Tag Archives: Germany

War Movies: “Anthropoid” (2016).

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If you want a look at a true case of “state-sponsored terrorism” and at one approach to counter-terrorism, watch “Anthropoid” (dir. Sean Ellis, 2016).  It gives a compelling view of the May 1942 assassination of Reinhard Heydrich (the head of the Reich Main Security Office and also “Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia”[1]) and of what followed. 

In the movie, the motive for the assassination is the desire on the part of the Czech government-in-exile to inspire more resistance in the Nazi-occupied country.  The team of killers (Josef Gabcik, Jan Kubis[2]) is air-dropped at night; overcome difficulties to reach Prague; find that the Germans have wrecked the resistance movement and they must rely upon a small group of locals; eventually, they are joined by some other parachutists who had been dropped later; and they improvise an attack on Heydrich.  The German is mortally wounded; a gigantic manhunt begins; the Germans track the parachutists to a Prague church; and one hell of a gunfight ensues.  The few surviving parachutists kill themselves rather than be taken alive. 

The movie strives for realism: it was filmed in Prague and mostly on the sites where events occurred; the pervasive fear of the Germans among the Czechs is brought out, not minimized; the semi-botched assassination is clearly portrayed; and the ferocious Nazi manhunt should leave anyone squirming. 

Still, the movie simplifies or omits some things.  First, it begins with Gabcik and Kubis on the ground in a Czech forest.  The movie elides the origins of “Operation Anthropoid.”  In fact, Eduard Benes, the leader of the Czech government-in-exile, feared that the West would sell out his country after the war if the Czechs didn’t show some fight.  The British and French had surrendered the Sudetenland to Hitler at Munich (September 1938) and had shrugged their shoulders when Germany occupied the rest of the country (March 1939).  Several thousand Czech soldiers had found their way to the West before the Second World War began (September 1939), but this wasn’t much of a contribution.  Internal resistance had mostly been the work of the Czech Communist Party after Germany attacked the Soviet Union (June 1941).  If the Germans lost the war, the Communists might claim a moral right to rule as the only true “resisters.”   A dramatic act might arouse non-Communist resistance, but it would surely make the government-in-exile appear to be doing something.  So, kill Heydrich now for a distant gain.    

Second, Heydrich had crushed the resistance by a combination of carrot and stick.  He had good material.  Few Czechs wanted to run risks for the sake of the Western powers that had betrayed them before.  Wages and working conditions in factories were improved at the same time that Gestapo penetration agents combatted the Communist underground. 

Third, the Germans unleashed a savage response to the attack on Heydrich.  Mass arrests; right to torture in the pursuit of some clue; massacres of villages on the mere rumor that someone had sheltered the killers.  In a society where few people actually backed resistance, this worked.  Finally, one of the parachutists betrayed someone else to save his own family; and the betrayed finally gave up the hiding place of the other parachutists. 

“The Battle of Algiers” openly confronts truths that “Anthropoid” skims over. 

[1] Also the driving force behind the implementation of the Holocaust.  On this, see: “Conspiracy” (dir. Frank Pierson, 2001), with Kenneth Branagh as Heydrich and Stanley Tucci as Adolf Eichmann. 

[2] Played by Cillian Murphy and Jamie Dornan respectively. 

An Episode of Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Pact, June 1935 4.

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            Having decided to accept the German proposal for talks on a naval agreement, the government spent the next few months quietly setting the stage.  First, in January 1935, the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, informed King George V that an agreement might help get Germany back into “the comity of nations.”  In February 1935, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald met with the then very anti-German French Prime Minister Pierre Laval.  The “communique” afterward expressed their hope that talks with Germany would lead to enhanced security in Europe.  In late March 1935, Simon had a preliminary meeting with Hitler in Berlin.  The German dictator told Simon that he was done with the arms limitations imposed by Versailles Treaty.  Germany would expand its army from the 100,000-man limit imposed by Versailles to 500,000 men, begin conscription, and build an air force.  However, Hitler would make commitments to Britain to limit naval forces.  Hitler also announced that Joachim von Ribbentrop, a Nazi schemer, rather than an experienced diplomat, would lead the German delegation in such talks. 

Yet no talks began.  The British foreign policy-makers were divided in their attitudes.  Sir Robert Vansittart, the chief British diplomat, believed that Hitler meant to conquer all of Europe, so the best solution was a strong alliance with France, Italy, and even the Soviet Union if necessary.  Anthony Eden, the second-ranking political figure at the Foreign Office, wanted British commitment to Western Europe, but would abandon Eastern Europe; he also put more stock in the League of Nations than in an Italian alliance.  Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, had no views of his own and went where Vansittart pushed. 

The British were busy negotiating the “Stresa Pact” with France and Italy.  Signed on 14 April 1935, it committed Britain, France, and Italy to resist any future German violations of the Versailles Treaty.  The Stresa Pact” could not be squared with a bilateral Anglo-German agreement to violate the naval limits in the treaty. 

At the end of April 1935, the Germans prodded the British by informing them that they had launched new U-Boats and had begun construction of 12 more.  They meant “We’re going ahead; with or without you.”  This got the British moving.  On 29 April 1935, Simon told the House of Commons that Germany had begun building U-Boats; on 2 May 1935, Prime Minister MacDonald told the Commons that he would seek a naval agreement with Germany. 

Things moved fast.  Ribbentrop came to London on 2 June 1935.  On 4 June, he told the British that Germany would accept the 35 percent ratio, but nothing less, and that the British had a few days to decide.  Simon, the Foreign Secretary, walked out in answer to such rude behavior.  Stil, on 5 June the government accepted Ribbentrop’s proposal.  Two days later, Simon left the Foreign Office and Sir Samuel Hoare became Foreign Secretary.  During further discussions, the Germans accepted the British requirement that the German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy.  The two parties signed the completed agreement on 18 June 1935. 

The Anglo-German agreement enraged the French.  Britain had not consulted the French or the Italians.  The agreement of the British and Germans to “legalize” a violation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty could not be squared with the “Stresa Pact.”  It appeared to fall into the tradition of “Perfidious Albion.”  It’s hard to form an alliance against a common danger when the parties don’t trust each other.  That’s part of the story of appeasement. 

An Episode of Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 3.

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            Adolf Hitler’s view of Britain wavered between implacable foe and natural partner in a division of the world.  In Mein Kampf (1925), he castigated Imperial Germany for pursuing a pointless fleet-building program that forced Britain into alliance with its traditional colonial enemies France and Russia.  In the “Hossbach Memorandum” (1937) he described both France and Britain as “hate-filled” opponents who would never accept Germany’s revival.  In 1934-1935 he still had hopes of winning over Britain, if only to disrupt the emerging Franco-British-Italian common front. 

            In November 1934, the Germans told the British that they wanted to reach a bilateral agreement that would allow the Germany navy to rise to 35 percent of the British navy.[1]  The offer simultaneously attracted and disturbed the British.  The Germans seemed bent on rearming in defiance of the Versailles Treaty in any case.  The British most feared German bombing of cities.  An agreement on navies could lead to an agreement on air forces.  So, the German offer deserved consideration. 

Several questions had to be resolved.  First, could Britain tolerate ANY German naval rearmament?  The Royal Navy had to be dispersed to meet its global responsibilities, while a German fleet would be concentrated in the North Sea and North Atlantic.  Could Britain defend itself in Europe against a fleet one-third the size of the Royal Navy? 

Second, would it be best to shape that rearmament to the kind of German fleet would be easiest to deal with?  Would such a German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy (in battle ships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines)?  Or would it be a “lighter” fleet organized for attacking merchant shipping (lots of submarines and light cruisers, but few battleships)? 

Third, British rearmament would prioritize the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, while German rearmament was already prioritizing the Army (Wehrmacht) and the Air Force (Luftwaffe).  Both the British Army and the Germany Navy got the leftovers.  Expert opinion held that the Germany Navy would not reach 35 percent of the present Royal Navy until 1942.  By that time the Royal Navy would have been greatly expanded.  The Germans would never really catch up.  Seen from this perspective, a naval agreement might be a strategically meaningless concession while perhaps improving the climate of relations between the two countries.  A more meaningful agreement on air forces might follow. 

Fourth, the agreement could create diplomatic problems with the French.  Britain and France were working up a common front with Italy to check further German violations of Versailles.[2]  A bilateral agreement to end the naval disarmament conditions of the multi-lateral Versailles Treaty would be understood in France as both slimy and a betrayal. 

            Committees considered the issues.  They concluded that a German fleet 35 percent the size of the Royal Navy marked the maximum that could be accepted, but it could be accepted.  It would be best to insist upon a symmetrical fleet to short-stop one organized for a “guerre de course.”  A naval agreement should be followed by pursuit of an agreement on air forces.  Finally, “the French be damned” went unspoken, but not unthought. 

[1] Joseph Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: Appeasement and the Origins of

the Second World War in Europe (1998). 

[2] See No more coals to Newcastle. | waroftheworldblog 

An Episode in Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 2.

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            Various “truths” emerged from the early histories of the origins of the First World War.  Prominent among them: arms races lead to war, so—by implication–disarmament would lead to peace.   The reasoning behind this “truth” ran something like the following.  Military equality led to stability.  Military inequality led to instability.  Military inequality could emerge from either countries creating larger armies or from new technologies.  Imbalances of either sort created a sense of insecurity on the weaker side and aggressive behavior on the stronger side.  Building up one’s own power to restore stability became an entrenched response.  Mutual fear and suspicion became entrenched, building up psychological tension.  Linked to this idea of a spiral of power and fear, was a belief that the “Merchants of Death” (MOD) winding-up governments and publics in order to increase their profits.  Corrupt politicians and journalists served the MOD as the agents of influence.  After the war, disarmament became one chief purpose of diplomacy. 

            Therefore, naval armaments remained a live subject after the First World War.  The Washington Naval Conference (1922) had agreed on a ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 in the number of battleships and battlecruisers between Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy.  The Geneva Naval Conference (1927) tried and failed to strike an agreement on the size and number of cruisers.  The American and British concepts could not be reconciled.[1]  The issues were revived, and this time agreed upon, in the London Naval Treaty (1930).  The countries compromised on different classes of cruisers, while also limiting submarines and destroyers.[2] 

Germany participated in none of these conferences because its navy had been severely limited by the Versailles Treaty.  The Versailles Treaty did allow Germany to replace existing ships once they were at least 20 years old.  The oldest of its battleships had been built in 1902, so by the mid-Twenties, Germany designed a new type of ship, the “Panzerkreuzer” (or “pocket battleship”).  When the wartime Allies learned of these ships, they tried to prevent their construction.  Germany offered to not build the ships in exchange for admission to the Washington naval treaty with a limit of 125,000 tons.  The Americans and British were willing to appease German demands, but the French refused. 

Meanwhile, Germany argued that either all countries should disarm or Germany should be allowed to rearm to the level of other countries.  The League of Nations and many right-thinking people took this argument at face value, so it sponsored a World Disarmament Conference (1932-1933). 

Mid-stream, Hitler came to power, abandoned the Disarmament Conference (October 1933), and announced that Germany would rearm in defiance of the Versailles Treaty.  On the one hand, this tipped Britan toward a policy of gradual rearmament (1935-1939).[3]  On the other hand, it led to the creation of the Stresa Agreement (14 April 1935) between Britain, France, and Italy to resist future German violations of Versailles.  Could the “allies” maintain solidarity?  Yet no British leader wanted war.  Could Germany be either deterred or appeased?  

[1] The British wanted more light cruisers for protecting imperial trade routes, the Americans wanted fewer, but heavier cruisers.  The Japanese wanted a ratio of 70 percent of the American fleet, not the same 5:5:3 ratio of 1922. 

[2] One effect of the naval treaties combined with the Great Depression appeared in the collapse of the British shipbuilding industry.  Beating arms into breadlines, so to speak. 

[3] British rearmament in the Thirties. | waroftheworldblog 

A Piece of Resistance.

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            Nationalism preaches that all the people speaking the same language should be grouped together in one independent country.  Nationalism came to Rumania in the later 19th Century, when part of it escaped from the Ottoman Empire to form the new country.  However, many Rumanian-speakers still lived outside the country.  After Russia collapsed into revolution and civil war during the First World War, Rumania grabbed the mostly-Rumanian territory of Bessarabia (1918). 

            Anti-Semitism walked in daylight in Rumania.[1]  Jews had no rights and could not be citizens.  Most lived in miserable poverty.  A large Jewish community lived in Bessarabia, so the change of borders brought them under Rumanian rule.  In 1923, a new constitution—imposed by the Western powers—granted Jews citizenship.  Nothing else changed.  Many Jews pined for the Soviet Union which they believed to be a socialist utopia where religion didn’t matter. 

            Baruch Bruhman (1908-2004) began life as a Jewish Russian subject in Bessarabia; then became Rumanian.[2]  He rejected everything about the Rumanian state: he joined the illegal Communist Party (1929); went to jail for it (1930); deserted from the army during compulsory service (1932); went to jail for it; did organizational work for the Communist Party; fled to Czechoslovakia one step ahead of the police (1936); went to France to join the International Brigades fighting in the Spanish Civil War (1938), but arrived too late; worked for the French Communist Party (PCF) for a year; and enlisted in the French Foreign Legion under the name Boris Holban when the Second World War broke out (1939).[3] 

            The Germans captured Holban in June 1940, but he escaped in December 1940 and returned to Paris.  In June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union.  All foreign Communist parties were ordered to attack the Germans to divert troops from the Russian front.  The PCF knew that the Germans would shoot a lot of French civilian hostages in reprisal.  Holban had spent his life on the run and had been to war.  The PCF set him to recruiting immigrant workers to kill Germans.  Holban found Rumanians, Hungarians, Poles, and Italians willing to fight the Germans.  Most were Jews and veterans of Spain.  If Germany won, they were doomed. 

            From August 1942 to June 1943, Holban’s group derailed trains, attacked factories, and killed 83 Germans on the streets of Paris.  Both the Germans and the French police hunted the “terrorists.”  Holban fell out with his PCF bosses.  They wanted more attacks; he wanted to slow down while concentrating on security.  In July 1943, Holban was replaced by Missak Manouchian, who accelerated attacks.  Then Manouchian was caught.  The PCF brought Holban back to run a rat-hunt for whoever had betrayed the group (December 1943). 

            Returning to now-Communist Rumania after the war, Holban soon fell into the whirlpool of the Stalinist purges.  Many years later, after he had re-settled in France (1984), he was accused of betraying Manouchian.  A storm followed, but Holban was proved innocent. 

            A puzzle: Was this Jewish resistance or Communist resistance or French resistance? 

[1] Even if vampires did not.  See: Bram Stoker, Dracula (1897); “Nosferatu” (dir. F. W. Murnau, 1922). 

[2] Renee Poznansky, Jews in France during World War II (2001). 

[3] This is very significant.  In August 1939, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin did a deal with German dictator Adolf Hitler.  The Soviet Union would remain neutral in any war between Germany and other countries.  All foreign Communist parties were ordered to oppose their own nation’s war effort.  Bruhman/Holban was defying orders. 

An Episode in Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 1.

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            To put it mildly, France and Britain had a long history of conflict.[1]  Beginning in the 1890s, however, Germany’s pursuit of a large navy threatened Britain’s long-standing policy of maintaining naval dominance in order to safeguard the empire.  Britain responded to Germany’s fleet construction by settling many of its outstanding international conflicts and drawing closer to France.  The two countries fought shoulder to shoulder (although not without some elbows being thrown) during the First World War. 

            Once victory over Germany had been won, Britain and France began to drift apart.  First, the Versailles Treaty deprived Germany of a real navy.  The end of German naval power removed a thorn from the lion’s paw.  Britain’s policy turned to other things.[2]  Second, Anglo-American fair words and promises persuaded the French to back off their most extreme demands for guarantees against any revival of German power.[3]  Third, the two countries diverged on policy toward Central and Eastern Europe.  American repudiation of the security guarantee for France made the French all the more determined to strictly enforce the remaining terms.  This led to the Ruhr Crisis and the near-collapse of the German economy.[4]  That added to the chaos in Central and Eastern Europe.   

Yet Britain desired a restoration of stability in the region in hopes of creating markets for its troubled economy.  Later (in 1935), a diplomat at Britain’s Foreign Office would observe that “… from the earliest years following the war it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew to be unstable and indefensible.”[5]  Anglo-American financial pressure led France to accept a reduction in German reparations to a level that the Germans might be willing to pay, at least for a while.  This was the Dawes Plan.[6]  Then British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain[7] helped negotiate the Locarno treaty (1925).[8]  The treaty offered a general British guarantee of the existing frontiers in Western Europe.  However, the treaty offered nothing similar in Eastern Europe where France sought anti-German alliances among the “successor states” (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia).  If a future Germany attacked one of France’s allies, France would attack Germany.  However, the Locarno Treaty might require Britain to come to the aid of Germany, rather than France.  None of this was “good” from the French point of view.  It was merely the best that could be won under the circumstances. 

French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand tried to make the best of a bad deal.  His approach to the Americans about an alliance produced a meaningless general treaty open to all.  The “Kellogg-Briand Pact” (1928) renounced “aggressive war as an instrument of national policy.”  Even Weimar Germany signed. 

[1] History of France–United Kingdom relations – Wikipedia  Very sketchy, but you’ll get the drift: war, truce, war. 

[2] “Now that I’ve eaten, I see things in a different light.”—Groucho Marx. 

[3] The Americans soon repudiated their guarantee by refusing ratification of the Versailles treaty. 

[4] Occupation of the Ruhr – Wikipedia 

[5] Part of this sprang from the de-legitimation of the Versailles Treaty by people like Keynes and Sydney Fay. 

[6] Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan.   

[7] Older half-brother of the future Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. 

[8] Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929.    

Background to the Nuremberg Trials.

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            Some soldiers (both commanders and their troops) have always behaved atrociously in war-time.  (Take a look at the Old Testament.)  Certain kinds of self-restraint in wartime grew up as a form of self-preservation.  You didn’t want to establish a policy of the victor slaughtering the vanquished if you might lose the next battle.  Still, there were always exceptions to such self-restraint.  People of different social groups within your own society or different races outside your society could not expect such treatment.  Neither European Americans nor Native Americans were much inclined to give the other side quarter. 

            This began to change during the 18th Century.  The Enlightenment established the idea of Humanitarian action.  Many Europeans and Americans turned against traditional practices like the use of torture as part of a judicial inquiry, human slavery, and the intolerance of religious difference.  Then the 19th Century witnessed a number of important reforms: compulsory, free public primary education, and the construction of sewer and clean drinking water systems to conquer diseases are two examples of these reforms.  The same effort to make human life better appeared in warfare.  The International Red Cross exemplified this trend. 

            The new mood led to international agreements (conventions) governing the conduct of war.  The First Geneva Convention (1864) defined the proper treatment of wounded and sick soldiers.  Forty thousand wounded soldiers had been left lying around the battlefield at Solferino.  The Hague Convention (1899) banned bombing from the air, the use of poison gas, and dum-dum bullets.  The Second Geneva Convention (1906) extended the First Geneva Convention to cover sailors in navies.  While the first two Geneva Conventions were generally observed by all countries that fought in the First World War, they often were violated in the Second World War and the Hague Convention has been widely ignored in greater or lesser degree. 

            The Allies were outraged by the behavior of the Central Powers during the First World War.  An effort was made to prosecute Ottoman leaders and commanders for the “crime against humanity” of the Armenian genocide.  This failed because of the obstruction of the Turks.  Also after the First World War, the British and the French tried to prosecute some German leaders for the way in which Germany had conducted war.  The Versailles Peace Treaty required Germany to turn over a number of military and civilian officials for trial by a military tribunal of the victor powers.  The Dutch refused to turn over the Kaiser (who had abdicated in November 1918) and the Germans refused to extradite the men demanded by the Allies.  Instead, a handful of lesser figures were tried at Leipzig in 1921, mostly on charges of mistreating prisoners.  The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) renounced “aggressive war as an instrument of national policy.”  This made war a “crime against peace.”  Germany signed.  The Third Geneva Convention (1929) set rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. 

            In January 1942 British, American, and Russian lawyers began writing a law that would allow the punishment of Germany’s leaders once Germany had been defeated.  At the Teheran Conference (November 1943), the irrepressible Joe Stalin suggested shooting 50,000-100,000 German officers and letting it go at that.  After the Moscow Conference (later in November 1943), the Allies announced that Germans who had committed atrocities would be sent to those countries where they had committed the crimes for trial, while the top leaders would be judged by the Allies.  Germany surrendered in May 1945.  In August 1945 the victors announced the terms of the trials.  In addition to all those to be tried for “war crimes” as then understood, the Nazi leaders would be tried for “crimes against humanity” (see: Armenian genocide) and “crimes against peace” (see: Kellogg-Briand Pact).  This set the stage for the Nuremberg Trials. 

The Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937.

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            After the Second World War, the victors grabbed up all the surviving Nazi leaders and put them on trial at Nuremberg.  In the mass trial, one piece of evidence introduced by the prosecutors was the so-called “Hossbach Memorandum.”  They argued that the document from late 1937 demonstrated Hitler’s determination to wage aggressive war.  It’s worth taking a look at the essentials of the document to understand the international situation in Europe during the run-up to war in 1939. 

What is the source of the document? 

Documents on Germany Foreign Policy 1918-1945
Series D, Volume 1: From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937 – September 1938)
(Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1949.)[1] 

What is the Hossbach memorandum? 

            It is NOT a complete transcript of what was said at the meeting.  Instead, the secretary, Hitler’s adjutant Colonel Hossbach, took rapid fire notes, then cleaned up and fleshed out those notes for the archive.  That doesn’t mean that it is unreliable.  The ability to take such notes and produce a generally acceptable summary of the meeting formed one of the qualifications for someone in Hossbach’s position.  The archives of governments are full of such documents. 

When?  November 5, 1937, FROM 4:15 to 8:30 P.M

Who was present? 

The Fuehrer[2] and Chancellor.

Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister.
Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army.   
Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy.
Colonel General Goring, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe.  [NB: The only Nazi other than Hitler.] 
Baron [Konstantin] von Neurath, Foreign Minister.  
Colonel [Friedrich] Hossbach.  Secretary. 

What was the context of the conference?

1919-1924: France creates a system of alliances in Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia) to sorta replace the lost Russian alliance. 

1933-34: Hitler comes to power and consolidates the Nazi dictatorship.  

1934-1935: Political turmoil in France resulting from the Stavisky Scandal and the events of 6 February 1934.  Sharp divide between Left and Right. 

1935: Germany begins rearmament. 

1935: Britain begins rearmament, but chiefly with the hope of deterring German aggression. 

1935: Stresa Front.  Britain, France, and Italy agree to oppose any further German violations of the Versailles Treaty. 

1935: Italian invasion of Ethiopia led to a split with France and Britain, which raised the possibility of a war in the Mediterranean. 

1936: Germany re-occupies the Rhineland. 

1936: Popular Front [NB: alliance of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties] comes to power in France.  Economic turmoil and political polarization follows.  NB: The Radicals were middle-class and basically conservative.  The usual joke is that “they had their hearts on the left and their wallets on the right.” 

1936: Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).  Germany and Italy aid the rebels led by Franco; Russia aids the Republic’s government; Britain and France try to stay neutral. 

1937: Japanese invasion of China.  Threatens Western possessions and trade rights.  Australia, New Zealand, and Canada alarmed.  This raises the prospect of a war in the Far East. 

Brief exposition of Hitler’s ideas of race and living space. 

            Race: Basically, Aryans versus Latins and Slav “untermenschen.”  Doesn’t get into his thoughts on Jews. 

            Space: The borders of Germany created by Bismarck (1866-1871) were a temporary compromise.  Now they were insufficient to German needs for a resource base.  Britain had a vast overseas empire; Russia and the United States had whole continents.  Germany needs land and natural resources to stand on a level with these other empires. 

Discussion of “Autarky.”  (Isolation from the world economy.) 

Participation in the world economy.  (Alternative to autarky.) 

            Britain and France: two hate-inspired powers.  NB: They aren’t going to share. 

“Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. The campaigns of Frederick the Great for Silesia and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had involved unheard-of risk, and the swiftness of the Prussian action in 1870 had kept Austria from entering the war. If one accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remain still to be answered the questions “when” and “how.” In this matter there were three cases [Falle] to be dealt with.” 

Three cases:

Case 1: Period 1943-1945.  Germany would decline relative to other powers after this time.  Therefore, Germany had to take action by this period. 

Case 2: Civil war in France.  That would keep the French from interfering in German action. 

Case 3: France at war with some other power, like Italy. 

In case of war with France, Germany’s first step must be to over-throw Czechoslovakia and Austria to remove the danger of an attack if things began to go badly for Germany in the west.  That would also insure that the Poles remained neutral. 

Looking forward to 1943-1945, Hitler foresaw the following. 

“Actually, the Fuehrer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question could be cleared up in due course by Germany.”  NB: Munich Conference, September 1938. 

“Military intervention by Russia must be countered by the swiftness of our operations; however, whether such an intervention was a practical contingency at all was, in view of Japan’s attitude, more than doubtful.”  NB: Japanese leaders debated attacking South (Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, French Indo-China) OR attacking North (Russian Far East). 

“Should case 2 arise -the crippling of France by civil war- the situation thus created by the elimination of the most dangerous opponent must he seized upon whenever it occurs for the blow against the Czechs.” 

“The Fuehrer saw case 3 [i.e. war between France and Italy] coming definitely nearer; it might emerge from the present tensions in the Mediterranean, and he was resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938.”  NB: Spanish Civil War provides one possible cause of war between France and someone else, but the Italians were winding up Arab nationalists in French-ruled Syria and Tunisia.  Germany occupied French attention, but what if a fit of Gallic vivacity caused the French to decide to sort out Mussolini? 

“If Germany made use of this war [between Italy and France-Britain] to settle the Czech and Austrian questions, it was to be assumed that Britain -herself at war with Italy- would decide not to act against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany was not to be expected.” 

How did the German generals respond to this exposition?

“In appraising the situation Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Fritsch repeatedly emphasized the necessity that Britain and France must not appear in the role of our enemies, and stated that the French Army would not be so committed by the war with Italy that France could not at the same time enter the field with forces superior to ours on our western frontier.  NB: The French could bust up the Italians without much effort.  Enjoy it too. 

General von Fritsch estimated the probable French forces available for use on the Alpine frontier at approximately twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on the western frontier, with the role, according to the German view, of invading the Rhineland. In this matter, moreover, the advanced state of French defense preparations [Mobilmachung] must be taken into particular account, and it must be remembered apart from the insignificant value of our present fortifications -on which Field Marshal von Blomberg laid special emphasis- that the four motorized divisions intended for the West were still more or less incapable of movement.

In regard to our offensive toward the southeast, Field Marshal von Blomberg drew particular attention to the strength of the Czech fortifications, which had acquired by now a structure like a Maginot Line and which would gravely hamper our attack.” 

“Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume.” 

Hitler responds:

“To the Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume, the Fuehrer put the summer of 1938 as the date which seemed to him possible for this.  [NB: How far away is that?] 

In reply to considerations offered by Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch regarding the attitude of Britain and France, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France against Germany.  NB: “These are not the Britain and France of 1914.  I can smell their fear.”  That’s what I think he means. 

Should the Mediterranean conflict under discussion lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we must immediately begin action against the Czechs. On the other hand, should the powers not engaged in the war declare themselves disinterested, then Germany would have to adopt a similar attitude to this for the time being.”

What events followed?

January-February 1938: Blomberg forced to resign in late January 1938 after the scandalous past of his new wife became known to the secret police; Fritsch forced to resign in early February 1938 after falsified allegations of homosexuality (worked up by Reinhard Heydrich, Goring’s right-hand man).  Hossbach had warned Fritsch about the scheme, so he was dismissed as Hitler’s adjutant two days later.

Early February 1938: Neurath: fired as Foreign Minister. 

March 1938: Germany suddenly annexes Austria. 

August-September 1938: Czech crisis led to the Munich settlement, giving Germany the Sudetenland. 

1938: Tide of battle turned decisively against the Republicans in Spain, although they remained in possession of large parts of the country. 

March 1939: Germany seizes the rest of Czechoslovakia.   Britain and France then extended a “guarantee” of the remaining existing borders in Central Europe.  In practice, this meant Poland. 

Summer 1939: France and Britain begin talks with the Soviet Union for a military alliance. 

What can we tell about Hitler’s intentions from this document? 

            Is the Hossbach Memorandum a “blueprint” for the war that came in September 1939? 

            Or is it something much more limited than that? 

            Is Hitler irrational and fantasizing in his analysis of the political situation? 

            Or is Hitler a hard-headed and cold-hearted realist? 

            What if the conference between Hitler and his military commanders and head diplomat wasn’t about informing them of his plans?  What if he just wanted to smoke-out any opposition to whatever it was that he wanted to do? 

            What would Neville Chamberlain have made of this document if he had the opportunity to read it between November 1937 (when it was created) and the annexation of Austria in March 1938 or the Munich conference in September 1938? 

            This last question is the premise for the historical thriller Munich, by Robert Harris (2017).  It was made into a Netflix movie, “Munich: The Edge of War” (2021) with Jeremy Irons as Neville Chamberlain. 

[1] In Spring 1945, specially created Anglo-American expert teams were sent to Germany to search for political and economic archives, particularly those which shed light on the origins of the war, and Germany’s operations and war aims. The experts assembled several tons of German Foreign Ministry documents discovered in the Harz Mountains and Thuringia, together with documents from other places of deposit at Marburg Castle. These established a unified collection of the captured material.  Subsequently, the documents were both microfilmed and translated and published on paper.  The originals were later returned to the government of the German Federal Republic. 

[2] “Leader”: title assumed by Hitler after the death of President von Hindenburg in 1934 when Hitler combined the offices of President and Chancellor (prime minister). 

British rearmament in the Thirties.

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            The government had ended the “Ten Year Rule” in 1932, but continued to hold down defense spending.  Then, in October 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference.  This tipped the balance toward rearmament. 

            In November 1933, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) formed a “Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC).”  Its mission was to identify the worst gaps in the military forces, plan how to meet them, and to make broad judgements about strategy.  By July 1934 it identified Germany as the primary danger and determined that Britain should avoid conflict with Japan.  Also, the DRC adopted a five-year time-line for rearmament (1934-1939).[1]  In March 1935, the government broke decisively in favor of rearmament.

            Having made the decision to rearm in a hurry, all went smoothly, no?  No.  The DRC proposed increasing military spending by £71 million over the five years, much of it on the Army.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer[2] imposed important changes.  First, he cut the total to £50 million.  Second, he cut the money for the Army in half, while doubling the proposed spending on the Royal Air Force (RAF).  He placed the emphasis squarely on home defense.  Henceforth, rearmament would involve constant tension between the armed services and the Treasury, with the Foreign Office getting buffeted between them. 

Defense spending rose from £37.2 million (1934) to £42.6 million (1935) to £60.7 million (1936) to £104.2 million (1937) to £182.2 million (1938) to £273.1 million (1939).  Almost half went to the Navy each year with the RAF receiving over half of the remainder.[3]    

What did Britain get for the money and how soon?  First and foremost, the RAF got thousands of modern, all-metal, single wing fighter planes–the Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane–which were to play such an important role in the Battle of Britain.  In addition, money went to development of radar for air defense control.[4]  In addition, a good deal of the expanded Army budget went to anti-aircraft artillery for home defense.  Second, the Navy received five new battleships, several aircraft carriers, and a host of light cruisers, while several older battleships were totally modernized.  Also, the defenses of the Singapore Base were hurried to conclusion as a stop-gap defense against Japan.  The Army largely got skint.  It could field only five divisions for service on the Continent.  Finally, industrial production saw improvements, both through the increased spending for the Royal Ordnance Factories (essentially bullets and shells), and through “Shadow Factories” (government-aided factories to expand aircraft production).[5] 

Britain had to try to avoid war until the program had been completed.  Until then,…

[1] Which would suggest that the “Ten-Year Rule” should have foreseen war in 1929.  But that is ridiculous.  It shows how fast things can change in human affairs. 

[2] Neville Chamberlin served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from November 1931 to May 1937, when he became Prime Minister. 

[3] Michael M. Postan, British War Production, Official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, Chapter II, p. 12, at HyperWar: British War Production [Chapter II]  On Postan, see: Michael Postan – Wikipedia 

[4] The prioritization of the RAF over the Army, but not over the Navy, reflected a fear of the danger from enemy bombing.  See: Chain Home – Wikipedia, especially the section “The bomber will always get through.”  It also demonstrates the initially defensive and deterrent nature of British rearmament. 

[5] British shadow factories – Wikipedia 

Why did Britain hesitate to rearm in the Thirties?

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            Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany at a particularly difficult time for Britain.  The decision to re-arm, to prepare for another great war—even if could be limited to a merely “European War”[1]—proved agonizing and divisive. 

On the one hand, Britain faced the Great Depression which drove up unemployment, forced Britain off the Gold Standard (21 September 1931), and began the process of converting Britain from a policy of free trade to a system of protective tariffs.[2]  The tariffs went into effect in February 1932.  They encouraged import-substitute re-industrialization.  By one later estimate, the tariffs led to a rise of real annual GDP by 4 percent (1932-37), on a par with Nazi Germany.  These events marked a dramatic turning point in Britain’s national policies. 

The ship’s pilot guiding this turn was Neville Chamberlain.[3]  Having devoted his political career to domestic reform, he foresaw the GDP growth serving to revitalize the British economy through industrial modernization and a social policy that eased old divisions, rather than preparation for another world war.[4]  Threatened by Japan in the Far East, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule” (March 1932).  Even so, the government remained preoccupied by the “very serious financial and economic situation.”  It was determined to resist big increases in military spending. 

On the other hand, the forces opposed to war and the preparation for war occupied a strong position in political.  These forces coalesced around the League of Nations.  Although the League had been the brain-child of American President Woodrow Wilson, it found its strongest popular support in Britain.  Britain’s League of Nations Union acted as a powerful pressure-group.[5]  Its goals were to promote international justice and human rights; disarmament and the settlement of international conflicts by peaceful means; and reliance upon collective security, rather than alliances.[6]  Membership rose from about 250,000 in the mid-Twenties to over 400,000 in 1931. 

Anti-militarism became a public fixture in the early Thirties.  Examples include the Oxford “King and Country” debate (February 1933); the East Fulham by-election, in which the peace candidate thrashed the rearmament candidate (October 1933); the “Peace Ballot,” (results June 1935), which strongly endorsed League membership, universal disarmament, abolition of air forces and the arms industry, and collective security against aggression; and the ferocious opposition to the Hoare-Laval Pact (December 1935).  This only worked if everyone played.    

            Hitler’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference (October 1933) ended real hope. 

[1] John Lukacs, The Last European War: September 1939-December 1941 (1976). 

[2] See: Import Duties Act 1932 – Wikipedia  This Act formed a first step in a much larger plan.  In Summer 1932, representatives of Britain and the Dominions met in Ottawa.  They agreed upon a policy of high tariffs around the Empire; low tariffs within the Empire; and Keynesian ideas about demand management (low interest rates, increased government spending).  See: British Empire Economic Conference – Wikipedia for an under-developed sketch. 

[3] Neville Chamberlain – Wikipedia 

[4] For some of the National government’s social reforms, see: Unemployment Act 1934 – Wikipedia;

 Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934 – Wikipedia; Special Areas (Amendment) Act 1937 – Wikipedia; Factory Acts – Wikipedia; Coal Act 1938 – Wikipedia; Holidays with Pay Act 1938 – Wikipedia;

[5] Members of the Liberal Party provided much of the leadership for the group, but important Conservatives also joined.  At the same time, many Conservative politicians and voters saw the League as ridiculous.

[6] See: Collective security – Wikipedia, and Disarmament – Wikipedia.  Both have useful bibliographies.