Donald Trump is not a fascist, but there is good reason to think that Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, is a fascist. He became prime minister as leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002; then became president; then campaigned for much stronger powers for the president; then, in June 2015, saw the AKP blocked from winning an outright majority for the first time; then played the anti-Kurdish/antiterrorism card to regain a majority for the AKP in November 2015 elections; then ruthlessly exploited a failed in July 2016 to purge Turkey’s civil and military institutions of purported supporters of the coup; and then proposed a referendum on greater powers and time in office for the president.
One of Erdogan’s closest advisers told the Wall Street Journal that “In these lands [i.e. the Middle East], if you need to survive, you need a very strong system.” The proposed constitutional changes include getting rid of the prime minister and transferring powers from parliament to the president. If the voters in the referendum–tentatively scheduled for June 2016–approve his plan, Erdogan could remain president until 2029—or until the cows come home.
The AKP has 316 seats in the legislature. It needs 14 more have number required to win parliamentary approval for the referendum. Where will Erdogan find the votes he needs? One theory is that the conservative MHP party will support the legislation in hopes of gaining a voice in the new government. However, between May and November 2015, Erdogan refused to form a coalition government when his party lacked a majority. Why would the MHP view the offer of a vice-presidency in the new government for its leader as anything other than a short-lived transaction to get the referendum approved? The MHP would soon find itself discarded. Erdogan seems more likely to use national security issues to stampede support.
In the mellow, holiday-induced state of mind, it might be possible to view the prospects for the Middle East in 2017 with a certain optimism. The horrible Syrian civil war appears to be grinding to an end with an Assad victory in western Syria. In Iraq, the Shi’ite majority, with the backing of Iran and a lot of American airpower, are battering at the eastern borders of the ISIS caliphate. The caliphate seems likely to collapse entirely in the coming year. The Iranian nuclear agreement has muted the drum-beat for a new war for the time being.
However, Erdogan’s justification for strengthening the powers of the president rests on a belief that things are going to get worse, not better in the Middle East. First, there is the Kurdish problem. With American backing, the Kurds of Iraq created an autonomous proto-state in northern Iraq. With American backing, the Kurds of Iraq and Syria have played an important part in the containment of ISIS. Turkey sees Kurdish nationalism as a grave threat to its national existence. The Shi’ite majority in Iraq takes a similar view. The Kurds are likely to rise to the top of their opponents’ To Do list once the fate of the Assad regime is settled and ISIS is defeated. Attacks on the Kurds will pose problems for American diplomacy.
Second, there is the problem of Turkey’s future orientation. Will Turkey remain in NATO and continue to press for membership in the European Union (EU)? In 2016, Erdogan unleashed a flood of refugees and economic migrants on the EU in a bid to extort financial aid and revived negotiation on Turkish entry into the EU. On the other hand, recently Turkey has patched up its several quarrels with Russia. What real inducements can Vladimir Putin offer Turkey to shift its alliance? Aside from the psychological affinity of two authoritarian leaders?
 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Violence Bolsters Erdogan’s Power Play,” WSJ, 23 December 2016.
 Surviving fighters are likely to flee abroad. Many of these refugees will become a counter-terrorist policing problem in Europe and elsewhere in Arab countries. ISIS itself will cease being a military problem.