War Movies: “Anthropoid” (2016).

If you want a look at a true case of “state-sponsored terrorism” and at one approach to counter-terrorism, watch “Anthropoid” (dir. Sean Ellis, 2016).  It gives a compelling view of the May 1942 assassination of Reinhard Heydrich (the head of the Reich Main Security Office and also “Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia”[1]) and of what followed. 

In the movie, the motive for the assassination is the desire on the part of the Czech government-in-exile to inspire more resistance in the Nazi-occupied country.  The team of killers (Josef Gabcik, Jan Kubis[2]) is air-dropped at night; overcome difficulties to reach Prague; find that the Germans have wrecked the resistance movement and they must rely upon a small group of locals; eventually, they are joined by some other parachutists who had been dropped later; and they improvise an attack on Heydrich.  The German is mortally wounded; a gigantic manhunt begins; the Germans track the parachutists to a Prague church; and one hell of a gunfight ensues.  The few surviving parachutists kill themselves rather than be taken alive. 

The movie strives for realism: it was filmed in Prague and mostly on the sites where events occurred; the pervasive fear of the Germans among the Czechs is brought out, not minimized; the semi-botched assassination is clearly portrayed; and the ferocious Nazi manhunt should leave anyone squirming. 

Still, the movie simplifies or omits some things.  First, it begins with Gabcik and Kubis on the ground in a Czech forest.  The movie elides the origins of “Operation Anthropoid.”  In fact, Eduard Benes, the leader of the Czech government-in-exile, feared that the West would sell out his country after the war if the Czechs didn’t show some fight.  The British and French had surrendered the Sudetenland to Hitler at Munich (September 1938) and had shrugged their shoulders when Germany occupied the rest of the country (March 1939).  Several thousand Czech soldiers had found their way to the West before the Second World War began (September 1939), but this wasn’t much of a contribution.  Internal resistance had mostly been the work of the Czech Communist Party after Germany attacked the Soviet Union (June 1941).  If the Germans lost the war, the Communists might claim a moral right to rule as the only true “resisters.”   A dramatic act might arouse non-Communist resistance, but it would surely make the government-in-exile appear to be doing something.  So, kill Heydrich now for a distant gain.    

Second, Heydrich had crushed the resistance by a combination of carrot and stick.  He had good material.  Few Czechs wanted to run risks for the sake of the Western powers that had betrayed them before.  Wages and working conditions in factories were improved at the same time that Gestapo penetration agents combatted the Communist underground. 

Third, the Germans unleashed a savage response to the attack on Heydrich.  Mass arrests; right to torture in the pursuit of some clue; massacres of villages on the mere rumor that someone had sheltered the killers.  In a society where few people actually backed resistance, this worked.  Finally, one of the parachutists betrayed someone else to save his own family; and the betrayed finally gave up the hiding place of the other parachutists. 

“The Battle of Algiers” openly confronts truths that “Anthropoid” skims over. 


[1] Also the driving force behind the implementation of the Holocaust.  On this, see: “Conspiracy” (dir. Frank Pierson, 2001), with Kenneth Branagh as Heydrich and Stanley Tucci as Adolf Eichmann. 

[2] Played by Cillian Murphy and Jamie Dornan respectively. 

No more coals to Newcastle.

            By the mid-Thirties the international situation had begun to darken.  It was not yet Desperate.  The worst—another World War—might still be avoided.  Serious men had to deal with situations in a realistic way.  What were the situations? 

First, there was the conflict between the “democratic” and “status-quo” powers (Britain, France, and the United States) and the “authoritarian” and “revisionist”: powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, and Imperial Japan.  Each of the “revisionist” powers desired to expand its territorial control over adjoining areas.  To accomplish these goals they would have to overthrow the system of international order—often called the Versailles settlement—created after the First World War.  Beyond that common goal they were often at odds among themselves. 

            Second, there were the military realities.  The conventional economic policy adopted to respond to the Depression (1929-1939) combined lower taxes with spending cuts, while limiting international trade (autarky).  Where countries stuck with this policy, military budgets suffered.  Where they did not stick with this policy, they rearmed faster.  Meanwhile, autarky spurred both isolationism and aggression.

            Third, Britain had three enemies threatening its global position: Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Far East.  It had the military resources to fight one major war at a time.  Britain lacked good allies.  America was deeply isolationist; Communist Russia hated capitalist counties—democratic or authoritarian; and France had been “bled white” in the First World War, while the Depression intensified partisan polarization.  If Britain fought one major power, the other two enemies would pile on.  Unless they were bought off or deterred. 

            In July 1934, Austrian Nazis had tried to seize power.  Hitler’s fingerprints were all over the failed coup.  The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ordered four army divisions to the border with Austria to deter German intervention.  In London and Paris, this seemed a good omen. 

            In March 1935, Nazi Germany declared that it would begin rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty.  In April 1935, representatives from Britain, France, and Italy met in the resort town of Stresa.  They agreed to resist any further German violation of the Versailles Treaty.  During the conference, the Italians raised the issue of Ethiopia.  Italy wanted to take over a big chunk of Ethiopia.  This was Italy’s bill for helping contain Germany.  The demand embarrassed the British, so it never made it into a written agreement.    

Mussolini had not abandoned his goals.  In October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia.  Public opinion, but especially “progressive” opinion, in both Britain and France went wild.  Demands rang out for support for the League of Nations and economic sanctions on Italy. 

British and French leaders still hoped to save the Italian alliance against Germany.  In December 1935, British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare met secretly with French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval.  They agreed on a plan that gave most of Ethiopia to Italy while leaving a fragment independent.  News leaked, public opinion revolted, the plan was abandoned, and Hoare resigned.  King George V said “Ah well Sam, no more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris.” 

Lesson: If you want the “status quo” in one area you may have to accept “revisionism” in another.  Who is the main enemy?  What are the alternatives? 

The Depression.

            By late 1929 the American economy had reached the saturation point in its ability to consume new goods.  The number of new cars registered began to fall sharply and new houses being constructed fell off as well.  These were warning signs of an economic slowdown.  As the American economy slowed, the Stock Market began to fall.  The fall of the Stock Market was more a symptom than a cause of the problem.  From 1929 to 1931 the American economy went into a deep spiral.  Demand for goods fell off, producers cut back on the number of workers and on the amount of raw materials.  The unemployed suddenly spent less and farmers and miners saw their incomes shrink even further, so they spent less.  Falling spending by ordinary consumers then drove down demand even further, setting off a new turn of the spiral.  People who couldn’t pay back the loans they had contracted in happier times lost their homes or farms or businesses.  Banks collected farms and houses and businesses they couldn’t then resell. The banks themselves went bankrupt too.  Most countries had little or no unemployment insurance.  If you lost your job, you had to get another one or starve.  There weren’t any jobs to be found.  People got desperate.  They demanded government action, or they moved elsewhere in search of work, or they tried to organize protest movements and political movements.  All existing institutions were called into question. 

            This crisis quickly spread to the rest of the world.  Americans stopped importing, but insisted on collecting the loans they were owed by other countries.  These countries first tightened up their own economies to try to pay back the loans, then defaulted on the loans rather than drive themselves into complete collapse.  Countries went off the existing system of international payments.[1]  This caused international trade to decline sharply, throwing more people out of work.  Nobody but the Soviet Union—a non-capitalist country that traded very little with the rest of the world—managed to ride out this crisis without suffering economic hard times.[2]  In many places, people concluded that the government would have to accept responsibility for insuring prosperity in the future, as well as peace and security.[3] 

            Many people questioned the systems of capitalism and representative government.  All they seemed to offer was the “freedom to starve.”  Democracy failed in Germany and Adolf Hitler came to power.  It teetered on the edge of collapse in France.  In the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt became president and launched a program called the “New Deal.”

This constituted a decisive moment in the development of modern governments.  The historian John Garraghty has written an interesting book comparing the response to the Depression of the American “New Deal” and Nazi Germany.  One would expect that they were very different from one another.  Wrong: there were a lot of similarities.  The main difference was that Nazi Germany was more effective at putting people back to work.  The both increased government control of the economy.  They both spent a lot of money to put the unemployed back to work.  One thing that people discovered, during the Depression and later in the Second World War, was that deficit spending offered the best way out of the slump.  We’re still living with the consequences of that discovery. 


[1] The Gold Standard. 

[2] Well, more accurately, it didn’t suffer hardships as a result of the Depression.  Stalin’s drive for rapid industrialization inflicted severe hardship on almost all Russians. 

[3] If you look at the—so far—failed efforts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act/Obamacare, you can see that Americans have now concluded that it is the duty of the government to insure health care at a low cost to consumers.