Tag Archives: rearmament

The Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937.

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            After the Second World War, the victors grabbed up all the surviving Nazi leaders and put them on trial at Nuremberg.  In the mass trial, one piece of evidence introduced by the prosecutors was the so-called “Hossbach Memorandum.”  They argued that the document from late 1937 demonstrated Hitler’s determination to wage aggressive war.  It’s worth taking a look at the essentials of the document to understand the international situation in Europe during the run-up to war in 1939. 

What is the source of the document? 

Documents on Germany Foreign Policy 1918-1945
Series D, Volume 1: From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937 – September 1938)
(Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1949.)[1] 

What is the Hossbach memorandum? 

            It is NOT a complete transcript of what was said at the meeting.  Instead, the secretary, Hitler’s adjutant Colonel Hossbach, took rapid fire notes, then cleaned up and fleshed out those notes for the archive.  That doesn’t mean that it is unreliable.  The ability to take such notes and produce a generally acceptable summary of the meeting formed one of the qualifications for someone in Hossbach’s position.  The archives of governments are full of such documents. 

When?  November 5, 1937, FROM 4:15 to 8:30 P.M

Who was present? 

The Fuehrer[2] and Chancellor.

Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister.
Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army.   
Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy.
Colonel General Goring, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe.  [NB: The only Nazi other than Hitler.] 
Baron [Konstantin] von Neurath, Foreign Minister.  
Colonel [Friedrich] Hossbach.  Secretary. 

What was the context of the conference?

1919-1924: France creates a system of alliances in Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia) to sorta replace the lost Russian alliance. 

1933-34: Hitler comes to power and consolidates the Nazi dictatorship.  

1934-1935: Political turmoil in France resulting from the Stavisky Scandal and the events of 6 February 1934.  Sharp divide between Left and Right. 

1935: Germany begins rearmament. 

1935: Britain begins rearmament, but chiefly with the hope of deterring German aggression. 

1935: Stresa Front.  Britain, France, and Italy agree to oppose any further German violations of the Versailles Treaty. 

1935: Italian invasion of Ethiopia led to a split with France and Britain, which raised the possibility of a war in the Mediterranean. 

1936: Germany re-occupies the Rhineland. 

1936: Popular Front [NB: alliance of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties] comes to power in France.  Economic turmoil and political polarization follows.  NB: The Radicals were middle-class and basically conservative.  The usual joke is that “they had their hearts on the left and their wallets on the right.” 

1936: Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).  Germany and Italy aid the rebels led by Franco; Russia aids the Republic’s government; Britain and France try to stay neutral. 

1937: Japanese invasion of China.  Threatens Western possessions and trade rights.  Australia, New Zealand, and Canada alarmed.  This raises the prospect of a war in the Far East. 

Brief exposition of Hitler’s ideas of race and living space. 

            Race: Basically, Aryans versus Latins and Slav “untermenschen.”  Doesn’t get into his thoughts on Jews. 

            Space: The borders of Germany created by Bismarck (1866-1871) were a temporary compromise.  Now they were insufficient to German needs for a resource base.  Britain had a vast overseas empire; Russia and the United States had whole continents.  Germany needs land and natural resources to stand on a level with these other empires. 

Discussion of “Autarky.”  (Isolation from the world economy.) 

Participation in the world economy.  (Alternative to autarky.) 

            Britain and France: two hate-inspired powers.  NB: They aren’t going to share. 

“Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. The campaigns of Frederick the Great for Silesia and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had involved unheard-of risk, and the swiftness of the Prussian action in 1870 had kept Austria from entering the war. If one accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remain still to be answered the questions “when” and “how.” In this matter there were three cases [Falle] to be dealt with.” 

Three cases:

Case 1: Period 1943-1945.  Germany would decline relative to other powers after this time.  Therefore, Germany had to take action by this period. 

Case 2: Civil war in France.  That would keep the French from interfering in German action. 

Case 3: France at war with some other power, like Italy. 

In case of war with France, Germany’s first step must be to over-throw Czechoslovakia and Austria to remove the danger of an attack if things began to go badly for Germany in the west.  That would also insure that the Poles remained neutral. 

Looking forward to 1943-1945, Hitler foresaw the following. 

“Actually, the Fuehrer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question could be cleared up in due course by Germany.”  NB: Munich Conference, September 1938. 

“Military intervention by Russia must be countered by the swiftness of our operations; however, whether such an intervention was a practical contingency at all was, in view of Japan’s attitude, more than doubtful.”  NB: Japanese leaders debated attacking South (Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, French Indo-China) OR attacking North (Russian Far East). 

“Should case 2 arise -the crippling of France by civil war- the situation thus created by the elimination of the most dangerous opponent must he seized upon whenever it occurs for the blow against the Czechs.” 

“The Fuehrer saw case 3 [i.e. war between France and Italy] coming definitely nearer; it might emerge from the present tensions in the Mediterranean, and he was resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938.”  NB: Spanish Civil War provides one possible cause of war between France and someone else, but the Italians were winding up Arab nationalists in French-ruled Syria and Tunisia.  Germany occupied French attention, but what if a fit of Gallic vivacity caused the French to decide to sort out Mussolini? 

“If Germany made use of this war [between Italy and France-Britain] to settle the Czech and Austrian questions, it was to be assumed that Britain -herself at war with Italy- would decide not to act against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany was not to be expected.” 

How did the German generals respond to this exposition?

“In appraising the situation Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Fritsch repeatedly emphasized the necessity that Britain and France must not appear in the role of our enemies, and stated that the French Army would not be so committed by the war with Italy that France could not at the same time enter the field with forces superior to ours on our western frontier.  NB: The French could bust up the Italians without much effort.  Enjoy it too. 

General von Fritsch estimated the probable French forces available for use on the Alpine frontier at approximately twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on the western frontier, with the role, according to the German view, of invading the Rhineland. In this matter, moreover, the advanced state of French defense preparations [Mobilmachung] must be taken into particular account, and it must be remembered apart from the insignificant value of our present fortifications -on which Field Marshal von Blomberg laid special emphasis- that the four motorized divisions intended for the West were still more or less incapable of movement.

In regard to our offensive toward the southeast, Field Marshal von Blomberg drew particular attention to the strength of the Czech fortifications, which had acquired by now a structure like a Maginot Line and which would gravely hamper our attack.” 

“Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume.” 

Hitler responds:

“To the Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume, the Fuehrer put the summer of 1938 as the date which seemed to him possible for this.  [NB: How far away is that?] 

In reply to considerations offered by Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch regarding the attitude of Britain and France, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France against Germany.  NB: “These are not the Britain and France of 1914.  I can smell their fear.”  That’s what I think he means. 

Should the Mediterranean conflict under discussion lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we must immediately begin action against the Czechs. On the other hand, should the powers not engaged in the war declare themselves disinterested, then Germany would have to adopt a similar attitude to this for the time being.”

What events followed?

January-February 1938: Blomberg forced to resign in late January 1938 after the scandalous past of his new wife became known to the secret police; Fritsch forced to resign in early February 1938 after falsified allegations of homosexuality (worked up by Reinhard Heydrich, Goring’s right-hand man).  Hossbach had warned Fritsch about the scheme, so he was dismissed as Hitler’s adjutant two days later.

Early February 1938: Neurath: fired as Foreign Minister. 

March 1938: Germany suddenly annexes Austria. 

August-September 1938: Czech crisis led to the Munich settlement, giving Germany the Sudetenland. 

1938: Tide of battle turned decisively against the Republicans in Spain, although they remained in possession of large parts of the country. 

March 1939: Germany seizes the rest of Czechoslovakia.   Britain and France then extended a “guarantee” of the remaining existing borders in Central Europe.  In practice, this meant Poland. 

Summer 1939: France and Britain begin talks with the Soviet Union for a military alliance. 

What can we tell about Hitler’s intentions from this document? 

            Is the Hossbach Memorandum a “blueprint” for the war that came in September 1939? 

            Or is it something much more limited than that? 

            Is Hitler irrational and fantasizing in his analysis of the political situation? 

            Or is Hitler a hard-headed and cold-hearted realist? 

            What if the conference between Hitler and his military commanders and head diplomat wasn’t about informing them of his plans?  What if he just wanted to smoke-out any opposition to whatever it was that he wanted to do? 

            What would Neville Chamberlain have made of this document if he had the opportunity to read it between November 1937 (when it was created) and the annexation of Austria in March 1938 or the Munich conference in September 1938? 

            This last question is the premise for the historical thriller Munich, by Robert Harris (2017).  It was made into a Netflix movie, “Munich: The Edge of War” (2021) with Jeremy Irons as Neville Chamberlain. 

[1] In Spring 1945, specially created Anglo-American expert teams were sent to Germany to search for political and economic archives, particularly those which shed light on the origins of the war, and Germany’s operations and war aims. The experts assembled several tons of German Foreign Ministry documents discovered in the Harz Mountains and Thuringia, together with documents from other places of deposit at Marburg Castle. These established a unified collection of the captured material.  Subsequently, the documents were both microfilmed and translated and published on paper.  The originals were later returned to the government of the German Federal Republic. 

[2] “Leader”: title assumed by Hitler after the death of President von Hindenburg in 1934 when Hitler combined the offices of President and Chancellor (prime minister). 

British rearmament in the Thirties.

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            The government had ended the “Ten Year Rule” in 1932, but continued to hold down defense spending.  Then, in October 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference.  This tipped the balance toward rearmament. 

            In November 1933, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) formed a “Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC).”  Its mission was to identify the worst gaps in the military forces, plan how to meet them, and to make broad judgements about strategy.  By July 1934 it identified Germany as the primary danger and determined that Britain should avoid conflict with Japan.  Also, the DRC adopted a five-year time-line for rearmament (1934-1939).[1]  In March 1935, the government broke decisively in favor of rearmament.

            Having made the decision to rearm in a hurry, all went smoothly, no?  No.  The DRC proposed increasing military spending by £71 million over the five years, much of it on the Army.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer[2] imposed important changes.  First, he cut the total to £50 million.  Second, he cut the money for the Army in half, while doubling the proposed spending on the Royal Air Force (RAF).  He placed the emphasis squarely on home defense.  Henceforth, rearmament would involve constant tension between the armed services and the Treasury, with the Foreign Office getting buffeted between them. 

Defense spending rose from £37.2 million (1934) to £42.6 million (1935) to £60.7 million (1936) to £104.2 million (1937) to £182.2 million (1938) to £273.1 million (1939).  Almost half went to the Navy each year with the RAF receiving over half of the remainder.[3]    

What did Britain get for the money and how soon?  First and foremost, the RAF got thousands of modern, all-metal, single wing fighter planes–the Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane–which were to play such an important role in the Battle of Britain.  In addition, money went to development of radar for air defense control.[4]  In addition, a good deal of the expanded Army budget went to anti-aircraft artillery for home defense.  Second, the Navy received five new battleships, several aircraft carriers, and a host of light cruisers, while several older battleships were totally modernized.  Also, the defenses of the Singapore Base were hurried to conclusion as a stop-gap defense against Japan.  The Army largely got skint.  It could field only five divisions for service on the Continent.  Finally, industrial production saw improvements, both through the increased spending for the Royal Ordnance Factories (essentially bullets and shells), and through “Shadow Factories” (government-aided factories to expand aircraft production).[5] 

Britain had to try to avoid war until the program had been completed.  Until then,…

[1] Which would suggest that the “Ten-Year Rule” should have foreseen war in 1929.  But that is ridiculous.  It shows how fast things can change in human affairs. 

[2] Neville Chamberlin served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from November 1931 to May 1937, when he became Prime Minister. 

[3] Michael M. Postan, British War Production, Official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, Chapter II, p. 12, at HyperWar: British War Production [Chapter II]  On Postan, see: Michael Postan – Wikipedia 

[4] The prioritization of the RAF over the Army, but not over the Navy, reflected a fear of the danger from enemy bombing.  See: Chain Home – Wikipedia, especially the section “The bomber will always get through.”  It also demonstrates the initially defensive and deterrent nature of British rearmament. 

[5] British shadow factories – Wikipedia 

British Disarmament in the Nineteen Twenties.

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            Britain’s military spending had soared during the First World War.  It remained high in the immediate aftermath of the war: £766 million in 1919–20.  Then, in August 1919, led by the Secretary of State for War and Air,[1] the Cabinet’s Committee of Imperial Defence adopted the “Ten Year Rule”: the government would base its defense budgets “on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” 

            From January 1920 to July 1921, Britain suffered a severe recession.  In 1921, the media titan Lord Rothermere founded the “Anti-Waste League” to pressure the government.[2]  It worked: the government appointed a budget-cutting Committee on National Expenditure with Sir Eric Geddes as chairman.  What followed became known as the “Geddes Axe.”[3]  In the end, total defense spending fell from £189.5 million (1921–22) to £111 million (1922–23), before rebounding to £114.7 million in 1924–25.[4] 

            Then a series of international agreements altered the context.  The Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) prevented a naval arms race between Britain, the United States, and Japan.  The Dawes Plan (1924) conceded to German objections on reparations.  The Locarno Pact (1925) stabilized relations in Western Europe between Germany and its former opponents.  In 1925, the new—and very popular in Britain–League of Nations began pushing for a World Disarmament Conference that would reduce “offensive” weapons almost out of existence.  The Versailles treaty had substantially disarmed Germany; now it was time for the other powers to follow suit.  A reduced chance of war would justify deep cuts in military budgets.  In 1928, in light of all these developments, the Chancellor of the Exchequer[5] persuaded the Cabinet to make the “Ten Year Rule” permanent unless specifically changed by the government.   

In the early Thirties, the Great Depression forced still more economies: defense spending fell to £102 million in 1932.  In April 1931, the First Sea Lord told the Committee of Imperial Defense that “owing to the operation of the ‘ten-year-decision’ and the clamant need for economy, our absolute [naval] strength also has … been so diminished as to render the fleet incapable, in the event of war, of efficiently affording protection to our trade.”  Moreover, if the Navy had to move the bulk of its strength to the Far East to deal with Japan, it would have the means to defend neither Britain’s overseas trade nor Britain itself. 

            In September 1931, Japan seized the Chinese outlying province of Manchuria.  On 23 March 1932, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule.”  However, it stipulated that “this [change] must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation” of Britain. 

Then, in January 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany.  War was less than seven years, not ten, away.  Much rearmament would have to be done in great haste. 

[1] Winston Churchill. 

[2] See: Anti-Waste League – Wikipedia and Harold Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Rothermere – Wikipedia  Comic in light of current events.  However, it was his rival, Lord Beaverbrook, who was the immigrant. 

[3] On Geddes, see: Eric Geddes – Wikipedia   On the Committee on National Expenditure, see: Geddes Axe – Wikipedia 

[4] For its part, social spending (education, health, housing, pensions, unemployment) fell from £205.8 million (1920–21) to £182.1 million (1922–23) to £175.5 million (1923–24), before rising to £177.4 million (1924–25). 

[5] Winston Churchill. 

No more coals to Newcastle.

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            By the mid-Thirties the international situation had begun to darken.  It was not yet Desperate.  The worst—another World War—might still be avoided.  Serious men had to deal with situations in a realistic way.  What were the situations? 

First, there was the conflict between the “democratic” and “status-quo” powers (Britain, France, and the United States) and the “authoritarian” and “revisionist”: powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, and Imperial Japan.  Each of the “revisionist” powers desired to expand its territorial control over adjoining areas.  To accomplish these goals they would have to overthrow the system of international order—often called the Versailles settlement—created after the First World War.  Beyond that common goal they were often at odds among themselves. 

            Second, there were the military realities.  The conventional economic policy adopted to respond to the Depression (1929-1939) combined lower taxes with spending cuts, while limiting international trade (autarky).  Where countries stuck with this policy, military budgets suffered.  Where they did not stick with this policy, they rearmed faster.  Meanwhile, autarky spurred both isolationism and aggression.

            Third, Britain had three enemies threatening its global position: Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Far East.  It had the military resources to fight one major war at a time.  Britain lacked good allies.  America was deeply isolationist; Communist Russia hated capitalist counties—democratic or authoritarian; and France had been “bled white” in the First World War, while the Depression intensified partisan polarization.  If Britain fought one major power, the other two enemies would pile on.  Unless they were bought off or deterred. 

            In July 1934, Austrian Nazis had tried to seize power.  Hitler’s fingerprints were all over the failed coup.  The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ordered four army divisions to the border with Austria to deter German intervention.  In London and Paris, this seemed a good omen. 

            In March 1935, Nazi Germany declared that it would begin rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty.  In April 1935, representatives from Britain, France, and Italy met in the resort town of Stresa.  They agreed to resist any further German violation of the Versailles Treaty.  During the conference, the Italians raised the issue of Ethiopia.  Italy wanted to take over a big chunk of Ethiopia.  This was Italy’s bill for helping contain Germany.  The demand embarrassed the British, so it never made it into a written agreement.    

Mussolini had not abandoned his goals.  In October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia.  Public opinion, but especially “progressive” opinion, in both Britain and France went wild.  Demands rang out for support for the League of Nations and economic sanctions on Italy. 

British and French leaders still hoped to save the Italian alliance against Germany.  In December 1935, British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare met secretly with French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval.  They agreed on a plan that gave most of Ethiopia to Italy while leaving a fragment independent.  News leaked, public opinion revolted, the plan was abandoned, and Hoare resigned.  King George V said “Ah well Sam, no more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris.” 

Lesson: If you want the “status quo” in one area you may have to accept “revisionism” in another.  Who is the main enemy?  What are the alternatives?