Tag Archives: American foreign policy

Prologue to a Diary of the Second Addams Administration 15.

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            The Agenda: Iran.[1] 

            The Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Shah (1979) spread chaos in the country.  Saddam Hussein, the dictator of neighboring Iraq, sought to exploit the situation by attacking Iran.  The subsequent war[2] (1980-1988) caused all sorts of troubles.  In its aftermath, during the 1990s, the Iranian Republic launched a program to develop nuclear weapons.  The program’s physical component—as opposed to intellectual and technological components–began with the construction of a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy-water plant at Arak. 

            In 2002, Iranian dissidents obtained and published secret documents on the nuclear program for all the world to see.  In 2003, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei published a “fatwa” banning the possession or use of nuclear weapons.  No one believed him.[3]  Eventually, in 2006, the United Nations plastered Iran with economic sanctions.  In 2015, the Obama administration, busy with other quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, led the negotiation of a deal with Iran.  Iran would limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent and send 97 percent of its already-enriched uranium to Russia for safe-keeping.[4]  The agreement would run for 15 years.  It hardly made it out the gate. 

            In 2018, President Donald Trump abandoned the agreement so far as the United States was concerned.  In Trump’s view, the agreement did nothing to address Iran’s non-nuclear aggressive behavior in the region.  Specifically, Iran was arming-up and coordinating allied forces in the region.[5]  Trump seems to have hoped that renewed economic sanctions would force the Iranian regime to cut a new and better deal.  To emphasize his point, in 2020 Trump ordered the killing of General Qassem Soleimani, a leading figure in the Revolutionary Guards. 

Next, in 2021, President Joe Biden[6] tried to revive the agreement, but the Iranians had moved on.  At about the same time that Biden entered the White House, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 percent, and then to 60 percent.  Enrichment to 90 percent creates “weapons grade material.”  All the while, economic sanctions and mismanagement have battered Iran’s domestic economy.[7]  

The last year or so has altered the situation.  First, Israel has inflicted immense damage on Iran’s clients through its wars in Gaza and Lebanon.  Turkey sponsored a rebel offensive in Syria that overthrew Iran’ ally Assad.  When Israel killed a Hamas leader in Tehran, Iran responded with a missile barrage; and, in October 2024; Israel answered with air strikes that wrecked key elements of Iran’s air defense system, among other things.  This leaves Iran open to follow-on strikes against nuclear facilities (and the Iranian leadership cadres) if Tehran doesn’t change its tune. 

Second, Donald Trump’s return to the White House has seemed possible (if not certain) since the beginning of 2024.  Tehran has been intensifying its drive to enrich uranium to 60 percent.  That is, apparently, a hop, skip, and a jump from 90 percent or weapons-grade uranium.[8]  I don’t know how much time that hop, skip, and jump would take.  Expert opinion holds that a basic sort of bomb could be manufactured six months after a sufficient quantity of weapons-grade uranium has been accumulated.  Another year after that and they could have a warhead for a ballistic missile.  One that could easily hit Israel. 

NOTHING in the history of Israel’s military and national security policy suggests that Israel will let Iran get anywhere near that point.  They will not allow Iran to get even one nuclear weapon.  Never mind the ballistic missiles.  “Just put it on a freighter bound for Haifa.”  The time-line for preventive action by Israel (and/or the United States) is very short.  Maybe a year at the outside?  There will be heavy pressure on the prime minister of Israel[9] to act soon. 

The time-line for Iran to decide what course it will choose is very short.  Will the rulers of Iran try to rush ahead and break-out to possession of nuclear weapons?[10]  If they do achieve a nuclear weapon, will they feel compelled to “use it or lose it”?   

Or will the leaders of Iran repent their disdain for Biden’s offer to revive the 2015 agreement?  The country’s alliance network is in shambles and its own defense vulnerabilities have been exposed.  Russia could divert no forces from the Ukraine war to save Assad, so it isn’t likely to do much for Iran.  Would the Iranian leaders—belatedly—seek to engage with the United States?  If so, how stiff-necked would they be about concessions? 

The stakes are high.  In theory, Israel would need the assistance of the United States to attack the key Iranian facilities.  A prime target would be an enrichment facility near the city of Qom.  It is tunneled into a mountain.  So is another site near Isfahan.  The American “Massive Ordnance Penetrator,” dropped by a B-2 bomber would be the only conventional weapon that could destroy the targets.[11]  In reality, Israel has its own nuclear weapons that might do the job.  That’s an awful thing to ponder.[12] 

Finally, there is a loose alliance between Iran, Russia, and China.  How would the Russians and the Chinese respond to either an Israel-America joint attack on Iran or to an Israel-alone attack (albeit with American blessing)? 

Can of worms.  Or, as the French say, “a basket of crabs.” 

[1] “Briefing: A looming nuclear crisis,” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 11. 

[2] See: Iran–Iraq War – Wikipedia  If you want to explore in depth, see: Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods The Iran–Iraq War. A Military and Strategic History (2014).  Murray is deeply knowledgeable and hard-headed.   

[3] Iran is predominantly Shi’ite Muslim.  As a long-persecuted minority within Islam, Shi’ite theologians determined that Shi’ites could dissemble about their real religious beliefs.  Over the centuries, other people have come to believe that Iranian culture has generalized this originally purely religious easement on veracity. 

[4] So, as part of their recent mutual sliming-up to each other, has Russia secretly returned the enriched uranium to Iran?  I haven’t noticed reporting on this question.  My bad.  What does Mossad say? 

[5] Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Assad regime in Syria. 

[6] More recent developments cause me to wonder if it wasn’t the policy of President-for-Foreign-Policy Antony Blinken.  Who would have been President-for-Domestic-Policy?  Can’t have been Janet Yellen.  We wouldn’t have had the inflation mess.  I understand that this is a nasty remark.  But see “Biden: How to hide a president’s decline” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 16.  Reports on a WSJ story on “how Biden’s aides and family hid his apparent cognitive decline from almost day one of his presidency.”  On which side of “day one” did the hiding begin? 

[7] Pakistan’s prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once said that “Even if we have to eat grass, we will make a nuclear bomb.”  You couldn’t force that in a democracy, but neither Pakistan nor Iran are real democracies. 

[8] Obviously, I haven’t tried it myself.  Nor would I try.  Don’t want to get hauled into a black Escalade while I’m walking my dog. 

[9] Probably Benjamin Netanyahu, but it doesn’t matter.  The leaders of the IDF and Mossad seem likely to be on the same page. 

[10] The ever-shrewd Eliot A. Cohen raised this possibility in the Atlantic in December 2024.  For a sample of Cohen’s Atlantic pieces, see: Eliot A. Cohen, The Atlantic 

[11] It has been reported that the Pentagon has briefed President Biden on plans for American attacks on Iranian nuclear resources.  “Briefing: A looming nuclear crisis,” The Week, 17 January 2025, p. 11. 

[12] Many people outside of Israel already are appalled by pictures from Gaza. 

Some Choices.

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            Walter Russell Mead, who comments on foreign affairs for the Wall Street Journal, discerns several long-term shifts underway in international affairs.[1] 

            First, Europe continues to decline as a force in world politics.  This can be seen as the latest stage in a long-running process.  The “European Civil War” of 1914-1945 wrecked the basis of European global power.  The Eastern and Western parts of the Continent then found themselves bound to alliances with the Soviet Union and the United States.  However, in Western Europe, dramatic post-war economic modernization and the construction of the European Union (EU) allowed a revived role.[2]  

Now it seems that the wheels have come off in a serious way.  It’s possible to point to all sorts of current problems: the collapse of French influence in Africa; the EU’s confrontation with a Turkish Republic that uses refugees as a weapon; and the dangers to Germany posed by China’s automobile industry, and to all Europe by its trade practices.  More fundamental, says Mead, are the rapid aging and eventual shrinking of Europe’s population; all the policies and incrustations that have produced a low growth economy; the follow-on effect of robbing national security to pay for social security; and the surrender to wishful thinking in diplomacy. 

            Second, there is the “emergence of India as one of the world’s leading powers and as an increasingly close partner of the U.S.”  This should not be misunderstood as a real reflection of Indian economic or military power.  What matters much more is that Europe’s long-term decline has created a tension between the rising nations of Asia and the “South,” on the one hand, and international institutions in which European countries are over-represented, on the other hand.  The advance of India represents an entering wedge for other countries.  Their ambition is a “reform” that shoulders aside the doddering countries of Europe. 

            Third, China, Russia, and some follower-countries are intensifying their challenge to the “American-led”[3] post-1945 world order.  Part of their effort—as it was in the Cold War—is an attack on the existing, Western-dominated, international institutions.  This is intended to play to the ambitions and frustrations of the Indo-Pacific and Global South. 

This convergence of factors creates a dilemma for American policy makers.  It is likely to take some time to resolve because it requires making painful choices.  Mead, a not-unfriendly critic since the start of the Biden Administration, chooses to emphasize the “woke” agenda of current American diplomacy.  The Administration assigns great importance to the Democratic causes of climate-change, human-rights, and democratic government.  The trouble is that most of the countries that need to be courted don’t assign the same importance to these issues as does the Administration.  If anything, they resent being harped-at by American progressives.  Which will you have? 

There is also the far more important issue of American national reconstruction.  No one seems to speak for higher taxes, lower spending, trying to shift values and culture, and pursuing national reconciliation.  Yet those issues matter too, and perhaps most of all. 

[1] Walter Russell Mead, “The G-20 Reveals a Shifting World Order,” WSJ, 12 September 2023. 

[2] All the same, the post-war fantasies of Charles de Gaulle seem absurd.  Even French historians and policy-makers must be circumlocuting their way around calling him “not very realistic,” to use Stalin’s judgement. 

[3] “American-led” always makes me think of “first among equals,” a label claimed by Octavian. 

Franco Still Dead.

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            Back in the day, “Saturday Night Live” had a long-running gag about a news anchor reporting that “Spanish dictator Francisco Franco is still dead.”  Wasn’t funny then (unless you were high) and it’s meaningless now.  The reference offers the chance to think about an important issue.  Is the chief objective of American foreign policy to defend American democracy or to create a democratic world? 

            In a straight fight between two countries, allies don’t matter.  The wars of the 20th Century spread far outside such boundaries.  They were most commonly wars of coalitions: the First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1939-1945), and the Cold War (1945-1990).  An entire century convulsed over issues of national independence, representative government, and human rights.  In the end, the champions of democracy triumphed over the champions of authoritarianism. 

            Yet it wasn’t that simple.  In the First World War, the parliamentary governments of France and Britain made common cause with Russian autocracy and the Italian and Japanese monarchies.  In the Second World War, the United States and Britain joined with the Soviet Union and Kuomintang China to form a “Grand Alliance.”  During the Cold War, America’s allies included some very undemocratic countries: Greece under occasional dictatorships, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran for a time, South Vietnam, and many African and Latin American countries.  The reasons for these alliances were pragmatic: America needed allies, but many countries were not democratic.[1] 

            Now the Biden Administration is being criticized for taking a more puritanical view.[2]  President Joe Biden talks a lot about a global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.  Well, the democracy is all on one side in the twilight struggles with China and Russia, but there’s authoritarianism on both sides.  The catalogue of authoritarian states not aligned with Russia or China is long: in Africa there are Angola, Nigeria, and Ethiopia; in Southeast Asia there are Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar; in South Asia there are India, Indonesia, Malaya, and Sri Lanka; and in Central Asia and the Middle East there are a host of unfree countries. 

            Is democratic government a natural and inevitable stage of social, political, and economic development?  If it is, then it can be held back for a time by a dictator or monarch, but it also can be swiftly brought into being by toppling the dictator, provided the country is sufficiently “developed.”[3]  Or is each country or civilization the unique product of historical developments in government and culture?  If it is, then democratic countries will have to tolerate diversity and practice inclusiveness while seeking common ground in shared real interests.  Failing that, a country could wall off sin by aligning with and trading with only real democracies. 

            Conservative “realist” critics of the Biden foreign policy see it pushing an advanced and extended one-size-fits-all view of Democracy.  This alarms or alienates potential allies whose real interest lies in countering the rise of Russian and Chinese power.  Many observers can’t help but notice current American weakness.  So, the old plan may be the best plan. 

[1] “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least find a few kind words to say about the Devil.”—Winston Churchill. 

[2] Walter Russell Mead, “The Cost of Biden’s ‘Democracy’ Fixation,” WSJ, 4 April 2023. 

[3] As in Iraq in 2003. 

Where we are with Iran.

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            The radioactive isotope U-235 can be “enriched” to higher levels of purity by the use of special centrifuges.[1] Enriched to low levels (3.67 percent), U-235 can be used as fuel for nuclear power plants.  Enriched to very high levels (90 percent), U-235 can become the basis for a nuclear weapon.  Enrichment is a slow business in the early stages, but each successive step becomes much faster from higher levels of purity.  According to one expert, it might take a month to enrich U-235 from 20 percent to 60 percent, then a week to go from 60 percent to 90 percent.  However, more centrifuges are required to achieve each higher level of purity.[2] 

            The development of nuclear material is one step.  The development of the technology of making an actual weapon, and the development of ballistic missiles are additional steps.  There is nothing to say that these steps have to be done sequentially, rather than in parallel.    

            Iran had developed a large infrastructure of uranium-enriching centrifuges, along with other elements of nuclear weapons development.  Alarmed, the international community imposed increasingly severe economic sanctions on Iran.  Eventually, the Iranian government agreed to negotiate. 

            The 2015 international agreement limited Iran to possessing 660 pounds of U-235 enriched to 3.67 percent and required the shut-down of many of its centrifuges.  In return, Iran won removal of some—but not all—of the international economic sanctions.  Many other issues regarding Iran’s foreign and military policy were set aside for further negotiations.  Many economic sanctions were retained as leverage for these proposed future talks. 

            President Donald Trump soon abandoned the 2015 agreement and plastered Iran with sanctions.  Iran then began moving away from compliance with the 2015 agreement.[3]  Iran increased its supply of U-235 that had been enriched to 3.67 percent; enriched some of its U-235 to 20 percent; restarted some its centrifuges; and blocked international inspectors from some of their agreed work.  According to a February 2021 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran now possesses ten times the amount of enriched U-235 allowed under the agreement.  If processed into weapons-grade material, that would be enough for three nuclear weapons.  In addition, Iran has “largely ignored” an agreement on missiles and has allowed an agreement to expire that permits the security cameras to view Iran’s nuclear fuel.[4] 

            There are several ways of interpreting the series of measures taken by Iran.  One way is to see it as slicing the salami, seeing exactly what it can get away with without provoking an attack.  Another way is to see it as a slow ratcheting up of pressure to both force a revival of the 2015 agreement and to improve Iran’s position in negotiations. 

            In the nature of the production process, holding down both the amount of enriched U-235 and the number of centrifuges are key.  In mid-April 2021, Israel caused a major “mishap” at the centrifuge facility at Natanz.  Perhaps several thousand centrifuges were destroyed. 

[1] Rick Gladstone, William J. Broad, and Michael Crowley, “Iran Says It Won’t Make Bombs, But It May Be Inching Closer,” NYT, 18 April 2021. 

[2] Thus it would take 500 centrifuges to move from 20 percent enrichment to 60 percent enrichment, and 600 centrifuges to move from 60 percent to 90 percent enrichment. 

[3] As American bombing in Vietnam showed, this latter strategy doesn’t always work.

[4] David E. Sanger, “On Iran, Biden Walks a Tightrope Between Force and Diplomacy,” NYT, 29 June 2021. 

The Syrian Refugee Crisis.

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A civil war between the Sunni majority and the Shi’ite minority has been ravaging the Middle East. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, more than four million refugees have fled the country.[1] While many went first to all the surrounding countries (Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq), most went to Turkey. By late 2011, the number of refugees in Turkey reached 7,600. By the end of 2012 the number of refugees in Turkey topped 135,000; the number in Egypt passed 150,000. In summer 2014 the appearance of ISIS in eastern Syria and western Iraq sent the number of refugees soaring. By August 2014 the number of refugees in Turkey reached an estimate 850,000. Then the CrISIS just exploded in the second half of 2014. Western aid workers were decapitated, a Jordanian pilot was burned to death, and Yazidis were enslaved. Huge numbers of Syrians “loaded up the truck and moved to Turkey-ey.” By early 2015, Turkey had 2.1 million Syrian refugees within its borders. Camps expanded and proliferated.

Then, in late summer 2015, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees suddenly sought to scale the walls of the European Union (EU). More than 300,000 refugees from Syria entered the EU between January and July 2015. It accelerated from there, with 100,000 refugees entering the EU during July 2015. Now hundreds of thousands are pressing their noses against the glass in Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia. Media attention has focused on the appalling human suffering in the West.

How did hundreds of thousands of refugees get from camps in southern Turkey to either the Greco-Turkish frontier near Edirne or to the Turkish coast opposite the nearby Greek island of Lesbos? Most of the refugee camps are in Hatay Province in the far south. There is a railroad station in Iskenderun in Hatay province. The line from Iskerderun runs through Adana, Konya, Afyon, and Izmir (Smyrna) to the port of Dikili, on the Aegean. Dikili faces the island of Lesbos, the nearest Greek land. Lesbos has been swamped in refugees crossing from Turkey. How has the Turkish government failed to perceive or resist this huge movement of people? Are the Turks actually trying to organize the movement of refugees from the camps to the coast?

The 100,000 refugees to be taken in by the United States in the next several years seem ridiculous compared to the need. However, the Gulf states have taken in no Syrian refugees. None, nada, zip. They have pitched in a bunch of money to support the refugees. Those sums are piddly compared to what the United States has contributed. The refugee-aid sums provided by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar amount to 60 percent of what the US alone has contributed. In short, the Sunni Arab states aren’t concerned.

The Syrian refugee migration is best understood as part of the larger civil war in the Muslim world between Sunnis and Shi’ites. The Sunni Turks and the Sunni Saudis want the Alawite (a sect of Shi’ism) government of Bashar al-Assad gone. Shi’ite Iran wants the Assad regime to remain in place. How to get the western powers to intervene more effectively against the Assad regime? How about you cause them a bunch of problems? Hence, the refugee crisis.

Western states are deluged in migrants. These refugees are unwelcome in the West. It would be best if they went home. How to get them to go home? We’ll, no one is going home if the Assad government or ISIS is in a position to do them harm. So, get rid of Assad and ISIS. The Sunni states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia) are muscling the West by indirect means to overthrow the Assad regime. The Syrian refugee crisis is an act of aggression against the West by its nominal allies.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refugees_of_the_Syrian_Civil_War

Good enough for government work.

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What follows is the sort of quibbling over details that appeals only to scholars. However, historians believe that human affairs are “contingent.” That is, even if humans are storm-tossed in some vast sea of historical processes, the actions that individuals take or do not take always have consequences.

Commenting on the troubles in Yemen and Libya, Professor Daniel Benjamin (US State Department counter-terrorism co-ordinator, 2009-2012, and now a professor at Dartmouth) said that “The forces that drove the Arab Spring [of 2011] were of such enormous dimensions that it’s unrealistic to think any president or any group of leaders could steer these events.”[1] It is possible to take a different view.

For one thing, the “forces that drove the Arab Spring” have been totally mastered. Protests in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Djibouti, and Somalia all soon ended after largely cosmetic concessions by the authorities.   Something harsher was required in in Egypt and Syria. Under pressure from the crowds in a few urban areas and from the United States, the Egyptian military dictatorship bent but did not break. Now it has reasserted its power, using the threat of Islamism as its justification. Seeing what was happening in Egypt, the far more ruthless Assad government in Syria took a strong line with the urban malcontents.   They malcontents are mostly in refugee camps at the moment. What the Syrians were left with was an uprising among conservative Sunni Muslims who have been joined by a flood of Islamist foreign fighters, just as the insurgency in Iraq attracted hordes of Islamist jihadis. What does Islamism have to do with the American liberal vision of the “Arab Spring”?[2]

For another thing, the United States played an active role in creating the chaos that now engulfs both Libya and Yemen.   The Obama Administration exceeded its mandate from the UN when it expanded its involvement in the Libyan rebellion from protecting civilian lives to toppling the Gaddafi regime through air-power.[3] Then the U.S. walked away when the overthrow of Gaddafi opened a Pandora’s box of troubles. Much more reasonably, the U.S. also supported the initiative by the Saudi-dominated Gulf Co-operation Council to push “president” Ali Abdullah Saleh out of office. Here alone the Americans had a clear goal: to preserve the ability to hunt Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula jihadis.

As the NYT headlined the story in which Daniel Benjamin was quoted, “Killing Terrorists May Be Best U.S. Can Hope For.” That’s a modest goal. Not transformative of the entire Middle East. Not a lasting solution to the problem of radical Islam. Not the sort of thing to win someone a Nobel Peace Prize. But manageable within the limits of our power.

[1] Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, “Killing Terrorists May Be Best U.S. Can Hope For,” NYT, 17 June 2015.

[2] See: “Arab Youth,” September 2014.

[3] It also helped poison Russian-American relations. See: “Obama versus Putin,” September 2014.

“Die for Danzig?” Marcel Deat, “Mourir pour Danzig?” L’Oeuvre, 4 May 1939.

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Fighting Russia isn’t a very popular idea. Fighting Russia over Ukraine doesn’t have much support in spite of the obvious Russian intervention in the rebellion in eastern Ukraine. But fighting Russia if it attacks a fellow member of NATO seems like a no-brainer. That’s what a military alliance is all about, right? Well, not necessarily.[1]

Back in 1956, in the midst of the Eisenhower administration and at the height of the Cold War, 82 percent of Americans believed that a Russian attack on one member was an attack on all and that the US should fight, while 8 percent opposed it, and 10 percent weren’t sure. In a recent Pew Research Center poll, 56 percent of Americans supported using force against Russia if it became involved in a “serious military conflict” with another NATO member state, while 37 percent were opposed, and a mere 7 percent weren’t sure. Among some other NATO countries, support then falls off by small steps. Support for fighting slides down through Canada (53), Britain (49), Poland and Spain (48), France (47), Italy (40), and Germany (38).[2] In Germany, 58 percent opposed fighting Russia, while only 4 percent weren’t sure.

With regard to the conflict in Ukraine, Poland (50 percent) and the United States (46 percent) most strongly support sending weapons to the Kiev government. Thereafter, support declines among other NATO members through Canada (44), Britain (42), and France (40), before falling off sharply in Spain (25 percent), Italy (22) and Germany (19). Similarly, 62 percent of Americans favor admitting Ukraine to NATO, but only 36 percent of Germans supported such a move.

One way to think about this is that, in spite of the frequent media references to a revived Cold War, most people in the West aren’t there yet. Still, it may be where we are headed. Favorable opinion about the United States among Russians has fallen from 51 percent in 2013 to 15 percent in June 2015 and favorable opinion about NATO has fallen from 37 percent to 26 percent over the same period. Favorable opinion about Russia in the NATO countries has fallen from 37 percent to 26 percent.

Another way to think about this is that there has been a significant disaggregation within the NATO alliance since the end of the Cold War. The United States and Germany now represent opposite poles on a number of key policy issues. As the creation of the Eurozone and the negotiations over the Greek debt crisis show, Germany has become the dominant power in Europe. Americans demonstrate a resolution (or belligerence) unmatched by the Germans. This is something with which future leaders of both countries will have to wrestle.

Still another way to think about this is that we are witnessing yet another phase in the troubled, tortuous relationship between Germany and Russia. Before the First World War they were two conservative empires in opposed alliances. Between the wars they were ideologically opposed states driven to co-operate by their international pariah status. Since 1945, the partitioned Germanys first clung to their dominant partner, then West Germany’s “Ostpolitik” began opening a road East based on economic complementarity. Vladimir Putin’s assertion of Russian power and interests among the non-NATO former members of the Soviet Union has challenged that relationship. Belarus and Georgia may be next, but people worry that he will not stop at the borders of the Baltic states. Putin’s own moderation—or lack of it–holds the key.

[1] Naftali Bendavid, “Poll Shows West Is Divided On How to Deal With Russia,” WSJ, 10 June 2015.

[2] The Polish stance is worth some thought because Poland is going to provide the most likely battlefield in such a conflict.

The Iran Dilemma.

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Tom Friedman’s opinion on Middle Eastern matters must command respect. Friedman has remarkable access to American government sources. The Obama administration often appears to voice its views through his column.

Since the Revolution of 1979 overthrew the Shah, the United States and Iran have been at odds. At the same time, Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite Iran have been at odds. So, an alliance of convenience formed between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Recently, the upheavals in the Middle East have consolidated the grip on power of Iranian clients in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Over the longer term, however, Iran’s long pursuit of nuclear weapons has been profoundly destabilizing to the region. (See: Bomb ‘em ‘till the mullahs bounce.)

Friedman’s recent column on the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program lays out some essential issues, even if it does not fully explore them.[1]

First, the Obama Administration hopes that a nuclear deal with Iran will be “transformational.” If sanctions are lifted, Iran can be drawn into the larger world. Contact with more liberal societies may—eventually—turn Iran into a “normal,” non-revolutionary state.

Second, the Obama administration sees Iran as a legitimate counter-weight to the Wahhabist version of Islam sponsored by America’s nominal “ally,” Saudi Arabia. Iran has competitive (if not “free”) elections; respect for women beyond the norm in the Muslim world; and real military power that it is willing to use. In contrast, Saudi Arabia is an absolutist monarchy that sponsors the spread of the extremist Wahhabism that can easily turn into Islamic radicalism, but will not use its powerful military for more than air shows.

Third, “America’s interests lie not with either the Saudis or the Iranian ideologues winning, but rather with balancing the two against each other until they get exhausted enough to stop prosecuting their ancient Shi’ite-Sunni, Persian-Arab feud.”

Fourth, “managing the decline of the Arab state system is not a problem [the United States] should own. We’ve amply proved we don’t know how.”

Points worth discussing.

What caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, contact with the West or the inherent stupidity of Communism? Is expanded contact with the West eroding the power of the Chinese Communist Party? These examples go to the “transformational” aspect of the issue.

Is the Obama administration hoping for a Nixon-Kissinger style “opening” (as to China) that will remake the politics of the Middle East? If so, is the game worth the candle? What American interests will be advanced by such an opening? Iran will fight ISIS and Saudi Arabia will back opponents of the Shi’ite government in Baghdad regardless of such a change.

Does the Obama administration accept that we are witnessing the undoing of the Sykes-Picot borders? If so, which borders are likely to be redrawn? Iraq, Syria, and Libya are failed states. What about Saudi Arabia (home to most of the foreign fighters in ISIS) or Egypt?

Finally, Friedman argues that “if one assumes that Iran already has the know-how and tools to build a nuclear weapon, changing the character of the regime is the only way it becomes less threatening.” First, he accepts the thrust of the piece by Broad and Sanger, that Iraq knows how to make a nuclear weapon. (See: A note of caution in Iran.) Second, he argues that changing attitudes is the “only” way to deal with the danger. Really? Soldiers usually plan for an enemy’s capabilities, not his intentions—which can be hard to discern.

[1] Thomas L. Friedman, “Looking Before Leaping,” NYT, 25 March 2015.

Putinium.

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Vladimir Putin was born in 1952 in Leningrad. He had impeccable Communist credentials; his father was a manual laborer, his mother was a school teacher. He studied law in university (like Mikhail Gorbachev), then took a job with the KGB. (See: irony.) Here he was an intelligence officer, operating in East Germany. When the USSR began to withdraw its forces from its East European empire Putin came home to Leningrad. Here he worked for a number of politicians in the new democracy. One of these was Boris Yeltsin.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had not thrilled the Russians. Street crime and white-collar crime exploded, while the economy decayed, and Russia fell from the status of a superpower. People around Yeltsin piled up immense fortunes by seizing control of Russia’s natural resources, banking, and media. Mikhail Khodorkovsky got control of the Yukos oil company, which established a virtual monopoly on Russian oil production and exports. Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky created media empires. Generally, nobody paid taxes. A few people got rich while most suffered.

In 1998 Yeltsin appointed Putin to run the FSB, heir to the KGB. Two years later in 2000, when the ailing Yeltsin left government, Putin ran for President of Russia. During the campaign someone bombed an apartment building in Moscow, killing 200 people. The suspected bombers were Chechen separatists. Putin promised to wipe them out. He won the presidency.

In power, Putin turned on the “oligarchs” who had risen up during the Yeltsin era. Khodorkovsky went to jail and Yukos Oil was nationalized, Berezovsky and Gusinsky fled abroad. Taxes got collected. Street crime got squashed. Putin’s nationalization of Yukos Oil coincided with a sharp increase in demand for oil around the world. By 2007, Russia was earning about $170 billion a year from oil exports. Prosperity returned to Russia. Putin has distributed favors on a far more prudent basis than Yeltsin ever did. He uses them to build support for himself without harming the interests of the Russian people. At the same time, Putin has been ruthless in dealing with critics: he has used control of the media to prevent opposition candidates from getting out their message; and he is suspected of having prompted the assassination of dissidents Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006. In the December 2007 elections voters had to mark the ballots in public view—of soldiers. This is a lot like mid-19th Century elections. Not exactly the Australian ballot. Still, it seemed to work. Public opinion polls showed Putin enjoying a 70 percent favorable rating among ordinary Russians. In December 2007 Putin’s United Russia party won 400 of 450 seats in the Russian parliament (the Duma).

Where is he headed? He appears to be aiming at a restoration of Russian power. He has begun a $200 billion rearmament program. He has tried to block the extension of an American anti-missile system into Eastern Europe. He has challenged the idea of America as the sole super-power. He is still fighting the Chechen war. He turns off the flow of oil to the Ukraine whenever it seems too independent. Then there’s the Crimea.

The question is not whether Russia could have been held down permanently after the collapse of Communism. It could not. But could Russia have become a Western-style democracy? Is a collision inevitable between a reviving Russia and the West?

“Why Russia Loves Putin,” The Week, 21 December 2007, p. 11.