Monthly Archives: March 2025

JMO 1.

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            Both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times have been squalling for years about how China controls most of the “rare earth” metals that are vital for much modern technology.[1]  Also, they are hard to find and difficult to develop in the United States.  That is “We’re doomed!”  Then, turns out that there are important “rare earth” sources in…wait for it…Greenland and Ukraine.  President Donald Trump has made plain his determination to get a tight grip on both.  “Oh what an awful man he is, trying to insure the well-being of the United States in such a rude fashion!” 

            The same religious-fanatic dictator has been ruling Iran for 35 years.  The elections are rigged to keep out any representative of “liberal” opinion; there’s a big political prison into which prisoners disappear and from which they rarely emerge; the morality police can get away with murdering girls who don’t wear the hijab properly; corruption is rife and the upper ranks of society live well; living standards low for most people, in large part because the country spends a lot of its oil wealth on weapons systems and on the Revolutionary Guards Corps; the regime built a “ring of fire” around Israel not as a defense against the “Zionist entity,” but as the front line in Iran’s drive to revolutionize the Middle East on its own model; and the regime is close to producing nuclear weapons.[2]  Iran also is allied with Russia, China, and North Korea.  Lots of Iranians are unhappy with their masters.  Help them pressure the regime for meaningful change. 

            America built its economic power behind a high tariff wall in the later 19th and early 20th Century.  Yes, that kept prices for consumers high.  It also created a huge number of blue collar and white collar jobs; vast national wealth, and the industrial base that decided the outcomes of both World Wars and the Cold War.  After the Second World War, the United States adopted a free trade policy as a way to restore prosperity to a war-ravaged world.  Part of this plan involved accepting higher tariffs on American imports than the Americans imposed on their trading partners.[3]  The US was big, rich, and easy, while everywhere else was a pile of rubble. 

By the end of the Cold War (c. 1990), these conditions no longer applied.  It might have been a good time to renegotiate trade relations with many countries.  “But you didn’t do that, did you?”[4]  Instead, we doubled down by admitting China to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Cheap consumer goods flooded the country, wrecking many industrial areas of the United States.  In the first Trump administration, the president wall-papered China with tariffs and harassed Huawei, allegedly because it posed a security threat.  First, enlightened opinion deprecated this departure from “norms.”  Then Biden continued them.  Now President Trump is hammering everyone with tariffs.  People say “well the tariffs on China are OK, but he’s also hitting our friends and allies.”  Give it a couple of years and everybody will be on-board, just like before. 

Trump’s cabinet is mostly made up of clowns.  The president is pursuing real policies along with the rest of his nonsense.  This is what you get when the Establishment abdicates on solving big problems for decades. 

[1] Take a gander at Rare Earths – The New York Times 

[2] Now big chunks of Iran’s client states are reeling from hard blows struck by Israel. 

[3] The US also accepted Canada adjusting the exchange rate to make American goods expensive in Canada and Canadian goods cheap in the US. 

[4] Looking at you, William Jefferson Clinton.  We should have re-elected George H. W. Bush. 

EDC.

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            In the wake of the Second World War, Western European countries pondered some form of “unity.”  At first, this meant unity “at the peak”: countries surrendering some measure of sovereignty to form a “European” government.  This went nowhere.  So, attention turned to unity “at the base”: create specialized “European” institutions and let it cook.  This approach soon gave birth to the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC, Schuman Plan).  It worked once, so try it in other areas (Common Market, Euratom). 

            The “wake of the Second World War” broadly overlapped the “dawning of the Cold War.”  The Americans and the Europeans shared an interest in preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe.[1]  Eventually (1947-), this led to the Marshall Plan and some CIA meddling in French and Italian elections.  Still, what if the Red Army marched west?  Military security rose up as an issue.  One part of the answer came in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  The United States would keep troops in Europe as a “trip wire.”[2] 

            In dealing with these problems, “Europe” faced three problems.  First, the British didn’t want to join.[3]  Second, how were countries to reconcile with the Germans?  Third, Many American officials disdained the Europeans.  The purpose of Marshall Plan aid was “to get the Europeans on their feet and off our back.” 

            Then, in June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea.  The “Cold War” wasn’t just going to be an economic and political struggle in Western Europe.  It could also be a military struggle.  American troops might have to be sent to the Far East or the Middle East.  So, Western Europeans would have to bulk-up their military forces.  In September 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed re-arming West Germany.  The European responded with dismay.[4] 

            The “European integration” and American military themes soon came together.  In October 1950, French Defense Minister Rene Pleven suggested the creation of a “European Defense Community” to create a “European Army.”  West German troops would be raised, but would not be formed into units larger than battalion.  The German battalions would be mixed with troops from other countries and the higher commands would be held only by non-Germans.  The Americans reluctantly agreed if this was the only way to get West German troops. 

            Negotiation of the treaty dragged on for a year and a half.  The size of the German units rose to divisions, not battalions; and the European Army would be under the American commander of NATO, rather than independent.  After signatures (May 1952), the treaty went back to the national parliaments for ratification.  In the meantime, the context changed.  The Korean War ended in a truce; Joseph Stalin died and was succeeded by more moderate seeming men.  The EDC seemed less urgent.  The French parliament rejected the treaty (August 1954). 

            Afterwards, NATO admitted West Germany (and its army).  Europe enjoyed American nuclear “extended deterrence.”  Eventually, the Soviet Union fell.  Who needed armies now?[5] 

[1] Not much could be done about Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe what with the Red Army being what it was. 

[2] If Red Army troops attacked American troops, then nuclear weapons could come into play. 

[3] The British—understandably, labored under the illusion that they ranked among the “victors.”  In fact, Britain had suffered the ruin of its economy and loss of will to hold its empire.  Which is what Neville Chamberlain had feared. 

[4] See Category:Nazi war crimes in France – Wikipedia 

[5] European defense spending has fallen from 3.76 percent of GDP (1960) to 1.56 percent (2022).  That’s 58 percent.  European Union Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2025 | MacroTrends   

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 13.

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            President Donald Trump sees great virtues in building a tariff wall around America.  Is that good or bad?  It depends. 

Trump’s argument is that tariffs are good for America over the long run, even if they have short-term costs.  “Other countries have used tariffs against us for decades, and now it’s our turn.”  Trump has claimed that tariffs will make the American economy “even more self-sufficient, producing more of its energy, lumber, steel, and computer chips than ever before.”[1]  If those hopes come true, there will many jobs—white collar as well as blue collar—created.  The American economy’s supply-chain will become much more secure in a time of rising international tensions.  Trump has conceded that America would experience a “period of transition,” which might include a recession.[2]  

Critics argue that tariffs are bad for America and for everyone else.  First, tariffs raise prices for consumer countries, not for producer countries.[3]  Second, if one country raises tariffs, the other country or countries will raise tariffs on the first country’s goods.  This will reduce exports in what becomes a” trade war.”  Slowing down the domestic economy by raising consumer prices and reducing employment in sectors tied to exports could bring on a recession. 

President Donald Trump has followed a very erratic course on actually imposing tariffs.  Is that good or bad?  It’s bad. 

In early March 2025, Trump imposed a 20 percent tariff on goods imported from China[4] and 25 percent tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada.[5]  China responded with 10-15 percent tariffs on American corn and wheat.  The stock market tumbled and Trump quickly announced a month-long pause on tariffs on imported cars and parts.  The Wall Street Journal wondered “which side of the tariff bed Trump will wake up on” in days to come?  They got a quick answer.  In mid-March 2025, Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff on all steel and aluminum (both unprocessed and turned into something else—look at your soda can) imported into the United States. 

No one seemed to care about the tariff hike for China, but critics insisted that Canada and Mexico take about a third of America’s exports and send the US valuable commodities. 

Is this what got Trump elected?  Journalists posit that Trump won election on the promise of a vibrant economy, low inflation and unemployment, and controlled immigration.  That’s not all they’re getting.  One recent poll reported that 56 percent of respondents disapproved of Trump’s management of the economy.  He tariff-bombed China in his first administration and talked about tariffs in the campaign for his second.  Apparently, no one took him seriously.  Now he is acting like a real lame-duck president: doing what he thinks is right regardless of the polls or the pols—or the stock market.  Albeit in an erratic, bloviating, Trump-like fashion. 

[1] Quoted in “The Trump economy: Adrift in a sea of tariffs,” The Week, 28 March 2025, p. 34. 

[2] “Trump tariffs cause stock market whiplash,” The Week, 21 March 2025, p. 4. 

[3] Which is exactly the purpose of tariffs.  More expensive imports create a market for cheaper domestic producers. 

[4] Previously 10 percent.  The key question becomes whether the American producers can deliver equal goods at a lower cost. 

[5] Even though all three countries are members of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  “U.S. tariffs spark North American trade war,” The Week, 14 March 2025, p. 5. 

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 12.

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            For a long time, the United States has imposed lower tariffs on the goods of its trading partners than those trading partners have imposed on American goods.  The US did this because the national strategy was to foster a world of openish markets in pursuit of “peace, prosperity, and American exports around the world.”[1]  A month into office, President Donald Trump is announcing the end of the Age of America as the “benevolent hegemon.”  Now it is “pursuing its own interests first.”[2]  Trump’s actions began wreaking havoc in the international economy.  He doubled the tariff on Chinese goods, announced a looming 25 percent tariff on imported steel and aluminum, and raised the possibility of tariffs on semi-conductors, drugs (and not the fentanyl kind either), and cars. 

            Take the example of cars.  About 8 million of the 16 million new cars sold in the United States each year are manufactured abroad, chiefly in Germany, Japan, and South Korea.  Many more “foreign” cars are manufactured in American plants.  In late February 2025, President Donald Trump raised the idea of imposing a 25 percent tariff on car imports.[3]  One solution might be for foreign car-makers to increase production in their American facilities, while reducing exports to the United States.  Fine, except that a) it takes along time to build a car plant and recruit a work force, and Trump might be out of office before the plants are ready, taking his tariffs with him back to Mar-a-Lago; and b) if they cut manufacturing in their home country, they will have to lay off many workers there, as well as taking the political heat that comes with the lay-offs. 

            Then there’s steel.[4]  Many foreign countries subsidize their own steel industries at the expense of American producers.  Eighty percent of America’s steel imports come from “friendly” countries (Europe, Japan), rather than from China.[5]  Trump wants to privilege American steel-producers over those foreign competitors.  American steel-consumers—car companies for example, and their American customers—will have to bear the transitional costs. 

            The push-back came swift and hard.  Basically, “He did this in his first term and the results were BAD!”  Prices rose, American companies saw their sales fall, and car companies came under a lot of financial stress.[6]  Moreover, bullying our friends gains us nothing.  Canada—the country that invented hockey—dropped the gloves, at least rhetorically for the moment.[7]

On the other hand, some observers thought that the threat of tariffs could serve a useful purpose.  It could bring foreign trading partners to renegotiate existing trade deals.[8]  In short, Trump isn’t serious about actually imposing the tariffs. 

But what if he is serious?  And what if he insists on including the reduction of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) to trade?  This would include things like currency manipulation, and the taxation and regulation of American businesses abroad.  Eeeek! 

[1] “Trump’s tariffs: A new era of protectionism,” The Week, 28 February 2025, p. 34.    

[2] See Oren Cass, quoted in “Tariffs: Does Trump know what he is doing?” The Week, 14 February 2025, p. 6. 

[3] “Trade: Tariffs may hike foreign car prices,” The Week, 28 February 2025, p. 32. 

[4] “Trum brings back steel tariffs,” The Week, 21 February 2025, p. 32. 

[5] That is, our “friends” have been harming us for decades in the service of domestic interest groups. 

[6] “Trump’s tariffs: A new era of protectionism,” The Week, 28 February 2025, p. 34. 

[7] “Canada: Proudly resisting Trump’s bullying,” The Week, 14 February 2025, p. 14. 

[8] “Tariffs: Does Trump know what he is doing?” The Week, 14 February 2025, p. 6. 

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 11.

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            The year began with a menacing fact about Sino- American trade.  In the course of the last year of the interminable Biden presidency, China’s global trade surplus hit $992 billion, the highest ever.  China’s surplus in trade with the United States reached almost $525 billion.[1]  That’s over half of the total trade surplus for the year.  This news came as a grim confirmation of fears to people who think that trade deficits represent job losses in the deficit country, represent a victory for the chief rival of the United States, and that China is trying to export its way out of grave domestic economic problems. 

            This fact provides important background to President-elect Donald Trump’s tariff policy.  Trump had promised to impose tariffs “on Day 1.”  He didn’t quite do that.  No sooner was he inaugurated than Trump said that he was considering a 10 percent increase on the existing tariffs on imports from China and a 25 percent tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico.[2]  The tariffs would go into effect on 1 February 2025. 

“He’s a fake!” chortled Never-Trump pundits in early January 2025.[3]  He campaigned on levying tariffs of 10-20 percent on all imports from everywhere.  Now the President-elect is talking about focused tariffs on a few things.  Others took a more nuanced view.  This is his second term, so people have become accustomed to his “bluster.”  More than likely, he talks about tariffs in order to “squeez[e] out some concessions.”[4]

            In the eyes of critics, there are two different issues here.  The first is economic warfare against China.  America’s aggressive rival[5] has some serious weak spots.  Most noticeably, these include “a spiraling property market, perilous local government finances, a shrinking labor force, and brittle consumer confidence.”[6]  Since the first Trump administration, many American companies have been pulling back from China.  The country is vulnerable to pressure. 

            China hawks felt ambivalent about tariffs.  The very smart Aaron Friedberg,[7] took a hopeful view.  To resist “Chinese mercantilism,” tariffs “in a more targeted, tailored form” can be useful.  Tariffs on everyone else, however, would impede formation of an anti-China alliance.[8]  Meanwhile, China is exploiting every opportunity to build an anti-American alliance.  Why increase the number of volunteers? 

            The second is the tariffs on everyone else.  The tariffs on Mexico and Cananda “could throw American diplomatic relationships and global supply chains into disarray.”[9] 

            What does China do with all the dollars it earns from selling to America? 

[1] “The bottom line,” The Week 24 January 2025, p. 32. 

[2] “Trade: Trump readies tariffs on rivals and allies,” The Week, 31 January 2025, p. 32. 

[3] No, he’s all too real. 

[4] Gabriel Rubin in Reuters, quoted in “Trade: Trump readies tariffs on rivals and allies,” The Week, 31 January 2025, p. 32.

[5] “A toughish lot, but very go ahead, rather like we were in the old days.”—Sam Collins to George Smiley in John LeCarre, Smiley’s People. 

[6] Eswar Prasad in NYT, quoted in “China: Does Trump really want a trade war?” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 34.

[7] See: Aaron Friedberg – Wikipedia 

[8] Friedberg’s blog at Foreign Policy, quoted in “China: Does Trump really want a trade war?” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 34. 

[9] Ana Swanson in NYT, quoted in “Trade: Trump readies tariffs on rivals and allies,” The Week, 31 January 2025, p. 32. 

Sleigh Ride.

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            Imagine a Russian four-horse sleigh.  Coming home from a Christmas party at a nobleman’s country estate, it is loaded with presents.  Its passengers are bundled in furs and further insulated against the cold by much wine and an elaborate meal.  Sleep beckons. 

            Glancing drowsily toward the nearby forest, one among them sees the glitter of eyes watching from the woods.  “Wolves,” he says.  The sleigh-driver urges his horses on a bit.  Looking back, the passengers see a pack of wolves emerge from among the trees.  Then the leader of the pack begins to run after the sleigh.  The others follow.  Looking back, the driver sees them and quickly cracks his whip.  The horses surge forward and the passengers come fully awake.  Safety lies only in reaching their own country house. 

            The wolf-pack gains ground.  The driver belabors his horses with the whip, but calls to his passengers that they must throw things overboard.  That will lighten the load for the horses and it may distract the wolves.  Hampers filled with left-overs are the first to go.  The wolves pause briefly to snap at the offerings, but then come on with appetites whetted.  Gifts still wrapped in paper and ribbon go over the back next.  The wolves hardly glance at these, just keep rushing toward the sleigh.  Panic begins to grip the people on the sleigh.  Would they reach home before the wolves caught up? 

            So it was with rearmament in the Thirties.  Germany was the leader of the pack, Japan and Italy were other members of the pack; Britain and France were the passengers in the sleigh; and rearmament itself was the sleigh. 

            For more detail and depth on these issues, you can see additional posts on this blog. 

            The Costs of the First World War.  The Costs of the First World War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Appeasement and Beliefs.  Appeasement and Beliefs. | waroftheworldblog 

            Britain, Appeasement, and Today.  Britain, Appeasement, and Today. | waroftheworldblog 

            France and Appeasement in the Thirties. France and Appeasement in the Thirties. | waroftheworldblog   

            Crossing the Line.  Crossing the Line. | waroftheworldblog 

            Hitler’s War.  Hitler’s War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Why write this stuff NOW?  Why write?  I’m a historian trying to make sense of human actions under the pressure of ideas and events.  It’s my way of trying to serve a useful purpose beyond my own enjoyment.  Why NOW?  I suspect that those times inform our times.  China is the leader of the pack; Russia, North Korea, and Iran are the other wolves.  Maybe I’m just crying “Wolf!” 

British rearmament in the Thirties.

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            The government had ended the “Ten Year Rule” in 1932, but continued to hold down defense spending.  Then, in October 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference.  This tipped the balance toward rearmament. 

            In November 1933, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) formed a “Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC).”  Its mission was to identify the worst gaps in the military forces, plan how to meet them, and to make broad judgements about strategy.  By July 1934 it identified Germany as the primary danger and determined that Britain should avoid conflict with Japan.  Also, the DRC adopted a five-year time-line for rearmament (1934-1939).[1]  In March 1935, the government broke decisively in favor of rearmament.

            Having made the decision to rearm in a hurry, all went smoothly, no?  No.  The DRC proposed increasing military spending by £71 million over the five years, much of it on the Army.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer[2] imposed important changes.  First, he cut the total to £50 million.  Second, he cut the money for the Army in half, while doubling the proposed spending on the Royal Air Force (RAF).  He placed the emphasis squarely on home defense.  Henceforth, rearmament would involve constant tension between the armed services and the Treasury, with the Foreign Office getting buffeted between them. 

Defense spending rose from £37.2 million (1934) to £42.6 million (1935) to £60.7 million (1936) to £104.2 million (1937) to £182.2 million (1938) to £273.1 million (1939).  Almost half went to the Navy each year with the RAF receiving over half of the remainder.[3]    

What did Britain get for the money and how soon?  First and foremost, the RAF got thousands of modern, all-metal, single wing fighter planes–the Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane–which were to play such an important role in the Battle of Britain.  In addition, money went to development of radar for air defense control.[4]  In addition, a good deal of the expanded Army budget went to anti-aircraft artillery for home defense.  Second, the Navy received five new battleships, several aircraft carriers, and a host of light cruisers, while several older battleships were totally modernized.  Also, the defenses of the Singapore Base were hurried to conclusion as a stop-gap defense against Japan.  The Army largely got skint.  It could field only five divisions for service on the Continent.  Finally, industrial production saw improvements, both through the increased spending for the Royal Ordnance Factories (essentially bullets and shells), and through “Shadow Factories” (government-aided factories to expand aircraft production).[5] 

Britain had to try to avoid war until the program had been completed.  Until then,…

[1] Which would suggest that the “Ten-Year Rule” should have foreseen war in 1929.  But that is ridiculous.  It shows how fast things can change in human affairs. 

[2] Neville Chamberlin served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from November 1931 to May 1937, when he became Prime Minister. 

[3] Michael M. Postan, British War Production, Official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, Chapter II, p. 12, at HyperWar: British War Production [Chapter II]  On Postan, see: Michael Postan – Wikipedia 

[4] The prioritization of the RAF over the Army, but not over the Navy, reflected a fear of the danger from enemy bombing.  See: Chain Home – Wikipedia, especially the section “The bomber will always get through.”  It also demonstrates the initially defensive and deterrent nature of British rearmament. 

[5] British shadow factories – Wikipedia 

Why did Britain hesitate to rearm in the Thirties?

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            Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany at a particularly difficult time for Britain.  The decision to re-arm, to prepare for another great war—even if could be limited to a merely “European War”[1]—proved agonizing and divisive. 

On the one hand, Britain faced the Great Depression which drove up unemployment, forced Britain off the Gold Standard (21 September 1931), and began the process of converting Britain from a policy of free trade to a system of protective tariffs.[2]  The tariffs went into effect in February 1932.  They encouraged import-substitute re-industrialization.  By one later estimate, the tariffs led to a rise of real annual GDP by 4 percent (1932-37), on a par with Nazi Germany.  These events marked a dramatic turning point in Britain’s national policies. 

The ship’s pilot guiding this turn was Neville Chamberlain.[3]  Having devoted his political career to domestic reform, he foresaw the GDP growth serving to revitalize the British economy through industrial modernization and a social policy that eased old divisions, rather than preparation for another world war.[4]  Threatened by Japan in the Far East, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule” (March 1932).  Even so, the government remained preoccupied by the “very serious financial and economic situation.”  It was determined to resist big increases in military spending. 

On the other hand, the forces opposed to war and the preparation for war occupied a strong position in political.  These forces coalesced around the League of Nations.  Although the League had been the brain-child of American President Woodrow Wilson, it found its strongest popular support in Britain.  Britain’s League of Nations Union acted as a powerful pressure-group.[5]  Its goals were to promote international justice and human rights; disarmament and the settlement of international conflicts by peaceful means; and reliance upon collective security, rather than alliances.[6]  Membership rose from about 250,000 in the mid-Twenties to over 400,000 in 1931. 

Anti-militarism became a public fixture in the early Thirties.  Examples include the Oxford “King and Country” debate (February 1933); the East Fulham by-election, in which the peace candidate thrashed the rearmament candidate (October 1933); the “Peace Ballot,” (results June 1935), which strongly endorsed League membership, universal disarmament, abolition of air forces and the arms industry, and collective security against aggression; and the ferocious opposition to the Hoare-Laval Pact (December 1935).  This only worked if everyone played.    

            Hitler’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference (October 1933) ended real hope. 

[1] John Lukacs, The Last European War: September 1939-December 1941 (1976). 

[2] See: Import Duties Act 1932 – Wikipedia  This Act formed a first step in a much larger plan.  In Summer 1932, representatives of Britain and the Dominions met in Ottawa.  They agreed upon a policy of high tariffs around the Empire; low tariffs within the Empire; and Keynesian ideas about demand management (low interest rates, increased government spending).  See: British Empire Economic Conference – Wikipedia for an under-developed sketch. 

[3] Neville Chamberlain – Wikipedia 

[4] For some of the National government’s social reforms, see: Unemployment Act 1934 – Wikipedia;

 Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934 – Wikipedia; Special Areas (Amendment) Act 1937 – Wikipedia; Factory Acts – Wikipedia; Coal Act 1938 – Wikipedia; Holidays with Pay Act 1938 – Wikipedia;

[5] Members of the Liberal Party provided much of the leadership for the group, but important Conservatives also joined.  At the same time, many Conservative politicians and voters saw the League as ridiculous.

[6] See: Collective security – Wikipedia, and Disarmament – Wikipedia.  Both have useful bibliographies.   

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 10.

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            Elon Musk kept swinging his scythe through the federal workforce, firing 7,000 people at the IRS and an additional 1,400 from Veterans Affairs, while warning the Environmental Protection Agency to expect a 65 percent reduction in force from its current 17,000 employees.[1] 

            Then, at the end of February 2025, Elon Musk had the Office of Personnel Management e-mail, oh, several million federal civilian employees.  The message instructed them to submit a five bullet-point list of the major stuff that they had done the previous week.  Failure to comply would be taken as a resignation. 

            Federal employees, their union representatives, and the Democratic Party responded with their competing imitations of Albert Goldman.[2]  About a dozen Secretaries of Departments rallied to the defense of their employees.  The latter seemed to some observers like the leaders being captured by their followers.  President Donald Trump may have seen it in that light because he gave Musk pride of place at a televised Cabinet meeting. 

            The themes in the criticism were as before: Musk is an “unelected” person culling the ranks of the unelected employees wielding the power of the federal government; and lots of Americans—Republicans and Democrats alike–depend upon the federal government for income or medical care or education.  The appeal to elected politicians to keep things as they are against the actions of the unelected man-child genius seeking to avert national bankruptcy captures the spirit of the enterprise.  It is disruption of the Old Order and NOT kicking the can down the road that arouses resistance.  In addition, it is argued that cutting employees from Veterans Affairs will harm veterans.  In reality, for at least twenty years people who deal with Veterans Affairs have been complaining that it is the most messed-up organization that they have ever seen.  A string of good leaders (e.g. Eric Shinseki) have failed in their efforts to fix it.  Finally, it is asserted that the cuts to the IRS will just hinder efforts to get the rich to pay their “fair share.”  This is an ever-green political issue.  Democrats like having it as an issue with which to bash the Republicans, but they will not actually raise taxes on the rich when they could.[3] 

            Then, to be asked to briefly state what work one did last week doesn’t seem unusual or difficult.  Corporations—both in America and around the world—carry out reductions in force whenever the balance sheet tips too much into the red.  Often, they’re not too strategic about where the axe falls.  It isn’t regarded as the end of the world. 

            On the other hand, government isn’t a business.  Ideally, the government does things for society that are essential or highly desirable, but for which there is no reasonable private sector provider.  The Departments of Defense, State, Justice, the Treasury, and the CIA and NSA for example.  Then there is the government’s role in funding and coordinating scientific and medical research, and managing a system of air traffic control.  Moreover, the “bureaucracy” isn’t staffed only with drones.  It recruits many specialist experts.  Sweeping purges will cause a bunch of things to go wrong soon.  And once the experts get the heave, it will be hard to lure them back. 

[1] “DOGE slashes workforce with Trump’s backing,” The Week, 7 March 2025, p. 5. 

[2] The character played by the great Nathan Lane in “The Birdcage” (dir. Mike Nichols, 1996). 

[3] The Biden administration’s “American Rescue Plan” passed the Senate 50-49; its “Inflation Reduction Act” passed the Senate 51-50.  Both used “Reconciliation” to by-pass the filibuster.  Higher taxes easily could have been included if they actually wanted to make the rich pay “their fair share.”  Same for repealing the “debt ceiling.” 

British Disarmament in the Nineteen Twenties.

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            Britain’s military spending had soared during the First World War.  It remained high in the immediate aftermath of the war: £766 million in 1919–20.  Then, in August 1919, led by the Secretary of State for War and Air,[1] the Cabinet’s Committee of Imperial Defence adopted the “Ten Year Rule”: the government would base its defense budgets “on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” 

            From January 1920 to July 1921, Britain suffered a severe recession.  In 1921, the media titan Lord Rothermere founded the “Anti-Waste League” to pressure the government.[2]  It worked: the government appointed a budget-cutting Committee on National Expenditure with Sir Eric Geddes as chairman.  What followed became known as the “Geddes Axe.”[3]  In the end, total defense spending fell from £189.5 million (1921–22) to £111 million (1922–23), before rebounding to £114.7 million in 1924–25.[4] 

            Then a series of international agreements altered the context.  The Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) prevented a naval arms race between Britain, the United States, and Japan.  The Dawes Plan (1924) conceded to German objections on reparations.  The Locarno Pact (1925) stabilized relations in Western Europe between Germany and its former opponents.  In 1925, the new—and very popular in Britain–League of Nations began pushing for a World Disarmament Conference that would reduce “offensive” weapons almost out of existence.  The Versailles treaty had substantially disarmed Germany; now it was time for the other powers to follow suit.  A reduced chance of war would justify deep cuts in military budgets.  In 1928, in light of all these developments, the Chancellor of the Exchequer[5] persuaded the Cabinet to make the “Ten Year Rule” permanent unless specifically changed by the government.   

In the early Thirties, the Great Depression forced still more economies: defense spending fell to £102 million in 1932.  In April 1931, the First Sea Lord told the Committee of Imperial Defense that “owing to the operation of the ‘ten-year-decision’ and the clamant need for economy, our absolute [naval] strength also has … been so diminished as to render the fleet incapable, in the event of war, of efficiently affording protection to our trade.”  Moreover, if the Navy had to move the bulk of its strength to the Far East to deal with Japan, it would have the means to defend neither Britain’s overseas trade nor Britain itself. 

            In September 1931, Japan seized the Chinese outlying province of Manchuria.  On 23 March 1932, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule.”  However, it stipulated that “this [change] must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation” of Britain. 

Then, in January 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany.  War was less than seven years, not ten, away.  Much rearmament would have to be done in great haste. 

[1] Winston Churchill. 

[2] See: Anti-Waste League – Wikipedia and Harold Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Rothermere – Wikipedia  Comic in light of current events.  However, it was his rival, Lord Beaverbrook, who was the immigrant. 

[3] On Geddes, see: Eric Geddes – Wikipedia   On the Committee on National Expenditure, see: Geddes Axe – Wikipedia 

[4] For its part, social spending (education, health, housing, pensions, unemployment) fell from £205.8 million (1920–21) to £182.1 million (1922–23) to £175.5 million (1923–24), before rising to £177.4 million (1924–25). 

[5] Winston Churchill.