Tag Archives: Appeasement

An Episode of Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Pact, June 1935 4.

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            Having decided to accept the German proposal for talks on a naval agreement, the government spent the next few months quietly setting the stage.  First, in January 1935, the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, informed King George V that an agreement might help get Germany back into “the comity of nations.”  In February 1935, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald met with the then very anti-German French Prime Minister Pierre Laval.  The “communique” afterward expressed their hope that talks with Germany would lead to enhanced security in Europe.  In late March 1935, Simon had a preliminary meeting with Hitler in Berlin.  The German dictator told Simon that he was done with the arms limitations imposed by Versailles Treaty.  Germany would expand its army from the 100,000-man limit imposed by Versailles to 500,000 men, begin conscription, and build an air force.  However, Hitler would make commitments to Britain to limit naval forces.  Hitler also announced that Joachim von Ribbentrop, a Nazi schemer, rather than an experienced diplomat, would lead the German delegation in such talks. 

Yet no talks began.  The British foreign policy-makers were divided in their attitudes.  Sir Robert Vansittart, the chief British diplomat, believed that Hitler meant to conquer all of Europe, so the best solution was a strong alliance with France, Italy, and even the Soviet Union if necessary.  Anthony Eden, the second-ranking political figure at the Foreign Office, wanted British commitment to Western Europe, but would abandon Eastern Europe; he also put more stock in the League of Nations than in an Italian alliance.  Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, had no views of his own and went where Vansittart pushed. 

The British were busy negotiating the “Stresa Pact” with France and Italy.  Signed on 14 April 1935, it committed Britain, France, and Italy to resist any future German violations of the Versailles Treaty.  The Stresa Pact” could not be squared with a bilateral Anglo-German agreement to violate the naval limits in the treaty. 

At the end of April 1935, the Germans prodded the British by informing them that they had launched new U-Boats and had begun construction of 12 more.  They meant “We’re going ahead; with or without you.”  This got the British moving.  On 29 April 1935, Simon told the House of Commons that Germany had begun building U-Boats; on 2 May 1935, Prime Minister MacDonald told the Commons that he would seek a naval agreement with Germany. 

Things moved fast.  Ribbentrop came to London on 2 June 1935.  On 4 June, he told the British that Germany would accept the 35 percent ratio, but nothing less, and that the British had a few days to decide.  Simon, the Foreign Secretary, walked out in answer to such rude behavior.  Stil, on 5 June the government accepted Ribbentrop’s proposal.  Two days later, Simon left the Foreign Office and Sir Samuel Hoare became Foreign Secretary.  During further discussions, the Germans accepted the British requirement that the German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy.  The two parties signed the completed agreement on 18 June 1935. 

The Anglo-German agreement enraged the French.  Britain had not consulted the French or the Italians.  The agreement of the British and Germans to “legalize” a violation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty could not be squared with the “Stresa Pact.”  It appeared to fall into the tradition of “Perfidious Albion.”  It’s hard to form an alliance against a common danger when the parties don’t trust each other.  That’s part of the story of appeasement. 

An Episode of Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 3.

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            Adolf Hitler’s view of Britain wavered between implacable foe and natural partner in a division of the world.  In Mein Kampf (1925), he castigated Imperial Germany for pursuing a pointless fleet-building program that forced Britain into alliance with its traditional colonial enemies France and Russia.  In the “Hossbach Memorandum” (1937) he described both France and Britain as “hate-filled” opponents who would never accept Germany’s revival.  In 1934-1935 he still had hopes of winning over Britain, if only to disrupt the emerging Franco-British-Italian common front. 

            In November 1934, the Germans told the British that they wanted to reach a bilateral agreement that would allow the Germany navy to rise to 35 percent of the British navy.[1]  The offer simultaneously attracted and disturbed the British.  The Germans seemed bent on rearming in defiance of the Versailles Treaty in any case.  The British most feared German bombing of cities.  An agreement on navies could lead to an agreement on air forces.  So, the German offer deserved consideration. 

Several questions had to be resolved.  First, could Britain tolerate ANY German naval rearmament?  The Royal Navy had to be dispersed to meet its global responsibilities, while a German fleet would be concentrated in the North Sea and North Atlantic.  Could Britain defend itself in Europe against a fleet one-third the size of the Royal Navy? 

Second, would it be best to shape that rearmament to the kind of German fleet would be easiest to deal with?  Would such a German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy (in battle ships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines)?  Or would it be a “lighter” fleet organized for attacking merchant shipping (lots of submarines and light cruisers, but few battleships)? 

Third, British rearmament would prioritize the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, while German rearmament was already prioritizing the Army (Wehrmacht) and the Air Force (Luftwaffe).  Both the British Army and the Germany Navy got the leftovers.  Expert opinion held that the Germany Navy would not reach 35 percent of the present Royal Navy until 1942.  By that time the Royal Navy would have been greatly expanded.  The Germans would never really catch up.  Seen from this perspective, a naval agreement might be a strategically meaningless concession while perhaps improving the climate of relations between the two countries.  A more meaningful agreement on air forces might follow. 

Fourth, the agreement could create diplomatic problems with the French.  Britain and France were working up a common front with Italy to check further German violations of Versailles.[2]  A bilateral agreement to end the naval disarmament conditions of the multi-lateral Versailles Treaty would be understood in France as both slimy and a betrayal. 

            Committees considered the issues.  They concluded that a German fleet 35 percent the size of the Royal Navy marked the maximum that could be accepted, but it could be accepted.  It would be best to insist upon a symmetrical fleet to short-stop one organized for a “guerre de course.”  A naval agreement should be followed by pursuit of an agreement on air forces.  Finally, “the French be damned” went unspoken, but not unthought. 

[1] Joseph Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: Appeasement and the Origins of

the Second World War in Europe (1998). 

[2] See No more coals to Newcastle. | waroftheworldblog 

An Episode in Appeasement: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, June 1935 1.

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            To put it mildly, France and Britain had a long history of conflict.[1]  Beginning in the 1890s, however, Germany’s pursuit of a large navy threatened Britain’s long-standing policy of maintaining naval dominance in order to safeguard the empire.  Britain responded to Germany’s fleet construction by settling many of its outstanding international conflicts and drawing closer to France.  The two countries fought shoulder to shoulder (although not without some elbows being thrown) during the First World War. 

            Once victory over Germany had been won, Britain and France began to drift apart.  First, the Versailles Treaty deprived Germany of a real navy.  The end of German naval power removed a thorn from the lion’s paw.  Britain’s policy turned to other things.[2]  Second, Anglo-American fair words and promises persuaded the French to back off their most extreme demands for guarantees against any revival of German power.[3]  Third, the two countries diverged on policy toward Central and Eastern Europe.  American repudiation of the security guarantee for France made the French all the more determined to strictly enforce the remaining terms.  This led to the Ruhr Crisis and the near-collapse of the German economy.[4]  That added to the chaos in Central and Eastern Europe.   

Yet Britain desired a restoration of stability in the region in hopes of creating markets for its troubled economy.  Later (in 1935), a diplomat at Britain’s Foreign Office would observe that “… from the earliest years following the war it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew to be unstable and indefensible.”[5]  Anglo-American financial pressure led France to accept a reduction in German reparations to a level that the Germans might be willing to pay, at least for a while.  This was the Dawes Plan.[6]  Then British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain[7] helped negotiate the Locarno treaty (1925).[8]  The treaty offered a general British guarantee of the existing frontiers in Western Europe.  However, the treaty offered nothing similar in Eastern Europe where France sought anti-German alliances among the “successor states” (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia).  If a future Germany attacked one of France’s allies, France would attack Germany.  However, the Locarno Treaty might require Britain to come to the aid of Germany, rather than France.  None of this was “good” from the French point of view.  It was merely the best that could be won under the circumstances. 

French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand tried to make the best of a bad deal.  His approach to the Americans about an alliance produced a meaningless general treaty open to all.  The “Kellogg-Briand Pact” (1928) renounced “aggressive war as an instrument of national policy.”  Even Weimar Germany signed. 

[1] History of France–United Kingdom relations – Wikipedia  Very sketchy, but you’ll get the drift: war, truce, war. 

[2] “Now that I’ve eaten, I see things in a different light.”—Groucho Marx. 

[3] The Americans soon repudiated their guarantee by refusing ratification of the Versailles treaty. 

[4] Occupation of the Ruhr – Wikipedia 

[5] Part of this sprang from the de-legitimation of the Versailles Treaty by people like Keynes and Sydney Fay. 

[6] Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan.   

[7] Older half-brother of the future Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. 

[8] Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929.    

The Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937.

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            After the Second World War, the victors grabbed up all the surviving Nazi leaders and put them on trial at Nuremberg.  In the mass trial, one piece of evidence introduced by the prosecutors was the so-called “Hossbach Memorandum.”  They argued that the document from late 1937 demonstrated Hitler’s determination to wage aggressive war.  It’s worth taking a look at the essentials of the document to understand the international situation in Europe during the run-up to war in 1939. 

What is the source of the document? 

Documents on Germany Foreign Policy 1918-1945
Series D, Volume 1: From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937 – September 1938)
(Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1949.)[1] 

What is the Hossbach memorandum? 

            It is NOT a complete transcript of what was said at the meeting.  Instead, the secretary, Hitler’s adjutant Colonel Hossbach, took rapid fire notes, then cleaned up and fleshed out those notes for the archive.  That doesn’t mean that it is unreliable.  The ability to take such notes and produce a generally acceptable summary of the meeting formed one of the qualifications for someone in Hossbach’s position.  The archives of governments are full of such documents. 

When?  November 5, 1937, FROM 4:15 to 8:30 P.M

Who was present? 

The Fuehrer[2] and Chancellor.

Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister.
Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army.   
Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy.
Colonel General Goring, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe.  [NB: The only Nazi other than Hitler.] 
Baron [Konstantin] von Neurath, Foreign Minister.  
Colonel [Friedrich] Hossbach.  Secretary. 

What was the context of the conference?

1919-1924: France creates a system of alliances in Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia) to sorta replace the lost Russian alliance. 

1933-34: Hitler comes to power and consolidates the Nazi dictatorship.  

1934-1935: Political turmoil in France resulting from the Stavisky Scandal and the events of 6 February 1934.  Sharp divide between Left and Right. 

1935: Germany begins rearmament. 

1935: Britain begins rearmament, but chiefly with the hope of deterring German aggression. 

1935: Stresa Front.  Britain, France, and Italy agree to oppose any further German violations of the Versailles Treaty. 

1935: Italian invasion of Ethiopia led to a split with France and Britain, which raised the possibility of a war in the Mediterranean. 

1936: Germany re-occupies the Rhineland. 

1936: Popular Front [NB: alliance of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties] comes to power in France.  Economic turmoil and political polarization follows.  NB: The Radicals were middle-class and basically conservative.  The usual joke is that “they had their hearts on the left and their wallets on the right.” 

1936: Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).  Germany and Italy aid the rebels led by Franco; Russia aids the Republic’s government; Britain and France try to stay neutral. 

1937: Japanese invasion of China.  Threatens Western possessions and trade rights.  Australia, New Zealand, and Canada alarmed.  This raises the prospect of a war in the Far East. 

Brief exposition of Hitler’s ideas of race and living space. 

            Race: Basically, Aryans versus Latins and Slav “untermenschen.”  Doesn’t get into his thoughts on Jews. 

            Space: The borders of Germany created by Bismarck (1866-1871) were a temporary compromise.  Now they were insufficient to German needs for a resource base.  Britain had a vast overseas empire; Russia and the United States had whole continents.  Germany needs land and natural resources to stand on a level with these other empires. 

Discussion of “Autarky.”  (Isolation from the world economy.) 

Participation in the world economy.  (Alternative to autarky.) 

            Britain and France: two hate-inspired powers.  NB: They aren’t going to share. 

“Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. The campaigns of Frederick the Great for Silesia and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had involved unheard-of risk, and the swiftness of the Prussian action in 1870 had kept Austria from entering the war. If one accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remain still to be answered the questions “when” and “how.” In this matter there were three cases [Falle] to be dealt with.” 

Three cases:

Case 1: Period 1943-1945.  Germany would decline relative to other powers after this time.  Therefore, Germany had to take action by this period. 

Case 2: Civil war in France.  That would keep the French from interfering in German action. 

Case 3: France at war with some other power, like Italy. 

In case of war with France, Germany’s first step must be to over-throw Czechoslovakia and Austria to remove the danger of an attack if things began to go badly for Germany in the west.  That would also insure that the Poles remained neutral. 

Looking forward to 1943-1945, Hitler foresaw the following. 

“Actually, the Fuehrer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question could be cleared up in due course by Germany.”  NB: Munich Conference, September 1938. 

“Military intervention by Russia must be countered by the swiftness of our operations; however, whether such an intervention was a practical contingency at all was, in view of Japan’s attitude, more than doubtful.”  NB: Japanese leaders debated attacking South (Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, French Indo-China) OR attacking North (Russian Far East). 

“Should case 2 arise -the crippling of France by civil war- the situation thus created by the elimination of the most dangerous opponent must he seized upon whenever it occurs for the blow against the Czechs.” 

“The Fuehrer saw case 3 [i.e. war between France and Italy] coming definitely nearer; it might emerge from the present tensions in the Mediterranean, and he was resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938.”  NB: Spanish Civil War provides one possible cause of war between France and someone else, but the Italians were winding up Arab nationalists in French-ruled Syria and Tunisia.  Germany occupied French attention, but what if a fit of Gallic vivacity caused the French to decide to sort out Mussolini? 

“If Germany made use of this war [between Italy and France-Britain] to settle the Czech and Austrian questions, it was to be assumed that Britain -herself at war with Italy- would decide not to act against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany was not to be expected.” 

How did the German generals respond to this exposition?

“In appraising the situation Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Fritsch repeatedly emphasized the necessity that Britain and France must not appear in the role of our enemies, and stated that the French Army would not be so committed by the war with Italy that France could not at the same time enter the field with forces superior to ours on our western frontier.  NB: The French could bust up the Italians without much effort.  Enjoy it too. 

General von Fritsch estimated the probable French forces available for use on the Alpine frontier at approximately twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on the western frontier, with the role, according to the German view, of invading the Rhineland. In this matter, moreover, the advanced state of French defense preparations [Mobilmachung] must be taken into particular account, and it must be remembered apart from the insignificant value of our present fortifications -on which Field Marshal von Blomberg laid special emphasis- that the four motorized divisions intended for the West were still more or less incapable of movement.

In regard to our offensive toward the southeast, Field Marshal von Blomberg drew particular attention to the strength of the Czech fortifications, which had acquired by now a structure like a Maginot Line and which would gravely hamper our attack.” 

“Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume.” 

Hitler responds:

“To the Foreign Minister’s objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume, the Fuehrer put the summer of 1938 as the date which seemed to him possible for this.  [NB: How far away is that?] 

In reply to considerations offered by Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch regarding the attitude of Britain and France, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France against Germany.  NB: “These are not the Britain and France of 1914.  I can smell their fear.”  That’s what I think he means. 

Should the Mediterranean conflict under discussion lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we must immediately begin action against the Czechs. On the other hand, should the powers not engaged in the war declare themselves disinterested, then Germany would have to adopt a similar attitude to this for the time being.”

What events followed?

January-February 1938: Blomberg forced to resign in late January 1938 after the scandalous past of his new wife became known to the secret police; Fritsch forced to resign in early February 1938 after falsified allegations of homosexuality (worked up by Reinhard Heydrich, Goring’s right-hand man).  Hossbach had warned Fritsch about the scheme, so he was dismissed as Hitler’s adjutant two days later.

Early February 1938: Neurath: fired as Foreign Minister. 

March 1938: Germany suddenly annexes Austria. 

August-September 1938: Czech crisis led to the Munich settlement, giving Germany the Sudetenland. 

1938: Tide of battle turned decisively against the Republicans in Spain, although they remained in possession of large parts of the country. 

March 1939: Germany seizes the rest of Czechoslovakia.   Britain and France then extended a “guarantee” of the remaining existing borders in Central Europe.  In practice, this meant Poland. 

Summer 1939: France and Britain begin talks with the Soviet Union for a military alliance. 

What can we tell about Hitler’s intentions from this document? 

            Is the Hossbach Memorandum a “blueprint” for the war that came in September 1939? 

            Or is it something much more limited than that? 

            Is Hitler irrational and fantasizing in his analysis of the political situation? 

            Or is Hitler a hard-headed and cold-hearted realist? 

            What if the conference between Hitler and his military commanders and head diplomat wasn’t about informing them of his plans?  What if he just wanted to smoke-out any opposition to whatever it was that he wanted to do? 

            What would Neville Chamberlain have made of this document if he had the opportunity to read it between November 1937 (when it was created) and the annexation of Austria in March 1938 or the Munich conference in September 1938? 

            This last question is the premise for the historical thriller Munich, by Robert Harris (2017).  It was made into a Netflix movie, “Munich: The Edge of War” (2021) with Jeremy Irons as Neville Chamberlain. 

[1] In Spring 1945, specially created Anglo-American expert teams were sent to Germany to search for political and economic archives, particularly those which shed light on the origins of the war, and Germany’s operations and war aims. The experts assembled several tons of German Foreign Ministry documents discovered in the Harz Mountains and Thuringia, together with documents from other places of deposit at Marburg Castle. These established a unified collection of the captured material.  Subsequently, the documents were both microfilmed and translated and published on paper.  The originals were later returned to the government of the German Federal Republic. 

[2] “Leader”: title assumed by Hitler after the death of President von Hindenburg in 1934 when Hitler combined the offices of President and Chancellor (prime minister). 

Sleigh Ride.

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            Imagine a Russian four-horse sleigh.  Coming home from a Christmas party at a nobleman’s country estate, it is loaded with presents.  Its passengers are bundled in furs and further insulated against the cold by much wine and an elaborate meal.  Sleep beckons. 

            Glancing drowsily toward the nearby forest, one among them sees the glitter of eyes watching from the woods.  “Wolves,” he says.  The sleigh-driver urges his horses on a bit.  Looking back, the passengers see a pack of wolves emerge from among the trees.  Then the leader of the pack begins to run after the sleigh.  The others follow.  Looking back, the driver sees them and quickly cracks his whip.  The horses surge forward and the passengers come fully awake.  Safety lies only in reaching their own country house. 

            The wolf-pack gains ground.  The driver belabors his horses with the whip, but calls to his passengers that they must throw things overboard.  That will lighten the load for the horses and it may distract the wolves.  Hampers filled with left-overs are the first to go.  The wolves pause briefly to snap at the offerings, but then come on with appetites whetted.  Gifts still wrapped in paper and ribbon go over the back next.  The wolves hardly glance at these, just keep rushing toward the sleigh.  Panic begins to grip the people on the sleigh.  Would they reach home before the wolves caught up? 

            So it was with rearmament in the Thirties.  Germany was the leader of the pack, Japan and Italy were other members of the pack; Britain and France were the passengers in the sleigh; and rearmament itself was the sleigh. 

            For more detail and depth on these issues, you can see additional posts on this blog. 

            The Costs of the First World War.  The Costs of the First World War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Appeasement and Beliefs.  Appeasement and Beliefs. | waroftheworldblog 

            Britain, Appeasement, and Today.  Britain, Appeasement, and Today. | waroftheworldblog 

            France and Appeasement in the Thirties. France and Appeasement in the Thirties. | waroftheworldblog   

            Crossing the Line.  Crossing the Line. | waroftheworldblog 

            Hitler’s War.  Hitler’s War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Why write this stuff NOW?  Why write?  I’m a historian trying to make sense of human actions under the pressure of ideas and events.  It’s my way of trying to serve a useful purpose beyond my own enjoyment.  Why NOW?  I suspect that those times inform our times.  China is the leader of the pack; Russia, North Korea, and Iran are the other wolves.  Maybe I’m just crying “Wolf!” 

No more coals to Newcastle.

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            By the mid-Thirties the international situation had begun to darken.  It was not yet Desperate.  The worst—another World War—might still be avoided.  Serious men had to deal with situations in a realistic way.  What were the situations? 

First, there was the conflict between the “democratic” and “status-quo” powers (Britain, France, and the United States) and the “authoritarian” and “revisionist”: powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, and Imperial Japan.  Each of the “revisionist” powers desired to expand its territorial control over adjoining areas.  To accomplish these goals they would have to overthrow the system of international order—often called the Versailles settlement—created after the First World War.  Beyond that common goal they were often at odds among themselves. 

            Second, there were the military realities.  The conventional economic policy adopted to respond to the Depression (1929-1939) combined lower taxes with spending cuts, while limiting international trade (autarky).  Where countries stuck with this policy, military budgets suffered.  Where they did not stick with this policy, they rearmed faster.  Meanwhile, autarky spurred both isolationism and aggression.

            Third, Britain had three enemies threatening its global position: Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Far East.  It had the military resources to fight one major war at a time.  Britain lacked good allies.  America was deeply isolationist; Communist Russia hated capitalist counties—democratic or authoritarian; and France had been “bled white” in the First World War, while the Depression intensified partisan polarization.  If Britain fought one major power, the other two enemies would pile on.  Unless they were bought off or deterred. 

            In July 1934, Austrian Nazis had tried to seize power.  Hitler’s fingerprints were all over the failed coup.  The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ordered four army divisions to the border with Austria to deter German intervention.  In London and Paris, this seemed a good omen. 

            In March 1935, Nazi Germany declared that it would begin rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty.  In April 1935, representatives from Britain, France, and Italy met in the resort town of Stresa.  They agreed to resist any further German violation of the Versailles Treaty.  During the conference, the Italians raised the issue of Ethiopia.  Italy wanted to take over a big chunk of Ethiopia.  This was Italy’s bill for helping contain Germany.  The demand embarrassed the British, so it never made it into a written agreement.    

Mussolini had not abandoned his goals.  In October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia.  Public opinion, but especially “progressive” opinion, in both Britain and France went wild.  Demands rang out for support for the League of Nations and economic sanctions on Italy. 

British and French leaders still hoped to save the Italian alliance against Germany.  In December 1935, British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare met secretly with French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval.  They agreed on a plan that gave most of Ethiopia to Italy while leaving a fragment independent.  News leaked, public opinion revolted, the plan was abandoned, and Hoare resigned.  King George V said “Ah well Sam, no more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris.” 

Lesson: If you want the “status quo” in one area you may have to accept “revisionism” in another.  Who is the main enemy?  What are the alternatives? 

France and Appeasement in the Thirties.

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For France, too, here was the memory of the First World War.  Most of the decision-makers of the Thirties had been through the first war.  Edouard Daladier, the prime minister who would eventually sign the Munich agreement abandoning France’s Czechoslovakian ally, had a chest covered with medals he had won in the trenches.  Marshall Petain, the senior military officer in the country, had made his reputation holding Verdun in the First World War.  One of those was enough for anybody.  They knew just what would be involved. 

There was a powerful pacifist movement.  Pacifism had an especially strong grip on the French school teachers, so it got passed on to the next generation as well.  French people didn’t really believe in the League of Nations the way British people did, so it had less support. 

The French population pyramid had a narrower base and steeper sides than did the German one, so French casualties in the first war would take a lot longer to replace than would German ones.  France would run short of 18 year-olds in the early 1930s.  These came to be called the “Hollow Years.”  Hard to have an army without soldiers, hard to fight a war without an army. 

France lacked the industrial base for rearmament.  France ranked behind Germany, Russia, and Britain as an industrial economy.  There was also less big industry and more small workshops than was the case elsewhere.  Hard to produce a lot or to impose standardization under these conditions.  Then, the “hollow years” also meant that there was a shortage of factory workers at the same time that there was a shortage of soldiers.  Pushed to an extreme, the argument could be posed as a choice between soldiers without guns or guns without soldiers.  Neither one seemed very promising. 

For much of the Thirties, France teetered on the edge of a civil war between Left and Right.  France had a strong Communist Party.  The appeal of the Communist Party among workers pulled the Socialist Party over toward the extreme left.  France had a strong anti-republican conservative movement and some people were drawn to a French form of fascism.  This pulled the conservative parties toward the extreme right.  The middle ground thinned out. 

In 1934 a slimy political scandal sent the right-wing groups into the streets in huge demonstrations that seemed like an attempt at a fascist coup.  In 1936 the Popular Front (an alliance of Communists, Socialists, and middle-class Radicals) came to power.  This triggered a wave of strikes that forced employers to raise wages, shorten working weeks, and accept mass unionization.  All of this slowed down industrial rearmament.  Tanks and warplanes were slow coming off the assembly lines.  Employers were outraged; middle class people were frightened by the presence of the Communists.  The Popular Front government then botched its economic policy causing many middle-class voters to drift back toward the right. 

The French interpreted the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) in different ways: the right thought that it resulted from a Communist plot and France was next on the list; the left thought that it resulted from a fascist plot and France was next on the list.  The left wanted an alliance with the Soviet Union, while the right thought that this would just allow the Bolsheviks to revolutionize France.  The right wanted an alliance with Italy, while the left thought that this was just French support for fascism and aggression. 

The pre-war and wartime alliances were gone.  In 1918 France had won as part of a powerful coalition.  Now Russia had become an anti-Western outlaw country; the Italians were leaning toward Germany; the British might support France when push came to shove, but they refused to support France’s allies in Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia); and the United States had retreated into isolationism. 

The Locarno Pact (1926) hindered France’s ability to aid its eastern allies.  Britain had promised to fight to defend France against a German attack, but not if France attacked Germany.  How could France support its threatened allies in Poland and Czechoslovakia against a German attack?  It could not move into Germany without international approval. 

So it wasn’t a case of “cheese-eating surrender monkeys.”  It looks to have been a shipload of people caught on a lee shore in a storm.