Looking back on Tahrir Square.

Posted on February 12, 2017 by jsh54

We try not to look back at the “Arab Spring.” The military autocracy in place since the coup in 1952 has oppressed the vast majority of Egyptians and been opposed by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. Eventually, the Muslim Brotherhood forswore violence and the military dictatorship grew long in the tooth. While many Egyptians disliked the autocracy, most found ways to adapt to living under its heel. Meanwhile, largely un-noticed by Western observers, a younger generation of Egyptians entered the scene. In 2011, an impulsive revolt in Tunisia set off a sympathetic detonation in Egypt. Huge demonstrations took place in Cairo and other cities. The autocracy appeared to buckle, but elections revealed that the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood commanded the will of many voters. The new government, headed by Mohammed Morsi, soon alienated the young people whose demonstrations had opened his way to power. In July 2013, after having covertly disrupted the efforts of the government, the military overthrew Morsi.

What went wrong? Egyptian society is shot through with conflicts and individuals rebel against Western stereotypes; these truths extend unto the younger generation.[1] Egypt remains a deeply “traditional” society in which women are constrained. Egypt remains a Muslim society.[2] While Western commentators have made much of the role of “tech-savvy” young people orchestrating protests through social media, the state has equal facility in this area. Most of all, the “revolution” changed only the holders of some offices, not the underlying society.

As is so often the case, context matters. Egypt has a long tradition of relying upon assertive leaders in government and religion. Egypt is nationalist in ways that are now difficult for Westerners to comprehend. Moreover, Egyptians, like many Muslims in the Middle East, are unusually prone to embrace conspiracy theories. These cultural traditions limited the scope of action for even the most “Westernized” of people.

In journalistic fashion, Aspden limns the devotees of an Islamist televangelist who still wish to encounter Westerners; a secular Muslim who despises Christians; and a rebellious teacher under heavy pressure from her family to conform to her expected role.

Many/Most of these young people quickly turned against the Muslim government of Mohammed Morsi. Some young people joined new protest movements under the illusion that they were reviving the spirit of Tahrir Square. In fact, the new movements had been created by the intelligence services to give a sheen of populism to the coming coup. Families exerted sustained pressure on their children to “be reasonable,” as families have always done. Many children eventually bent before the pressure, as many children have always done. They welcomed the military coup of July 2013. What they did not welcome or expect was the repression launched by the “deep state” against the original sparks of the revolution.

“What kind of change is possible in the Arab world”? “Why were so many young Egyptians willing to risk everything in 2011, and why,…just two years later in July 2013, were they willing to make another devil’s bargain with a despot”?[3] These are important questions, not least because they are likely to arise again when unrest sweeps Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and—perhaps–Iran.

[1] Rachel Aspden, Generation Revolution: On the Front Lines Between Tradition and Change in the Middle East (2017). Aspden now writes for the Guardian. For a sense of her writing and views, see: https://www.theguardian.com/profile/rachel-aspden

[2] The apparent notion in the West is that Muslim countries are just like Western countries, except that they are nominally Muslim rather than nominally Christian. This is an erroneous view. In Muslim countries, both atheism and apostasy are crimes that will bring a swift and severe response.

[3] Thanassis Cambanis, “Youth Was Not Enough,” NYT Book Review, 12 February 2017.

A Fateful Moment.

Posted on February 9, 2017 by jsh54

Currently, the American list of terrorist organizations in the Middle East includes al Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, and many other groups.[1] Now the Trump administration is considering adding both Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard and the Muslim Brotherhood to the list.

What are the arguments for and against such steps?

A Sunni-Shi’ite civil war tears at the Middle East. Russia has made a clear choice to back the Shi’ite side. Iran leads the Shi’ite cause, is unique as an Islamist state, and is hostile to both the United States and Israel as well. The Obama administration refused to choose, causing a good deal of distress among its Sunni allies and Israel. Despite these real diplomatic problems, an attack on Iran’s nuclear program would have opened a larger conflict at a moment when Americans were fed-up with war in the Middle East and ISIS banged at the gates of Baghdad.

The Trump administration is re-thinking this policy. The Revolutionary Guard is an independent military force that answers directly to the Supreme Leader of Iran. Over the years it has also spread into a powerful position in the economy. In addition, it plays a leading role in Iran’s covert operations.[2] The Trump administration believes that Iran plays a disruptive, hostile role in the Middle East. Targeting the Revolutionary Guard makes sense as a starting point.

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928.[3] Eventually, getting nowhere with violence, the Egyptian core of the Brotherhood abandoned that in favor of concentrating on its other social programs. The Egyptian movement has off-shoots elsewhere. There are affiliates in Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, is another off-shoot.

In the wake of 9/11, the Bush and Obama administrations pursued a policy of engagement with any Muslim group that sought political power by peaceful and democratic means.[4] Thus, in 2012 the Obama administration embraced the Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt. However, important American allies in the Middle East have long considered the Brotherhood to be a terrorist organization. These allies include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.[5] Also, Israel is deeply hostile to Hamas.

Again, the Trump administration is considering reversing course by declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. However, Turkey’s Islamist government supports the Brotherhood, which it sees as a similar movement. Since the Egyptian coup, the Brotherhood has been allowed to maintain offices in Istanbul and to operate a television station that broadcasts throughout the Middle East (including to Egypt). Moreover, millions of Egyptians still support the Brotherhood, albeit they’re keeping their heads down at the moment.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an umbrella organization. Many of its members in many Middle Eastern countries remain committed—for now—to peaceful means. Would declaring the Muslim Brotherhood further alienate its members? Would it drive some of them to using violence?

So, a fateful moment in which caution should prevail over bold action. Bold action in 2003 led to the invasion of Iraq, “and all that implies.”

[1] Felecia Schwartz and Jay Solomon, “U.S. Weighs Terror Label for Two Groups,” WSJ, 9 February 2017.

[2] I realize that it is inflammatory to say so, but the historian in me sees organizational and political parallels between the Revolutionary Guard and the SS in Nazi Germany. I do not mean to suggest any moral equivalence.

[3] Yaroslav Trofimov, “The Pitfalls of Blacklisting Muslim Brotherhood,” WSJ, 27 January 2017.

[4] While this is admirable in theory, one cannot help wondering if it is merely cosmetic in a region of authoritarian governments.

[5] That said, Saudi Arabia has eased up a little in its hostility to the Brotherhood. Conversely, Egypt experimented with toleration for the Brotherhood in 2012-2013, only to restore the military dictatorship by a coup.

Memoirs of the Addams Administration 3.

Posted on February 5, 2017 by jsh54

Last week, a team of people from the Trump administration told a number of senior professionals at the State Department that their resignations had been accepted and that there would be no need for them to remain in their positions until the administration’s nominees for replacements had gotten up to speed. (Is this the case in other Departments[1] or is it unique to the State Department? If it is unique to the State Department, then was it the decision of President Trump or of his Secretary of State-designate Rex Tillerson or of someone else who shall remain nameless, but whose initials are Steven Bannon? If the decision originated with Tillerson, did it reflect previous contact with the State Department while negotiating oil deals with foreign countries?)

Over the week-end, President Trump reconfigured the “principals committee” of the National Security Council. While this has been characterized as, among other things, a diminution of the role of the professional military, both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security are retired Marine Corps generals. Thus, it could be construed—OK, misconstrued—as a shift from the Bureaucratasaurus to the Parrisasaurus Rex.

Currently, an estimated 90,000 people from radical-Islamist-ridden “countries” have received visas to enter the United States.[2] On Friday, 27 January 2017 (one week after taking office) elected-President Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing a 90-day “pause” on immigrants from the seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States.[3] This disrupted the late-stage travel plans of about 700 people, who were prevented from boarding U.S.-bound planes. An additional 300 were halted upon arrival in the United States.[4]

Critics quickly pointed out that no one from these countries had ever committed an act of terror in the United States. Implicitly, this left liberals in the awkward position of defending Sudan, which has waged a war of aggression—that the left has been quick to denounce as “genocide–in western Sudan, and that Sudan provided a safe haven to Osama bin Laden until President Bill Clinton launched cruise missile attacks against suspected al-Qaeda terrorist sites inside Sudan. In contrast, countries whose citizens have engaged in terrorism against the United States—Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia—escaped the ban.

Massive protests followed at airports, in the streets, in Congress, and on editorial pages. Not to mention that Iran launched a ballistic missile in a “test” shot: Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are Iranian-dominated countries, in the Iranian view.[5] None the less, a snap poll revealed that almost half (49 percent) of Americans approved President Trump’s order, while 41 percent disapproved the order. Various courts were quick to block the order. All the same, neither refugees nor those foreigners seeking visas are protected by the Bill of Rights. Indeed, that’s why so many people want to come to the United States.

The deep polarization of American politics continues into the post-election period. However, neither Donald Trump nor Hillary Clinton appeared to be much of a healer. So,,,

[1] This leaves the estimable-I’m-instructed Sally Yates out of the discussion.

[2] The seven countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen. To be picky, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian-born “underwear bomber” who tried to bring down an airliner headed to Detroit (why?) had been recruited, trained, and armed in Yemen; al-Shabab in Somalia has recruited a number of Somali-Americans from the upper Midwest.

[3] The temporary and limited ban easily could be extended and broadened. But why would it have to be? President Trump has already succeeded in scaring the be-Muhammad out of Muslims and potential immigrants.

[4] “Travel ban prompts chaos, protests,” The Week, 10 February 2017, p. 4.

[5] “How they see us: Trapped by Trump’s travel ban,” The Week, 10 February 2017, p. 15.

Making a Difference.

Posted on January 20, 2017 by jsh54

For a long time, Sudan had been the “bete noire” of humanitarian activists. The government in Khartoum provided shelter to Osama bin Laden before American pressure mounted to such a level that he had to be invited to relocate to Afghanistan. It waged a grisly war in the western province of Darfur. This earned Sudan widespread condemnation for “genocide.” Then it ramped-up a smoldering conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian/Animist South Sudan. Eventually, the United States played a leading role in achieving national independence for South Sudan in July 2011.[1]

This arguably marked a considerable success for the foreign policy of President Barack Obama. One question is whether it caused American diplomats to become too invested in that apparent success to see the possible flaws and even to correctly judge the character of the men who took power. They owed their positions in part—but only in part—to American diplomacy.

Immediately, a problem arose: South Sudan wasn’t a “nation”; it was an agglomeration of tribes. The two chief tribes were the Dinka and the Nuer. Although bitter hostilities had pitted Dinka against Nuer in the past, the two groups united to fight the government of Sudan. At independence, Salva Kiir, a Dinka leader became president, and Riek Machar, a Nuer leader, became vice-president.

Neither peace nor unity lasted very long. First, Riek Machar lost his position as vice-president. Then, in December 2013 civil war broke out between the Dinka and the Nuer. Many people perished in the fighting. The United Nations brokered a series of peace agreements that were honored only in the breach by the warring parties. Deaths have mounted into the tens of thousands. Generally, the Western press and humanitarian groups, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, presented ample evidence of the mass killings to the Western public. Generally, that public showed no interest in these events.

That left it to governments to decide what course to follow, then to make the case for their policies to the voting public. Here the wheels came off American diplomacy. Although the Obama administration had played an important role in creating the South Sudan, it failed to engage with the subsequent crisis. By Summer 2014, humanitarian groups were urging the United States to use an arms embargo and targeted economic sanctions (of the sort rapidly applied to Russia after it re-took the Crimea from Ukraine) to try to restrain the killing. However, division ruled in the American government.

In Summer 2016, the United States urged the U.N. to authorize the sending of 4,000 additional peace-keeping troops to the capital city of Juba. In September 2016, the American ambassador to the U.N., Samantha Power, got the government of South Sudan to agree to admit additional peace-keeping troops. It appears that President Kiir only agreed to this to get Power to go back to Washington. So, far none have actually been allowed into the country.

By November 2016, with the Obama administration headed for the exits, Power finally won support within the government for an American proposal to the U.N. to impose both economic sanctions and an arms embargo. In late December 2016, the U.N. Security Council rejected this proposal.

Why? Perhaps because the Russians opposed sanctions, and African countries didn’t want to impose sanctions. Perhaps because it is safe to defy an outgoing administration.[2]

[1] Somini Sengupta, “Failures on South Sudan Highlight the Limits of U.S. Diplomacy,” NYT, 19 January 2017.

[2] And not just for foreign countries. This is the second recent article implicitly critical of Samantha Power as more theatrical than effective. See: Helene Cooper, “From a Fateful Motorcade,..,” NYT, 6 January 2017.

The Next Step in Syria.

Posted on January 19, 2017 by jsh54

The two current centers of resistance by the Islamic State’s caliphate are in the Iraqi city of Mosul and the Syrian city of Raqqa.[1] Both cities have been heavily fortified by ISIS. Coalitions of opposition forces are advancing on both cities. Iraqi Kurds are important for the siege of Mosul and Syrian Kurds are important for the siege of Raqqa.

Of the two coalitions, the Syrian one is the more problematic. Raqqa holds particular importance as the capital city of the caliphate. President Obama has committed substantial military resources to the struggle: American planes are bombing; 400 Special Forces troops have been sent to Syria to serve as spotters for air strikes and to train local fighters; and Apache helicopter gunships have been used against Mosul’s defenses. However, in both countries, the brunt of the fighting has and will fall on local forces.

As an American military problem, this is simple enough. The Americans hope that the final attack on Raqqa can begin in February 2017. The core of the anti-ISIS force laying siege to Raqqa is Syrian Kurds. Around this core have been arrayed (or cajoled) loose groups of Syrian Arabs. The Syrian Arabs have much less experience with war than do the Kurds. This means that the Kurds will have to do most of the heavy lifting in the assault on Raqqa. The Defense Department believes that the Syrian Kurds need to be supplied with better weapons for an urban assault than those that have served them on open battlefields. These weapons would include rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, and armored vehicles. Furthermore, the Defense Department has recommended that Apache gunships be used against Raqqa.

As an American diplomatic problem, this is less simple. Neighboring Turkey regards the Syrian Kurd political group (the Y.P.G.) as terrorists. If the Syrian Kurds succeed in carving out an autonomous Kurdish enclave in Syria they will have expanded the proto-state that is being created in neighboring Iraq. From this proto-state, at some point, the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds can begin to work to liberate the Turkish Kurds. Arming up the Syrian Kurds poses a future danger to Turkey. Turkey is a member of NATO and the United States is bound by treaty to defend it against outside attack.

The Turkish government has begun delaying approval of American air attacks launched from Incirlik air base and hampering the flow of supplies into the base. American diplomats suspect that Erdogan might respond to an increased armament for the Syrian Kurds by attacking Kurdish enclaved along the Syrian-Turkish border. This might compel the Kurds to divert forces from the attack on Raqqa. Worse still, Turkey’s authoritarian president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has begun to lean toward Russia. Already prone to blame the United States for many untoward events within Turkey and the region, Erdogan might contemplate disrupting the NATO alliance in the same fashion as did France’s Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s. A pessimist might see one possible outcome of arming the Kurds to be the weakening of NATO’s southeastern flank at a time when Vladimir Putin is on the watch for opportunities to extend Russian influence.

Grasping at straws, the Americans have contemplated promising the Turks that close monitoring of any weapons will prevent their use against Turkey. This is hardly credible given the failures to control weapons supplied to Syrian “moderate” forces. This leaves President Obama with no easy choices. Perhaps he’ll leave the decision to President Trump. The new president would be torn between the devil of improving relations with Russia and the deep blue sea of destroying ISIS.

[1] Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Obama’s Syrian Options: Arm Kurds or Let Trump Decide,” NYT, 18 January 2017.

Next Steps in Syria.

Posted on December 30, 2016 by jsh54

After the American pull-out, Iraqi Shi’ite sectarianism undermined the army of Iraq as a fighting force. In Summer 2014, the fundamentalist Sunni movement called the Islamic State (ISIS) attacked out of eastern Syria into Iraq. The army of Iraq collapsed. Then Iraqi Shi’ite sectarianism came to the rescue. Various Shi’ite militias, under the umbrella term Popular Mobilization Forces, were called upon to save the day.[1] At first blush, the militias didn’t seem capable of stopping the advance of ISIS forces, which quickly over-ran Mosul and drew close to Baghdad itself.

However, the Sunni-Shi’ite civil war has long involved Shi’ite Iran’s support for embattled Shi’ite regimes elsewhere. Iran has been a principal ally of Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria. When ISIS tore into Iraq, Iran responded with aid and support. The Iraqi militias received a lot of training, weapons, and direction from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. To whom are the militias more loyal, the government of Iraq or the government of Iran? The issue is going to become pressing as the Assad regime appears to be triumphing in western Syria and the Iraqi offensive erodes the ISIS position in western Iraq.

Having sectarian militia featured too prominently in the fight against ISIS posed all sorts of problems for the government of Iraq. So, the brunt of the attack on ISIS-held Mosul has been born by the regular army of Iraq, backed-up by paramilitary national police. The Shi’ite militias were deployed to cut off the lines of communication between Mosul and the ISIS stronghold in eastern Syria. In the course of their operations, the militias have seized some of the territory along the border with Syria.

Once Mosul falls, will the Iraqi militias cross the border into Syria? Iraqi militia intervention in Syria would raise another set of problems. The Assad regime is beset by ISIS, but also by Sunni “moderates” and by Syrian Kurds. Could/would the Iraqis limit themselves to fighting ISIS? The Assad regime, backed by Russia and Iran, has concentrated its attacks on the Syrian “moderates.” Would the irruption of a foreign Shi’ite military force into Syria reignite Sunni resistance? Shi’ite fighters from Lebanon’s Hezbollah have long been an important prop to the Assad regime. More recently, Iraqi Shi’ite militia troops were airlifted in to western Syria to join the fight against the “moderate” Sunnis.

Turkey, which has reduced its opposition to the Assad regime while continuing to support rebel forces that are fighting against ISIS, is deeply alarmed by the advance of Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq because this threatens to create a Kurdish proto-state outside its borders. That Kurdish state could support Kurds within Turkey. The United States has long insisted that the fight against ISIS should be the real point of concentration for military efforts in Syria.

Spokesmen for the Syrian “moderate” rebels are insisting to Western journalists that Iraqi intervention in eastern Syria would be a disaster. Iraqi intervention “will cause a sectarian ignition,” said one. It “will ruin everything” said another, perhaps causing Sunnis to flock to ISIS as their only defense against the Shi’ites. More significantly, president-elect Donald Trump has opposed further Iranian expansion. Similarly, Saudi Arabia would be even more alarmed—if that’s possible–by Iranian proxies intervening in force against Sunnis on a new front.

The decision on this question may rest with other people. Both sides in the Syrian civil war are close to or past the point of exhaustion. Vladimir Putin, ruler of the regional power, has chosen not to worsen relations with the United States by taking up President Obama’s challenge. He may prefer to insist on a pause before any action in eastern Syria.

[1] Yaroslav Trofimov, “Will Iraq’s Shi’ite Militias Cross Into Syria Next,” WSJ, 30 December 2016.

Erdogan in 2017.

Posted on December 26, 2016 by jsh54

Donald Trump is not a fascist, but there is good reason to think that Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, is a fascist. He became prime minister as leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002; then became president; then campaigned for much stronger powers for the president; then, in June 2015, saw the AKP blocked from winning an outright majority for the first time; then played the anti-Kurdish/antiterrorism card to regain a majority for the AKP in November 2015 elections; then ruthlessly exploited a failed in July 2016 to purge Turkey’s civil and military institutions of purported supporters of the coup; and then proposed a referendum on greater powers and time in office for the president.

One of Erdogan’s closest advisers told the Wall Street Journal that “In these lands [i.e. the Middle East], if you need to survive, you need a very strong system.” The proposed constitutional changes include getting rid of the prime minister and transferring powers from parliament to the president. If the voters in the referendum–tentatively scheduled for June 2016–approve his plan, Erdogan could remain president until 2029—or until the cows come home.[1]

The AKP has 316 seats in the legislature. It needs 14 more have number required to win parliamentary approval for the referendum. Where will Erdogan find the votes he needs? One theory is that the conservative MHP party will support the legislation in hopes of gaining a voice in the new government. However, between May and November 2015, Erdogan refused to form a coalition government when his party lacked a majority. Why would the MHP view the offer of a vice-presidency in the new government for its leader as anything other than a short-lived transaction to get the referendum approved? The MHP would soon find itself discarded. Erdogan seems more likely to use national security issues to stampede support.

In the mellow, holiday-induced state of mind, it might be possible to view the prospects for the Middle East in 2017 with a certain optimism. The horrible Syrian civil war appears to be grinding to an end with an Assad victory in western Syria. In Iraq, the Shi’ite majority, with the backing of Iran and a lot of American airpower, are battering at the eastern borders of the ISIS caliphate. The caliphate seems likely to collapse entirely in the coming year.[2] The Iranian nuclear agreement has muted the drum-beat for a new war for the time being.

However, Erdogan’s justification for strengthening the powers of the president rests on a belief that things are going to get worse, not better in the Middle East. First, there is the Kurdish problem. With American backing, the Kurds of Iraq created an autonomous proto-state in northern Iraq. With American backing, the Kurds of Iraq and Syria have played an important part in the containment of ISIS. Turkey sees Kurdish nationalism as a grave threat to its national existence. The Shi’ite majority in Iraq takes a similar view. The Kurds are likely to rise to the top of their opponents’ To Do list once the fate of the Assad regime is settled and ISIS is defeated. Attacks on the Kurds will pose problems for American diplomacy.

Second, there is the problem of Turkey’s future orientation. Will Turkey remain in NATO and continue to press for membership in the European Union (EU)? In 2016, Erdogan unleashed a flood of refugees and economic migrants on the EU in a bid to extort financial aid and revived negotiation on Turkish entry into the EU. On the other hand, recently Turkey has patched up its several quarrels with Russia. What real inducements can Vladimir Putin offer Turkey to shift its alliance? Aside from the psychological affinity of two authoritarian leaders?

[1] Yaroslav Trofimov, “Violence Bolsters Erdogan’s Power Play,” WSJ, 23 December 2016.

[2] Surviving fighters are likely to flee abroad. Many of these refugees will become a counter-terrorist policing problem in Europe and elsewhere in Arab countries. ISIS itself will cease being a military problem.

Sequence.

Posted on December 22, 2016 by jsh54

Can Bashar al-Assad win the Syrian Civil War? The answer depends on definitions. What does “win” mean? What does “Syria” mean?

Aleppo and Palmyra are two ancient cities in Syria.[1] One of them is today a major population center and the other is a mere tourist trap. If Syria were at peace, the distinction wouldn’t matter. Both would be income-streams. However, Syria is at war and the distinction does matter. The Syrian government of dictator Bashar al-Assad has concentrated its military forces and received important foreign assistance —Russian air-power and Iranian fighters—to capture the rebel-held eastern sections of Aleppo, the population center. In the meantime, he has yielded territory to ISIS forces around Palmyra, the tourist trap. Probably to be able to claim that the regime was fighting ISIS, the Syrian army recaptured Palmyra in March 2016. However, they didn’t put in the resources to hold it. In mid-December 2016, while the Syrians and their allies concentrated on the capture of Eastern Aleppo, ISIS forces managed to retake the city.

How should we interpret this mixed outcome? The main point to take away is that Aleppo matters to the Assad regime, but Palmyra—and most other ISIS-held territory–doesn’t matter to the Assad regime. The regime has been most threatened by the rebellion in the much more heavily-populated western parts of the country. Rebels there have received support from Sunni Arab countries. In contrast, ISIS holds vast swathes of the less densely populated—and less important –eastern parts of the country. Moreover, ever since its invasion of western Iraq, ISIS has been targeted by the Americans, the Kurds, and the Iraqis. The Syrian Army has been at war for a very long time. Both its current manpower and its ability to recruit new soldiers are close to exhaustion. Russian aircraft and Iranian troops abruptly have dragged the regime out of a dire situation. Why would the hard-pressed Assad regime devote scarce resources to the lesser enemy when other countries are willing to do the work?

Now Eastern Aleppo has fallen to the regime. What further action will the regime take after this costly victory? Wishful thinking abounds. One conspiracy theory holds that the Assad regime sand-bagged the defense of Palmyra so that ISIS jihadis would appear in the news to distract the ADHD-prone Western media from the brutal final assault on Aleppo. One Egyptian diplomat speculated that “unless the regime opens up negotiations with the opposition in finding a proper reconciliation, the guerrilla warfare will spread all over the place.” The U.S. government urged the Syrians and Russians to divert their energies from pursuing final victory over the rebels in Aleppo to resisting ISIS in an inconsequential place.

More practically, the Assad regime may concentrate on consolidating its victory in western Syria. It seems wise to anticipate a further flood of refugees into Turkey and—soon thereafter—into Greece. Then, the regime, and the Russians and Iranians, will contemplate what further action to take. Will they really want to embark on a costly new offensive to retake desert wastelands? Will they want to imperial their existing substantial gains in order to fight ISIS? Will they leave ISIS to the Americans and their allies? Will they decide to wipe out the remnants of resistance in western Syria, then turn to dealing with the Syrian Kurds? Given the alliance between the Russians and the Shi’ites of Iran and Iraq, all parties may be willing to sit and wait for a time before deciding the fate of ISIS.

So, “Syria” may mean western Syria and “win” may mean a localized victory followed by a period of watchful waiting. Then, a new round in the unraveling of Sykes-Picot Agreement. First one thing, then another thing. Sequence.

[1] Yaroslav Trofimov, “Assad’s Choice: Fight Rebels but Cede to Islamic State,” WSJ, 16 December 2016.

Peace Negotiations.

Posted on October 9, 2016 by jsh54

Except for a lot of killing, the civil war in western Syria is over.[1] Backed by Russia, the Assad regime has defeated the rebel forces in the western part of the country.[2] The siege of the eastern third of the city of Aleppo will grind on. Horror stories will continue to turn the stomachs of readers of the New York Times. Still, the die is cast. Some of the states which have used Syria as a battlefield in larger struggles have now turned to settling the peace terms in this conflict while preparing for the next conflict.

Religion-based alliances have been the common basis of coalitions in the Middle East for a long time now. During the Syrian civil war, Iran, the majority Shi’a government of Iraq, the minority Alawite government of Syria, and Shi’ite Hezbollah in Lebanon all joined forces to fight the Sunni insurgency. Conversely, Sunni Turkey and Sunni Saudi Arabia long co-operated against the Assad regime. Russia gained influence in the region by choosing the Shi’ite side. The United States may have lost some influence by its unwillingness to choose sides.

However, it appears that identities other than religion offer the basis for alignment. The Saudis seem to have taken Turkish support as a given in the continuing struggle against Iran. Iran and Turkey have been backing opposing sides in the civil war, so they should be at daggers drawn for years to come. In practice, this is not so. Iran and Turkey both are non-Arab states. During the 20^th Century, both did a better job at fending off direct Western domination than did any of the Arab states. Beyond this “usable past” (if they care to invoke it for practical reasons of state) the two countries have a problem with the Kurds.

Iran and Turkey (and the soon-to-be-victorious Assad regime) all fear the next problem on the horizon, Kurdish nationalism. First came the protected zone for Iraqi Kurds created by the US after the First Gulf War. Then came the near-autonomous region created after the 2003 invasion which gave birth to a proto-Kurdistan in northern Iraq. Over the last several years, Kurdish militias from Iraq and Syria have done much of the heavy lifting in the fight against ISIS. Along the way, Syrian Kurds have carved out an enclave along Syria’s border with Turkey. Kurdish nationalism is burning in Turkey.

Saudi Arabia fears its neighbor across the Persian Gulf, but Turkey feels no real danger from Iran. Erdogan’s allegations of U.S. involvement in the recent attempt to overthrow him might be taken as window-dressing meant to justify his shift toward reconciliation with Iran.

All this is speculation, not prophecy. Yet one speculation leads to other speculations. If the Syrian civil war is winding down and the Kurdish issue is winding up, will all the major players take a moment to concentrate on destroying ISIS? If the Assad regime and its patrons have won the civil war, then will Turkey close the border to both the inflow of aid to the rebels and any flight by anti-Assad refugees? If Turkey, Syria, and Iran are about to turn on the Kurds, will Saudi Arabia shift its support to the Kurds as a way of pressuring Iraq, Iran, and Turkey? If the Kurds see the coalition gathering against them, will they shorten their reach in an effort to hold onto the core of what they have already obtained? Having been so continually frustrated of late by developments in the Middle East, will American diplomacy profit from the experience and seek new means to achieve American goals?

[1] Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turkey, Iran Get Friendly, Despite War,” WSJ, 7 October 2016.

[2] Whether it will now turn to defeating the Islamic State in the eastern part of the country remains an open question.

The Syrian Civil War.

Posted on August 27, 2016 by jsh54

How long do civil wars last?[1] The Spanish Civil War lasted 2 years, 8 months, 2 weeks and 1 day; the American Civil War lasted 4 years, 3 weeks and 6 days. However, the average duration for modern civil wars is about ten years.[2] Lots of these civil wars end in a peace deal because both sides already have shot their bolt. The Syrian civil war has lasted about half that long. So far.

Why have modern civil wars dragged on for so long? Historically, foreign intervention plays a large role in prolonging civil wars. That is one reason that the Americans welcomed French support in the War for Independence and Abraham Lincoln sought to avoid British or French intervention in the American Civil War. Spain became a battle ground for Fascism (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) and Communism (the Soviet Union and the International Brigades raised by the Comintern). Syria has become the battle ground for radical Islam (ISIS and the Al Nusra Front); the Shi’ite side of the larger Muslim civil war (Iran, Iraq, and Syria); the Sunni side of the larger Muslim civil war (Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states); Kurdish nationalists and Turkey (which has its own issues with the Kurds); and Western powers (the USA and Russia). The multiple powers engaged only complicate a peace settlement.[3]

Why has the Syrian civil war been so gory? Normally, say the scholars of these things, both sides in a civil war have a strong incentive to win the loyalty of the civilians who provide the “sea” in which the insurgents “swim.” This puts a check on the atrocities.[4] It doesn’t prevent them, but it does limit them. However, the Syrian civil war is different. First, the Alawite and Christian minorities fear genocide at the hands of the Sunni majority. If you look at the broader pattern in the Middle East, this isn’t an unreasonable fear. Outside support/intervention reduces the importance of the local population in the eyes of the fighters. Thus, ISIS is OK with atrocities committed against Unbelievers, or Insufficient Believers. The government is backed by a minority of Syrians, so there is little to be gained from humane conduct toward the rebellious Sunni majority. The foreign Sunni supporters of the rebels only stand to profit from the massacre of Shi’ites. This intensifies the “normal” atrocities of war. The popular image of men with guns run amuck may not be accurate. Syria could be suffering multiple “ethnic cleansings.” The government is the “Mr. Clean” in this business, but it has competitors. Thus, many Christians and Alawite Muslims have fled to sanctuary in western Aleppo.

Is the Syrian Civil War un-winnable? This is unclear, in spite of the prognostication of the New York Times and the Obama administration.

What is the basis of a peace deal? All sides are coalitions of things that they are against, rather than things they are for. (This is much like the Russo-British-Americans alliance during the Second World War.( The Russkies want President Assad to get off the stage at some point, but aren’t—yet–willing to force him or kill him. Neither Turkey nor Iraq wants the Kurds to gain much territory or prestige. The various parties will try to hold what they have already won. (Except, perhaps, ISIS.) ISIS will be defeated, but what will become of the Sunni rebel territories? Perhaps, the country will have to be partitioned between an Assad-ruled-for-now West and an ISIS-ruled “free fire zone” in the East. Then what?

[1] Max Fisher, “Why Syria’s War, After 400,000 Deaths, Is Only Getting Worse,” NYT, 27 August 2016.

[2] This may reflect weak governments out against weak insurgencies, with lots of ordinary people caught in the middle.

[3] See: The Thirty Years War; see: The Treaty of Westphalia.

[4] More specifically, it puts a check on the actions of the psychopaths who fill the ranks of opposing armies.

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