Tag Archives: Middle East

Prologue to a Diary of the Second Addams Administration 15.

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            The Agenda: Iran.[1] 

            The Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Shah (1979) spread chaos in the country.  Saddam Hussein, the dictator of neighboring Iraq, sought to exploit the situation by attacking Iran.  The subsequent war[2] (1980-1988) caused all sorts of troubles.  In its aftermath, during the 1990s, the Iranian Republic launched a program to develop nuclear weapons.  The program’s physical component—as opposed to intellectual and technological components–began with the construction of a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy-water plant at Arak. 

            In 2002, Iranian dissidents obtained and published secret documents on the nuclear program for all the world to see.  In 2003, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei published a “fatwa” banning the possession or use of nuclear weapons.  No one believed him.[3]  Eventually, in 2006, the United Nations plastered Iran with economic sanctions.  In 2015, the Obama administration, busy with other quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, led the negotiation of a deal with Iran.  Iran would limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent and send 97 percent of its already-enriched uranium to Russia for safe-keeping.[4]  The agreement would run for 15 years.  It hardly made it out the gate. 

            In 2018, President Donald Trump abandoned the agreement so far as the United States was concerned.  In Trump’s view, the agreement did nothing to address Iran’s non-nuclear aggressive behavior in the region.  Specifically, Iran was arming-up and coordinating allied forces in the region.[5]  Trump seems to have hoped that renewed economic sanctions would force the Iranian regime to cut a new and better deal.  To emphasize his point, in 2020 Trump ordered the killing of General Qassem Soleimani, a leading figure in the Revolutionary Guards. 

Next, in 2021, President Joe Biden[6] tried to revive the agreement, but the Iranians had moved on.  At about the same time that Biden entered the White House, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 percent, and then to 60 percent.  Enrichment to 90 percent creates “weapons grade material.”  All the while, economic sanctions and mismanagement have battered Iran’s domestic economy.[7]  

The last year or so has altered the situation.  First, Israel has inflicted immense damage on Iran’s clients through its wars in Gaza and Lebanon.  Turkey sponsored a rebel offensive in Syria that overthrew Iran’ ally Assad.  When Israel killed a Hamas leader in Tehran, Iran responded with a missile barrage; and, in October 2024; Israel answered with air strikes that wrecked key elements of Iran’s air defense system, among other things.  This leaves Iran open to follow-on strikes against nuclear facilities (and the Iranian leadership cadres) if Tehran doesn’t change its tune. 

Second, Donald Trump’s return to the White House has seemed possible (if not certain) since the beginning of 2024.  Tehran has been intensifying its drive to enrich uranium to 60 percent.  That is, apparently, a hop, skip, and a jump from 90 percent or weapons-grade uranium.[8]  I don’t know how much time that hop, skip, and jump would take.  Expert opinion holds that a basic sort of bomb could be manufactured six months after a sufficient quantity of weapons-grade uranium has been accumulated.  Another year after that and they could have a warhead for a ballistic missile.  One that could easily hit Israel. 

NOTHING in the history of Israel’s military and national security policy suggests that Israel will let Iran get anywhere near that point.  They will not allow Iran to get even one nuclear weapon.  Never mind the ballistic missiles.  “Just put it on a freighter bound for Haifa.”  The time-line for preventive action by Israel (and/or the United States) is very short.  Maybe a year at the outside?  There will be heavy pressure on the prime minister of Israel[9] to act soon. 

The time-line for Iran to decide what course it will choose is very short.  Will the rulers of Iran try to rush ahead and break-out to possession of nuclear weapons?[10]  If they do achieve a nuclear weapon, will they feel compelled to “use it or lose it”?   

Or will the leaders of Iran repent their disdain for Biden’s offer to revive the 2015 agreement?  The country’s alliance network is in shambles and its own defense vulnerabilities have been exposed.  Russia could divert no forces from the Ukraine war to save Assad, so it isn’t likely to do much for Iran.  Would the Iranian leaders—belatedly—seek to engage with the United States?  If so, how stiff-necked would they be about concessions? 

The stakes are high.  In theory, Israel would need the assistance of the United States to attack the key Iranian facilities.  A prime target would be an enrichment facility near the city of Qom.  It is tunneled into a mountain.  So is another site near Isfahan.  The American “Massive Ordnance Penetrator,” dropped by a B-2 bomber would be the only conventional weapon that could destroy the targets.[11]  In reality, Israel has its own nuclear weapons that might do the job.  That’s an awful thing to ponder.[12] 

Finally, there is a loose alliance between Iran, Russia, and China.  How would the Russians and the Chinese respond to either an Israel-America joint attack on Iran or to an Israel-alone attack (albeit with American blessing)? 

Can of worms.  Or, as the French say, “a basket of crabs.” 

[1] “Briefing: A looming nuclear crisis,” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 11. 

[2] See: Iran–Iraq War – Wikipedia  If you want to explore in depth, see: Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods The Iran–Iraq War. A Military and Strategic History (2014).  Murray is deeply knowledgeable and hard-headed.   

[3] Iran is predominantly Shi’ite Muslim.  As a long-persecuted minority within Islam, Shi’ite theologians determined that Shi’ites could dissemble about their real religious beliefs.  Over the centuries, other people have come to believe that Iranian culture has generalized this originally purely religious easement on veracity. 

[4] So, as part of their recent mutual sliming-up to each other, has Russia secretly returned the enriched uranium to Iran?  I haven’t noticed reporting on this question.  My bad.  What does Mossad say? 

[5] Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Assad regime in Syria. 

[6] More recent developments cause me to wonder if it wasn’t the policy of President-for-Foreign-Policy Antony Blinken.  Who would have been President-for-Domestic-Policy?  Can’t have been Janet Yellen.  We wouldn’t have had the inflation mess.  I understand that this is a nasty remark.  But see “Biden: How to hide a president’s decline” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 16.  Reports on a WSJ story on “how Biden’s aides and family hid his apparent cognitive decline from almost day one of his presidency.”  On which side of “day one” did the hiding begin? 

[7] Pakistan’s prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once said that “Even if we have to eat grass, we will make a nuclear bomb.”  You couldn’t force that in a democracy, but neither Pakistan nor Iran are real democracies. 

[8] Obviously, I haven’t tried it myself.  Nor would I try.  Don’t want to get hauled into a black Escalade while I’m walking my dog. 

[9] Probably Benjamin Netanyahu, but it doesn’t matter.  The leaders of the IDF and Mossad seem likely to be on the same page. 

[10] The ever-shrewd Eliot A. Cohen raised this possibility in the Atlantic in December 2024.  For a sample of Cohen’s Atlantic pieces, see: Eliot A. Cohen, The Atlantic 

[11] It has been reported that the Pentagon has briefed President Biden on plans for American attacks on Iranian nuclear resources.  “Briefing: A looming nuclear crisis,” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 11. 

[12] Many people outside of Israel already are appalled by pictures from Gaza. 

Prologue to a Diary of the Second Addams Administration 12.

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The Agenda: The Middle East. 

Syria’s fifty-year-long government-by-massacre suddenly collapsed under a surprise assault by Turkish-sponsored Arabs.[1]  Bashar al-Assad fled (with his millions) to Russia. 

The lead group among the victorious rebels, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), began establishing a government.  While people are more or less glad to be shed of Assad, HTS could be problematic.  On the one hand, the group is an off-shoot of al Qaeda; they’re Islamists; and they’ve be labeled as terrorists by Western governments.  On the other hand, HTS and the “Syrian National Army” are Turkish puppets.[2] 

Other countries began adapting to the new situation.  The Russians began cutting their losses by pulling out their men and material.  Israel has every reason to suspect Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, of harboring anti-Israel sentiments.  He may want to create an Islamist-governed “ally” on Israel’s door-step.  Of late, there has been much celebration of the whole series of blows dealt to Iran’s allies and proxies (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad in Syria).  Erdogan won’t have missed the lesson.  He may use his proxies to exert pressure on Israel.  Israel exploited the opportunity by bombing Syrian bases and arms stockpiles to reduce the weaponry available to the HTS that had toppled Assad (just in case). 

Both Syria and the members of the European Union (EU) began nudging Syrian refugees to go home.  About 3 million Syrian refugees remain in Syria.  Erdogan would like them to go home.  About 1.5 million Syrians fled the civil war that began in 2011 for Europe.  Their arrival contributed greatly to an anti-foreign, anti-liberal reaction in many European countries.  European politics shifted right in an alarming fashion.  Many Europeans are saying “Go.” 

The United States and its European allies began talking to the people who are the de facto rulers of Syria.  They would like the rebels-turned-government to say the right things.  It’s a sticky situation.  It seemed brilliant to overthrow Libya’s Ghaddafi, but the follow-on effects—civil war, gangs, a migrant surge toward Europe—continues to trouble the region.  What if this turns out to be the same basic story? 

            Most immediately, there is the “problem” of the Kurds.  “Kurdistan” sprawls over Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.  The Kurds have been a dangerous thorn in the side of Turkey for decades.  They form the largest minority population within Turkey and they have long harbored nationalist ambitions.  The successive American wars against Iraq made that problem much worse by creating, then enlarging, a Kurdish proto-state in northern Iraq.  Moreover, the Kurds have been a loyal—and better yet, effective–ally of the United States in the fight against ISIS.  Indeed, the chief check on ISIS has been the Kurds.  In north-eastern Syria, Kurds braced for a likely attack from Turkey or its Syrian proxies.  If Turkey or its minions do attack the Kurds, that isn’t likely to be Turkey’s last move. 

President-elect Donald Trump has said “Syria is not America’s problem.”  He may mean it, more than did predecessors who hoped to “pivot to Asia.”  Is Israel also “not an American problem”?  What about Turkey, nominally a NATO member, but bound on its own course?  Whether he can sustain that resolve to disengage will be an early test. 

[1] “Turkey prepares attack on U.S. allies in Syria,” The Week, 27 December 2024-3 January 2025, p. 5. 

[2] “Syria: From Iranian client to Turkish puppet?” The Week, 27 December 2024-3 January 2025, p. 16. 

The Start of a New Chapter in Syria.

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The awful Syrian Civil War (2011- ) appeared to have guttered out in a Russian-assisted victory for Assad Jr.[1]  Assad’s government held 70 percent of the country.  Kurds held territory in the Northeast where Syria abuts the Kurdish sections of Iraq…and Turkey.[2]  Opponents of the regime also remained in possession of a chunk of Northwestern Syria centered on Idlib.  The most formidable of these opponents were the Islamists of the group “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,” at least nominally linked to al Qaeda.  There is also a Syrian opposition militia sponsored by Turkey.  Both groups receive support and direction from Turkey.[3] 

In early December 2024, they launched a sudden attack which soon stampeded the surprised Assad forces.  Soon, the insurgents took possession of Aleppo.  Surprised and panicked, Assad asked his Russian and Iranian allies for help.  Russian air forces stationed in Syria did some bombing.  Iran sent an estimated 300 troops from those already stationed in Iraq.  All this seems like small potatoes for a threatened ally.  However, Russia is bending all its strength to beat Ukraine.  For the past year Israel has been grinding away Iranian commanders and forces in Syria whenever it has a free minute from leveling Gaza and then beating up on Hezbollah in Lebanon.  Iran may prefer to keep its reach short in a country that borders Israel.  What with Israel’s touchy sensitivity about Iran.[4] 

            National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan remarked that “we don’t cry over the fact that the Assad government, backed by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, is facing certain kinds of pressure.”  “Certain kinds of pressure” my left foot!  By 8 December 2024 Assad was in Russia and Damascus had fallen to the rebels. 

            I didn’t see this coming.  But “I only know what I read in the papers,” as Will Rogers said.  Did anyone else see it coming?  These developments caught many journalists specializing in the Middle East flat-footed.  One asked “Will Assad survive”?  Another speculated that Turkey had sponsored the attack in the expectation that it would be possible to impose a peace deal on Assad that allowed the better than 4.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey to go home, while also checking the power of Kurds in Syria.  Still another argued that “the Kremlin has too much at stake” to give up on Syria.  We’re way beyond that now. 

What about the C.I.A., Israel’s Mossad, Russia’s F.S.B., Iran’s intelligence service? 

Turkey’s intelligence service, the MIT, must have known, permitting or ordering the attack.  It was their clients who attacked.  Did they not share the information with the United States?  Probably not.  Both may belong to NATO, but Turkish and American interests have diverged in important areas over the last several decades.  The United States has cooperated with Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, while Turkey sees Kurdish nationalism as a grave danger.  The American overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003 created a Kurdish proto-state in northern Iraq.  American efforts to battle ISIS/ISIL have required close cooperation with Kurds.  Like Israel, Turkey has a foreign policy to advance its own interests. 

[1] “Islamist rebel attack reignites Syrian civil war,” The Week, 13 December 2024, p. 5.

[2] There are about 900 American Special Forces troops in the Northeast.  They work with the Kurdish forces, primarily against the remnants of ISIS. 

[3] See: National Intelligence Organization – Wikipedia 

[4] Wouldn’t want somebody in Jerusalem shouting “OK, that tears it!” 

At the Start of Something.

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            Over the years, Iran has armed and helped organize “proxy” forces on the borders of Israel.  Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthies in Yemen all are clients of Iran.  The Iranian term for these groups is the “Axis of Resistance.”  They are sometimes described in the Western media as Iran’s forward line of defense against Israel.  In truth they are the “Axis of Aggression” and Iran’s forward line of attack against Israel. 

On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel.[1]  Israel began a long, grinding conquest of Gaza.  Soon after Hamas launched its attack, Hezbollah (“Party of God”) in Lebanon (and eventually the Houthies in Yemen) began supporting Hamas by their own missile attacks on northern Israel and shipping in the Red Sea.  Sixty thousand people fled northern Israel in search of a place of greater safety.  Israel did little in response to these attacks as it concentrated its effort on Gaza. 

The Israeli are, apparently, masters of Sequence: first one thing, then the next thing.  Suddenly, Israeli pummeled Hezbollah.  (This may be a sign that the government regards matters as being well in hand in Gaza.)  First, pagers previously distributed by Hezbollah to many of its members exploded.  These had been chosen as a more secure communication device than cell phones, calls on which might easily be intercepted by Israel.  The next day, walkie-talkies distributed as a back-up system to the pagers exploded.  Israel’s intelligence service had compromised Hezbollah’s communications logistics. 

Then Israel began bombing in a precise (but bloody) fashion.  On the one hand, they hit many in the upper ranks of Hezbollah’s leadership.  Apparently, they knew how to locate them.  Among the dead were Hassan Nasrallah, the long-time leader of Hezbollah; Nabil Kaouk, a deputy of Nasrallah; and Ibrahim Akil, head of Hezbollah’s equivalent of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.  These all come on top of earlier assassinations.[2] 

On the other hand, Israeli jets pounded storage sites of Hezbollah’s missiles and rockets.  American and Israeli sources claim that perhaps half of Hezbollah’s huge stockpile has been destroyed.[3]  Then Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded southern Lebanon.  The government of Israel claims that this is a “limited” operation meant to clear southern Lebanon of Hezbollah troops and weapons.  Only time will tell if this operation really is “limited” or if it portends something larger. 

In response to the battering of Hezbollah, it’s patron-state Iran launched a large strike of 181 missiles at targets in Israel.  Backed up by fire from U.S. Navy destroyers, Israel’s air defense system shot down most of the incoming missiles. 

            Is Hezbollah irreparably damaged or destroyed?  Much of the discussion seems to report a consensus view that Hezbollah SHOULD be destroyed or, at least, forced out of its powerful position in Lebanon’s politics.  It doesn’t really address the question of whether Hezbollah CAN be destroyed.  Certainly, the huge damage done to its upper leadership will weaken and disorganize Hezbollah for some time.  That weakness and disorganization will open more gaps for Israel to attack.  Furthermore, in light of the history of other revolutionary movements, there is likely to be a great “rat hunt” inside Hezbollah for the Israeli agent or agents.  In light of the history of other “rat hunts,” the person in charge of the hunt will almost certainly be an Israeli agent.[4]  In light of the history of other organizations, such hunts tend to wreak havoc with the organization engaged in the “rat hunt.”[5]  Deep distrust may lead to fragmentation, at least for a time. 

            However, Hezbollah is supposed to have around 100,000 fighting men that it can call up.  That is a substantial base from which to recruit a new leadership hierarchy.  Not to draw too close a parallel, but consider the American “War on Drugs.”  For half a century now, we’ve devoted great resources to battling the “drug cartels.”[6]  Huge loads of illegal drugs and the cash from their sale have been captured; many cartel members have been captured; many others have died in the fratricidal battles of the drug trade.  In 2022, the United States suffered 73,838 deaths attributed to fentanyl.[7]  People in the drug trade are like “dragon’s teeth.”  Is it the same for Hezbollah? 

[1] “Israel vows retaliation after Iranian attack,” The Week, 11 October 2024, p. 4. 

[2] For lists of Hezbollah leaders believed to have been killed as of 30 September 2024, see: The Hezbollah leaders killed by Israel – who they were and the key players that remain | CNN and List of Hezbollah’s high-ranking figures killed by Israel | Al Bawaba.  Among the others killed was Fateh al-Sharif, who led Hamas fighters in Lebanon and acted as co-ordinator of Hamas with Hezbollah.  When not busy with those activities he worked as a school principal for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and as head of the teachers’ union.  The Week, 11 October 2024, p. 9.  During the Second World War, the British and the Czechs assassinated Reinhard Heydrich, while the Americans ambushed the plane they knew to be carrying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had planned the Pearl Harbor attack. 

[3] Either that’s a wild guess and they’re just blowing smoke or they’re right on the money because they knew the location and exact contents of the dumps.  Given the evidence from Israel’s other attacks, it seems that Hezbollah has been riddled by Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad.  See: The GWOT if Israel was in charge. | waroftheworldblog

[4] See: Peter Hart, The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923 (1988). 

[5] David Wise, Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered the C.I.A. (1992). 

[6] Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (2001). 

[7] See: Fentanyl overdose deaths U.S. 1999-2022 | Statista 

Remaking the Middle East 7 October 2024.

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            It is a moment of great uncertainty in the Middle East.  Many people fear the expansion of Israel’s war with Hamas and Hezbollah into a larger war involving Iran and the United States, one which has no certain outcome.  For others, however, visions of sugar plums dance in their head.[1]  A Saudi Arabian journalist[2] wrote that Israel’s deadly attacks had done so much damage to Hezbollah that “even if the group were to live on, it would most likely be a caricature of its former self.”[3]  Lebanon may be able to free itself from the thirty-year death-grip of Hezbollah.  A British journalist judged that, in spite of the Biden administration dragging on Israel’s coat, “Israel is likely to see the current moment as too good an opportunity to miss.” 

Opportunity to do what?  One answer is to strike at the nuclear weapons program that threatens the survival of Israel.  Another answer is both more ambitious and ill-defined.  An American journalist reported that “Many in Israel see a ‘once-in-a-generation chance’ to remake the Middle East to Israel’s advantage.”  Naftali Bennett, a former Prime Minister of Israel, sees “the biggest opportunity in the past 50 years” to reshape the region.[4] 

Reshape how?  Destroy Hamas entirely?  Destroy Hezbollah entirely or, at least as a significant force in regional conflicts?  Gravely damage Iran’s nuclear program and force it to accept long-term international supervision?  Topple the Islamist regime in Iran entirely in hopes of something better emerging?  Forge an alliance with Saudi Arabia over the Iran conflict and relegate the Palestinian question to Israel alone?  Redraw the map of the Middle East to unite all Kurds not under Turkish rule into a sovereign state?  Redraw the map of the Middle East to assign the Sunni part of Iraq to Jordan?  “Transfer”[5] the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank to the Shi’ite portion of a partitioned Iraq?

            What does History tell us about once-in-a-generation opportunities? 

            In the early 19th Century, “Nationalism” meant that all people speaking the same language and sharing the same culture should live in a single independent country.  Germany were split into 30-plus states; Italy was split into half a dozen states; the Austrian Empire smooshed together people from many different latent-countries.  Many people saw Nationalism as the wave of the future.  Austria saw it as a death sentence.  One of these Believers was the French Emperor Napoleon III, the nephew of the great Napoleon I.  France should lead this remaking of the map of Europe. 

            Napoleon III started with Italy, concluding a secret deal with Count Camillo di Cavour, the prime minister of the Italian kingdom of Piedmont-Sardina.[6]  If Cavour would provide a war with Austria, Napoleon II would furnish the French army to win it.  Then, the Austrians would be expelled from Italy, and Italy would be “united” in a loose federation.  Piedmont would expand to dominate northern Italy; central Italy’s small states would join together under a ruler to be supplied by France; the backward southern Italian kingdom of the Two Sicilies would join the confederation; and the Pope’s lands would be much reduced, but the Pope would become head of this loose confederation. 

            Cavour did what he said that he would: he provoked Austria into declaring war.  Napoleon III did what he said that he would: his army thrashed the Austrians at Magenta and Solferino.  Then the wheels came off, badly and at high speed.  First, the French were appalled by the casualties suffered in battle and tried to crawfish on Piedmont by striking a deal with the Austrians.  Second, Italian popular nationalism surged up on the enthusiasm of victories won by others.  Popular revolts led to demands for the unification of all Italy north of the kingdom of Naples, regardless of promises made to Napoleon III.  Third, then the Italian nationalist and republican adventurer Giusseppe Garibaldi led a small expedition (with or without the knowledge of Cavour?) against the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.  The kingdom collapsed like a house of cards.  Garibaldi led his army north toward Rome.  Faced with the danger of a republican revolution overwhelming a monarchical revolution, the king of Piedmont met Garibaldi face to face.  The great man surrendered to the little king, at the price of southern Italy being included in the new nation. 

            France hadn’t wanted a united Italian peninsula unified under a centralized government.  The northern Italians hadn’t really wanted the inclusion of the backward Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in their new nation.  Garibaldi hadn’t wanted a monarchy, but a unified and centralized republic.  No one got exactly what they wanted. 

            Nor did they clearly foresee the long-term effects. The unification of Italy made the unification of Germany (against and without the Austrian empire) the next pressing question in European affairs.  Nationalist victories in central Europe then accelerated the spread of nationalism into the great multi-national empires of eastern Europe and the Middle East.  The Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman empires all succumbed during the First World War. 

            Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian statesman and leader of German unification, was a temperamentally conservative and cautious person.  He spent a lot of time thinking about all the possible scenarios, but he didn’t go looking for “once-in-a-generation” chances. 

            Of course, other people are more time-bound and fixated on one outcome as the only possible outcome.  That is, they feel a burning need to accomplish some great mission in their lifetime.  Both Lenin and Hitler were that way. 

[1] Marc Champion wrote in Bloomberg that the blows suffered by Iran offer a tempting chance for Israel to inflict serious harm on its avowed main enemy.  Champion acknowledged that an Israeli attack would force Iran to choose between humiliation for the regime and a war with a surprising adversary and the possibility of American involvement. 

[2] A place where speech is never free, but often inspired. 

[3] Faisal Abbas, quoted in “Lebanon: Can Hezbollah survive the death of its leader?” The Week, 11 October 2024, p. 15. 

[4] All quoted in “Israel vows retaliation after Iranian attack,” The Week, 11 October 2024, p. 4. 

[5] At the end of and after the Second World War, many ethnic Germans fled the advancing Red Army or were driven out of places like Poland and the Czech Sudetenland.  These and other population movements were sometimes referred to as population “transfers.” 

[6] Derek Beales and Eugenio Biagini, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy (2003).  It’s an update of an earlier work.  But, if you have the time, there are a series of classic older books by Denis Mack Smith. 

Public opinion and foreign policy.

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Back in April 2014, almost half of Americans (47 percent) thought that the United States should be “less active” abroad.[1] That included both Republicans and Democrats (45 percent each, which suggests that Independents were still more likely to favor caution). However, markedly more Republicans (29 percent) than Democrats (12 percent) or all Americans (19 percent) thought that the US should be “more active” abroad. The Republican “don’t knows” amounted to 26 percent, compared to 43 percent for Democrats and 34 percent for all Americans. Thus, there was a more intense division of opinion among Republicans than among Democrats, while Democrats were more uncertain about the right course of action.

By August 2014, Americans were generally feeling surly about the country’s situation. The vast majority (71 percent) felt the country to be “on the wrong track,” and well over half (60 percent) felt it to be “in decline.”[2] A lot of this had to do with the still-unsatisfactory economic recovery and with the continuing dead-lock between the legislative and the executive branches, but some of it probably arose from foreign policy issues as well. In the wake of the rapid advance of ISIS in western Iraq, as well as in light of other domestic reverses (like the ObamaCare roll-out fiasco in Fall 2013), only 42 percent of Americans believed that President Obama could “manage the government effectively,” while a stinging 57 percent thought that he could not. That left only 1 percent who weren’t sure.[3]

A year and a half later, the course of events had shifted opinion among both Republicans and Democrats.  The rise of ISIS from Summer 2014 on, the terrorist attacks in Western countries, and the controversial Iran deal all worked to polarize opinion. The events sent many Republicans back toward a traditional policy of engagement. By December 2015, only 32 percent of Republicans wanted to “focus more at home,” while 62 percent favored being “stronger abroad.” That left only 6 percent saying that they “didn’t know.” The same events sent many Democrats toward a policy of disengagement. Among Democrats, 69 percent now said that the US should “focus more at home,” while only 23 percent favored being “stronger abroad.” That left only 8 percent saying that they “didn’t know.”

Partly, this may be a reflection of the dissolution of established verities. Only 44 percent of Democrats sympathized with Israel in its war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip in Summer 2014, while only 51 percent of Americans overall sympathized more with Israel than with the Palestinians. In contrast, 73 percent of Republicans sympathized with Israel. Whatever the merits of Israel’s policy, the actual implementation of blockade, bombings, and artillery fire in an urban area crowded with women and children as well as missile-firing militants made for gruesome television viewing.

Or perhaps it was just the return to a presidential election campaign that caused many Democrats and Republicans to adopt policies in knee-jerk opposition to their rivals’ policies. For example, in March 2015, 53 percent of Republicans supported automatic registration of all eligible voters. Then, Hillary Clinton endorsed this proposal. Soon, only 28 percent of Republicans supported automatic registration of all eligible voters.[4]

In any event, American voters will get a clear choice in November 2016.

[1] “Behind Shifting GOP Mindset,” WSJ, 4 February 2016.

[2] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 22 August 2014, p. 17.

[3] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 8 August 2014, p. 15.

[4] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 19 June 2015, p. 15. Still, only a minority (48 percent) of Americans supported the idea, while 36 percent were opposed.

The Iran Dilemma.

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Tom Friedman’s opinion on Middle Eastern matters must command respect. Friedman has remarkable access to American government sources. The Obama administration often appears to voice its views through his column.

Since the Revolution of 1979 overthrew the Shah, the United States and Iran have been at odds. At the same time, Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite Iran have been at odds. So, an alliance of convenience formed between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Recently, the upheavals in the Middle East have consolidated the grip on power of Iranian clients in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Over the longer term, however, Iran’s long pursuit of nuclear weapons has been profoundly destabilizing to the region. (See: Bomb ‘em ‘till the mullahs bounce.)

Friedman’s recent column on the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program lays out some essential issues, even if it does not fully explore them.[1]

First, the Obama Administration hopes that a nuclear deal with Iran will be “transformational.” If sanctions are lifted, Iran can be drawn into the larger world. Contact with more liberal societies may—eventually—turn Iran into a “normal,” non-revolutionary state.

Second, the Obama administration sees Iran as a legitimate counter-weight to the Wahhabist version of Islam sponsored by America’s nominal “ally,” Saudi Arabia. Iran has competitive (if not “free”) elections; respect for women beyond the norm in the Muslim world; and real military power that it is willing to use. In contrast, Saudi Arabia is an absolutist monarchy that sponsors the spread of the extremist Wahhabism that can easily turn into Islamic radicalism, but will not use its powerful military for more than air shows.

Third, “America’s interests lie not with either the Saudis or the Iranian ideologues winning, but rather with balancing the two against each other until they get exhausted enough to stop prosecuting their ancient Shi’ite-Sunni, Persian-Arab feud.”

Fourth, “managing the decline of the Arab state system is not a problem [the United States] should own. We’ve amply proved we don’t know how.”

Points worth discussing.

What caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, contact with the West or the inherent stupidity of Communism? Is expanded contact with the West eroding the power of the Chinese Communist Party? These examples go to the “transformational” aspect of the issue.

Is the Obama administration hoping for a Nixon-Kissinger style “opening” (as to China) that will remake the politics of the Middle East? If so, is the game worth the candle? What American interests will be advanced by such an opening? Iran will fight ISIS and Saudi Arabia will back opponents of the Shi’ite government in Baghdad regardless of such a change.

Does the Obama administration accept that we are witnessing the undoing of the Sykes-Picot borders? If so, which borders are likely to be redrawn? Iraq, Syria, and Libya are failed states. What about Saudi Arabia (home to most of the foreign fighters in ISIS) or Egypt?

Finally, Friedman argues that “if one assumes that Iran already has the know-how and tools to build a nuclear weapon, changing the character of the regime is the only way it becomes less threatening.” First, he accepts the thrust of the piece by Broad and Sanger, that Iraq knows how to make a nuclear weapon. (See: A note of caution in Iran.) Second, he argues that changing attitudes is the “only” way to deal with the danger. Really? Soldiers usually plan for an enemy’s capabilities, not his intentions—which can be hard to discern.

[1] Thomas L. Friedman, “Looking Before Leaping,” NYT, 25 March 2015.

Your mind is in the Qatar.

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Qatar is about the size of Connecticut, but has a lot more going for it than insurance companies and casinos on Indian Reservations. Once an impoverished sandlot that lived from the pearl fisheries, Qatar now earns an immense amount of money from the sale of natural gas.

The ruling sheikh, Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani (1952- ,r. 1995-2013) set out to make Qatar “important” to other people. On the one hand, he wants Qatar to be important to Americans in case the neighbors–either Saudi Arabia or Iran—took it into their minds to do his country some nastiness. What Iraq had tried to do to Kuwait in 1990, some other power might do to Qatar. He got the Americans to build a local command center for Central Command (which runs American military operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia) at Doha. He enhanced the importance of Qatar for the world energy market by building a huge natural gas condensing plant to facilitate exports and earnings.

On the other hand, the sheikh wanted to be a player in the Middle East. In 1996 he created the “Al Jazeera” news network to promote an Islamist message. Beginning in 2011, Qatar has been financing upheaval in the Middle East. It has funded both the “Arab Spring” uprisings (which Westerners like to think of as “liberal” and “modernizing”) and Islamist groups (which Westerners think of as “illiberal” and “anti-modern”). Money flowed to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, to Hamas, and to the Al Nusra Front fighting the Assad government in Syria.

Blaming Qatar for pursuing a two-faced policy by seeking close ties to America while funding Islamists groups misses the point. The Middle East is torn in its attitudes toward “modernization” and “Westernization.” Islamism is one face of that controversy. The rise of Islamism threatens the established order in the Middle East. People with an interest in history will note the radical difference between American policy in Europe after the Second World War and contemporary American policy. Then, the Americans had a better solution than its opponents and they were in favor of dramatic change to solve problems. Now, the United States doesn’t appear to have any positive alternative to offer and isn’t comfortable with change.

Qatar falls into a larger pattern. Qatar’s ruler may believe that you can’t get anywhere by pandering to the Americans. You’ll just end up living in Los Angeles and selling rugs at craft fairs. The military government in Egypt and the moderate Islamist government in Turkey also have both bridled at American policy of late. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates combined to bomb rebels in Libya without bothering to inform the United States first. Turkey refuses to have its army fight ISIS until the Americans agree to overthrow the Assad government in Syria.

Qatar also seeks to influence American opinion through “Al Jazeera America” and donations to the Brookings Institution. For American conservatives, this is an illegitimate international influence on American policy. For them, it falls into the same category as Islamist illegals entering the US through our porous border with Mexico. There is another way of looking at it, however. American journalism no longer invests many resources in foreign reporting. American journalists rarely have the language skills or the cultural competence to get outside of a restricted safe zone, either physically or intellectually. (It’s hard to understand the exaggerated importance assigned to the demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square otherwise.) Qatar seeks to enrich the information and perspectives offered to American to help them better understand events in the Middle East. Maybe people should spend more time watching an alternative news source? You don’t have to believe what you see and hear. It’s a free country.

“The tiny nation that roared,” The Week, 27 September 2013, p. 9.

Why the Crimean War mattered

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In the middle of the Nineteenth Century there were five “Great Powers” which charted he course of European diplomacy: the Austrian Empire, the German kingdom of Prussia, France, Britain, and Russia.  Of these, Austria held pride of place.  The Austrian Empire dominated both Germany and Italy, and had an alliance with Russia to maintain the international system created at Vienna after the fall of Napoleon.

To the southeast lay the Ottoman Empire.  In those days it included much of the Balkan Peninsula, the future Arab countries of the Middle East, and modern-day Turkey.  Plagued by centuries of sloth and despotism, the Ottoman Empire had been disintegrating for many years.  Europeans expected it to break up, eventually.  When would that time come and who would gather up the bits and pieces?  This last question put Britain, one of whose “lifelines of Empire” ran through the Eastern Mediterranean, at odds with Russia, which shared a long border with the Ottoman Empire.  When Russia and the Ottomans went to war in 1853, Britain and France (which had its own interests in the Middle East) joined the Ottomans in 1854.

The British Army that went to war against Russia suffered from several disabilities.  First of all, it lived in the shadow of its previous successes.  The most recent and most important of these had come under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington.  Wellington had commanded the British troops fighting against Napoleon’s armies in Spain (1808-1814) and then had defeated Napoleon himself at Waterloo (1815).  Whatever the “Iron Duke” had done was good enough for his successors—even if conditions had change.  The senior ranks of the army were filled with men who had served under the duke in their younger days.  These were now long past, so a virtual living history museum now led the army.  Second, Britain’s subsequent wars had been comparatively small-scale fights in distant India.  Officers drawn from the ranks of the British aristocracy often chose not to accompany British troops to India.  Instead, they allowed professional soldiers from lower social groups to command on foreign duty.  A “European” war against Russia appeared as very different and more acceptable service than did Indian service.  Those with little experience of real war would take command.

The war took place around the edges of the Black Sea, first in the future Rumania, later on the Crimean Peninsula.  The Russians had invaded the Balkan portions of the Ottoman Empire, but had then retreated.  The British and the French decided to invade Russia itself by capturing the port of Sebastopol.  From September 1854 to September 1855 the British and French besieged Sebastopol while other Russian forces tried to raise the siege.  Bloody battles followed at Balaclava, Inkerman, Eupatoria and Tchernaya.  All were defeats for the Russians.  Sebastopol finally surrendered.

The subsequent peace treaty did nothing to solve the problem of Ottoman decadence.  The behavior of the Austrians, who had remained neutral while their Russian ally was beaten, led to Vienna’s isolation when first Italy, then Germany, were united at its expense.  The rise of a powerful Germany, the long-term hostility between Russia and Austria in the Balkans, and the continuing collapse of the Ottoman Empire provided the fuel for the First World War.