Various “truths” emerged from the early histories of the origins of the First World War. Prominent among them: arms races lead to war, so—by implication–disarmament would lead to peace. The reasoning behind this “truth” ran something like the following. Military equality led to stability. Military inequality led to instability. Military inequality could emerge from either countries creating larger armies or from new technologies. Imbalances of either sort created a sense of insecurity on the weaker side and aggressive behavior on the stronger side. Building up one’s own power to restore stability became an entrenched response. Mutual fear and suspicion became entrenched, building up psychological tension. Linked to this idea of a spiral of power and fear, was a belief that the “Merchants of Death” (MOD) winding-up governments and publics in order to increase their profits. Corrupt politicians and journalists served the MOD as the agents of influence. After the war, disarmament became one chief purpose of diplomacy.
Therefore, naval armaments remained a live subject after the First World War. The Washington Naval Conference (1922) had agreed on a ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 in the number of battleships and battlecruisers between Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. The Geneva Naval Conference (1927) tried and failed to strike an agreement on the size and number of cruisers. The American and British concepts could not be reconciled.[1] The issues were revived, and this time agreed upon, in the London Naval Treaty (1930). The countries compromised on different classes of cruisers, while also limiting submarines and destroyers.[2]
Germany participated in none of these conferences because its navy had been severely limited by the Versailles Treaty. The Versailles Treaty did allow Germany to replace existing ships once they were at least 20 years old. The oldest of its battleships had been built in 1902, so by the mid-Twenties, Germany designed a new type of ship, the “Panzerkreuzer” (or “pocket battleship”). When the wartime Allies learned of these ships, they tried to prevent their construction. Germany offered to not build the ships in exchange for admission to the Washington naval treaty with a limit of 125,000 tons. The Americans and British were willing to appease German demands, but the French refused.
Meanwhile, Germany argued that either all countries should disarm or Germany should be allowed to rearm to the level of other countries. The League of Nations and many right-thinking people took this argument at face value, so it sponsored a World Disarmament Conference (1932-1933).
Mid-stream, Hitler came to power, abandoned the Disarmament Conference (October 1933), and announced that Germany would rearm in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. On the one hand, this tipped Britan toward a policy of gradual rearmament (1935-1939).[3] On the other hand, it led to the creation of the Stresa Agreement (14 April 1935) between Britain, France, and Italy to resist future German violations of Versailles. Could the “allies” maintain solidarity? Yet no British leader wanted war. Could Germany be either deterred or appeased?
[1] The British wanted more light cruisers for protecting imperial trade routes, the Americans wanted fewer, but heavier cruisers. The Japanese wanted a ratio of 70 percent of the American fleet, not the same 5:5:3 ratio of 1922.
[2] One effect of the naval treaties combined with the Great Depression appeared in the collapse of the British shipbuilding industry. Beating arms into breadlines, so to speak.
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