In the wake of the Second World War, Western European countries pondered some form of “unity.”  At first, this meant unity “at the peak”: countries surrendering some measure of sovereignty to form a “European” government.  This went nowhere.  So, attention turned to unity “at the base”: create specialized “European” institutions and let it cook.  This approach soon gave birth to the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC, Schuman Plan).  It worked once, so try it in other areas (Common Market, Euratom). 

            The “wake of the Second World War” broadly overlapped the “dawning of the Cold War.”  The Americans and the Europeans shared an interest in preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe.[1]  Eventually (1947-), this led to the Marshall Plan and some CIA meddling in French and Italian elections.  Still, what if the Red Army marched west?  Military security rose up as an issue.  One part of the answer came in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  The United States would keep troops in Europe as a “trip wire.”[2] 

            In dealing with these problems, “Europe” faced three problems.  First, the British didn’t want to join.[3]  Second, how were countries to reconcile with the Germans?  Third, Many American officials disdained the Europeans.  The purpose of Marshall Plan aid was “to get the Europeans on their feet and off our back.” 

            Then, in June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea.  The “Cold War” wasn’t just going to be an economic and political struggle in Western Europe.  It could also be a military struggle.  American troops might have to be sent to the Far East or the Middle East.  So, Western Europeans would have to bulk-up their military forces.  In September 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed re-arming West Germany.  The European responded with dismay.[4] 

            The “European integration” and American military themes soon came together.  In October 1950, French Defense Minister Rene Pleven suggested the creation of a “European Defense Community” to create a “European Army.”  West German troops would be raised, but would not be formed into units larger than battalion.  The German battalions would be mixed with troops from other countries and the higher commands would be held only by non-Germans.  The Americans reluctantly agreed if this was the only way to get West German troops. 

            Negotiation of the treaty dragged on for a year and a half.  The size of the German units rose to divisions, not battalions; and the European Army would be under the American commander of NATO, rather than independent.  After signatures (May 1952), the treaty went back to the national parliaments for ratification.  In the meantime, the context changed.  The Korean War ended in a truce; Joseph Stalin died and was succeeded by more moderate seeming men.  The EDC seemed less urgent.  The French parliament rejected the treaty (August 1954). 

            Afterwards, NATO admitted West Germany (and its army).  Europe enjoyed American nuclear “extended deterrence.”  Eventually, the Soviet Union fell.  Who needed armies now?[5] 

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[1] Not much could be done about Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe what with the Red Army being what it was. 

[2] If Red Army troops attacked American troops, then nuclear weapons could come into play. 

[3] The British—understandably, labored under the illusion that they ranked among the “victors.”  In fact, Britain had suffered the ruin of its economy and loss of will to hold its empire.  Which is what Neville Chamberlain had feared. 

[4] See Category:Nazi war crimes in France – Wikipedia 

[5] European defense spending has fallen from 3.76 percent of GDP (1960) to 1.56 percent (2022).  That’s 58 percent.  European Union Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2025 | MacroTrends