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The French War in Indochina, 1946 to 1954 Part 1B

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The Backwater in a Global War. 

Developments in French Indochina depended on the course of the Second World War, in which the French colony played no important part.  In Summer 1940, Germany defeated France and drove the British off the Continent.  In this moment of crisis, the French Third Republic gave way to the “Vichy Regime.”  Germany held the whip hand over Vichy: the Germans occupied two-thirds of the country (and eventually all of it); retained hundreds of thousands of French P.O.W.’s; and ruthlessly exploited the French economy.  At home, Vichy pursued a “National Revolution,” while simultaneously trying to defend its overseas empire.  The latter proved to be difficult.  Dissident and colonial nationalists sought to engage the “Anglo-Saxons.”  Eventually, French possessions in the Levant, the South Pacific, and Africa all fell under the control of anti-Vichy forces. 

A variety of this larger pattern arose in French Indochina.  There, the colonial administration declared for Vichy.  Almost immediately, predators gathered.  In this case, it was Japan.  Japan had been at war in China since 1937.  As the Japanese campaign had bogged down short of a Chinese surrender, Japan had sought to cut off the sources of external aid to China.  These ran through British-ruled Burma and French-ruled Indochina.  The rise of German power in Europe came to pre-occupy British and French leaders.  Painfully aware of their own weaknesses, Britain and France increasingly sought to accommodate Japan in the Far East. 

Only meager French forces defended the colony.  The “Colonial Army” consisted of French soldiers of the all-volunteer force (sometimes called “Marines”) and regiments of indigenous troops under French officers.  In addition, there were three battalions of the Foreign Legion.  The regiments of indigenous troops—“Tirailleurs”–numbered about 48,000 men, the French and Legion troops numbered about 17,000 men.  Neither supplies nor new recruits reached Indochina after France’s defeat in 1940.  French air forces in Indochina totaled only about 100 planes, many of them obsolete.  The French Navy ships in Indochina consisted of a light cruiser and at least four corvettes. 

In July 1940, Governor Admiral Jean Decoux signed an agreement with Japan under duress.  It allowed Japan to station forces in Indochina and to transit through the territory for other operations.  Then Japan exploited France’s subordination to Japan’s ally Germany to extract more substantial concessions.  In September 1940, Japanese troops marched into the northern territory of Tonkin; less than a year later, in July 1941, they moved into southern Indochina.  Just as Vichy served as Germany’s puppet in the metropole, so did the French colonial administration serve as a Japanese puppet in Indochina.  Thereafter, French troops still manned the defenses; French bureaucrats still handled the pettifoggery; French businessmen and planters still managed the economy.  All was done under the suspicious gaze of the Japanese.[1] 

Already in control of much of China, from late 1941 to mid-1942, Japan’s military over-ran a vast swath of territory belonging to the Western powers.  British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the American Philippines, and a host of islands to the south and east all passed under Japanese rule.  French Indochina lay isolated at the center of the Japanese empire.  Then the tide of Japanese victory began to ebb, as did that if its ally Germany.  By Summer 1944, the final outcome of the war seemed as certain as can be in anything so risky and surprising as war.  The Anglo-Americans liberated France and joined the Soviet Union in the direct assault on Germany.  A long string of American victories in the Pacific had destroyed Japanese naval power and brought American bombers within range of the Home Islands. 

A footnote to these great events appeared in the effort by the government of liberated France to assert its control over French Indochina.  In 1940, Winston Churchill had ordered the creation of a new organization to assist anti-German resistance movements in Europe.  This “Special Operations Executive” (S.O.E.) then added a Far Eastern element (Force 136) to work against the Japanese.  In later 1944 and 1945, Force 136 airdropped 40 French “Jedburghs”[2] into northern Indochina.  These men had exciting adventures, but made little difference on the ground. 

More importantly, Governor Admiral Decoux grew restive under Japanese control as Japan’s own doom drew near.  He made contact with the new government in France; he began to prepare an uprising against the Japanese; and he refused to turn over to the Japanese American Navy fliers downed during a carrier raid in the South China Sea. 

The carrier raid into the South China Sea alarmed the already-edgy local Japanese commander.[3]  He feared an imminent American invasion of Indochina and had some knowledge of Decoux’s preparation for a French uprising.  The Japanese Army began moving troops from surrounding areas into Indochina, almost doubling the size of the occupation force by the end of February 1945.  They spread out to key positions around the country.  On 9 March 1945, after obtaining permission from the government in Tokyo, Japanese troops in Indochina swarmed over the French garrisons around the colony.  The French fought in a number of places, but all resistance had ended by mid-March 1945.  As often had been the case during the Japanese offensive wave of 1941-1942, victories were accompanied by massacres of their defeated opponents. 

            The Vietnam Famine of 1944-1945.[4] 

            The global war weighed heavily upon political events in Indochina.  The same can be said of other, non-political events.  So, too, did other larger forces. 

            Coastal Vietnam had long suffered from droughts, floods, and typhoons.  All of these threatened the food supply.  Before the French arrived, the government had created rice storehouses.  French construction of a north-south coastal railroad drew part of its motivation from the desire to move food from the Mekong in the south to the central coast and mountains.  The French also built substantial flood control and irrigation infrastructure.  During the Depression of the 1930s, the French colonial administration had encouraged the cultivation of cash crops.  This did not seriously harm food production. 

The war seriously disrupted the rice market.  For one thing, the French government had imposed a mandatory government purchasing system which fixed a price paid to producers for the rice.[5]  The producer price remained fixed, while the sale price of rice on the market soared.  Ordinary peasants could not purchase enough rice to feed their families or plant for the next season.[6]  For another thing, the Japanese Army fed itself off local food production.  The presence of an eventual total of 140,000 Japanese troops meant that there were many more mouths to feed.  Moreover, the Japanese had the determination and the means to see that their troops got adequately fed, regardless of who else did not.  The food supply available for civilians shrank, while the market price rose.  Military factors compounded the difficulties.  The Japanese commandeered all sea vessels of more than 30 tons displacement.  Off and on, American planes attacked coastal shipping and the north-south railroad.  These attacks further disrupted the shipment of food to the hardest-hit areas.  Famine became widespread in the north during 1945. 

            The “Empire of Vietnam.” 

            A knock-on effect of the Japanese coup against the French came in the creation of a new “puppet state,” this one led by Vietnamese.  It marked the first play of the nationalist card as a device to maintain outside control.  It would not be the last. 

On 11 March 1945, two days after the Japanese “coup” began, the Emperor Bao Dai read a speech prepared for him by a minor[7] Japanese official.  He declared independence for the “Empire of Vietnam,” with himself as the head of state.  Two chief tasks preoccupied the emperor for the next six months.  First, the political structures of the new nation had to be created.  Second, Tonkin and Annam remained administratively separate from Cochinchina.  His government pursued national unification. 

As a first order of business, Bao Dai appointed Tran Trong Kim as his prime minister.[8]  Tran, in turn, began assembling a cabinet.  It would be considered a cabinet of “technical experts,” rather than a collection of representatives of any particular political outlook.[9] 

The work of the brief Tran Trong Kim government reminds one of the “Professors’ Parliament” of Germany during the Revolution of 1848-1849.  At the same time, they had no knowledge of future external events that would shape political developments.  For them, the cliché “the fog of war” was very real.  All the war news brought ill-tidings for Japan.  Who could tell when the roof would fall in?  On the other hand, France had been wrecked by the war and the Vietnamese had seen the French in Indochina humbled.  Real independence might well be within reach, particularly if it had the support of the Americans and the Nationalist Chinese.  What was worth doing that might set the stage for future developments?  The emperor, his prime minister, and the cabinet spent several months figuring out what to try to do in the very uncertain conditions. 

By the second half of June 1945, they were ready to take the next steps.  The Emperor created four committees: a “National Consultative Committee”; a committee on a constitution; a committee on basic administrative systems (administrative reform, legislation, and finance); and a committee on education.  They also worked on fostering a sense of national identity.  They designed a flag and  they renamed the country’s regions.  The set up a committee to pick national heroes for inclusion in a “Temple of Martyrs,” city streets were renamed from the French colonial names.  In some places French statues were torn down to remove a reminder of French triumphalism over the indigenous population. 

The Justice Minister amnestied some of the political prisoners held by the French.  They proclaimed freedom of the press.  A tide of anti-French publications flowed in.  Later, the criticism would turn against the emperor’s government.  The government, made up of middle-aged men, sought to mobilize “Youth” for the national cause.  Physical training and small-group organization presaged the formation of military units.  Sometimes “Youth” had other ideas.  Very soon the university at Hanoi became a hotbed of political activism. 

The second axis of effort for the “Empire of Vietnam” lay in creating territorial unity.  The French had established a “colony” in Cochinchina in the far south; then had established “protectorates” over Annam in the center and Tonkin in the north.  When the Japanese had prompted the declaration of independence by the “Empire of Vietnam” in March 1945, they had allowed Bao Dai authority over only Tonkin and Annam.  Cochinchina, far closer to the approaching enemy, remained under direct Japanese control.   Bao Dai insisted that the Japanese engage in negotiations to complete the unification of the country. 

In May and June 1945, Bao Dai’s Foreign Minister Tran Van Chuong eroded the Japanese resistance.  Eventually, in July, the Japanese yielded.  They agreed to begin the process of uniting Cochinchina with Annam and Tonkin.  Under normal conditions, this would have been a substantial victory for Indochinese nationalism.  Conditions weren’t normal. 

Most importantly, the famine entered its most severe stage in late 1944 and continued to wreak havoc through mid-1945.  Committees, flags, and formalities of diplomacy disappeared in significance when people could see the streets littered with emaciated corpses.  The inability of the “Empire of Vietnam” to respond effectively undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of many Vietnamese. 

This is not to say that the government stood around with its hands in its pockets.  However, the government’s response was confused.  The government liberalized the regulations on the rice trade to encourage entrepreneurs to buy and transport rice and the Minister of Supply was ordered to Saigon to co-ordinate famine aid.  It also worked against liberalization by imposing new controls on prices and stockpiles and it created a “Northern Economic Intelligence Service” to crack-down on smuggling.  The crux of the matter lay in the fall off in the rice harvest combined with the Japanese primacy in feeding their troops.  Eventually, the crisis eased, but not from government efforts.  Good harvests returned in May and June 1945, and—as a result of the famine–there being many fewer mouths left to feed.  Estimates vary between half a million and two million deaths during the famine.  Fairly or unfairly, the “Empire of Vietnam” bore much of the blame in the eyes of ordinary people. 

The “Empire of Vietnam” held no monopoly on organizing for the future.  When the Japanese overthrew French rule, the Viet Minh took action.  Hanoi and the port of Haiphong in the north, Saigon in the south, and Hue in the center formed the essential Japanese goals.  Japanese forces had little presence in the countryside beyond guarding lines of supply.  Beyond that, they wanted things quiet at a low cost to themselves.  They expected the “Empire of Vietnam” to maintain orderly government that did not interfere with Japanese activities.  For the Viet Minh, opportunity knocked. 

In a meeting in Hanoi in the third week of April 1945, the Viet Min’s Tonkin Revolutionary Military Conference struck a militant nationalist pose that set it apart from the cautious gradualism of the “Empire of Vietnam.”  They made a rhetorical call for resistance—an uprising, guerrilla war–against the Japanese. 

The Viet Minh had no real military force to speak of.  Much attention has focused on the group of soldiers from the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) who parachuted into northern Vietnam on 16 and 29 July 1945.  The set about creating a training program for Viet Minh recruits.  They also provided the weapons for several hundred Viet Minh soldiers.  However, they only remained in Vietnam until the end of August.  In all likelihood, much more help came from several hundred Japanese soldiers, either prisoners or deserters from the Japanese Army, who served with and advised the Viet Minh.  In any event, the Viet Minh didn’t do much fighting against the Japanese.  They didn’t have the forces for it. 

The real focus of their efforts lay toward the future.  They called for independence from France.  They denounced the “Empire of Vietnam” as a Japanese puppet.  They created seven military districts.  The countryside lay open before them.  Faced with famine, the Viet Minh led peasants in the seizure and distribution of the contents of 75-100 warehouses full of rice.  They intimidated tax collectors.  None of this did much to ease the famine, but it was dramatic and visible.  In contrast, the actions of the government were bureaucratic and veiled.  Many a peasant must have said “At least the Viet Minh did something!”  Peasant recruits began to come in.[10]  Like Bao Dai’s government, the Viet Minh wanted to lay the foundation for action in the near future. 

[1] The Japanese left it to the French to stamp out local revolt (Cochinchina, November-December 1940).   

[2] There are several academic books on the ”Jeds,” but you’re best served by consulting David Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Center for Military History, 1992).  See: Wayback Machine 

[3] On the raid, see: South China Sea raid – Wikipedia 

[4] Geoffrey Gunn, Rice Wars in Colonial Vietnam: The Great Famine and the Viet Minh Road to Power (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014) is deeply researched. 

[5] This was an extension of the wartime farm price purchasing system adopted in metropolitan France.  There it led to an extensive black market. 

[6] The government price for 1943 was 1.4 piastres/10 kilograms.  The market price rose to 6-7 piastres in mid-1944.  During the height of the famine in 1945, the market price rose to 60-70 piastres/10 kilograms. 

[7] Minor in the scheme-of-things.  I’m sure that Yokoyama Seiko, the Minister of Economic Affairs at the Japanese diplomatic mission, gloried in his elevated position. 

[8] On Tran, see: Tran Trong Kim – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 

[9] The article on Tran, Tran Trong Kim – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, lists the cabinet members with links to the biographies in the Vietnamese Wikipedia. 

[10] There is another aspect to the famine that is worth exploring.  What social and psychological effects did the famine have on the worst-hit area? The famine was concentrated in the north.  This area became the base of the Viet Minh.  Doubtless, much of this depended upon proximity to China.  The Chinese Communist Party could offer some support and shelter to Indochinese Communists.  Covert travel to Annam and Cochinchina would be much more difficult.  Still, the failings of the Bao Dai government’s response would have been stark in the north, less so in the south.  Moreover, all the deaths would have torn apart families and villages.  Networks of social and intergenerational support—and obligation or duty—would have broken down.  Parents, wives, siblings, children would have died.  Perhaps many young men lost all the ‘hostages to fortune” that held them in place in their village.  Why not go to the forests and find a Cause for which they could fight?   From starvation to depression: unveiling the link between the great famine and late-life depression – PMC 

War Movies: “Anthropoid” (2016).

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If you want a look at a true case of “state-sponsored terrorism” and at one approach to counter-terrorism, watch “Anthropoid” (dir. Sean Ellis, 2016).  It gives a compelling view of the May 1942 assassination of Reinhard Heydrich (the head of the Reich Main Security Office and also “Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia”[1]) and of what followed. 

In the movie, the motive for the assassination is the desire on the part of the Czech government-in-exile to inspire more resistance in the Nazi-occupied country.  The team of killers (Josef Gabcik, Jan Kubis[2]) is air-dropped at night; overcome difficulties to reach Prague; find that the Germans have wrecked the resistance movement and they must rely upon a small group of locals; eventually, they are joined by some other parachutists who had been dropped later; and they improvise an attack on Heydrich.  The German is mortally wounded; a gigantic manhunt begins; the Germans track the parachutists to a Prague church; and one hell of a gunfight ensues.  The few surviving parachutists kill themselves rather than be taken alive. 

The movie strives for realism: it was filmed in Prague and mostly on the sites where events occurred; the pervasive fear of the Germans among the Czechs is brought out, not minimized; the semi-botched assassination is clearly portrayed; and the ferocious Nazi manhunt should leave anyone squirming. 

Still, the movie simplifies or omits some things.  First, it begins with Gabcik and Kubis on the ground in a Czech forest.  The movie elides the origins of “Operation Anthropoid.”  In fact, Eduard Benes, the leader of the Czech government-in-exile, feared that the West would sell out his country after the war if the Czechs didn’t show some fight.  The British and French had surrendered the Sudetenland to Hitler at Munich (September 1938) and had shrugged their shoulders when Germany occupied the rest of the country (March 1939).  Several thousand Czech soldiers had found their way to the West before the Second World War began (September 1939), but this wasn’t much of a contribution.  Internal resistance had mostly been the work of the Czech Communist Party after Germany attacked the Soviet Union (June 1941).  If the Germans lost the war, the Communists might claim a moral right to rule as the only true “resisters.”   A dramatic act might arouse non-Communist resistance, but it would surely make the government-in-exile appear to be doing something.  So, kill Heydrich now for a distant gain.    

Second, Heydrich had crushed the resistance by a combination of carrot and stick.  He had good material.  Few Czechs wanted to run risks for the sake of the Western powers that had betrayed them before.  Wages and working conditions in factories were improved at the same time that Gestapo penetration agents combatted the Communist underground. 

Third, the Germans unleashed a savage response to the attack on Heydrich.  Mass arrests; right to torture in the pursuit of some clue; massacres of villages on the mere rumor that someone had sheltered the killers.  In a society where few people actually backed resistance, this worked.  Finally, one of the parachutists betrayed someone else to save his own family; and the betrayed finally gave up the hiding place of the other parachutists. 

“The Battle of Algiers” openly confronts truths that “Anthropoid” skims over. 

[1] Also the driving force behind the implementation of the Holocaust.  On this, see: “Conspiracy” (dir. Frank Pierson, 2001), with Kenneth Branagh as Heydrich and Stanley Tucci as Adolf Eichmann. 

[2] Played by Cillian Murphy and Jamie Dornan respectively. 

An Episode of Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Pact, June 1935 4.

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            Having decided to accept the German proposal for talks on a naval agreement, the government spent the next few months quietly setting the stage.  First, in January 1935, the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, informed King George V that an agreement might help get Germany back into “the comity of nations.”  In February 1935, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald met with the then very anti-German French Prime Minister Pierre Laval.  The “communique” afterward expressed their hope that talks with Germany would lead to enhanced security in Europe.  In late March 1935, Simon had a preliminary meeting with Hitler in Berlin.  The German dictator told Simon that he was done with the arms limitations imposed by Versailles Treaty.  Germany would expand its army from the 100,000-man limit imposed by Versailles to 500,000 men, begin conscription, and build an air force.  However, Hitler would make commitments to Britain to limit naval forces.  Hitler also announced that Joachim von Ribbentrop, a Nazi schemer, rather than an experienced diplomat, would lead the German delegation in such talks. 

Yet no talks began.  The British foreign policy-makers were divided in their attitudes.  Sir Robert Vansittart, the chief British diplomat, believed that Hitler meant to conquer all of Europe, so the best solution was a strong alliance with France, Italy, and even the Soviet Union if necessary.  Anthony Eden, the second-ranking political figure at the Foreign Office, wanted British commitment to Western Europe, but would abandon Eastern Europe; he also put more stock in the League of Nations than in an Italian alliance.  Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, had no views of his own and went where Vansittart pushed. 

The British were busy negotiating the “Stresa Pact” with France and Italy.  Signed on 14 April 1935, it committed Britain, France, and Italy to resist any future German violations of the Versailles Treaty.  The Stresa Pact” could not be squared with a bilateral Anglo-German agreement to violate the naval limits in the treaty. 

At the end of April 1935, the Germans prodded the British by informing them that they had launched new U-Boats and had begun construction of 12 more.  They meant “We’re going ahead; with or without you.”  This got the British moving.  On 29 April 1935, Simon told the House of Commons that Germany had begun building U-Boats; on 2 May 1935, Prime Minister MacDonald told the Commons that he would seek a naval agreement with Germany. 

Things moved fast.  Ribbentrop came to London on 2 June 1935.  On 4 June, he told the British that Germany would accept the 35 percent ratio, but nothing less, and that the British had a few days to decide.  Simon, the Foreign Secretary, walked out in answer to such rude behavior.  Stil, on 5 June the government accepted Ribbentrop’s proposal.  Two days later, Simon left the Foreign Office and Sir Samuel Hoare became Foreign Secretary.  During further discussions, the Germans accepted the British requirement that the German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy.  The two parties signed the completed agreement on 18 June 1935. 

The Anglo-German agreement enraged the French.  Britain had not consulted the French or the Italians.  The agreement of the British and Germans to “legalize” a violation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty could not be squared with the “Stresa Pact.”  It appeared to fall into the tradition of “Perfidious Albion.”  It’s hard to form an alliance against a common danger when the parties don’t trust each other.  That’s part of the story of appeasement. 

An Episode of Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 3.

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            Adolf Hitler’s view of Britain wavered between implacable foe and natural partner in a division of the world.  In Mein Kampf (1925), he castigated Imperial Germany for pursuing a pointless fleet-building program that forced Britain into alliance with its traditional colonial enemies France and Russia.  In the “Hossbach Memorandum” (1937) he described both France and Britain as “hate-filled” opponents who would never accept Germany’s revival.  In 1934-1935 he still had hopes of winning over Britain, if only to disrupt the emerging Franco-British-Italian common front. 

            In November 1934, the Germans told the British that they wanted to reach a bilateral agreement that would allow the Germany navy to rise to 35 percent of the British navy.[1]  The offer simultaneously attracted and disturbed the British.  The Germans seemed bent on rearming in defiance of the Versailles Treaty in any case.  The British most feared German bombing of cities.  An agreement on navies could lead to an agreement on air forces.  So, the German offer deserved consideration. 

Several questions had to be resolved.  First, could Britain tolerate ANY German naval rearmament?  The Royal Navy had to be dispersed to meet its global responsibilities, while a German fleet would be concentrated in the North Sea and North Atlantic.  Could Britain defend itself in Europe against a fleet one-third the size of the Royal Navy? 

Second, would it be best to shape that rearmament to the kind of German fleet would be easiest to deal with?  Would such a German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy (in battle ships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines)?  Or would it be a “lighter” fleet organized for attacking merchant shipping (lots of submarines and light cruisers, but few battleships)? 

Third, British rearmament would prioritize the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, while German rearmament was already prioritizing the Army (Wehrmacht) and the Air Force (Luftwaffe).  Both the British Army and the Germany Navy got the leftovers.  Expert opinion held that the Germany Navy would not reach 35 percent of the present Royal Navy until 1942.  By that time the Royal Navy would have been greatly expanded.  The Germans would never really catch up.  Seen from this perspective, a naval agreement might be a strategically meaningless concession while perhaps improving the climate of relations between the two countries.  A more meaningful agreement on air forces might follow. 

Fourth, the agreement could create diplomatic problems with the French.  Britain and France were working up a common front with Italy to check further German violations of Versailles.[2]  A bilateral agreement to end the naval disarmament conditions of the multi-lateral Versailles Treaty would be understood in France as both slimy and a betrayal. 

            Committees considered the issues.  They concluded that a German fleet 35 percent the size of the Royal Navy marked the maximum that could be accepted, but it could be accepted.  It would be best to insist upon a symmetrical fleet to short-stop one organized for a “guerre de course.”  A naval agreement should be followed by pursuit of an agreement on air forces.  Finally, “the French be damned” went unspoken, but not unthought. 

[1] Joseph Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: Appeasement and the Origins of

the Second World War in Europe (1998). 

[2] See No more coals to Newcastle. | waroftheworldblog 

An Episode in Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 2.

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            Various “truths” emerged from the early histories of the origins of the First World War.  Prominent among them: arms races lead to war, so—by implication–disarmament would lead to peace.   The reasoning behind this “truth” ran something like the following.  Military equality led to stability.  Military inequality led to instability.  Military inequality could emerge from either countries creating larger armies or from new technologies.  Imbalances of either sort created a sense of insecurity on the weaker side and aggressive behavior on the stronger side.  Building up one’s own power to restore stability became an entrenched response.  Mutual fear and suspicion became entrenched, building up psychological tension.  Linked to this idea of a spiral of power and fear, was a belief that the “Merchants of Death” (MOD) winding-up governments and publics in order to increase their profits.  Corrupt politicians and journalists served the MOD as the agents of influence.  After the war, disarmament became one chief purpose of diplomacy. 

            Therefore, naval armaments remained a live subject after the First World War.  The Washington Naval Conference (1922) had agreed on a ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 in the number of battleships and battlecruisers between Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy.  The Geneva Naval Conference (1927) tried and failed to strike an agreement on the size and number of cruisers.  The American and British concepts could not be reconciled.[1]  The issues were revived, and this time agreed upon, in the London Naval Treaty (1930).  The countries compromised on different classes of cruisers, while also limiting submarines and destroyers.[2] 

Germany participated in none of these conferences because its navy had been severely limited by the Versailles Treaty.  The Versailles Treaty did allow Germany to replace existing ships once they were at least 20 years old.  The oldest of its battleships had been built in 1902, so by the mid-Twenties, Germany designed a new type of ship, the “Panzerkreuzer” (or “pocket battleship”).  When the wartime Allies learned of these ships, they tried to prevent their construction.  Germany offered to not build the ships in exchange for admission to the Washington naval treaty with a limit of 125,000 tons.  The Americans and British were willing to appease German demands, but the French refused. 

Meanwhile, Germany argued that either all countries should disarm or Germany should be allowed to rearm to the level of other countries.  The League of Nations and many right-thinking people took this argument at face value, so it sponsored a World Disarmament Conference (1932-1933). 

Mid-stream, Hitler came to power, abandoned the Disarmament Conference (October 1933), and announced that Germany would rearm in defiance of the Versailles Treaty.  On the one hand, this tipped Britan toward a policy of gradual rearmament (1935-1939).[3]  On the other hand, it led to the creation of the Stresa Agreement (14 April 1935) between Britain, France, and Italy to resist future German violations of Versailles.  Could the “allies” maintain solidarity?  Yet no British leader wanted war.  Could Germany be either deterred or appeased?  

[1] The British wanted more light cruisers for protecting imperial trade routes, the Americans wanted fewer, but heavier cruisers.  The Japanese wanted a ratio of 70 percent of the American fleet, not the same 5:5:3 ratio of 1922. 

[2] One effect of the naval treaties combined with the Great Depression appeared in the collapse of the British shipbuilding industry.  Beating arms into breadlines, so to speak. 

[3] British rearmament in the Thirties. | waroftheworldblog 

Missak Manouchian.

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            Off and on, the Ottoman Empire persecuted Armenians.  Many of the victims sought greener fields outside the empire.  Wherever they went, the emigres stayed in touch with other emigres and with their families at home.  In 1905, some of them established the Armenian General Benevolent Union.  The AGBU raised money to send seeds and farm equipment to Armenians still inside the Empire.  Then came the Ottoman Empire’s terrible genocide of the Armenians.  The AGBU provided much humanitarian aid at the time, but then also established orphanages to care for the hordes of children who had lost their parents.  Later, they paid for the higher education of talented Armenian orphans. 

Missak Manouchian (1909-1944) benefitted from the help of the AGBU.  He lost his parents in the genocide (must have been about 6 years old), grew up in an orphanage in French-ruled Lebanon, and went to France (1925) in search of work.  Eventually, he became a lathe-operator at Citroen near Paris.  Naturally, he joined the Confederation General du Travail (CGT), a trades union group.  He lost that job when the Depression hit France in the early Thirties.  Disappointed, like almost everyone else, in capitalism and parliamentary democracy, he joined the French Communist Party in 1934. 

He also had literary and intellectual aspirations.  From 1935 to 1937, the Party put him to editing an Armenian-language literary magazine, and working on a Party-inspired Relief Committee for Armenia. 

The Hitler-Stalin Pact (August 1939) led the French government to ban the Communist Party when war broke out a few days later.  Manouchian was one among many communists who were arrested.  Like others, he was then released for military service.  Assigned to a unit remote from the front lines, Manouchian was discharged after Germany defeated France in Summer 1940.  He went back to Paris; got arrested by the Germans; got released.  Then there is a gap in what is known of his life.  After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Communist Party went to war in a serious way.  Manouchian seems not to have been involved or involved much in any Resistance work.  The most likely thing is that he did some writing for clandestine newspapers. 

Things changed in February 1943.  Boris Milev, a Bulgarian Communist living in France, recruited Manouchian for the group being led by Boris Holban.[1]  In Summer 1943, Manouchian replaced Holban as head of the group.  In September 1943, Manouchian ordered a team to kill an SS General in Paris.  They did and Heinrich Himmler demanded action.  He got it.  Holban had worried that the group’s many young men were careless about security.  He had wanted to back off for a while and increase security.  He had been right.  The Vichy police had already identified some of the group, who led them to many others.  The French arrested 22 members of the group in November 1943.  They were turned over to the Germans, tried and executed in February 1944. 

Much later, an ugly quarrel over responsibility took place in the media.[2]   

Resistance movements were (and are) vulnerable.  They attracted enthusiasts who often were not suited by maturity or temperament or life experience to secret work.  Security services often have the bulge in all these areas, along with superior resources.  It can be a martyr’s game. 

[1] Boris Milev – Wikipedia 

[2] See: Affiche Rouge – Wikipedia and Missak Manouchian – Wikipedia.  These people deserved better. 

An Episode in Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 1.

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            To put it mildly, France and Britain had a long history of conflict.[1]  Beginning in the 1890s, however, Germany’s pursuit of a large navy threatened Britain’s long-standing policy of maintaining naval dominance in order to safeguard the empire.  Britain responded to Germany’s fleet construction by settling many of its outstanding international conflicts and drawing closer to France.  The two countries fought shoulder to shoulder (although not without some elbows being thrown) during the First World War. 

            Once victory over Germany had been won, Britain and France began to drift apart.  First, the Versailles Treaty deprived Germany of a real navy.  The end of German naval power removed a thorn from the lion’s paw.  Britain’s policy turned to other things.[2]  Second, Anglo-American fair words and promises persuaded the French to back off their most extreme demands for guarantees against any revival of German power.[3]  Third, the two countries diverged on policy toward Central and Eastern Europe.  American repudiation of the security guarantee for France made the French all the more determined to strictly enforce the remaining terms.  This led to the Ruhr Crisis and the near-collapse of the German economy.[4]  That added to the chaos in Central and Eastern Europe.   

Yet Britain desired a restoration of stability in the region in hopes of creating markets for its troubled economy.  Later (in 1935), a diplomat at Britain’s Foreign Office would observe that “… from the earliest years following the war it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew to be unstable and indefensible.”[5]  Anglo-American financial pressure led France to accept a reduction in German reparations to a level that the Germans might be willing to pay, at least for a while.  This was the Dawes Plan.[6]  Then British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain[7] helped negotiate the Locarno treaty (1925).[8]  The treaty offered a general British guarantee of the existing frontiers in Western Europe.  However, the treaty offered nothing similar in Eastern Europe where France sought anti-German alliances among the “successor states” (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia).  If a future Germany attacked one of France’s allies, France would attack Germany.  However, the Locarno Treaty might require Britain to come to the aid of Germany, rather than France.  None of this was “good” from the French point of view.  It was merely the best that could be won under the circumstances. 

French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand tried to make the best of a bad deal.  His approach to the Americans about an alliance produced a meaningless general treaty open to all.  The “Kellogg-Briand Pact” (1928) renounced “aggressive war as an instrument of national policy.”  Even Weimar Germany signed. 

[1] History of France–United Kingdom relations – Wikipedia  Very sketchy, but you’ll get the drift: war, truce, war. 

[2] “Now that I’ve eaten, I see things in a different light.”—Groucho Marx. 

[3] The Americans soon repudiated their guarantee by refusing ratification of the Versailles treaty. 

[4] Occupation of the Ruhr – Wikipedia 

[5] Part of this sprang from the de-legitimation of the Versailles Treaty by people like Keynes and Sydney Fay. 

[6] Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan.   

[7] Older half-brother of the future Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. 

[8] Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929.    

Background to the Nuremberg Trials.

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            Some soldiers (both commanders and their troops) have always behaved atrociously in war-time.  (Take a look at the Old Testament.)  Certain kinds of self-restraint in wartime grew up as a form of self-preservation.  You didn’t want to establish a policy of the victor slaughtering the vanquished if you might lose the next battle.  Still, there were always exceptions to such self-restraint.  People of different social groups within your own society or different races outside your society could not expect such treatment.  Neither European Americans nor Native Americans were much inclined to give the other side quarter. 

            This began to change during the 18th Century.  The Enlightenment established the idea of Humanitarian action.  Many Europeans and Americans turned against traditional practices like the use of torture as part of a judicial inquiry, human slavery, and the intolerance of religious difference.  Then the 19th Century witnessed a number of important reforms: compulsory, free public primary education, and the construction of sewer and clean drinking water systems to conquer diseases are two examples of these reforms.  The same effort to make human life better appeared in warfare.  The International Red Cross exemplified this trend. 

            The new mood led to international agreements (conventions) governing the conduct of war.  The First Geneva Convention (1864) defined the proper treatment of wounded and sick soldiers.  Forty thousand wounded soldiers had been left lying around the battlefield at Solferino.  The Hague Convention (1899) banned bombing from the air, the use of poison gas, and dum-dum bullets.  The Second Geneva Convention (1906) extended the First Geneva Convention to cover sailors in navies.  While the first two Geneva Conventions were generally observed by all countries that fought in the First World War, they often were violated in the Second World War and the Hague Convention has been widely ignored in greater or lesser degree. 

            The Allies were outraged by the behavior of the Central Powers during the First World War.  An effort was made to prosecute Ottoman leaders and commanders for the “crime against humanity” of the Armenian genocide.  This failed because of the obstruction of the Turks.  Also after the First World War, the British and the French tried to prosecute some German leaders for the way in which Germany had conducted war.  The Versailles Peace Treaty required Germany to turn over a number of military and civilian officials for trial by a military tribunal of the victor powers.  The Dutch refused to turn over the Kaiser (who had abdicated in November 1918) and the Germans refused to extradite the men demanded by the Allies.  Instead, a handful of lesser figures were tried at Leipzig in 1921, mostly on charges of mistreating prisoners.  The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) renounced “aggressive war as an instrument of national policy.”  This made war a “crime against peace.”  Germany signed.  The Third Geneva Convention (1929) set rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. 

            In January 1942 British, American, and Russian lawyers began writing a law that would allow the punishment of Germany’s leaders once Germany had been defeated.  At the Teheran Conference (November 1943), the irrepressible Joe Stalin suggested shooting 50,000-100,000 German officers and letting it go at that.  After the Moscow Conference (later in November 1943), the Allies announced that Germans who had committed atrocities would be sent to those countries where they had committed the crimes for trial, while the top leaders would be judged by the Allies.  Germany surrendered in May 1945.  In August 1945 the victors announced the terms of the trials.  In addition to all those to be tried for “war crimes” as then understood, the Nazi leaders would be tried for “crimes against humanity” (see: Armenian genocide) and “crimes against peace” (see: Kellogg-Briand Pact).  This set the stage for the Nuremberg Trials. 

The Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937.

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            After the Second World War, the victors grabbed up all the surviving Nazi leaders and put them on trial at Nuremberg.  In the mass trial, one piece of evidence introduced by the prosecutors was the so-called “Hossbach Memorandum.”  They argued that the document from late 1937 demonstrated Hitler’s determination to wage aggressive war.  It’s worth taking a look at the essentials of the document to understand the international situation in Europe during the run-up to war in 1939. 

What is the source of the document? 

Documents on Germany Foreign Policy 1918-1945
Series D, Volume 1: From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937 – September 1938)
(Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1949.)[1] 

What is the Hossbach memorandum? 

            It is NOT a complete transcript of what was said at the meeting.  Instead, the secretary, Hitler’s adjutant Colonel Hossbach, took rapid fire notes, then cleaned up and fleshed out those notes for the archive.  That doesn’t mean that it is unreliable.  The ability to take such notes and produce a generally acceptable summary of the meeting formed one of the qualifications for someone in Hossbach’s position.  The archives of governments are full of such documents. 

When?  November 5, 1937, FROM 4:15 to 8:30 P.M

Who was present? 

The Fuehrer[2] and Chancellor.

Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister.
Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army.   
Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy.
Colonel General Goring, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe.  [NB: The only Nazi other than Hitler.] 
Baron [Konstantin] von Neurath, Foreign Minister.  
Colonel [Friedrich] Hossbach.  Secretary. 

What was the context of the conference?

1919-1924: France creates a system of alliances in Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia) to sorta replace the lost Russian alliance. 

1933-34: Hitler comes to power and consolidates the Nazi dictatorship.  

1934-1935: Political turmoil in France resulting from the Stavisky Scandal and the events of 6 February 1934.  Sharp divide between Left and Right. 

1935: Germany begins rearmament. 

1935: Britain begins rearmament, but chiefly with the hope of deterring German aggression. 

1935: Stresa Front.  Britain, France, and Italy agree to oppose any further German violations of the Versailles Treaty. 

1935: Italian invasion of Ethiopia led to a split with France and Britain, which raised the possibility of a war in the Mediterranean. 

1936: Germany re-occupies the Rhineland. 

1936: Popular Front [NB: alliance of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties] comes to power in France.  Economic turmoil and political polarization follows.  NB: The Radicals were middle-class and basically conservative.  The usual joke is that “they had their hearts on the left and their wallets on the right.” 

1936: Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).  Germany and Italy aid the rebels led by Franco; Russia aids the Republic’s government; Britain and France try to stay neutral. 

1937: Japanese invasion of China.  Threatens Western possessions and trade rights.  Australia, New Zealand, and Canada alarmed.  This raises the prospect of a war in the Far East. 

Brief exposition of Hitler’s ideas of race and living space. 

            Race: Basically, Aryans versus Latins and Slav “untermenschen.”  Doesn’t get into his thoughts on Jews. 

            Space: The borders of Germany created by Bismarck (1866-1871) were a temporary compromise.  Now they were insufficient to German needs for a resource base.  Britain had a vast overseas empire; Russia and the United States had whole continents.  Germany needs land and natural resources to stand on a level with these other empires. 

Discussion of “Autarky.”  (Isolation from the world economy.) 

Participation in the world economy.  (Alternative to autarky.) 

            Britain and France: two hate-inspired powers.  NB: They aren’t going to share. 

“Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. The campaigns of Frederick the Great for Silesia and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had involved unheard-of risk, and the swiftness of the Prussian action in 1870 had kept Austria from entering the war. If one accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remain still to be answered the questions “when” and “how.” In this matter there were three cases [Falle] to be dealt with.” 

Three cases:

Case 1: Period 1943-1945.  Germany would decline relative to other powers after this time.  Therefore, Germany had to take action by this period. 

Case 2: Civil war in France.  That would keep the French from interfering in German action. 

Case 3: France at war with some other power, like Italy. 

In case of war with France, Germany’s first step must be to over-throw Czechoslovakia and Austria to remove the danger of an attack if things began to go badly for Germany in the west.  That would also insure that the Poles remained neutral. 

Looking forward to 1943-1945, Hitler foresaw the following. 

“Actually, the Fuehrer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question could be cleared up in due course by Germany.”  NB: Munich Conference, September 1938. 

“Military intervention by Russia must be countered by the swiftness of our operations; however, whether such an intervention was a practical contingency at all was, in view of Japan’s attitude, more than doubtful.”  NB: Japanese leaders debated attacking South (Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, French Indo-China) OR attacking North (Russian Far East). 

“Should case 2 arise -the crippling of France by civil war- the situation thus created by the elimination of the most dangerous opponent must he seized upon whenever it occurs for the blow against the Czechs.” 

“The Fuehrer saw case 3 [i.e. war between France and Italy] coming definitely nearer; it might emerge from the present tensions in the Mediterranean, and he was resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938.”  NB: Spanish Civil War provides one possible cause of war between France and someone else, but the Italians were winding up Arab nationalists in French-ruled Syria and Tunisia.  Germany occupied French attention, but what if a fit of Gallic vivacity caused the French to decide to sort out Mussolini? 

“If Germany made use of this war [between Italy and France-Britain] to settle the Czech and Austrian questions, it was to be assumed that Britain -herself at war with Italy- would decide not to act against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany was not to be expected.” 

How did the German generals respond to this exposition?

“In appraising the situation Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Fritsch repeatedly emphasized the necessity that Britain and France must not appear in the role of our enemies, and stated that the French Army would not be so committed by the war with Italy that France could not at the same time enter the field with forces superior to ours on our western frontier.  NB: The French could bust up the Italians without much effort.  Enjoy it too. 

General von Fritsch estimated the probable French forces available for use on the Alpine frontier at approximately twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on the western frontier, with the role, according to the German view, of invading the Rhineland. In this matter, moreover, the advanced state of French defense preparations [Mobilmachung] must be taken into particular account, and it must be remembered apart from the insignificant value of our present fortifications -on which Field Marshal von Blomberg laid special emphasis- that the four motorized divisions intended for the West were still more or less incapable of movement.

In regard to our offensive toward the southeast, Field Marshal von Blomberg drew particular attention to the strength of the Czech fortifications, which had acquired by now a structure like a Maginot Line and which would gravely hamper our attack.” 

“Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume.” 

Hitler responds:

“To the Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume, the Fuehrer put the summer of 1938 as the date which seemed to him possible for this.  [NB: How far away is that?] 

In reply to considerations offered by Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch regarding the attitude of Britain and France, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France against Germany.  NB: “These are not the Britain and France of 1914.  I can smell their fear.”  That’s what I think he means. 

Should the Mediterranean conflict under discussion lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we must immediately begin action against the Czechs. On the other hand, should the powers not engaged in the war declare themselves disinterested, then Germany would have to adopt a similar attitude to this for the time being.”

What events followed?

January-February 1938: Blomberg forced to resign in late January 1938 after the scandalous past of his new wife became known to the secret police; Fritsch forced to resign in early February 1938 after falsified allegations of homosexuality (worked up by Reinhard Heydrich, Goring’s right-hand man).  Hossbach had warned Fritsch about the scheme, so he was dismissed as Hitler’s adjutant two days later.

Early February 1938: Neurath: fired as Foreign Minister. 

March 1938: Germany suddenly annexes Austria. 

August-September 1938: Czech crisis led to the Munich settlement, giving Germany the Sudetenland. 

1938: Tide of battle turned decisively against the Republicans in Spain, although they remained in possession of large parts of the country. 

March 1939: Germany seizes the rest of Czechoslovakia.   Britain and France then extended a “guarantee” of the remaining existing borders in Central Europe.  In practice, this meant Poland. 

Summer 1939: France and Britain begin talks with the Soviet Union for a military alliance. 

What can we tell about Hitler’s intentions from this document? 

            Is the Hossbach Memorandum a “blueprint” for the war that came in September 1939? 

            Or is it something much more limited than that? 

            Is Hitler irrational and fantasizing in his analysis of the political situation? 

            Or is Hitler a hard-headed and cold-hearted realist? 

            What if the conference between Hitler and his military commanders and head diplomat wasn’t about informing them of his plans?  What if he just wanted to smoke-out any opposition to whatever it was that he wanted to do? 

            What would Neville Chamberlain have made of this document if he had the opportunity to read it between November 1937 (when it was created) and the annexation of Austria in March 1938 or the Munich conference in September 1938? 

            This last question is the premise for the historical thriller Munich, by Robert Harris (2017).  It was made into a Netflix movie, “Munich: The Edge of War” (2021) with Jeremy Irons as Neville Chamberlain. 

[1] In Spring 1945, specially created Anglo-American expert teams were sent to Germany to search for political and economic archives, particularly those which shed light on the origins of the war, and Germany’s operations and war aims. The experts assembled several tons of German Foreign Ministry documents discovered in the Harz Mountains and Thuringia, together with documents from other places of deposit at Marburg Castle. These established a unified collection of the captured material.  Subsequently, the documents were both microfilmed and translated and published on paper.  The originals were later returned to the government of the German Federal Republic. 

[2] “Leader”: title assumed by Hitler after the death of President von Hindenburg in 1934 when Hitler combined the offices of President and Chancellor (prime minister). 

EDC.

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            In the wake of the Second World War, Western European countries pondered some form of “unity.”  At first, this meant unity “at the peak”: countries surrendering some measure of sovereignty to form a “European” government.  This went nowhere.  So, attention turned to unity “at the base”: create specialized “European” institutions and let it cook.  This approach soon gave birth to the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC, Schuman Plan).  It worked once, so try it in other areas (Common Market, Euratom). 

            The “wake of the Second World War” broadly overlapped the “dawning of the Cold War.”  The Americans and the Europeans shared an interest in preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe.[1]  Eventually (1947-), this led to the Marshall Plan and some CIA meddling in French and Italian elections.  Still, what if the Red Army marched west?  Military security rose up as an issue.  One part of the answer came in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  The United States would keep troops in Europe as a “trip wire.”[2] 

            In dealing with these problems, “Europe” faced three problems.  First, the British didn’t want to join.[3]  Second, how were countries to reconcile with the Germans?  Third, Many American officials disdained the Europeans.  The purpose of Marshall Plan aid was “to get the Europeans on their feet and off our back.” 

            Then, in June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea.  The “Cold War” wasn’t just going to be an economic and political struggle in Western Europe.  It could also be a military struggle.  American troops might have to be sent to the Far East or the Middle East.  So, Western Europeans would have to bulk-up their military forces.  In September 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed re-arming West Germany.  The European responded with dismay.[4] 

            The “European integration” and American military themes soon came together.  In October 1950, French Defense Minister Rene Pleven suggested the creation of a “European Defense Community” to create a “European Army.”  West German troops would be raised, but would not be formed into units larger than battalion.  The German battalions would be mixed with troops from other countries and the higher commands would be held only by non-Germans.  The Americans reluctantly agreed if this was the only way to get West German troops. 

            Negotiation of the treaty dragged on for a year and a half.  The size of the German units rose to divisions, not battalions; and the European Army would be under the American commander of NATO, rather than independent.  After signatures (May 1952), the treaty went back to the national parliaments for ratification.  In the meantime, the context changed.  The Korean War ended in a truce; Joseph Stalin died and was succeeded by more moderate seeming men.  The EDC seemed less urgent.  The French parliament rejected the treaty (August 1954). 

            Afterwards, NATO admitted West Germany (and its army).  Europe enjoyed American nuclear “extended deterrence.”  Eventually, the Soviet Union fell.  Who needed armies now?[5] 

[1] Not much could be done about Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe what with the Red Army being what it was. 

[2] If Red Army troops attacked American troops, then nuclear weapons could come into play. 

[3] The British—understandably, labored under the illusion that they ranked among the “victors.”  In fact, Britain had suffered the ruin of its economy and loss of will to hold its empire.  Which is what Neville Chamberlain had feared. 

[4] See Category:Nazi war crimes in France – Wikipedia 

[5] European defense spending has fallen from 3.76 percent of GDP (1960) to 1.56 percent (2022).  That’s 58 percent.  European Union Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2025 | MacroTrends