The government had ended the “Ten Year Rule” in 1932, but continued to hold down defense spending. Then, in October 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference. This tipped the balance toward rearmament.
In November 1933, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) formed a “Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC).” Its mission was to identify the worst gaps in the military forces, plan how to meet them, and to make broad judgements about strategy. By July 1934 it identified Germany as the primary danger and determined that Britain should avoid conflict with Japan. Also, the DRC adopted a five-year time-line for rearmament (1934-1939).[1] In March 1935, the government broke decisively in favor of rearmament.
Having made the decision to rearm in a hurry, all went smoothly, no? No. The DRC proposed increasing military spending by £71 million over the five years, much of it on the Army. The Chancellor of the Exchequer[2] imposed important changes. First, he cut the total to £50 million. Second, he cut the money for the Army in half, while doubling the proposed spending on the Royal Air Force (RAF). He placed the emphasis squarely on home defense. Henceforth, rearmament would involve constant tension between the armed services and the Treasury, with the Foreign Office getting buffeted between them.
Defense spending rose from £37.2 million (1934) to £42.6 million (1935) to £60.7 million (1936) to £104.2 million (1937) to £182.2 million (1938) to £273.1 million (1939). Almost half went to the Navy each year with the RAF receiving over half of the remainder.[3]
What did Britain get for the money and how soon? First and foremost, the RAF got thousands of modern, all-metal, single wing fighter planes–the Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane–which were to play such an important role in the Battle of Britain. In addition, money went to development of radar for air defense control.[4] In addition, a good deal of the expanded Army budget went to anti-aircraft artillery for home defense. Second, the Navy received five new battleships, several aircraft carriers, and a host of light cruisers, while several older battleships were totally modernized. Also, the defenses of the Singapore Base were hurried to conclusion as a stop-gap defense against Japan. The Army largely got skint. It could field only five divisions for service on the Continent. Finally, industrial production saw improvements, both through the increased spending for the Royal Ordnance Factories (essentially bullets and shells), and through “Shadow Factories” (government-aided factories to expand aircraft production).[5]
Britain had to try to avoid war until the program had been completed. Until then,…
[1] Which would suggest that the “Ten-Year Rule” should have foreseen war in 1929. But that is ridiculous. It shows how fast things can change in human affairs.
[2] Neville Chamberlin served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from November 1931 to May 1937, when he became Prime Minister.
[3] Michael M. Postan, British War Production, Official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, Chapter II, p. 12, at HyperWar: British War Production [Chapter II] On Postan, see: Michael Postan – Wikipedia
[4] The prioritization of the RAF over the Army, but not over the Navy, reflected a fear of the danger from enemy bombing. See: Chain Home – Wikipedia, especially the section “The bomber will always get through.” It also demonstrates the initially defensive and deterrent nature of British rearmament.
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