My Weekly Reader 14 June 2021.

Posted on June 14, 2021 by jsh54

“We had won” Winston Churchill later wrote of American entry into full belligerency after Pearl Harbor in December 1941. A “long and hard road” still had to be travelled to victory. By August 1942, the Japanese had conquered the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and Burma, and were on the frontiers of India. By the same point, German armies were advancing on Stalingrad in Russia and on Alexandria in Egypt.

The war in the Mediterranean linked the two greater Theaters of Operations. Gibraltar controlled the western entrance to the sea, while also serving as a key naval base protecting Atlantic Ocean convoys. Suez controlled the eastern entrance, while also anchoring the British position in the Middle East. In 1942, the Germans and Italians mounted a deadly threat to Suez from the Italian colony of Libya. The Afrika Korps joined with the Italian army to advance deep into Egypt. In one sense, holding onto the British position in the Middle East came down to a question of merchant shipping. The Italian army in North Africa and the Afrika Korps had to be supplied by the short sea route from Sicily to the Libyan port of Benghazi. The British in the Middle East had to be supplied by the long sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. Under these unequal circumstances, the British fought hard to disrupt the Axis supply line.

In this effort, the little island of Malta played an over-sized role. Located at the choke point between the western and eastern parts of the Mediterranean, it also stood astride the Sicily-Libya supply route. Initially judging Malta to be indefensible in modern war, the Royal Navy had largely withdrawn to the Egyptian port of Alexandria at the outbreak of war. However, the war in North Africa made it essential to hold Malta as a base for submarine attacks on the Italian supply line. Holding Malta meant running convoys through Italian and German air and naval attacks without much British air cover.

In 1940 and 1941, the Royal Navy generally got the better of the Italian “Regia Marina.”[1] The situation changed dramatically in 1942. In December 1941, Italian frogmen disabled two British battleships in Alexandria Harbor. The Japanese assault required the dispatch of other ships to the Indian Ocean. The German “Luftwaffe” also began to play a larger role. Britain lost naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. Three convoys in March and June 1942 suffered heavy losses or were turned back entirely.[2] Yet Malta had to be held. Courage and skill would have to make good the deficiency in ships.

In August 1942, the British sent off a do-or-die convoy code-named “Pedestal.”[3] Running eastward past Gibraltar under heavy escort, the convoy came under sustained naval and air attack. Three days of pure Hell followed. The British lost a carrier, two light cruisers, a destroyer, and nine merchant ships to bombs and torpedoes. Yet the essential supplies—including a tanker full of fuel oil for submarines and aviation gasoline—got through. Malta not only hung-on, attacks on the Axis supply line revived.

By the end of 1942, the tide of battle had turned against the Axis. Tobruk, Guadalcanal, and Stalingrad are well-remembered milestones. So, too, should be “Pedestal.”

[1] Look up the Battle of Cape Matapan and the attack on the Italian fleet anchorage at Taranto.

[2] A fictionalized and propagandistic account of the experience of one British cruiser, HMS “Artemis,” on one of these convoys is given by C.S. Forester, The Ship (1943). Fine stuff.

[3] Max Hastings, Operation Pedestal (2021), reviewed by Jonathan W. Jordan, WSJ, 12-13 June 2021.

The Asian Century 20.

Posted on June 5, 2021 by jsh54

Not so long ago, European hopes for a partnership with China looked promising. At Davos in 2017, Xi Jinping said all the right things about wanting to combat climate change, continue building an open world economy, and working co-operatively with other nations to solve shared problems. This made an appealing contrast to the Trump Administration’s “America First” stance. The “China Market” offered both a growing market for high-end European products and cheap source the consumer goods. China’s “Belt and Road” initiative dangled generous infrastructure spending before countries still struggling out of the financial crisis and recession of the first years of the 21^st Century.[1] European-Chinese co-operation looked like a low-cost or no-cost policy option.

Then the Chinese-American split came out into the open. Then China’s authoritarianism became too blatant to ignore, with the persecution of the Uighurs and the crack-down on democracy in Hong Kong. Then China started throwing its weight around in Europe to stave off criticism or coerce compliance.

Now, the deepening rivalry between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China is forcing other countries to choose sides. They can back the US, or back China, or try for non-aligned independence.[2]

Some in the European Union (EU) want to back the US. For exponents of an up-dated “Atlantic Alliance,” the US is the only choice: both countries uphold the same values and the US possesses formidable military and diplomatic power. They choose to see Donald Trump as a destructive anomaly. They argue that neither the US nor the EU are strong enough alone to counter the PRC, but together than can win.[3]

One problem here is that the EU is crumbling. The divide between the original founder countries of the EU and the later additions has surfaced with “Brexit” and the dissent of some of the Eastern Europeans from Franco-German leadership. The divide between Northern and Southern Europeans revealed by the financial crisis has only been papered over, not solved.

Others clearly want to pursue non-alignment in a manner that will enable them to hold the ring between the US and the PRC. Gaining this kind of power involves closer ties with Russia. Russia has greater military power than do the European countries; Russia has abundant oil and gas flowing to Europe through its pipelines. The EU and Russia would make a far more impressive bloc than does the EU alone.

One problem here is that Russia will exact a high price for its co-operation. Europeans might be willing to see Russia restore order a la Putin to the kleptocratic Ukraine. How would they deal with Russian irredentism around its Western and Southern frontiers? Then, Chinese dissidents end up in prison. Russian dissidents end up dead.

Is “Europe” too divided, weak, and even misguided, to chart an independent course in the world?

[1] Chinese management’s reform of half of the shipping facilities of the Piraeus probably delighted Northern Europeans fed up with Greek sloth, fraud, and incompetence.

[2] Yaroslav Trofimov, “Europe’s Face-Off With China,” WSJ, 29 February-1 March 2020.

[3] You can see this as Pessimistic in that it implies that the PRC has already gained so much strength that the US alone cannot check China’s course. Or perhaps it’s just Realistic.

All the News That Fits Is Printed.

Posted on June 2, 2021 by jsh54

Why do people believe nonsense?[1] One answer might be that people operate in an environment of nothing but nonsense. They don’t have any choice. Obviously, that’s not the case today, at least in Western-style democracies with public education systems, a free press, modern medicine, economies based on science and technology, and a general celebration of human reason. These institutions churn out immense amounts of “sense.”

Another answer might be that people filter information according to their group identity. According to sociologists and psychologists, people always have some sense of belonging to a sub-group of society, their “in-group.” It is a basic evolutionary survival strategy. That sense of group identity can vary with the larger social and political context. In a period of dramatic change or conflict, those larger events can intensify the sense of belonging to an in-group. Belonging can strengthen one’s sense of security when the person feels embattled by hostile forces. “News” about whatever forces or groups that are seen as threatening the in-group can become one of the shared elements reinforcing group identity.

Word of mouth communication of “news” provides validation. External or authoritative repetition of the “news” provides an even stronger validation. On the one hand, when that “news” is voiced or sponsored by a major public figure, then it seems more plausible still. It gains credibility from being stated by a public figure. It also expands the reference community of the “in-group” beyond local acquaintance. On the other hand, media exposure and endorsement of the “news” lends further credibility while massively expanding awareness of it. Social media has become a particular concern because of the feed-back from “likes” and “shares” provides an affirmation to the person who posts some bit of the “news.”

Taken together, “in a highly polarized society,” these factors “pull heavily toward in-group solidarity and out-group derogation. They do not much favor consensus reality or abstract ideals of accuracy.” In the context of contemporary American politics, this is concerning.

It’s possible that the cause for concern is real, but that both the degree of danger and the novelty of the situation are over-stated. In 1678 Titus Oates cooked up the story of a “Popish Plot” to kill British King Charles II. He accused the Jesuits and a long list of prominent Catholics. The government investigated and the list of accused people grew. Then the magistrate investigating the charges was found murdered. You can imagine the television reports, if there had been television in the 17^th Century: “New Plot by the ‘Scarlet Whore of Rome’!”; “Jesuit Secret Agents at Work in England!”; “Catholics Are Traitors!” The accusations played into all the fears and prejudices of ordinary Englishmen after a century of domestic and foreign conflict. Parliament took up the cause, forcing the king—who suspected the whole thing was a crock—to allow Oates to continue. At least fifteen innocent men were executed for participation in the “Popish Plot.” By 1681, tempers had begun to calm down. Just as quickly as people had believed in the plot, they suddenly disbelieved in it.

So why are “misinformation” and “fake news” such an urgent issue now? Perhaps it’s because, in America’s polarized politics, both “in-groups” feel under assault; prominent figures sound the alarm; and every corner of the media is filled with passionate intensity. Or maybe not.

[1] Max Fisher, “In an Us-Versus-Them World, Misinformation Reigns,” NYT, 10 May 2021.

Look After You Leap.

Posted on May 31, 2021 by jsh54

After the 11 September 2001 attacks, American military forces invaded Afghanistan in pursuit of Osama bin Laden’s head. This required toppling the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which had sheltered the Arab jihadi. The Taliban fell and its survivors withdrew into Pakistan, but American and Afghan forces failed to capture Bin Laden.[1]

The American government then set about transforming Afghanistan. Partly, this meant providing military security. American forces remained in Afghanistan, although the numbers diminished after the attack on Iraq in Spring 2003. Partly this meant economic and social modernization. Roads and bridges were built to connect the countryside with the few big cities. Schools and hospitals rose up. Women saw many opportunities open before them. Partly, it meant fostering democracy. A parliament and a president re-emerged; there were elections.

Much went wrong in a pretty public way. The “government” served as a device for corruption, much of it at the expense of American taxpayers.[2] From their safe-haven in Pakistan’s border areas, the Taliban rebuilt its military power, then began attacks inside Afghanistan. They targeted the government’s shoddy security forces. They also attacked American outposts in the Northeastern part of the country. These attacks couldn’t be called Taliban victories, but they did give the Americans a sense of the nature of their opponent.[3]

President Barack Obama inherited this mess, then tried to extricate America from Afghanistan. First, he “surged” almost 100,000 American forces into Afghanistan in time for the Summer 2010 “fighting season.” This did little to back-down the Taliban. American generals began to express their belief that the war needed a diplomatic solution. In May 2011, Special Forces finally killed Bin Laden in his Pakistan refuge. In June 2011, President Obama announced that American forces would transition to a training and support mission.

President Donald Trump inherited this mess, then tried to extricate American forces from Afghanistan. In 2018 it began negotiations with the Taliban, but without the Afghan government. These negotiations concluded successfully from the point of view of the Americans and the Taliban. In February 2020, an American-Taliban deal agreed that all American forces would be gone from Afghanistan by 1 May 2021. Meanwhile, the Taliban agreed to cut ties with Islamic radical organizations, dial back its attacks on Afghan government forces, and negotiate with that government.

Relations between the Americans and the Afghan government went further down-hill after this deal. The Taliban, which knew that they had won, proved unbending with the government, which knew that it had lost. Nor did the Taliban check the violence very much. Taliban forces have evicted government forces from much of the country and are taking control of local government and the roads

American security experts predict that the country will be under Taliban rule within two to three years after American forces depart. President Biden then set the final departure date for 11 September 2021. This is how endless wars end. Better to ask how they start.

[1] David Zucchino, “America’s War in Afghanistan: How It Started and How It Is Ending,” NYT, 23 April 2021.

[2] OK, not actually taxpayers. The US put the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the credit card.

[3] See, for example, https://mwi.usma.edu/podcast-the-spear-combat-in-the-kunar-river-valley/

The Murder Spike.

Posted on May 30, 2021 by jsh54

As the Covid-19 pandemic tide ebbs, all sorts of things come into plain view. One unsightly revelation is the sharp rise in homicides during 2020. Overall, the number of murders in major cities rose by more than a third (37 percent) over 2019.[1] The number of the slain rose by 40 percent in New York, 58 percent in Atlanta, 62 percent in New Orleans, 74 percent in Seattle, 78 percent in Louisville, and by 95 percent in Milwaukee. Taking New York City as an example, in 2006 there were 596 homicides; in 2009, there were 471 homicides; and in 2017, there were 292 homicides. During 2020 there were 447 homicides.[2]

The resulting sorrow is unevenly distributed. The violence hit the borough of Brooklyn hard: homicides rose almost 70 percent. More strikingly still, 10 of the city’s 77 police precincts, representing 13 percent of the city’s population, accounted for 34.2 percent of the homicides.

What brought down the number of homicides? What caused them to surge upward once more? The truth is that no one is sure. In some minds, the murder spike resulted from “frustration, anger,…trauma and mental health challenges” inflicted by the pandemic and its attendant lock-downs.[3] In some minds, two decades of aggressive and targeted policing brought down murder rates; while the progressive reforms of recent years handcuffed the police. The 1994 Crime Bill added 100,000 police to American forces, while greatly increasing prison space. Policies like “stop and frisk” in high-crime areas, high cash bail and long periods awaiting trial, and mass incarceration, it is argued, cut down the freedom of action allowed to criminals. These policies may—or may not—have driven down crime levels. They undoubtedly spawned a political backlash that decried mass incarceration and disparate effects of policing.

New York City embraced the new attitude. In 2014, the city stopped appealing a court verdict against “stop and frisk” policing; the police then greatly reduced their use of the practice. In 2019, the city announced a plan the close the gigantic Riker’s Island jail and to limit the city’s jail population to a much lower total of 3,300 inmates. In 2020, after the murder of George Floyd, the City Council passed further reforms. These included a $1 billion cut in the police department’s budget, and explicit restrictions on the use of things like choke-holds.[4] The budget cut led the NYPD to skip recruiting an entire class of new officers. The state did its part as well. In 2017, it raised the age of criminal responsibility, making it more difficult to charge 16- and 17-year olds as adults. In 2020, it passed bail reform to reduce cash bail.

In short, say conservatives, the reformers shifted the balance of forces on the streets of crime-plagued areas between the police and the criminals. One result, they say, is that many police have backed off from pro-actively enforcing the laws, while others have retired.

For the last decade, Blacks and Hispanics have born the burden of gun violence (95 percent) and that trend continued through 2020. If Black Lives Matter, then do all Black lives matter or just those taken by the police? It’s a choice facing progressives.

[1] Heather MacDonald, “Taking Stock of a Most Violent Year,” WSJ, 25 January 2021.

[2] Rafael A. Mangual, “The Homicide Spike Is Real,” NYT, 20 January 2021.

[3] Chicago mayor Lori Lightfoot, quoted in MacDonald, “Taking Stock.”

[4] For what it’s worth, see Joseph Wambaugh, The Onion Field, where the opinion is offered that it is really hard to subdue those resisting arrest without using choke-holds.

The Asian Century 19.

Posted on May 27, 2021 by jsh54

The Trump Administration decided to deal with the puzzle of how to manage the ascent of the Peoples Republic of China by hammering the living daylights out of China.[1] China runs a big trade surplus with the United States, so Trump slammed on heavy tariffs. The payment asymmetry meant that the Chinese could never hurt the United States as much by reciprocating.

China has long-standing claims on Taiwan, now a more or less democratic and economically successful country of its own. The Trump Administration diverged from long-standing American policy on Taiwan by warming up to it.

China has been extending claims over the South China Sea, notably by turning reefs into fortified islands, then claiming the airspace overhead. The Trump Administration challenged these claims, but also pressed Congress to build up the Navy.

China has engaged in a long-running struggle for American hearts and minds. The Trump Administration turned the FBI and Department of Justice loose on Chinese theft of intellectual property; then did the same on China’s efforts to cultivate agents of influence in academia and media.

However, the most effective Chinese agents of influence, during the Trump Administration and long before, were American businessmen who profited from the China trade. They have always argued for “moderation” and “dialogue” in China policy. Sometimes, President Trump listened to them, as did many of his predecessors. At times, he seemed to be seeking a “Grand Bargain” with China in which China would mend its ways in return for the United States easing up its pressure. Any such hopes crashed on the rocks of the Covid-19 pandemic and Trump’s re-election campaign. The “Kung Flu” line allowed him to blame China for the pandemic without acknowledging his own lackluster response.[2] American policy on China got tougher during 2016.

Tougher didn’t mean more effective. The Peoples Republic of China continues on the same path as before. That leaves the Biden Administration with an array of important decisions. Is “Get Tough With China” the wrong policy? In that case, one could expect an abandonment of coercion in favor of a return to older policies. Is “Get Tough With China” the right policy, but it hasn’t had enough time to work yet to change the behavior of such a formidable rival? In that case, one could expect a continuation of the path we’re on, dressed up with rhetorical distancing from the Trump Administration. Is “Get Tough With China” the right policy, but the Trump Administration didn’t go far enough? In that case, one could expect the addition of tight controls on further American investment in China, ugly quarrels in various international organizations, and port-calls by the U.S. Navy all over the region.

Other questions naturally follow. How much stress can either country take? Does Zi Jinping represent a consensus of Chinese leaders? If not, how solid is his grip on power?

[1] Josh Rogin, Chaos Under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the Twenty-First Century (2021), reviewed by Dan Blumenthal, WSJ, 12 May 2021.

[2] Yet uncertainty remains whether Trump was entirely wrong about the origins of the pandemic. See: Michael Gordon, Warren P. Strobel, and Drew Hinshaw, “Report on Wuhan Lab Fuels Covid-19 Debate,” WSJ, 24 May 2021; Jeremy Page, Betsy McKay, and Drew Hinshaw, “The Wuhan Lab Leak Debate: Disused Mine at Center Stage,” WSJ, 25 May 2021.

Israel and America.

Posted on May 26, 2021 by jsh54

The long-standing orthodoxy: the tiny, embattled democracy of Israel is encircled by hostile dictatorships; American support for Israel allows the country to survive, while giving the United States the influence to prevent Israel acting within safe bounds.[1]

The context for the orthodoxy: the Soviet-American Cold War made the Middle East, with its oil and important place in communications, a key area for American security; the Arab Cold War between revolutionary and monarchical dictatorships made for de-stabilizing meddling; Arab military incompetence allowed Israel to expand its borders, so a solution to the Palestinian problem would reduce the dangers of war in the entire region; and Middle Eastern oil underpinned a prosperous world economy.

The new heresy: The Cold War has ended, so Americans can view international affairs in a different way; Israel has made peace with most of its neighbors; Israel never intended to accept a Palestinian state, and the Arab states have abandoned the Palestinians to their fate; the great division in the Middle East runs between Shi’ites and Sunni; a nuclear-armed Israel is a valuable ally against an Iran striving for nuclear weapons of its own.

The trigger for Israel’s drive for greater autonomy may have come during the First Gulf War. The Americans couldn’t prevent Saddam Hussain’s Iraq from launching Scud missiles at Israel in an effort to broaden the war and undermine Arab support. President George H. W. Bush did arm-twist Israel into not responding. This may have suggested that post-Cold War Americans had begun to think of Israel as just another chess piece. Israel began preparing against the day.

The Israelis have managed to reconfigure their “occupation” of the West Bank into something that they—and the world—find tolerable. To accept a Palestinian state would be to endow their worst enemy with the benefits of sovereign statehood. That state would much more easily provide a base from which Hamas or the next version of the Islamic State could rain down death on the heart of Israel. Intervention and defensive response would both be much more difficult. Moreover, security barriers and check points have hived-off Israelis from Palestinians. The Israeli : Palestinian death toll has fallen from three-to-one to twenty-to-one. Palestinians may be miserable, humiliated, and enraged, but they are largely forgotten by the world.

The fear of Iran and of other forms of Islamic radicalism is bringing about a diplomatic realignment. Relationships have been “normalized” with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and Morocco. All this will be crowned—sooner or later—with warm relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Israel is in search of new friends. It’s hard to claim that your country is a democracy when it is holding several million Palestinians in a colonial status. Illiberal democracies like Hungary and India seem to be targets of Israel’s diplomacy.

Benjamin Netanyahu, at least, has been demonstrating his contempt for the United States since the Obama administration. Fair enough. Some future historians will write a book about our recent and current politics and diplomacy called America in a Dark Hour. But the United States has been through bad patches before and recovered. Betting on permanent decline seems like a game for the overly-clever.

[1] Inspired by Max Fisher, “Israel Grows Less Reliant on U.S. Aid,” NYT, 25 May 2021.

The Age of Revolt 1.

Posted on February 12, 2021 by jsh54

Where did “Trumpism”–the political movement–come from?[1] It arose out of the profits and losses from globalization. The costs were born by one segment of American society while the profits flowed to another segment. The beneficiaries were, first and foremost, the “political, cultural, and financial elite.” Their right to lead rested upon the pursuit of the common good.

In theory, the free-trade policies pursued by a whole series of American administrations after the Second World War would benefit Americans. They would allow the American economy to shift jobs producing low-value goods offshore and to redeploy assets toward higher-value jobs and goods. For a long time, these policies had no costs for Americans. The American economy emerged from the war with a long-term competitive advantage over anyone else. It could have not only butter and guns, but low-end butter and high-end butter. By the Sixties, that advantage had eroded badly. As foreign competition began to bite, it turned out that a lot of people depended on those low-value jobs for their living and found it difficult to shift into high-value jobs.

Globalization began to take a more serious toll on the American working class in the wake of the “Oil Shocks” of 1973 and 1979.[2] That seems incomprehensibly long ago to most journalists and politicians, so they just ignore the larger story. Then the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994) reduced tariffs on trade with Mexico and Canada. It accelerated the early wave of job-losses. Already in the 1990s, Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot could run for president, if not win, on the loss of blue-collar manufacturing jobs. At the same time, China’s abandonment of suicidal Maoist economic policies and its entry into the World Trade Organization (1990) greatly accelerated the loss of jobs. Those job losses not only tossed many workers into unemployment, they also left whole communities hollowed out and unable to address human problems. They not only tossed workers into unemployment, they undermined the value of the homes that formed an important asset of many workers. They not only tossed workers into unemployment, they also foreclosed the possibility of the children of the workers finding steady work at a living wage anywhere near their parents.

Globalization may have eroded manufacturing jobs, but it created enormous opportunities for the American financial services industry. Industrializing countries needed capital and expertise. Wall Street could provide both, not least because of the inflow of Chinese profits to New York banks and to the swelling 401(k) savings of the Baby Boomers. Increasingly “cosmopolitan” in its outlook, Wall Street also became increasingly influential over national economic policy.[3]

The year 2008 marked a turning point. A great deal of elite foolishness and some guile created the 2008 financial crisis. That, in turn gave rise to revolts on the right (Tea Party) and left (Occupy Wall Street); and to the invasion of the political system by “outsiders” like Barack Obama and Sarah Palin. Donald Trump, the ultimate outsider, was just a heart-beat away.

[1] Gerald F. Seib, “Where Trump Came From—And Where Trumpism Is Going,” WSJ, 16-17 January 2021.

[2] “In the wake of” does not mean “solely caused by.” For more of my peculiar view of this process, see https://waroftheworldblog.com/2015/03/02/american-union-stay-away-from-me-uh/ and https://waroftheworldblog.com/2015/12/17/the-new-economy/

[3] For one highly critical view of this process, see Simon Johnson, “The Quiet Coup,” The Atlantic, 5 May 2009.

The Asian Century 18.

Posted on February 12, 2021 by jsh54

How “hawkish” on China does President Biden want to be? Between the election and inauguration, observers recognized that the Democratic foreign policy establishment is divided. On the one hand, there is the global issues[1] faction that deprecates great power competition as a diversion from key future developments. On the other hand, there are the traditionalists who see a strong United States as the leader in a movement to create a rules-based international order that can shackle “evil doers.” China would provide a first test of which faction had the upper hand.

The Biden administration has moved quickly to confront the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC).[2] It invited Taiwan’s chief diplomatic representative to Biden’s inauguration; it announced that it would sell weapons to Taiwan; it fended off a Chinese suggestion of talks in the near future by pleading the need to consult allies; it endorsed the Trump administration’s position that China’s Uighur minority art the target of genocide[3]; and allowed the voyage of a naval force to the South China Sea to go forward.

On the surface, there is much to like about Biden’s assertion of traditional forms of American power. At the same time, previous practitioners would warn that it is all too easy to get into an escalating cycle of actions.[4]

If Zi wants tough action and not just tough talk, he could order some kind of military demonstration. Perhaps China could whack the Indians along their common border, as they did in late January, or fly war planes into Taiwan’s air defense zone, as they also did. The trouble is that such action might bring forth some new action by the Americans. This, in turn, would require some further response.

The alternative of doing nothing but talk tough in response would be tricky for Zi Jinping. It could signal weakness or uncertainty to people inside and outside China. Zi could easily survive foreign perceptions, because he could calmly wait on the growth of Chinese power while looking for safe opportunities to demonstrate it. Could he survive domestic perceptions of weakness? Is he sure enough of his position? Are his rivals sufficiently contained, his enemies imprisoned?[5] In this case, a renewed round of domestic repression would serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, it would offer a chance to weed out suspected weak links and dissidents. On the other hand, human rights is now an entrenched American foreign policy concern. So, domestic brutality would be both a way of shoring up Zi’s own position while openly defying one of American foreign policy’s stated goals. What are the Americans going to do about it? Sovereign countries can pretty much get away with doing whatever they want inside their own borders. It’s one of the privileges of sovereignty.

One might expect that Zi will opt for a policy of domestic toughness, notably against any “nationalists” who questions his toughness abroad. Meanwhile, the US and the PRC probably will continue strengthening their positions. Perhaps they will find a way out.

[1] Climate change first of all, but then human rights, migration, and—now—pandemic disease.

[2] Walter Russell Mead, “Can Biden Find Clarity on China and Russia?” WSJ, 14 December 2020; Mead, “Biden’s Opening Salvo on Beijing,” WSJ, date misplaced.

[3] Biden had said the same thing on the campaign trail before his election.

[4] For a scary, real-world example, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef7f9v2HEl0

[5] In all fairness, it usually took a long series of reverses before a Chinese emperor was said to have lost the “Mandate of Heaven.”

Team of Rivals in 2024.

Posted on January 31, 2021 by jsh54

In the likelihood that Joe Biden will not run for a second term, he has stocked his Cabinet and White House with his view of what would be desirable contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2024.

Susan Rice briefly entered the Democratic primaries in 2020. She went nowhere, so she angled for the Secretary of State. Biden never seriously considered her, but he didn’t just toss her aside either. Rice is a foreign policy expert without domestic policy credentials or much political sense.[1] Biden appointed her head of his domestic policy council. This will broaden her area of expertise and bring her into contact with many political figures. If she’s a quick learner, she could make a stronger candidate in 2024.

Gina Raimondo is Secretary of Commerce. BA, Harvard; Rhodes Scholar, Oxford; JD, Yale: she’s smarter than the average bear. Venture capitalist, then Rhode Island State Treasurer, where she had the audacity to reform the near-bankrupt state employee pension system. So, smart, but also a tough little cookie. First female Governor of Rhode Island from 2015 to 2021. Also, she seems to be on bad terms with Governor Michael Cuomo of New York.

Pete Buttigieg[2] is Secretary of Transportation. BA, Harvard; Rhodes Scholar, Oxford: so he, too, is smarter than the average bear. Consultant at McKinsey for a few years; mayor of South Bend, Indiana. Service in Afghanistan with the Naval Reserve. Openly gay, but the military service in a combat zone inoculates him against blowhards in recliners.[3]

Most attention has focused on Vice President Kamala Harris. However, Biden still doesn’t seem to have hived-off some large area of responsibility for her. Unless he does, she may spend the next four years representing the United States at the funerals of foreign leaders. That isn’t great preparation to run for president. Why take her on as Vice President, then basically short-circuit her presidential ambitions? Perhaps he can’t help holding a grudge about being blindsided by the question on bussing? Perhaps he is a little concerned about her questioning of Brett Kavanagh? Perhaps he’s alert to the reality that she flamed-out as a primary candidate, particularly among Black voters.

Equally interesting is who is not in the cabinet. Elizabeth Warren probably wanted to be Secretary of the Treasury,[4] but would have settled for Attorney General.[5] Bernie Sanders probably wanted to be Secretary of Labor. Both got skint. So did the “progressive” wing of the Democratic Party. Biden may believe that linking too closely to the left wing of the party spells disaster in future elections.

Thus, one could read the tea leaves to say that Biden is using second-tier positions as a school for the development of the next generation of Democratic party leaders.

Nancy Pelosi and Charles Schumer are not doing the same with the next generation of House and Senate leaders. There gerontocracy has dug in.

[1] Otherwise Hillary Clinton could not have run a pick off her on the Benghazi television interview.

[2] What were the clerks at Ellis Island thinking?

[3] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUyjT8VpwMI

[4] Neither Wall Street nor the AARP would have sat still for that.

[5] Anti-trust suits galore; claw-backs of “illegitimate” profits earned during the Trump presidency; and endless investigations (backed with pre-dawn serving of search warrants) of everyone who ever held a federal government position under Trump.