Japan’s Second World War 1.

During the Meiji Restoration, many “samurai” became officers in the new national army.  They and their descendants instilled many samurai beliefs about conduct in the Imperial Japanese Army.  Sakae Oba (1914-1992)[1] did not come from a samurai background.  His father farmed.  The son graduated from a teacher’s academy in 1933, and began working in a school.  Soon he married.  Within a year, however, he applied to be an officer in the army.

The IJA recruited soldiers into locally-based regiments.  Oba became an officer in the 18th Regiment.  The 18th had fought in the Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) wars.  From 1928 on, it did much of its service in China.  In 1931, Japan seized the territory of Manchuria; in 1932, Japanese and Chinese troops fought each other around Shanghai.

In July 1937, Japan launched a major invasion of China proper.  The 18th Regiment engaged in two months of savage fighting.  Oba was promoted to Second Lieutenant in late 1937.  The 18th Regiment then fought in the Japanese campaign in central China.  Possibly, the 18th Regiment took part in the terrible massacres of Chinese civilians that accompanied these operations.[2]  In 1939, he made First Lieutenant. In 1941, he received command of a company.  In 1943, he made Captain.

Japan’s war in China bogged down.  In late 1941, Japan opted for attacks on the Western possessions in the Far East.  The attack on Pearl Harbor, and the conquest of the Philippines, British Malaya and Burma, and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) followed.  By early 1944, many of the large number of troops in China began to move toward the Pacific islands that blocked the American advance on Japan.  In February 1944, an American submarine sank the troop ship carrying the 18th Regiment.  Less than half the regiment survived, but Captain Oba was among them.  The survivors were taken to the island of Saipan.  Rather than being a coral atoll, the island is mountainous and densely forests.  The Japanese saw it as part of a last line of defense against the Americans.  Oba and his men joined the garrison.

Between 15 June 1944 and 9 July, the Americans conquered Saipan.  On 7 July, most of the surviving Japanese soldiers made a “banzai charge,” rather than accept the shame of surrender.  When the attack ended, Marines and soldiers counted 4,300 dead Japanese in front of their lines.  Almost 30,000 Japanese soldiers died on Saipan, as did about 20,000 civilians.

Captain Oba and 45 of his men were among the survivors.  They gathered up several hundred civilians and headed for the woods.  Oba’s intentions appear to have been to preserve the lives of his men and to protect the civilians.  Occasionally, they staged night-raids on American positions, but these may have been chiefly attempts to acquire food and medicine.  Perhaps he had seen enough of massacres and suicides.  Despite determined searches by the Marines, Oba held out until 1 December 1945.

Oba returned to Japan, where he found his wife alive.  After the war, he worked in a department store.

[1] Don Jones, Oba: The Last Samurai (1986).  Haven’t read it; just read about Oba.

[2] These include the Nanjing Incident/Nanking Massacre.  See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_Massacre  Even before the Japanese atrocities of the Second World War, these events had created in the Western mind a reputation for ferocity and bestial behavior on the part of the Japanese military.

2020 Headlines I don’t expect to see 29 July 2019.

“VA for All.  Why shouldn’t your parents get the same care that Walter Reed Hospital offers to wounded warriors?”

“Single-payer media.  Think about it.”

“Just how much am I supposed to pay Jussie Smollett in reparations?”

“Did the Russians write the Steele dossier?  Durham investigation ponders the question.”

“China buckles–will reform trade rules AND massively cut carbon emissions.  Trump chortles; Environmentalists dismayed.”

“Iran buckles–will return to NPT and reduce support for Hezbollah.  Bolton tap dances the “Putting on the Ritz” segment from “Young Frankenstein”.”

“EU  buckles–will finally raise defense spending to long-agreed levels.  Poles eager to fight; Germans and French not so much.”

“Victory!  We’ve established a prohibition on abortion–just as with alcohol in the Twenties and drugs since the Seventies!  But gun-control will never work!”

“The EU blocked undesired immigration by paying Turkey, Niger, and Libya.  Now Trump has done the same with Mexico and Guatemala at a lower cost.  The “Squad” denounces agreements as “racist.”

“Illegal immigration de-criminalized!  120 million Chinese buy cruise-ship reservations for China-Hawaii-West Coast jaunts.”

“Oddly, the State Department appears to function just as before but with professional diplomats in most jobs, and without a bunch of courtiers from think-tanks.  Experts puzzled and Congress vows to subpoena the late George Kennan.”

“Congress approves Hudson River flood-gates to counter-climate change.  Mayor DiBlasio will reject federal funds: “New Yorkers would rather drown that accept money from a government that denies the reality of climate change!”

 

The Asian Century 26 July 2019.

Back in the 1990s many of the Asian economies were riding high.  People were talking about the “Asian tiger” economies, if that gives you some idea.  Japan, Taiwan, South Korea were all enjoying remarkable success at manufacturing and selling things.  In particular, they seemed to have mastered the industrial production of actual things that people all over the world would want to own: cars, computer hardware, televisions, and the music systems of the day.  Moreover, the other Asian economies all seemed to be taking off on remarkably similar and promising flight paths to prosperity.  Since all of these places had been late to adopt the Western economic model and because they had been leveled in the Second World War, this performance amounted to an extraordinary achievement that called out for explanation.  Moreover, the “Asian tigers” were generally out-performing the Western economies.  The Soviet Union had fallen flat on its face in 1989, so it was discredited.  Neither the United States nor Western Europe, however, showed a comparable dynamism.  The European economies were all growing slowly, thanks to what would later come to be labeled “Euro-sclerosis.”  The United States had already begun the habit of living beyond its means that continues to plague it to this day.

Under these conditions the Asian countries took a justifiable pride in their performance.  In discussions of the differences between Western and Asian economic performance, attention naturally turned to asking whether cultural differences might not make as much difference as did specific economic policies.  Ultimately, various people began to suggest that “Asian values” offered the best explanation.

What were the “values” which purportedly gave the Asian economies the bulge over the Western ones?  According to the proponents of the idea the Asian societies were the product of unique historical circumstances.  Confucian values had become deeply entrenched in the culture and could not be rooted out by any transient or imported political regime.  The key Confucian values were subordination of the desires of the individual to the welfare of the community (conformity); a preference for strong leadership over political competition; a commitment to excellence in academic and scientific pursuits; hard work; and thrift.

In essence, this doctrine is a denial of the ideal of universal human equality and universal human rights. (“We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are created equal…”)  The West had argued that “free markets and free people” were the twin keys to human progress.  Lots of people in Asian countries had been attracted by this doctrine because it promised to improve their situation.  Others had reacted against what they saw as just another face of Western imperialism or which unsettled their own lives.  (Thus, kids having rights is fine if you’re a kid; it is more problematic if you’re a parent.)  In any event, the rising relative power of the Asian economies seemed to justify an assertion of cultural independence.  Hence, the 1990s witnessed much discussion of “Asian values.”

Then the Asian financial crisis of July 1997 put a stop to all the big talk.  The bugs scuttled back into the woodwork.  But does that mean that there are no distinct Asian values?  Are universal values more credible?  Watch “To Live” and decide.

 

For more on the financial crisis, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_financial_crisis

For criticism of the Asian values movement, see: http://www.brainsnchips.org/hr/sen.htm and http://academic2.american.edu/~dfagel/Markets&democracyfukuyama.html

My Weekly Reader 25 July 2019.

In 1940 there were 251,000 African-Americans living in Philadelphia, out of a total population of 1,931,000 or 13 percent of the population.  In 1970, there were 655,000 African-Americans living in Philadelphia out of a total population of 1,948,000 or 33.6 percent of the population. [1] Thus, Philadelphia’s African-American population almost tripled in both numbers and as a share of the population.  Much of the growth in the African-American population is explained by the “Great Migration.”[2]

The African-American immigrants in search of better lives received a frosty welcome in the City of Brotherly Love.  First, the white city had strong local ethnic identities: South Philadelphia was Italian; Pennsport, Gray’s Ferry, Kensington, Fishtown, and much of Northeast Philadelphia were Irish; Port Richmond was Polish.  During the Sixties and Seventies, these people felt themselves in crisis.  Many of them worked blue-collar manufacturing jobs.  In 1951, 46 percent of Philadelphia workers earned a living from manufacturing.  After the war, Philadelphia began to lose many of these jobs: by 1977, only 24 percent still worked in manufacturing.  During the Seventies, Philadelphia lost 100,000 manufacturing jobs.

Second, the cost of government rose dramatically, from over $100 million (1947) to over $500 million (1970).  Hence, from 1961 on, budget shortfalls led to repeated increases in both the real estate and wage taxes.[3]

Third, the national murder rate went up from the late 1950s through 1974.  In 1955 it stood at 4.5/100,000 people; in 1974 it stood at 10.2/100,000.[4]   This trend and other increases in violence, hit Philadelphia as hard as anywhere else.  Since the Forties, “the complexion of urban crime had changed…as big cities turned blacker, so did big city homicides.”[5]

Fourth, racism was a real force.  The early post-war out-migration by whites opened up housing for African-Americans in formerly all-white neighborhoods.  “Throughout the city and its suburbs, wherever blacks sought to move freely in the housing market there was community tension and frequently vandalism, intimidation, street riots, and evacuation of whole neighborhoods by whites.”[6]  For example, South Philadelphia and Kensington lost from 15 to 30 percent of their populations in the Seventies.  Also, African-American migration into previously white-dominated areas changed the composition of the public schools.  In 1961 there were 250,000 students in the public schools, about equally divided between whites and black.  In 1970 there were 291,000 students in the system, 63 percent non-white and 37 percent white.

Philadelphia’s white population hardly formed a single block.  To over-simplify, however, the blue-collar and lower middle-class “ethnics” wanted a campaign of resistance, while upper middle-class “elites” wanted change.  The former had the votes.  They twice elected Frank Rizzo, the tough former police commissioner, as mayor (1971, 1975).  Thus, majority opinion on integration in one Democrat-governed city in the Seventies.  A time of troubles.

[1] Timothy Lombardo, Blue-Collar Conservatism: Frank Rizzo’s Philadelphia and Populist Politics (2019).

[2] Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land : The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America (1991); Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration (2010).

[3] Russell Weigley, Philadelphia, pp. 664-665.

[4] Roger Lane, Murder in America, p. 303.

[5] Lane, Murder, p. 273.

[6] Weigley, Philadelphia, p. 669.

The Asian Century 8 24 July 2019.

China’s strengths and ambitions have been eye-catching.  What of its weaknesses and fears?  These, too, are striking.[1]

China’s economic progress rests on three pillars.  First, a rapid industrialization that required moving hundreds of millions of peasants out of low-productivity rural agriculture into higher-productivity urban factory work.  Second, engagement with the global capitalist economy to draw upon Western investment and expertise while selling China’s products abroad.  Third, the move from a centrally-planned economy to something more like a market economy.

This approach produced significant benefits for China.  China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.  This opened many markets to Chinese goods on advantageous terms.  Moreover, China pursued neo-mercantilist policies aimed to boost exports while restricting imports.  These included manipulating exchange rates for currency, subsidizing Chinese producers to lower their prices on world markets, and raising all sorts of non-tariff barriers to Western imports.  By 2010, China’s exports amounted to almost 25 percent of the world’s trade.

Then, in 2008, the Great Recession began.  World economic growth—and trade—slowed down.  China’s problem: how to keep everyone working so that political dissent did not arise?  China’s solution: invest in the domestic economy by providing a lot of credit.  This meant cheap loans to businesses to build things.  Trouble is, there’s investment and then there’s “investment.”  The Chinese government poured money into all sorts of make-work projects: construction and infrastructure (roads and bridges, high-speed rail) were favored targets for government largesse.

What are the results?  China over-built, over-invested, and over-borrowed.  Chinese debt has ballooned, about half of it is in real-estate.  Many industries suffer from excess capacity, while much of the building spree has produced empty buildings.  China’s economy isn’t growing at the fantastic rates of the first decade of the century; profit margins have fallen to low levels compared to Western economies; many companies can’t earn enough to service their debts and about 20 percent of it is non-performing.

Other problems are policy-driven, but not specifically financial in nature.  First, the one-child policy launched in the 1970s is now beginning to produce a demographic trap.  The labor force will start to shrink while the number of retirees will grow.  When America faces this problem, one solution is immigration.  Can China find immigrants?  How would the Chinese respond to immigrants from Southeast Asia?  From South Asia?  From Africa?  Can the Chinese substitute robots and artificial intelligence for human labor?

Second, Xi Jinping’s instinct is to clamp down on all forms of freedom as disruptive.  His “Belt and Road” plan is fascinating, but it is essentially a top-down government plan that is insulated from market considerations.  His pursuit of a “surveillance state” and his insistence on joint party-enterprise decision-making for the state-owned enterprises is likely to be “stifling in terms of creativity and disruption.”

Combine a gigantic asset bubble with a global economic slowdown and a not-agile government and what do you get?  Trouble for all, and not just for the Chinese.

[1] George Magnus, Red Flags: Why Xi’s China Is in Jeopardy (2018).

The Asian Century 6 18 July 2019.

Normally, China pursues a policy of self-regarding isolationism.  Britain’s “McCartney Embassy” of 1793 offers a good example.[1]  “Sometimes you’re the windshield; sometimes you’re the bug.”[2]  Occasionally, however, China abandons isolation for engagement with the outer world.  Neither isolation nor engagement offers China an un-mixed blessing.

Take the late 19th Century, for example.  China’s defeats in the Opium Wars led to the infiltration of Christian missionaries into much of the “Heavenly Kingdom.”  Many of Western ideas expounded by the missionaries clashed with widely shared Chinese beliefs and social relationships.  The Chinese proved much like Will Rogers’ minister preaching on sin: “He was agin it.”  Hostility to the enforced contact with the outside world boiled over between 1899 and 1901 in the so-called “Boxer Rebellion.”[3]  Widespread attacks on foreigners and a long siege of the foreign embassies in Beijing resulted in a multi-national invasion.  Western victory over China in the war that followed did not make China more Western.

A century of turmoil in Asia followed.[4]  By the first decade of the 21st Century, once-Marxist China had embarked upon the process of becoming a capitalist behemoth.  This required a renewed encounter with the West and its beliefs.  Chinese students, experts, and exports went abroad; Western investment, experts, and imports came in.  It proved to be a remarkable period of “opening.”

Since the 1990s, in what amounts to a new Boxer Rebellion, the Communist Party has begun to slam the brakes on certain kinds of contact with the outside world and on sources of dissent.  There are about a million Muslims in “vocational schools,” political activism outside the Communist Party is repressed, and a “Great Firewall of China” censors the flow of information and ideas.[5]

The government censors blacklist and block access to sites like Google, foreign social media, and news publications.  At the same time, the pull of the China market is so great that foreign technology companies may accommodate the government’s demands.  The censors also keep watch on China’s own social media platforms because these have a much greater potential to facilitate political activism of the sort that produced Egypt’s Tahrir Square movement.

China’s economic transformation has wreaked havoc with economies and political systems in many countries.[6]  Now it’s “techno-authoritarianism” may serve as a model for aspiring tyrants elsewhere.

There is a rationality to this effort that escapes many Westerners.  China’s economic transformation has been faster and deeper than the equivalent experiences of Western countries.  Much about the experience has been disturbing, even traumatic, for many ordinary Chinese.  The potential for massive unrest in response to that dissatisfaction could overthrow Party leadership and derail China’s transformation.  In case it isn’t obvious, that’s an explanation, not a defense.

[1] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macartney_Embassy

[2] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q_rbjg2k6cI

[3] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boxer_Rebellion#Causes_of_conflict_and_unrest

[4] OK, that’s something of an understatement.

[5] James Griffiths, The Great Firewall of China (2019).

[6] See: https://waroftheworldblog.com/2019/07/15/the-asian-century-3-15-july-2019/

My Weekly Reader 20 June 2019.

If you don’t like the Donald Trump Presidency, then there are some questions you need to address.  First, is Trump what the Brits call a “one off,” or is he the leading edge of a new wave in American politics?[1]  Second, what led to Trump’s election?  No, it wasn’t the Russians.  No, it wasn’t Hillary Clinton’s incompetence as a politician.  Both are real, but the decisive factors lay elsewhere.  On the one hand, Donald Trump decided to target the grievances of white, working-class men.  On the other hand, Donald Trump decided to run as a Republican, rather than in his natural home as a Democrat.  Like “Bud” White, “he’s not as stupid as he seems.”

The grievances of white working-class men are real.  Once upon a time, they were the mainstays of the “New Deal Coalition” that put Democrats into the White House from 1932 to 1952, from 1960 to 1968, and from 1976 to 1980, along with various majorities in Congress.  Unionized working-class jobs gave blue-collar workers middle-class incomes.  Then they fell by the wayside for complex reasons: mostly mechanization, but also the two successive oil “shocks” of the 1970s, organized labor’s attack on struggling employers in the 1970s, foreign competition, and ideological shifts in the two major parties.  Then, in the 1990s, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) under favorable terms compounded the problems of American industry.

As a result, men’s industrial employment declined, new jobs shifted to other geographic areas;[2] new jobs required “college” rather than “vocational” education; and the social world of the “left behind” disintegrated (single motherhood, alcohol and drug use, general demoralization).[3]

No one in either party had bothered to address those grievances.  The suburban base of the Republicans lives in blue oxford-cloth shirts and Dockers (or the female equivalent).  The Democrats have embraced “identity politics,” which excludes the identity of the white working class.  These are “post-industrial” societies.

As a result Trump’s campaign could drag into the ranks of the Republicans a bunch of normally Democratic voters or non-voters.  The opened the possibility of a Republican presidential victory that must have seemed far-fetched if any of the other munchkins running for the nomination won in the primaries.  Republicans lined up behind Trump and they will do so again in 2020.  They get to pack the federal courts for the lifetime of the appointees.  They get to stall and roll-back the imperial decrees of Barack Obama.

Are we—as a country—better for it?

[1] That’s a disturbing thought.  In twenty years we could be talking about John Carpenter’s “Trump Tower: Power Outage.”  In 2025, radical environmentalists (but I repeat myself) sabotage the federally-mandated coal-fired generating plants that power New York City.  Suddenly, the nightlight of the city-that-never-sleeps go dark.  The elevators (and escalators) and AC and cable-television stop working.  Chaos breaks out in the streets below, but atop Trump Tower a “celebrity roast” of former members of the Trump Administration is underway.  Comments by Jim Mattis, Reince Priebus, H.R. McMaster, Hope Hicks, Sarah Saunders, Jim Comey, Jeff Sessions, Rex Tillerson, Nancy Pelosi, Mike Pompeo, John Bolton, etc.  I suppose the deranged killer haunting Trump Tower could wear a Robert Mueller hockey mask.

[2] Try selling your house if you live in Erie, PA.

[3] See: Isabel Sawhill, The Forgotten Americans (2019) and Oren Cass, The Once and Future Worker (2019).  If this is what happened to white Americans, then what are we to make of the impact of “liberal paternalism” on African-Americans since the 1960s?

My Weekly Reader C 19 June 2019.

Why does any of this historical background matter?  It matters, first, because—in these contested times—I have to insist that Belief Systems evolve in response to changing conditions.  For two centuries and more now, Liberalism, Conservatism, and Socialism have all had to make their peace with Reality.[1]  It matters, second, because I’m getting fed-up with people who spout off their “smarmy, silly, half-baked opinions”[2] without any historical context.

Nineteenth-Century Liberals didn’t like Democracy.  In their minds, the “common man” wasn’t capable of dealing with the complexities of modern life.  If all men got the vote, then a horde of ignorant, selfish, short-sighted, and grasping voters would be led around by a ring through their nose.  They would vote for stupid people and stupid things in hopes of making their own lives materially better over the short-run.[3]  To a historian, this amounts to the Leninist criticism of labor unions: dumb-ass working people will prefer higher pay and shorter hours to Revolution.[4]  (Historical events have demonstrated that Lenin foresaw things accurately.)

Scholarly investigations by psychologists recently have added to our understanding of democratic choice.  One of the most important of these observers has been Cass Sunstein.[5]  His book Nudge[6] argued that people suffer from cognitive biases and mis-perceptions that inhibit the “rational choice” beloved of economists.  As a result, individuals often make choices that re not in their material best interests.  Moreover, people are effort-economizers.  They will choose the easiest thing at any given moment.[7]  Sunstein and Thaler proposed requiring people to “opt-out,” rather than “opt-in” to things like retirement savings plans, and that people who failed to choose a health plan should be assigned to the best available.  It’s easy to see how such an approach might be generalized.

What if the duty of the liberal state today is to liberate people from making errors?  People often do stupid things, either out of a lack of information, or bias, or lacking the time to study complex issues, or stupidity (d’uh).  Should the liberal state seek to “guide” choices in critical areas?

If the answer is yes, then who determines the “best” choice?  Bureaucratic and academic experts?  Once upon a time, eugenics had wide support upon educated people.  Today, the majority of Alabama voters oppose abortion on virtually any grounds.  Today the New York State legislature has approved a plan to oppose climate change.  All are examples of experts going nuts.  Then, what happens if people defy the approved “best” choice?

If the answer is yes, then where do we draw the line?   Donald Trump is, to my mind, plainly unfit to be president of the United States.  However, he won enough votes in the Electoral College to become president.  Should expert opinion over-ride the constitutional system?  If so, who controls entry into ranks of “expert opinion”?

[1] Whereas, Soviet Communism did not.  RIP.  Well, actually, Roast in Hell.

[2] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9hkhKVq5rM&t=10s

[3] See: anything at all in the NYT since November 2016.

[4] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o_5bH-MLblE

[5] On Sunstein, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cass_Sunstein  See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Kahneman on the underlying research in psychology.

[6] Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).

[7] For example, racial prejudice is what might be called a “heuristic device.”  Saves time and thought.  Alas.

My Weekly Reader B 19 June 2019.

What “gave” first was Nineteenth Century Liberalism.  First, the sudden advance of modern science and medicine after 1850 explained a host of public health problems in a new way.  These discoveries compelled liberals to accept a huge—for them—expansion in the role of government to address the problems of cities: sewers, clean water supplies, public baths, street cleaning, streetlights, mass transportation, and a police force.  Then came interference in the labor market through the regulation of hours and working conditions.  Then they accepted democracy in the form of votes for adult males.  Then they accepted universal, compulsory, and free primary education.  Then came higher taxes, focused at first on the very wealthy to pay for these new services and functions—and for the public employees who made them work.  The goal here lay not in expanding government power for its own sake, but in using government in a positive way to create environments in which the Individual could fully achieve his/her potential.[1]  This wasn’t just a Liberalism that broke down previous barriers to Individual achievement.  It was an adaptive Liberalism that broke down the established barriers to Individual achievement created by the effects of previous Liberal reforms and difficult social changes.[2]

Then came the immense crisis of the first half of the Twentieth Century: two world wars and the Great Depression.  The First World War introduced economic planning, conscription both for the military and for industrial work, an end to free trade, the beginning of “managing” the money supply, and passports to control the movements of individuals.  The Twenties saw capitalist experiments with a managed and planned economy.  The Great Depression made governmental control of macro-economic processes a “normal” thing.[3]  How to maintain full employment amidst price stability?  Keynesian “demand management,” that’s how.  Government spends to take up the slack in business-cycle capitalism.[4]  The Second World War’s financing showed how to do this in peacetime as well.

It didn’t stop there.  Liberalism shifted it gaze to breaking down the barriers—Beliefs and Behaviors–that stopped Individuals in marginalized groups from reaching their potential.  The “Warren Court” attacked the oppression of Individuals by government at all levels and in all forms: racial discrimination and “Jim Crow” laws; sexism and “privacy” (contraception); censorship; policing (Miranda, etc.); housing conventions that barred property sales to African-Americans and Jews; and abortion.

Did “Liberalism” over-reach?  Perhaps.  Only time will tell and all political prognostications (i.e. consulting the gizzards of dead animals) are without value.  (Sad day for the op-ed writers, No?)  The current anti-liberal argument would be that modern Liberalism has embraced “identity politics” (i.e. privilege), “statism” (i.e. executive branch decrees and rule making), and the suppression of free speech (i.e. “name and shame” campaigns).  “Ah dunno.”

[1] For English Liberalism, one key author here is T.H. Green (1836-1882).  I read one of his books in Matt Temmel’s class on English history at the University of Washington.  Didn’t understand a word of it.  Rediscovered Green later.

[2] OK, “a fighting priest who can talk to the young.”

[3] See: Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (1995).  Really good book.

[4] Great idea in a large sense, but—JMO—does that mean that capitalism loses some of the purgative effects that come with normal business slumps?  Do wages stay too high, do marginal businesses survive, do over-investment and poor choices go un-punished?

The New Russia Investigation The Usual Suspects 13 June 2019.

Paul Manafort.

During the Cold War, the United States applied the Roosevelt Standard to foreign rulers: “He may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he’s our son-of-a-bitch.”  Paul Manafort made a very good living by helping improve the image of some very bad people.  He represented Jonas Savimbi, Ferdinand Marcos, and Joseph Mobutu in the corridors of power.  All of this activity aligned with American foreign policy.  Then the Cold War ended.  Suddenly, the “sons-of-bitches” had to swim for it.  So did Manafort.  He found an apparent new gold-mine in working with the post-Soviet Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska.  Much of this work focused on Ukraine.

Ukraine had escaped from the Soviet Union upon the collapse of the evil empire.  However, old antipathies and affinities survived in the new country.  Basically, the farther west you go, the more Russophobe the people become[1] and the farther east you go the more Russophile the people become.  From 2004 to 2010, Manafort found work trying to improve the political chances of the Russophile presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovitch.  It should have been obvious that this work aligned with post-Soviet Russian foreign policy.  Reportedly, sometime between 2006 and 2009, the American Ambassador to Ukraine, William Taylor, told Manafort that he was working against the interests of the United States.  Apparently, Manafort did not heed this warning.[2]  In 2010, Yanukovitch won the presidency in an election judged fair by international observers.[3]  In 2014 he aroused massive opposition among the Russophobes by reversing course on an application to join the European Union.  He certainly did this at the behest of Vladimir Putin.  Soon, Yanukovitch was both out of office and out of Ukraine.  According to one account, the FBI then opened a criminal investigation of Paul Manafort.[4]  It was still running when the FBI began its investigation of suspected conspiracy between the Russians and the Trump campaign in Summer 2016.

What did the FBI investigation launched in 2014 discover?  Did it discover that Manafort had scored big-time, but hadn’t reported his earnings to the IRS?[5]

Michael Flynn.

Michael Flynn had an impressive career in military intelligence during the “Global War on Terror.”  In April 2012, his ascent peaked when President Obama nominated him to lead the Defense Intelligence Agency.  Two years later, Flynn announced his retirement.   Normally, it seems, people get three years in that position, so he was leaving early.  Why?

On the one hand, there’s the whispering campaign.  It was “leaked” to the press that Flynn had a chaotic management style; he didn’t play well with others; he abused his staff; he wasn’t a team-player; and he had a loose grip on facts.  These seem like personality traits.  Nobody noticed them before while promoting him from Lieutenant to Lieutenant-General?  So I don’t think this is very credible.

On the other hand, there’s the counter-whispering campaign.  It has been suggested that Flynn repeatedly told the Obama White House that much of the opposition to Bashir al-Assad came from conservative-to-radical Muslims.  The “moderates” weren’t much present on the battlefield.  This seems to have contradicted the “narrative” preferred by the White House.  Eventually, the White House got fed up.

Then there’s this.  In February 2014, Flynn attended the “Cambridge Intelligence Seminar,”[6] run—in part–by Stefan Halper.  Reportedly, Halper found it alarming that Flynn seemed very close to a Russian woman who also attended the seminar.  Someone else shared these concerns with American “authorities.”[7]  The woman involved was Svetlana Lokhova.[8]  She denies that she spoke with Flynn for any extended period or that they had a personal relationship.  Did American authorities believe that Flynn had been caught in what John Le Carre novels call a “honey trap”?  The Director of the CIA at the time was John Brennan, subsequently an engaged participant in countering President Donald Trump’s allegations about the intelligence community.

[1] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holodomor

[2] Why not?  Perhaps because he was making a lot of money and the American government wasn’t offering him an alternative income.  Perhaps because he was trying to get his guy elected president of a new democracy.  America is all about exporting democracy.  What’s more important, democracy or getting the American candidate elected?

[3] See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/08/viktor-yanukovych-ukraine-president-election

[4] See: https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-paul-manafort-michael-flynn-russia-robert-mueller-turkey-620215  One might be forgiven for wondering if the investigation was pay-back for Manafort having ignored Ambassador Taylor’s warning.  If it was pay-back, it soon hit pay-dirt.

[5] If so, then what—exactly—was Robert Mueller doing with his time for two years?  The Russian hacking information came from the NSA and pretty damn quick at that.  Carter Page and George Papadopoulos were low-hanging fruit easily plucked.

[6] On the larger framework of the Seminar, see: https://thecsi.org.uk/  NB: The reported views of Sir Richard Dearlove are interesting.  For a recent iteration of the Seminar, see: https://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/seminars/intelligence

[7] See: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/us/politics/trump-fbi-informant-russia-investigation.html

[8] Her version of the encounter can be found at https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-39863781  See also: https://thefederalist.com/2019/05/28/lawsuit-suggests-spying-trump-campaign-started-early-2016/