Tag Archives: war

Sleigh Ride.

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            Imagine a Russian four-horse sleigh.  Coming home from a Christmas party at a nobleman’s country estate, it is loaded with presents.  Its passengers are bundled in furs and further insulated against the cold by much wine and an elaborate meal.  Sleep beckons. 

            Glancing drowsily toward the nearby forest, one among them sees the glitter of eyes watching from the woods.  “Wolves,” he says.  The sleigh-driver urges his horses on a bit.  Looking back, the passengers see a pack of wolves emerge from among the trees.  Then the leader of the pack begins to run after the sleigh.  The others follow.  Looking back, the driver sees them and quickly cracks his whip.  The horses surge forward and the passengers come fully awake.  Safety lies only in reaching their own country house. 

            The wolf-pack gains ground.  The driver belabors his horses with the whip, but calls to his passengers that they must throw things overboard.  That will lighten the load for the horses and it may distract the wolves.  Hampers filled with left-overs are the first to go.  The wolves pause briefly to snap at the offerings, but then come on with appetites whetted.  Gifts still wrapped in paper and ribbon go over the back next.  The wolves hardly glance at these, just keep rushing toward the sleigh.  Panic begins to grip the people on the sleigh.  Would they reach home before the wolves caught up? 

            So it was with rearmament in the Thirties.  Germany was the leader of the pack, Japan and Italy were other members of the pack; Britain and France were the passengers in the sleigh; and rearmament itself was the sleigh. 

            For more detail and depth on these issues, you can see additional posts on this blog. 

            The Costs of the First World War.  The Costs of the First World War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Appeasement and Beliefs.  Appeasement and Beliefs. | waroftheworldblog 

            Britain, Appeasement, and Today.  Britain, Appeasement, and Today. | waroftheworldblog 

            France and Appeasement in the Thirties. France and Appeasement in the Thirties. | waroftheworldblog   

            Crossing the Line.  Crossing the Line. | waroftheworldblog 

            Hitler’s War.  Hitler’s War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Why write this stuff NOW?  Why write?  I’m a historian trying to make sense of human actions under the pressure of ideas and events.  It’s my way of trying to serve a useful purpose beyond my own enjoyment.  Why NOW?  I suspect that those times inform our times.  China is the leader of the pack; Russia, North Korea, and Iran are the other wolves.  Maybe I’m just crying “Wolf!” 

Why did Britain hesitate to rearm in the Thirties?

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            Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany at a particularly difficult time for Britain.  The decision to re-arm, to prepare for another great war—even if could be limited to a merely “European War”[1]—proved agonizing and divisive. 

On the one hand, Britain faced the Great Depression which drove up unemployment, forced Britain off the Gold Standard (21 September 1931), and began the process of converting Britain from a policy of free trade to a system of protective tariffs.[2]  The tariffs went into effect in February 1932.  They encouraged import-substitute re-industrialization.  By one later estimate, the tariffs led to a rise of real annual GDP by 4 percent (1932-37), on a par with Nazi Germany.  These events marked a dramatic turning point in Britain’s national policies. 

The ship’s pilot guiding this turn was Neville Chamberlain.[3]  Having devoted his political career to domestic reform, he foresaw the GDP growth serving to revitalize the British economy through industrial modernization and a social policy that eased old divisions, rather than preparation for another world war.[4]  Threatened by Japan in the Far East, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule” (March 1932).  Even so, the government remained preoccupied by the “very serious financial and economic situation.”  It was determined to resist big increases in military spending. 

On the other hand, the forces opposed to war and the preparation for war occupied a strong position in political.  These forces coalesced around the League of Nations.  Although the League had been the brain-child of American President Woodrow Wilson, it found its strongest popular support in Britain.  Britain’s League of Nations Union acted as a powerful pressure-group.[5]  Its goals were to promote international justice and human rights; disarmament and the settlement of international conflicts by peaceful means; and reliance upon collective security, rather than alliances.[6]  Membership rose from about 250,000 in the mid-Twenties to over 400,000 in 1931. 

Anti-militarism became a public fixture in the early Thirties.  Examples include the Oxford “King and Country” debate (February 1933); the East Fulham by-election, in which the peace candidate thrashed the rearmament candidate (October 1933); the “Peace Ballot,” (results June 1935), which strongly endorsed League membership, universal disarmament, abolition of air forces and the arms industry, and collective security against aggression; and the ferocious opposition to the Hoare-Laval Pact (December 1935).  This only worked if everyone played.    

            Hitler’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference (October 1933) ended real hope. 

[1] John Lukacs, The Last European War: September 1939-December 1941 (1976). 

[2] See: Import Duties Act 1932 – Wikipedia  This Act formed a first step in a much larger plan.  In Summer 1932, representatives of Britain and the Dominions met in Ottawa.  They agreed upon a policy of high tariffs around the Empire; low tariffs within the Empire; and Keynesian ideas about demand management (low interest rates, increased government spending).  See: British Empire Economic Conference – Wikipedia for an under-developed sketch. 

[3] Neville Chamberlain – Wikipedia 

[4] For some of the National government’s social reforms, see: Unemployment Act 1934 – Wikipedia;

 Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934 – Wikipedia; Special Areas (Amendment) Act 1937 – Wikipedia; Factory Acts – Wikipedia; Coal Act 1938 – Wikipedia; Holidays with Pay Act 1938 – Wikipedia;

[5] Members of the Liberal Party provided much of the leadership for the group, but important Conservatives also joined.  At the same time, many Conservative politicians and voters saw the League as ridiculous.

[6] See: Collective security – Wikipedia, and Disarmament – Wikipedia.  Both have useful bibliographies.   

No more coals to Newcastle.

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            By the mid-Thirties the international situation had begun to darken.  It was not yet Desperate.  The worst—another World War—might still be avoided.  Serious men had to deal with situations in a realistic way.  What were the situations? 

First, there was the conflict between the “democratic” and “status-quo” powers (Britain, France, and the United States) and the “authoritarian” and “revisionist”: powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, and Imperial Japan.  Each of the “revisionist” powers desired to expand its territorial control over adjoining areas.  To accomplish these goals they would have to overthrow the system of international order—often called the Versailles settlement—created after the First World War.  Beyond that common goal they were often at odds among themselves. 

            Second, there were the military realities.  The conventional economic policy adopted to respond to the Depression (1929-1939) combined lower taxes with spending cuts, while limiting international trade (autarky).  Where countries stuck with this policy, military budgets suffered.  Where they did not stick with this policy, they rearmed faster.  Meanwhile, autarky spurred both isolationism and aggression.

            Third, Britain had three enemies threatening its global position: Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Far East.  It had the military resources to fight one major war at a time.  Britain lacked good allies.  America was deeply isolationist; Communist Russia hated capitalist counties—democratic or authoritarian; and France had been “bled white” in the First World War, while the Depression intensified partisan polarization.  If Britain fought one major power, the other two enemies would pile on.  Unless they were bought off or deterred. 

            In July 1934, Austrian Nazis had tried to seize power.  Hitler’s fingerprints were all over the failed coup.  The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ordered four army divisions to the border with Austria to deter German intervention.  In London and Paris, this seemed a good omen. 

            In March 1935, Nazi Germany declared that it would begin rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty.  In April 1935, representatives from Britain, France, and Italy met in the resort town of Stresa.  They agreed to resist any further German violation of the Versailles Treaty.  During the conference, the Italians raised the issue of Ethiopia.  Italy wanted to take over a big chunk of Ethiopia.  This was Italy’s bill for helping contain Germany.  The demand embarrassed the British, so it never made it into a written agreement.    

Mussolini had not abandoned his goals.  In October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia.  Public opinion, but especially “progressive” opinion, in both Britain and France went wild.  Demands rang out for support for the League of Nations and economic sanctions on Italy. 

British and French leaders still hoped to save the Italian alliance against Germany.  In December 1935, British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare met secretly with French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval.  They agreed on a plan that gave most of Ethiopia to Italy while leaving a fragment independent.  News leaked, public opinion revolted, the plan was abandoned, and Hoare resigned.  King George V said “Ah well Sam, no more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris.” 

Lesson: If you want the “status quo” in one area you may have to accept “revisionism” in another.  Who is the main enemy?  What are the alternatives? 

Prologue to a Diary of the Second Addams Administration 15.

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            The Agenda: Iran.[1] 

            The Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Shah (1979) spread chaos in the country.  Saddam Hussein, the dictator of neighboring Iraq, sought to exploit the situation by attacking Iran.  The subsequent war[2] (1980-1988) caused all sorts of troubles.  In its aftermath, during the 1990s, the Iranian Republic launched a program to develop nuclear weapons.  The program’s physical component—as opposed to intellectual and technological components–began with the construction of a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy-water plant at Arak. 

            In 2002, Iranian dissidents obtained and published secret documents on the nuclear program for all the world to see.  In 2003, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei published a “fatwa” banning the possession or use of nuclear weapons.  No one believed him.[3]  Eventually, in 2006, the United Nations plastered Iran with economic sanctions.  In 2015, the Obama administration, busy with other quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, led the negotiation of a deal with Iran.  Iran would limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent and send 97 percent of its already-enriched uranium to Russia for safe-keeping.[4]  The agreement would run for 15 years.  It hardly made it out the gate. 

            In 2018, President Donald Trump abandoned the agreement so far as the United States was concerned.  In Trump’s view, the agreement did nothing to address Iran’s non-nuclear aggressive behavior in the region.  Specifically, Iran was arming-up and coordinating allied forces in the region.[5]  Trump seems to have hoped that renewed economic sanctions would force the Iranian regime to cut a new and better deal.  To emphasize his point, in 2020 Trump ordered the killing of General Qassem Soleimani, a leading figure in the Revolutionary Guards. 

Next, in 2021, President Joe Biden[6] tried to revive the agreement, but the Iranians had moved on.  At about the same time that Biden entered the White House, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 percent, and then to 60 percent.  Enrichment to 90 percent creates “weapons grade material.”  All the while, economic sanctions and mismanagement have battered Iran’s domestic economy.[7]  

The last year or so has altered the situation.  First, Israel has inflicted immense damage on Iran’s clients through its wars in Gaza and Lebanon.  Turkey sponsored a rebel offensive in Syria that overthrew Iran’ ally Assad.  When Israel killed a Hamas leader in Tehran, Iran responded with a missile barrage; and, in October 2024; Israel answered with air strikes that wrecked key elements of Iran’s air defense system, among other things.  This leaves Iran open to follow-on strikes against nuclear facilities (and the Iranian leadership cadres) if Tehran doesn’t change its tune. 

Second, Donald Trump’s return to the White House has seemed possible (if not certain) since the beginning of 2024.  Tehran has been intensifying its drive to enrich uranium to 60 percent.  That is, apparently, a hop, skip, and a jump from 90 percent or weapons-grade uranium.[8]  I don’t know how much time that hop, skip, and jump would take.  Expert opinion holds that a basic sort of bomb could be manufactured six months after a sufficient quantity of weapons-grade uranium has been accumulated.  Another year after that and they could have a warhead for a ballistic missile.  One that could easily hit Israel. 

NOTHING in the history of Israel’s military and national security policy suggests that Israel will let Iran get anywhere near that point.  They will not allow Iran to get even one nuclear weapon.  Never mind the ballistic missiles.  “Just put it on a freighter bound for Haifa.”  The time-line for preventive action by Israel (and/or the United States) is very short.  Maybe a year at the outside?  There will be heavy pressure on the prime minister of Israel[9] to act soon. 

The time-line for Iran to decide what course it will choose is very short.  Will the rulers of Iran try to rush ahead and break-out to possession of nuclear weapons?[10]  If they do achieve a nuclear weapon, will they feel compelled to “use it or lose it”?   

Or will the leaders of Iran repent their disdain for Biden’s offer to revive the 2015 agreement?  The country’s alliance network is in shambles and its own defense vulnerabilities have been exposed.  Russia could divert no forces from the Ukraine war to save Assad, so it isn’t likely to do much for Iran.  Would the Iranian leaders—belatedly—seek to engage with the United States?  If so, how stiff-necked would they be about concessions? 

The stakes are high.  In theory, Israel would need the assistance of the United States to attack the key Iranian facilities.  A prime target would be an enrichment facility near the city of Qom.  It is tunneled into a mountain.  So is another site near Isfahan.  The American “Massive Ordnance Penetrator,” dropped by a B-2 bomber would be the only conventional weapon that could destroy the targets.[11]  In reality, Israel has its own nuclear weapons that might do the job.  That’s an awful thing to ponder.[12] 

Finally, there is a loose alliance between Iran, Russia, and China.  How would the Russians and the Chinese respond to either an Israel-America joint attack on Iran or to an Israel-alone attack (albeit with American blessing)? 

Can of worms.  Or, as the French say, “a basket of crabs.” 

[1] “Briefing: A looming nuclear crisis,” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 11. 

[2] See: Iran–Iraq War – Wikipedia  If you want to explore in depth, see: Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods The Iran–Iraq War. A Military and Strategic History (2014).  Murray is deeply knowledgeable and hard-headed.   

[3] Iran is predominantly Shi’ite Muslim.  As a long-persecuted minority within Islam, Shi’ite theologians determined that Shi’ites could dissemble about their real religious beliefs.  Over the centuries, other people have come to believe that Iranian culture has generalized this originally purely religious easement on veracity. 

[4] So, as part of their recent mutual sliming-up to each other, has Russia secretly returned the enriched uranium to Iran?  I haven’t noticed reporting on this question.  My bad.  What does Mossad say? 

[5] Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Assad regime in Syria. 

[6] More recent developments cause me to wonder if it wasn’t the policy of President-for-Foreign-Policy Antony Blinken.  Who would have been President-for-Domestic-Policy?  Can’t have been Janet Yellen.  We wouldn’t have had the inflation mess.  I understand that this is a nasty remark.  But see “Biden: How to hide a president’s decline” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 16.  Reports on a WSJ story on “how Biden’s aides and family hid his apparent cognitive decline from almost day one of his presidency.”  On which side of “day one” did the hiding begin? 

[7] Pakistan’s prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once said that “Even if we have to eat grass, we will make a nuclear bomb.”  You couldn’t force that in a democracy, but neither Pakistan nor Iran are real democracies. 

[8] Obviously, I haven’t tried it myself.  Nor would I try.  Don’t want to get hauled into a black Escalade while I’m walking my dog. 

[9] Probably Benjamin Netanyahu, but it doesn’t matter.  The leaders of the IDF and Mossad seem likely to be on the same page. 

[10] The ever-shrewd Eliot A. Cohen raised this possibility in the Atlantic in December 2024.  For a sample of Cohen’s Atlantic pieces, see: Eliot A. Cohen, The Atlantic 

[11] It has been reported that the Pentagon has briefed President Biden on plans for American attacks on Iranian nuclear resources.  “Briefing: A looming nuclear crisis,” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 11. 

[12] Many people outside of Israel already are appalled by pictures from Gaza. 

Ukraine Crisis.

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            The military situation of Ukraine continued to decline.[1]  Russian ground forces have been making steady progress against Ukrainian forces in the east of the country.  Hoping, perhaps, to stave off a Ukrainian defeat until the Biden administration had left office, “Biden”[2] agreed to allow Ukraine to fire American-supplied “ATACMS” missiles into Russia itself.  The prickly, humorless Vladimir Putin saw this as another of “NATO’s aggressive actions against Russia.”  He argued that Russia had the right to hit not only Ukraine itself, but also countries “that allow their weapons to be used against our facilities.”  He didn’t say that Russia would do that, just that it had the right.  The incremental increases in Western military aid, always modulated by the United States, has been a long-running grievance for Putin.  Putin hasn’t wanted to come into a direct conflict with the West, any more than the West has wanted a direct conflict with Russia. 

What Putin did do was to order the bombardment of Ukraine with swarms of drones and a few new ballistic and nuclear-capable missiles.  Ukraine’s Volodymir Zelensky described the ballistic missile attack as an “escalation” that should be countered by the delivery of American more air defense artillery (like the HIMARS system). 

            War weariness is taking hold in Ukraine.  The share of the population that favors a negotiated peace has risen from 25 percent a year ago to over 50 percent now.  Why would Putin agree to negotiate or take less than his maximum aims?  It isn’t clear that Putin would have agreed to negotiate two years ago, when things were going badly for him.  Why would he negotiate now, when the boot is on the other neck?  Russian soldiers are fighting and dying, Vladimir Putin is not. 

            What does Putin want?  Some Western observers think that he will settle for possession of the Donbas and all the other territory acquired in the war.  Some think that Ukraine will now settle for remaining a sovereign state with most of its pre-war territory still in its possession. 

            What is NATO willing to do for a non-member under an unprovoked attack?  What NATO countries have done so far has not been enough to turn the tide.  Russia possesses a considerable numerical advantage over Ukraine. Providing weapons doesn’t create trained forces to use those weapons on the battlefield.  There is a degree of theater here. 

            There is one final, awful thing to consider.  The historian John Lewis Gaddis usefully renamed the “Cold War” as the “Long Peace.”  That peace was assured by deterrence based Mutual Assured Destruction.  The Indian-Pakistani nuclear rivalry has been based on a similar deterrence.  The American refusal to exploit its nuclear monopoly against Russia prevented the Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949 from becoming a one-sided nuclear war.  However, we’ve also seen what can happen when one country possesses nuclear weapons and its opponent in war does not.  Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

            How would the United States—under either Biden or Trump—respond to a nuclear attack on Ukraine? 

[1] “Russia gains ground as U.S. rushes aid to Ukraine,” The Week, 6 December 2024, p. 5.  See: Ukraine down the drain. | waroftheworldblog 

[2] Within quotation marks, the term refers to whatever group of people (perhaps Antony Blinken, Lloyd Austin, Avril Haines) is conducting American foreign and defense policy behind the façade of the man in the Biden-Trump debate. 

Ukraine down the drain.

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            In November 2022, about a year into the Russo-Ukraine War, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, said publicly that neither side could win a decisive victory.  He argued that a negotiated peace offered the best hope for peace.[1] 

            This was emphatically not the advice that people wanted to hear.  The Biden administration chose a different course.  In essence, the United States has provided (and has encouraged European allies to provide) arms that could be used in a struggle to recapture the territories lost to Russia since the initial Russia seizure of Ukrainian territory in 2014. 

However, for most of the last two years the Biden administration has rejected any measures that would put the United States at risk of a war with Russia.  Ukraine would not be admitted to NATO.  Biden refused repeated requests from Ukraine for long-range weapons that would allow it to strike Russian forces and military sites within Russia itself. 

Now the Russians are driving the Ukrainians back in parts of the front lines.  Now they have been joined by 8-10,000 North Korean “volunteers.”  Now Ukraine has lost about 57,000 dead and many others wounded.  Now the Ukrainian army is finding it hard to replace such losses.  Now the danger of a collapse by the exhausted and increasingly demoralized Ukrainian army grows.  Essentially, events have proved General Milley correct.  A negotiated peace, or at least a cease-fire, is the logical step if Vladimir Putin will settle for half a loaf.  

            As Biden’s term staggers to a close, some administration defense and foreign policy officials have suggested that the United States do what it has not done so far.  Specifically, they have allowed Ukraine to use longer range missiles; they have committed to provide Ukraine with anti-personnel mines[2] to shore up the sagging front; and they are pushing the remaining authorized military aid out the door before President Trump can stop them.   The weapons “are unlikely to change much on the battlefield” and “it will be difficult for Ukraine to regain the ground that Russia has steadily seized over the past few months” authorized leakers in the intelligence community told the New York Times. 

So why do it?  Administration sources offer the rationale that better terms for a cease-fire or peace can be obtained if Ukraine can slow the Russian advance and punish Russia in the final stage of the war.  Moreover, any cease-fire or peace will be at risk of violation by Russia.  Building up a strong defensive capacity could deter or defeat any new Russian attack. 

This seems nonsensical.  If Russia is exhausting the Ukrainians now, why not keep going until they totally collapse?  NATO membership is the only thing that might deter Russia. 

At the same time, the despised Trump administration looms.  The Biden administration is hurrying to issue $2.1 billion worth of contracts for arms to be delivered to Ukraine.  They have two months to go before the Trump administration takes office, although “normally” it takes four to nine months to issue such contracts.[3]

Is the Biden administration trying to encumber the path of the new administration?    

[1] Helene Cooper, Andrew E. Kramer, Eric Schmitt, and Julian Barnes, “Trump’s Vow Leaves Kyiv With Few Options,” New York Times , 22 November 2024. 

[2] Neither the United States nor Russia have signed the Ottawa Treaty outlawing landmines, but Ukraine has signed and ratified the treaty.  List of parties to the Ottawa Treaty – Wikipedia  Who could blame them for breaking it? 

[3] It is good news that one can cut all the red tape at the Pentagon if you want to cut it.   

Decisions.

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            “War is pure Hell.  You cannot refine it.”—William Tecumseh Sherman.  Peace in the Russo-Ukraine war is desirable.  Under the right terms. 

Under what terms is “peace” with Russia desirable for Ukraine?  Should Ukraine give up the territory that Russia already holds in exchange for peace?[1]  Should they try to keep fighting with whatever aid the European Union can provide, even if the United States does a bunk?  Should they try to extract commitments for the West in exchange for ceding territory to Russia and halting the fighting?  Such commitments might involve reconstruction aid, modern arms for a post-war Ukrainian military, and membership in the European Union and NATO.  What if Russia’s terms include demands for Ukraine’s “neutralization” and disarmament so as not to “threaten” Russia in the future? 

Under what terms is peace desirable for Russia?  It would take extreme pressure to make Russia give up its territorial gains.  Vladimir Putin’s long-term goal appears to be the reassembly of the Soviet Union.  Any peace that leaves Ukraine functionally independent marks a defeat.  In terms of manpower, Russia has a big edge.  At the moment, it profits from an alliance of convenience with China, North Korea, and Iran.  Putin may calculate that he can keep the pressure on Ukraine until the front lines cave in.  If that happens, Russia could be in a position to take much more than anyone else is contemplating at this moment. 

Under what conditions is peace desirable for the United States?  This question involves asking other questions.  First, where does Ukraine figure in America’s global strategy?  The United States faces multiple dangers simultaneously.  The Far East is the most important of these challenges.  Then there is the Middle East.  The key concerns here are the oil, Iran’s forward policy, and Israel.  Then there’s Europe.  Putin’s ambitions pose an eventual danger to the former “satellite states” and to the Baltic countries.  How soon would it become an actual danger?  Russia’s attack on Ukraine has prompted a revival and expansion of NATO.  Putin’s “allies” all have a strong interest in keeping the eyes of the world focused on Ukraine (and Gaza).[2]  At the same time, a consciousness of danger is poking the Europeans to look to their own defenses.  This will take time to develop. 

Second, to what extent can the United States make good its global commitments?  It operates from a weakened position compared to the past.  The United States military’s command structure has ossified, the defense industrial base has eroded for decades, and the human manpower base is in poor shape.[3]  It is by no means guaranteed that the United States can fight and win multiple simultaneous wars.  Rearmament is going to take time and cost money even IF the political will exists to rearm. 

            What’s best for Ukraine?  Only they can decide. 

            What’s best for the United States?  Only they can decide. 

            What’s best for Russia?  Only Putin can decide. 

            Where, if at all, do those decisions overlap? 

[1] See: 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine – Russo-Ukrainian War – Wikipedia 

[2] Someone once observed that Bismarck was the kind of guy who would set fire to your barn so that he could sleep through the night. 

[3] The country has a high rate of obesity, with attendant illnesses.  Wegovy in boot camp? 

“God is on the side of the big battalions”–Voltaire.

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            Russia and Ukraine have been “at war” since 2014.  Russia seized the Crimean peninsula and supported “rebellion” in two majority Russian “oblasts” in eastern Ukraine.  Then, in February 2024, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.  They missed their punch.  Since then, the Russians and Ukrainians have been engaged in a prolonged war of attrition.  Recently, a Ukrainian offensive ground to a halt without reaching its ambitious goals.  Since then, the Russians have mostly been grinding away on the Ukrainian lines in the Donbas.  Western observers predicted that the Ukrainian defense would hold as Russian bodies piled up in “No Man’s Land.”  Moreover, the Ukrainians launched their own minor counter-offensive in the Kursk region.  The intent was to seize Russian territory and force the Russians to shift soldiers from the Donbas, blunting the Russian offensive. 

The West has provided Ukraine with far more “lethal” aid since February 2022 than it did before then.  That aid has come with restrictions however.  In particular, Western governments seem to have wanted Ukraine to bleed Russia white until Vladimir Putin would agree to negotiate a reasonable settlement.  On the other hand, they didn’t want Ukraine risking an expansion of the war toward a threshold where Putin might use nuclear weapons.  So long-range weapons that could reach deep into Russia have been off the table.  Ukrainian President Zelensky has kept asking all the same. 

The trouble is that there are more Russians than Ukrainians.  Specifically, there are 143 million Russians and 38 million Ukrainians.  The Russians have suffered between 400,000 and 600,000 military casualties dead and wounded since the invasion began almost three years ago; Ukraine has lost perhaps as many as 80,000 dead and 400,000 wounded.[1]  However, the Russians have managed to dredge up 25,000-30,000 replacements per month.  Now they have managed to recruit 8,000 North Korean soldiers.  (There may be more to come.)  In contrast, Ukraine is just running out of soldiers.  It is the one being “bled white.” 

As a result, Russians managed to contain the incursion near Kursk while still attacking in the Donbas.  Now the Russians are moving forward against the Ukrainian defenses in both the Donbas and Kursk.  On the Ukrainian side, the fighting men are becoming exhausted and “morale is eroding.” 

People sympathetic to Ukraine ask “Why must Ukraine keep fighting with one hand tied behind its back?”[2]  Because NATO countries do not want to go to war with Russia directly.  Hemingway has one of his characters explain how he went broke: “Gradually and then suddenly.”[3]  The same thing is true for Ukraine now.  Ukraine is going to have to make a deal with Russia.  Shrewd, realistic thinking says that Ukraine will have to accept the loss of the territory that the Russians have conquered.[4]  Ukraine will have to settle for some guarantee of its future security, coupled with financial aid for reconstruction.  Membership in NATO, or just fair words and promises from Putin, may be that guarantee.

[1] See: Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War – Wikipedia 

[2] The Observer, quoted in “Ukraine: A grim reality sets in,” The Week, 15 November 2024, p. 15.

[3] Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises (1926).  And Jackson Browne counsels “don’t think it won’t happen just because it hasn’t happened yet.”  The Road and the Sky (Remastered) 

[4] Richard Haas, quoted in “Ukraine: A grim reality sets in,” The Week, 15 November 2024, p. 15. 

Remaking the Middle East 7 October 2024.

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            It is a moment of great uncertainty in the Middle East.  Many people fear the expansion of Israel’s war with Hamas and Hezbollah into a larger war involving Iran and the United States, one which has no certain outcome.  For others, however, visions of sugar plums dance in their head.[1]  A Saudi Arabian journalist[2] wrote that Israel’s deadly attacks had done so much damage to Hezbollah that “even if the group were to live on, it would most likely be a caricature of its former self.”[3]  Lebanon may be able to free itself from the thirty-year death-grip of Hezbollah.  A British journalist judged that, in spite of the Biden administration dragging on Israel’s coat, “Israel is likely to see the current moment as too good an opportunity to miss.” 

Opportunity to do what?  One answer is to strike at the nuclear weapons program that threatens the survival of Israel.  Another answer is both more ambitious and ill-defined.  An American journalist reported that “Many in Israel see a ‘once-in-a-generation chance’ to remake the Middle East to Israel’s advantage.”  Naftali Bennett, a former Prime Minister of Israel, sees “the biggest opportunity in the past 50 years” to reshape the region.[4] 

Reshape how?  Destroy Hamas entirely?  Destroy Hezbollah entirely or, at least as a significant force in regional conflicts?  Gravely damage Iran’s nuclear program and force it to accept long-term international supervision?  Topple the Islamist regime in Iran entirely in hopes of something better emerging?  Forge an alliance with Saudi Arabia over the Iran conflict and relegate the Palestinian question to Israel alone?  Redraw the map of the Middle East to unite all Kurds not under Turkish rule into a sovereign state?  Redraw the map of the Middle East to assign the Sunni part of Iraq to Jordan?  “Transfer”[5] the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank to the Shi’ite portion of a partitioned Iraq?

            What does History tell us about once-in-a-generation opportunities? 

            In the early 19th Century, “Nationalism” meant that all people speaking the same language and sharing the same culture should live in a single independent country.  Germany were split into 30-plus states; Italy was split into half a dozen states; the Austrian Empire smooshed together people from many different latent-countries.  Many people saw Nationalism as the wave of the future.  Austria saw it as a death sentence.  One of these Believers was the French Emperor Napoleon III, the nephew of the great Napoleon I.  France should lead this remaking of the map of Europe. 

            Napoleon III started with Italy, concluding a secret deal with Count Camillo di Cavour, the prime minister of the Italian kingdom of Piedmont-Sardina.[6]  If Cavour would provide a war with Austria, Napoleon II would furnish the French army to win it.  Then, the Austrians would be expelled from Italy, and Italy would be “united” in a loose federation.  Piedmont would expand to dominate northern Italy; central Italy’s small states would join together under a ruler to be supplied by France; the backward southern Italian kingdom of the Two Sicilies would join the confederation; and the Pope’s lands would be much reduced, but the Pope would become head of this loose confederation. 

            Cavour did what he said that he would: he provoked Austria into declaring war.  Napoleon III did what he said that he would: his army thrashed the Austrians at Magenta and Solferino.  Then the wheels came off, badly and at high speed.  First, the French were appalled by the casualties suffered in battle and tried to crawfish on Piedmont by striking a deal with the Austrians.  Second, Italian popular nationalism surged up on the enthusiasm of victories won by others.  Popular revolts led to demands for the unification of all Italy north of the kingdom of Naples, regardless of promises made to Napoleon III.  Third, then the Italian nationalist and republican adventurer Giusseppe Garibaldi led a small expedition (with or without the knowledge of Cavour?) against the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.  The kingdom collapsed like a house of cards.  Garibaldi led his army north toward Rome.  Faced with the danger of a republican revolution overwhelming a monarchical revolution, the king of Piedmont met Garibaldi face to face.  The great man surrendered to the little king, at the price of southern Italy being included in the new nation. 

            France hadn’t wanted a united Italian peninsula unified under a centralized government.  The northern Italians hadn’t really wanted the inclusion of the backward Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in their new nation.  Garibaldi hadn’t wanted a monarchy, but a unified and centralized republic.  No one got exactly what they wanted. 

            Nor did they clearly foresee the long-term effects. The unification of Italy made the unification of Germany (against and without the Austrian empire) the next pressing question in European affairs.  Nationalist victories in central Europe then accelerated the spread of nationalism into the great multi-national empires of eastern Europe and the Middle East.  The Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman empires all succumbed during the First World War. 

            Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian statesman and leader of German unification, was a temperamentally conservative and cautious person.  He spent a lot of time thinking about all the possible scenarios, but he didn’t go looking for “once-in-a-generation” chances. 

            Of course, other people are more time-bound and fixated on one outcome as the only possible outcome.  That is, they feel a burning need to accomplish some great mission in their lifetime.  Both Lenin and Hitler were that way. 

[1] Marc Champion wrote in Bloomberg that the blows suffered by Iran offer a tempting chance for Israel to inflict serious harm on its avowed main enemy.  Champion acknowledged that an Israeli attack would force Iran to choose between humiliation for the regime and a war with a surprising adversary and the possibility of American involvement. 

[2] A place where speech is never free, but often inspired. 

[3] Faisal Abbas, quoted in “Lebanon: Can Hezbollah survive the death of its leader?” The Week, 11 October 2024, p. 15. 

[4] All quoted in “Israel vows retaliation after Iranian attack,” The Week, 11 October 2024, p. 4. 

[5] At the end of and after the Second World War, many ethnic Germans fled the advancing Red Army or were driven out of places like Poland and the Czech Sudetenland.  These and other population movements were sometimes referred to as population “transfers.” 

[6] Derek Beales and Eugenio Biagini, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy (2003).  It’s an update of an earlier work.  But, if you have the time, there are a series of classic older books by Denis Mack Smith. 

“The System Is Blinking Red” 2.

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The Armed Services Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate created a “Commission on the National Defense Strategy.”  Eight people were appointed to the Commission by both parties in both committees.  The Commission examined both the current and foreseeable threat environment facing the United States and the military preparedness of the United States to address that environment.  The study makes grim reading.[1] 

First, the threat environment is familiar.  In first place is China; in second place is Russia; and in third and fourth places are Iran and North Korea.  All are aggressive tyrannies.  All devote a much larger share of their national resources to the military than does the United States.  All have grown closer to each other—formal or informal allies—over the last few years.  All are deeply aggrieved with the “rules-based order” fostered by the United States after the Cold War.  “The good old rule sufficeth them, the simple plan, That they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can.”[2]  One is already fully at war, one is using its proxies in war, and the others are using military power in an attempt to intimidate their neighbors, who are American allies.  In short, “the United States faces the most challenging and most dangerous international security environment since World War II.  It faces peer and near-peer competitors for the first time since the end of the Cold War.”  Once upon a time, such actions would have met a powerful American response as a matter of policy.[3] 

Now, “[the] consequences of an all-out war with a peer or near peer would be devastating.  Such a war would not only yield massive personnel and military costs but would also likely feature cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure and a global economic recession from disruptions to supply chains, manufacturing, and trade.” 

Why is this?  The Commission finds American power much reduced and hobbled, all by our own doing.  First, “The Commission finds that DoD’s business practices, byzantine research and development (R&D) and procurement systems, reliance on decades-old military hardware, and culture of risk avoidance reflect an era of uncontested military dominance.”  As a result, “the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.” 

Second, “the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB) is unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the United States and its allies and partners. A protracted conflict, especially in multiple theaters, would require much greater capacity to produce, maintain, and replenish weapons and munitions.” 

Third, “today’s [DoD workforce and all-volunteer force ] is the smallest force in generations. It is stressed to maintain readiness today and is not sufficient to meet the needs of strategic global competition and multi-theater war.”  “Recent recruitment shortfalls [for the all-volunteer force] have decreased the size of the Army, Air Force, and Navy.” 

Fourth, we aren’t spending on–or raising money for–defense the way we used to when we were conscious of danger.  On the one hand, defense spending as a share of GDP has roller-coastered: in 1965, 6.9 percent; in 1967, 8.6 percent; in 1979, 4.9 percent; in 1983, 6.8 percent; in 1999, 2.9 percent; in 2010, 4.7 percent; and in 2025 it is projected that the US will spend 3 percent.  On the other hand, “Defense spending in the Cold War relied on top marginal income tax rates above 70 percent and corporate tax rates averaging 50 percent.” 

The Commission concludes that “The lack of preparedness to meet the challenges to U.S. national security is the result of many years of failure to recognize the changing threats and to transform the U.S. national security structure and has been exacerbated by the 2011 Budget Control Act, repeated continuing resolutions, and inflexible government systems. The United States is still failing to act with the urgency required, across administrations and without regard to governing party.” 

It offers a series of urgent recommendations that are well worth considering.  But not for too long.  Our enemies can see all these things.  They may not wait. 

[1] See: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/nds_commission_final_report.pdf  The Report was brought to my attention by Walter Russell Mead, “U.S. Shrugs as World War II Approaches,” WSJ, 17 September 2024. 

[2] William Wordsworth, “Rob Roy’s Grave.” 

[3] Bing Videos