France of 1914.  I can smell their fear.”  That’s what I think he means. 

Should the Mediterranean conflict under discussion lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we must immediately begin action against the Czechs. On the other hand, should the powers not engaged in the war declare themselves disinterested, then Germany would have to adopt a similar attitude to this for the time being.”

What events followed?

January-February 1938: Blomberg forced to resign in late January 1938 after the scandalous past of his new wife became known to the secret police; Fritsch forced to resign in early February 1938 after falsified allegations of homosexuality (worked up by Reinhard Heydrich, Goring’s right-hand man).  Hossbach had warned Fritsch about the scheme, so he was dismissed as Hitler’s adjutant two days later.

Early February 1938: Neurath: fired as Foreign Minister. 

March 1938: Germany suddenly annexes Austria. 

August-September 1938: Czech crisis led to the Munich settlement, giving Germany the Sudetenland. 

1938: Tide of battle turned decisively against the Republicans in Spain, although they remained in possession of large parts of the country. 

March 1939: Germany seizes the rest of Czechoslovakia.   Britain and France then extended a “guarantee” of the remaining existing borders in Central Europe.  In practice, this meant Poland. 

Summer 1939: France and Britain begin talks with the Soviet Union for a military alliance. 

What can we tell about Hitler’s intentions from this document? 

            Is the Hossbach Memorandum a “blueprint” for the war that came in September 1939? 

            Or is it something much more limited than that? 

            Is Hitler irrational and fantasizing in his analysis of the political situation? 

            Or is Hitler a hard-headed and cold-hearted realist? 

            What if the conference between Hitler and his military commanders and head diplomat wasn’t about informing them of his plans?  What if he just wanted to smoke-out any opposition to whatever it was that he wanted to do? 

            What would Neville Chamberlain have made of this document if he had the opportunity to read it between November 1937 (when it was created) and the annexation of Austria in March 1938 or the Munich conference in September 1938? 

            This last question is the premise for the historical thriller Munich, by Robert Harris (2017).  It was made into a Netflix movie, “Munich: The Edge of War” (2021) with Jeremy Irons as Neville Chamberlain. 

[1] In Spring 1945, specially created Anglo-American expert teams were sent to Germany to search for political and economic archives, particularly those which shed light on the origins of the war, and Germany’s operations and war aims. The experts assembled several tons of German Foreign Ministry documents discovered in the Harz Mountains and Thuringia, together with documents from other places of deposit at Marburg Castle. These established a unified collection of the captured material.  Subsequently, the documents were both microfilmed and translated and published on paper.  The originals were later returned to the government of the German Federal Republic. 

[2] “Leader”: title assumed by Hitler after the death of President von Hindenburg in 1934 when Hitler combined the offices of President and Chancellor (prime minister). 

EDC.

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            In the wake of the Second World War, Western European countries pondered some form of “unity.”  At first, this meant unity “at the peak”: countries surrendering some measure of sovereignty to form a “European” government.  This went nowhere.  So, attention turned to unity “at the base”: create specialized “European” institutions and let it cook.  This approach soon gave birth to the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC, Schuman Plan).  It worked once, so try it in other areas (Common Market, Euratom). 

            The “wake of the Second World War” broadly overlapped the “dawning of the Cold War.”  The Americans and the Europeans shared an interest in preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe.[1]  Eventually (1947-), this led to the Marshall Plan and some CIA meddling in French and Italian elections.  Still, what if the Red Army marched west?  Military security rose up as an issue.  One part of the answer came in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  The United States would keep troops in Europe as a “trip wire.”[2] 

            In dealing with these problems, “Europe” faced three problems.  First, the British didn’t want to join.[3]  Second, how were countries to reconcile with the Germans?  Third, Many American officials disdained the Europeans.  The purpose of Marshall Plan aid was “to get the Europeans on their feet and off our back.” 

            Then, in June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea.  The “Cold War” wasn’t just going to be an economic and political struggle in Western Europe.  It could also be a military struggle.  American troops might have to be sent to the Far East or the Middle East.  So, Western Europeans would have to bulk-up their military forces.  In September 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed re-arming West Germany.  The European responded with dismay.[4] 

            The “European integration” and American military themes soon came together.  In October 1950, French Defense Minister Rene Pleven suggested the creation of a “European Defense Community” to create a “European Army.”  West German troops would be raised, but would not be formed into units larger than battalion.  The German battalions would be mixed with troops from other countries and the higher commands would be held only by non-Germans.  The Americans reluctantly agreed if this was the only way to get West German troops. 

            Negotiation of the treaty dragged on for a year and a half.  The size of the German units rose to divisions, not battalions; and the European Army would be under the American commander of NATO, rather than independent.  After signatures (May 1952), the treaty went back to the national parliaments for ratification.  In the meantime, the context changed.  The Korean War ended in a truce; Joseph Stalin died and was succeeded by more moderate seeming men.  The EDC seemed less urgent.  The French parliament rejected the treaty (August 1954). 

            Afterwards, NATO admitted West Germany (and its army).  Europe enjoyed American nuclear “extended deterrence.”  Eventually, the Soviet Union fell.  Who needed armies now?[5] 

[1] Not much could be done about Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe what with the Red Army being what it was. 

[2] If Red Army troops attacked American troops, then nuclear weapons could come into play. 

[3] The British—understandably, labored under the illusion that they ranked among the “victors.”  In fact, Britain had suffered the ruin of its economy and loss of will to hold its empire.  Which is what Neville Chamberlain had feared. 

[4] See Category:Nazi war crimes in France – Wikipedia 

[5] European defense spending has fallen from 3.76 percent of GDP (1960) to 1.56 percent (2022).  That’s 58 percent.  European Union Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2025 | MacroTrends   

Sleigh Ride.

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            Imagine a Russian four-horse sleigh.  Coming home from a Christmas party at a nobleman’s country estate, it is loaded with presents.  Its passengers are bundled in furs and further insulated against the cold by much wine and an elaborate meal.  Sleep beckons. 

            Glancing drowsily toward the nearby forest, one among them sees the glitter of eyes watching from the woods.  “Wolves,” he says.  The sleigh-driver urges his horses on a bit.  Looking back, the passengers see a pack of wolves emerge from among the trees.  Then the leader of the pack begins to run after the sleigh.  The others follow.  Looking back, the driver sees them and quickly cracks his whip.  The horses surge forward and the passengers come fully awake.  Safety lies only in reaching their own country house. 

            The wolf-pack gains ground.  The driver belabors his horses with the whip, but calls to his passengers that they must throw things overboard.  That will lighten the load for the horses and it may distract the wolves.  Hampers filled with left-overs are the first to go.  The wolves pause briefly to snap at the offerings, but then come on with appetites whetted.  Gifts still wrapped in paper and ribbon go over the back next.  The wolves hardly glance at these, just keep rushing toward the sleigh.  Panic begins to grip the people on the sleigh.  Would they reach home before the wolves caught up? 

            So it was with rearmament in the Thirties.  Germany was the leader of the pack, Japan and Italy were other members of the pack; Britain and France were the passengers in the sleigh; and rearmament itself was the sleigh. 

            For more detail and depth on these issues, you can see additional posts on this blog. 

            The Costs of the First World War.  The Costs of the First World War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Appeasement and Beliefs.  Appeasement and Beliefs. | waroftheworldblog 

            Britain, Appeasement, and Today.  Britain, Appeasement, and Today. | waroftheworldblog 

            France and Appeasement in the Thirties. France and Appeasement in the Thirties. | waroftheworldblog   

            Crossing the Line.  Crossing the Line. | waroftheworldblog 

            Hitler’s War.  Hitler’s War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Why write this stuff NOW?  Why write?  I’m a historian trying to make sense of human actions under the pressure of ideas and events.  It’s my way of trying to serve a useful purpose beyond my own enjoyment.  Why NOW?  I suspect that those times inform our times.  China is the leader of the pack; Russia, North Korea, and Iran are the other wolves.  Maybe I’m just crying “Wolf!” 

British rearmament in the Thirties.

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            The government had ended the “Ten Year Rule” in 1932, but continued to hold down defense spending.  Then, in October 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference.  This tipped the balance toward rearmament. 

            In November 1933, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) formed a “Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC).”  Its mission was to identify the worst gaps in the military forces, plan how to meet them, and to make broad judgements about strategy.  By July 1934 it identified Germany as the primary danger and determined that Britain should avoid conflict with Japan.  Also, the DRC adopted a five-year time-line for rearmament (1934-1939).[1]  In March 1935, the government broke decisively in favor of rearmament.

            Having made the decision to rearm in a hurry, all went smoothly, no?  No.  The DRC proposed increasing military spending by £71 million over the five years, much of it on the Army.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer[2] imposed important changes.  First, he cut the total to £50 million.  Second, he cut the money for the Army in half, while doubling the proposed spending on the Royal Air Force (RAF).  He placed the emphasis squarely on home defense.  Henceforth, rearmament would involve constant tension between the armed services and the Treasury, with the Foreign Office getting buffeted between them. 

Defense spending rose from £37.2 million (1934) to £42.6 million (1935) to £60.7 million (1936) to £104.2 million (1937) to £182.2 million (1938) to £273.1 million (1939).  Almost half went to the Navy each year with the RAF receiving over half of the remainder.[3]    

What did Britain get for the money and how soon?  First and foremost, the RAF got thousands of modern, all-metal, single wing fighter planes–the Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane–which were to play such an important role in the Battle of Britain.  In addition, money went to development of radar for air defense control.[4]  In addition, a good deal of the expanded Army budget went to anti-aircraft artillery for home defense.  Second, the Navy received five new battleships, several aircraft carriers, and a host of light cruisers, while several older battleships were totally modernized.  Also, the defenses of the Singapore Base were hurried to conclusion as a stop-gap defense against Japan.  The Army largely got skint.  It could field only five divisions for service on the Continent.  Finally, industrial production saw improvements, both through the increased spending for the Royal Ordnance Factories (essentially bullets and shells), and through “Shadow Factories” (government-aided factories to expand aircraft production).[5] 

Britain had to try to avoid war until the program had been completed.  Until then,…

[1] Which would suggest that the “Ten-Year Rule” should have foreseen war in 1929.  But that is ridiculous.  It shows how fast things can change in human affairs. 

[2] Neville Chamberlin served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from November 1931 to May 1937, when he became Prime Minister. 

[3] Michael M. Postan, British War Production, Official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, Chapter II, p. 12, at HyperWar: British War Production [Chapter II]  On Postan, see: Michael Postan – Wikipedia 

[4] The prioritization of the RAF over the Army, but not over the Navy, reflected a fear of the danger from enemy bombing.  See: Chain Home – Wikipedia, especially the section “The bomber will always get through.”  It also demonstrates the initially defensive and deterrent nature of British rearmament. 

[5] British shadow factories – Wikipedia 

Why did Britain hesitate to rearm in the Thirties?

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            Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany at a particularly difficult time for Britain.  The decision to re-arm, to prepare for another great war—even if could be limited to a merely “European War”[1]—proved agonizing and divisive. 

On the one hand, Britain faced the Great Depression which drove up unemployment, forced Britain off the Gold Standard (21 September 1931), and began the process of converting Britain from a policy of free trade to a system of protective tariffs.[2]  The tariffs went into effect in February 1932.  They encouraged import-substitute re-industrialization.  By one later estimate, the tariffs led to a rise of real annual GDP by 4 percent (1932-37), on a par with Nazi Germany.  These events marked a dramatic turning point in Britain’s national policies. 

The ship’s pilot guiding this turn was Neville Chamberlain.[3]  Having devoted his political career to domestic reform, he foresaw the GDP growth serving to revitalize the British economy through industrial modernization and a social policy that eased old divisions, rather than preparation for another world war.[4]  Threatened by Japan in the Far East, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule” (March 1932).  Even so, the government remained preoccupied by the “very serious financial and economic situation.”  It was determined to resist big increases in military spending. 

On the other hand, the forces opposed to war and the preparation for war occupied a strong position in political.  These forces coalesced around the League of Nations.  Although the League had been the brain-child of American President Woodrow Wilson, it found its strongest popular support in Britain.  Britain’s League of Nations Union acted as a powerful pressure-group.[5]  Its goals were to promote international justice and human rights; disarmament and the settlement of international conflicts by peaceful means; and reliance upon collective security, rather than alliances.[6]  Membership rose from about 250,000 in the mid-Twenties to over 400,000 in 1931. 

Anti-militarism became a public fixture in the early Thirties.  Examples include the Oxford “King and Country” debate (February 1933); the East Fulham by-election, in which the peace candidate thrashed the rearmament candidate (October 1933); the “Peace Ballot,” (results June 1935), which strongly endorsed League membership, universal disarmament, abolition of air forces and the arms industry, and collective security against aggression; and the ferocious opposition to the Hoare-Laval Pact (December 1935).  This only worked if everyone played.    

            Hitler’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference (October 1933) ended real hope. 

[1] John Lukacs, The Last European War: September 1939-December 1941 (1976). 

[2] See: Import Duties Act 1932 – Wikipedia  This Act formed a first step in a much larger plan.  In Summer 1932, representatives of Britain and the Dominions met in Ottawa.  They agreed upon a policy of high tariffs around the Empire; low tariffs within the Empire; and Keynesian ideas about demand management (low interest rates, increased government spending).  See: British Empire Economic Conference – Wikipedia for an under-developed sketch. 

[3] Neville Chamberlain – Wikipedia 

[4] For some of the National government’s social reforms, see: Unemployment Act 1934 – Wikipedia;

 Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934 – Wikipedia; Special Areas (Amendment) Act 1937 – Wikipedia; Factory Acts – Wikipedia; Coal Act 1938 – Wikipedia; Holidays with Pay Act 1938 – Wikipedia;

[5] Members of the Liberal Party provided much of the leadership for the group, but important Conservatives also joined.  At the same time, many Conservative politicians and voters saw the League as ridiculous.

[6] See: Collective security – Wikipedia, and Disarmament – Wikipedia.  Both have useful bibliographies.   

British Disarmament in the Nineteen Twenties.

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            Britain’s military spending had soared during the First World War.  It remained high in the immediate aftermath of the war: £766 million in 1919–20.  Then, in August 1919, led by the Secretary of State for War and Air,[1] the Cabinet’s Committee of Imperial Defence adopted the “Ten Year Rule”: the government would base its defense budgets “on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” 

            From January 1920 to July 1921, Britain suffered a severe recession.  In 1921, the media titan Lord Rothermere founded the “Anti-Waste League” to pressure the government.[2]  It worked: the government appointed a budget-cutting Committee on National Expenditure with Sir Eric Geddes as chairman.  What followed became known as the “Geddes Axe.”[3]  In the end, total defense spending fell from £189.5 million (1921–22) to £111 million (1922–23), before rebounding to £114.7 million in 1924–25.[4] 

            Then a series of international agreements altered the context.  The Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) prevented a naval arms race between Britain, the United States, and Japan.  The Dawes Plan (1924) conceded to German objections on reparations.  The Locarno Pact (1925) stabilized relations in Western Europe between Germany and its former opponents.  In 1925, the new—and very popular in Britain–League of Nations began pushing for a World Disarmament Conference that would reduce “offensive” weapons almost out of existence.  The Versailles treaty had substantially disarmed Germany; now it was time for the other powers to follow suit.  A reduced chance of war would justify deep cuts in military budgets.  In 1928, in light of all these developments, the Chancellor of the Exchequer[5] persuaded the Cabinet to make the “Ten Year Rule” permanent unless specifically changed by the government.   

In the early Thirties, the Great Depression forced still more economies: defense spending fell to £102 million in 1932.  In April 1931, the First Sea Lord told the Committee of Imperial Defense that “owing to the operation of the ‘ten-year-decision’ and the clamant need for economy, our absolute [naval] strength also has … been so diminished as to render the fleet incapable, in the event of war, of efficiently affording protection to our trade.”  Moreover, if the Navy had to move the bulk of its strength to the Far East to deal with Japan, it would have the means to defend neither Britain’s overseas trade nor Britain itself. 

            In September 1931, Japan seized the Chinese outlying province of Manchuria.  On 23 March 1932, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule.”  However, it stipulated that “this [change] must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation” of Britain. 

Then, in January 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany.  War was less than seven years, not ten, away.  Much rearmament would have to be done in great haste. 

[1] Winston Churchill. 

[2] See: Anti-Waste League – Wikipedia and Harold Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Rothermere – Wikipedia  Comic in light of current events.  However, it was his rival, Lord Beaverbrook, who was the immigrant. 

[3] On Geddes, see: Eric Geddes – Wikipedia   On the Committee on National Expenditure, see: Geddes Axe – Wikipedia 

[4] For its part, social spending (education, health, housing, pensions, unemployment) fell from £205.8 million (1920–21) to £182.1 million (1922–23) to £175.5 million (1923–24), before rising to £177.4 million (1924–25). 

[5] Winston Churchill. 

No more coals to Newcastle.

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            By the mid-Thirties the international situation had begun to darken.  It was not yet Desperate.  The worst—another World War—might still be avoided.  Serious men had to deal with situations in a realistic way.  What were the situations? 

First, there was the conflict between the “democratic” and “status-quo” powers (Britain, France, and the United States) and the “authoritarian” and “revisionist”: powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, and Imperial Japan.  Each of the “revisionist” powers desired to expand its territorial control over adjoining areas.  To accomplish these goals they would have to overthrow the system of international order—often called the Versailles settlement—created after the First World War.  Beyond that common goal they were often at odds among themselves. 

            Second, there were the military realities.  The conventional economic policy adopted to respond to the Depression (1929-1939) combined lower taxes with spending cuts, while limiting international trade (autarky).  Where countries stuck with this policy, military budgets suffered.  Where they did not stick with this policy, they rearmed faster.  Meanwhile, autarky spurred both isolationism and aggression.

            Third, Britain had three enemies threatening its global position: Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Far East.  It had the military resources to fight one major war at a time.  Britain lacked good allies.  America was deeply isolationist; Communist Russia hated capitalist counties—democratic or authoritarian; and France had been “bled white” in the First World War, while the Depression intensified partisan polarization.  If Britain fought one major power, the other two enemies would pile on.  Unless they were bought off or deterred. 

            In July 1934, Austrian Nazis had tried to seize power.  Hitler’s fingerprints were all over the failed coup.  The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ordered four army divisions to the border with Austria to deter German intervention.  In London and Paris, this seemed a good omen. 

            In March 1935, Nazi Germany declared that it would begin rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty.  In April 1935, representatives from Britain, France, and Italy met in the resort town of Stresa.  They agreed to resist any further German violation of the Versailles Treaty.  During the conference, the Italians raised the issue of Ethiopia.  Italy wanted to take over a big chunk of Ethiopia.  This was Italy’s bill for helping contain Germany.  The demand embarrassed the British, so it never made it into a written agreement.    

Mussolini had not abandoned his goals.  In October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia.  Public opinion, but especially “progressive” opinion, in both Britain and France went wild.  Demands rang out for support for the League of Nations and economic sanctions on Italy. 

British and French leaders still hoped to save the Italian alliance against Germany.  In December 1935, British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare met secretly with French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval.  They agreed on a plan that gave most of Ethiopia to Italy while leaving a fragment independent.  News leaked, public opinion revolted, the plan was abandoned, and Hoare resigned.  King George V said “Ah well Sam, no more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris.” 

Lesson: If you want the “status quo” in one area you may have to accept “revisionism” in another.  Who is the main enemy?  What are the alternatives? 

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 5.

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            From the adoption of the Constitution until 1974, Presidents were assumed to have the power—inherent in their office–to not spend money appropriated by Congress.[1]  In 1801, Thomas Jefferson chose to prioritize debt reduction over national defense.  He impounded $50,000 that had been appropriated for gunboats requested by the Navy.  Many of his successors impounded funds. 

By the early 1970s, members of Congress believed that President Richard Nixon was abusing his official powers in a variety of ways.  One example came in his impoundment of appropriated funds.  Nixon held up spending on “water pollution control, education and health programs and highway and housing construction.”[2]  The amount came to “$53.2‐billion during its first five years in office.”[3]  In the context of other struggles with President Nixon, House Speaker Carl Albert called it a struggle between Congress and “one-man rule.”  On a broadly bipartisan basis, Congress struck back.  The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 barred the President from impounding funds appropriated by Congress.[4]  It did permit a Presidential request for “rescission” if approved by Congress.[5]  Already mired in “Watergate,” Nixon signed the bill into law.  As a result of Nixon’s surrender, the law was never tested before the Supreme Court.  Do extreme cases make good law? 

That doesn’t mean that Presidents think that impoundment is a bad idea.  Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all supported the restoration of the authority stripped from the office because of that damn fool Nixon.  Other unsuccessful candidates for President—John McCain, Al Gore, and John Kerry—supported restoring the authority to impound.[6]   

Which brings us to President Trump.  During the campaign, he promised to “squeeze the bloated federal bureaucracy for massive savings.”[7]  From the get-go he stopped appropriated spending on D.I.E. initiatives; payments to non-governmental organizations; foreign aid (for a 90 day review period); and all federal loans and grants (almost immediately rescinded).  Trump wants to bring the issue to the Supreme Court for the hearing it didn’t get in the 1970s. 

The key issue here is self-restraint.  The ballooning national debt, fueled by unbalanced annual budgets, threatens the financial stability of the government.  Nixon’s abuse of the powers of his office went well beyond what other presidents had done, alarming many people in both parties.  Trump seems determined to disrupt the established “way we do things around here” patterns that have taken the United States to the brink of multiple crises.  He, too, is alarming people in both parties.  He wouldn’t be on the verge of shifting the balance of power if all of us had shown more self-restraint.  Not meant as an exculpation of Trump.   

[1] Impoundment of appropriated funds – Wikipedia 

[2] Richard D. Lyons, “Nixon’s Impounding of Billions in Federal Money Is Complicated Issue, Abounding in  Misconceptions,” NYT, 7 October 1973. 

[3] Compared to $39 billion impounded by Lyndon Johnson. 

[4] Passed by the House 385-23 (204 Democrats and 181 Republicans voting in favor); passed by the Senate 80-0 (50 Democrats and 29 Republicans). 

[5] Since then, Congress has rarely approved rescission requests, so Presidents rarely request them.     

[6] President Joe Biden did not.

[7] Charlie Savage, “Are Presidents Empowered to Block Spending Authorized by Congress?” NYT, 29 January 2025. 

American attitudes toward immigration.

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            We are all immigrants or the descendants of immigrants.[1]  Yet “Americans” have often been ambivalent about—or hostile to—new arrivals.  In the 17th Century Native Americans made repeated attempts to wipe out English settlers.  The early European settlements, especially those of the English, were starved for settlers.  They generally welcomed newcomers with open arms. 

            After independence from Britain had been won, the new United States had to define its own policy on immigration.  Generally, the new nation desired immigrants.  Immigrants could bring valuable skills, and the labor to transform the continent’s abundant resources into national wealth.  All residents enjoyed the same civil and legal rights.  The initial residency requirement for citizenship was two years, later set at five years.  No one coerced them to abandon their own culture, or even language. 

            In the 1830s began a great wave of immigrants, predominantly Germans and Irish.  Trouble arose from the reality that “new” Americans were not immediately and might never be “real” Americans in the eyes of the “old” Americans.  Increasingly, the “voluntary” Americans were drawn from countries where absolute monarchy prevailed.  This included all those who belonged to the “absolute monarchy” of the Papal Catholicism.[2]  Other American feared the United States would be swarmed by left-wing radicals in flight from more repressive regimes. 

“Nativism” arose as a political force, culminating in the American or “Know Nothing” Party in the 1850s.  They expressed Thomas Jefferson’s earlier fears that people raised under ana absolute monarchy could not learn how to participate in a democratic republic.[3] “Nativism” made impressive progress until swamped by the larger crisis of the Civil War. 

After the Civil War, as any textbook will tell you, the country bounded forward in both industrialization and the exploitation of the Trans-Mississippi West.  Vast amounts of natural resources (minerals, timber, grains and livestock) just needed manpower to put them to work.  British, German, Irish (and French-Canadian in New England) immigrants poured in.  Anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism revived, and a new anti-Socialism joined them as inspirations to immigrants.  Then, in the 1880s, there began a tidal wave of “new immigration” from Southern and Eastern Europe.  Poles, Russian Jews, Italians, Hungarians, Greeks, and others arrived in huge numbers.  Only the First World War (1914) paused most European emigration. 

This latter immigration stirred bubbling cauldron of late-19th and early-20th Century social, economic, cultural, and political strife.  Both “advanced” thinkers and organized labor championed the limits; but equivalent figures argued for inclusion over exclusion.  The contest produced the first laws restricting European immigration (1923-1924).   The laws have been revised on several occasions, but the United States has been a country of regulated and restricted immigration for a century.  Recently, mass defiance of the law has combined with important political and economic forces turning a blind eye to the issue has made it an explosive problem. 

So, we go back and forth in a debate that is ever-changing and ever-the-same. 

See: Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted; Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door. 

[1] Including those whose ancestors crossed the Bering land bridge when it was still above sea level.  

[2] The “Syllabus of Errors” (1877) summed up more than a century of Papal anti-modern, anti-republican, and anti-liberal thought.  “He was agin it,” as Will Rogers said of a fundamentalist Protestant preacher’s views on sin. 

[3] Jefferson came down on both sides of many issues.  This is one such.