Sleigh Ride.

            Imagine a Russian four-horse sleigh.  Coming home from a Christmas party at a nobleman’s country estate, it is loaded with presents.  Its passengers are bundled in furs and further insulated against the cold by much wine and an elaborate meal.  Sleep beckons. 

            Glancing drowsily toward the nearby forest, one among them sees the glitter of eyes watching from the woods.  “Wolves,” he says.  The sleigh-driver urges his horses on a bit.  Looking back, the passengers see a pack of wolves emerge from among the trees.  Then the leader of the pack begins to run after the sleigh.  The others follow.  Looking back, the driver sees them and quickly cracks his whip.  The horses surge forward and the passengers come fully awake.  Safety lies only in reaching their own country house. 

            The wolf-pack gains ground.  The driver belabors his horses with the whip, but calls to his passengers that they must throw things overboard.  That will lighten the load for the horses and it may distract the wolves.  Hampers filled with left-overs are the first to go.  The wolves pause briefly to snap at the offerings, but then come on with appetites whetted.  Gifts still wrapped in paper and ribbon go over the back next.  The wolves hardly glance at these, just keep rushing toward the sleigh.  Panic begins to grip the people on the sleigh.  Would they reach home before the wolves caught up? 

            So it was with rearmament in the Thirties.  Germany was the leader of the pack, Japan and Italy were other members of the pack; Britain and France were the passengers in the sleigh; and rearmament itself was the sleigh. 

            For more detail and depth on these issues, you can see additional posts on this blog. 

            The Costs of the First World War.  The Costs of the First World War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Appeasement and Beliefs.  Appeasement and Beliefs. | waroftheworldblog 

            Britain, Appeasement, and Today.  Britain, Appeasement, and Today. | waroftheworldblog 

            France and Appeasement in the Thirties. France and Appeasement in the Thirties. | waroftheworldblog   

            Crossing the Line.  Crossing the Line. | waroftheworldblog 

            Hitler’s War.  Hitler’s War. | waroftheworldblog 

            Why write this stuff NOW?  Why write?  I’m a historian trying to make sense of human actions under the pressure of ideas and events.  It’s my way of trying to serve a useful purpose beyond my own enjoyment.  Why NOW?  I suspect that those times inform our times.  China is the leader of the pack; Russia, North Korea, and Iran are the other wolves.  Maybe I’m just crying “Wolf!” 

British rearmament in the Thirties.

            The government had ended the “Ten Year Rule” in 1932, but continued to hold down defense spending.  Then, in October 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference.  This tipped the balance toward rearmament. 

            In November 1933, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) formed a “Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC).”  Its mission was to identify the worst gaps in the military forces, plan how to meet them, and to make broad judgements about strategy.  By July 1934 it identified Germany as the primary danger and determined that Britain should avoid conflict with Japan.  Also, the DRC adopted a five-year time-line for rearmament (1934-1939).[1]  In March 1935, the government broke decisively in favor of rearmament.

            Having made the decision to rearm in a hurry, all went smoothly, no?  No.  The DRC proposed increasing military spending by £71 million over the five years, much of it on the Army.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer[2] imposed important changes.  First, he cut the total to £50 million.  Second, he cut the money for the Army in half, while doubling the proposed spending on the Royal Air Force (RAF).  He placed the emphasis squarely on home defense.  Henceforth, rearmament would involve constant tension between the armed services and the Treasury, with the Foreign Office getting buffeted between them. 

Defense spending rose from £37.2 million (1934) to £42.6 million (1935) to £60.7 million (1936) to £104.2 million (1937) to £182.2 million (1938) to £273.1 million (1939).  Almost half went to the Navy each year with the RAF receiving over half of the remainder.[3]    

What did Britain get for the money and how soon?  First and foremost, the RAF got thousands of modern, all-metal, single wing fighter planes–the Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane–which were to play such an important role in the Battle of Britain.  In addition, money went to development of radar for air defense control.[4]  In addition, a good deal of the expanded Army budget went to anti-aircraft artillery for home defense.  Second, the Navy received five new battleships, several aircraft carriers, and a host of light cruisers, while several older battleships were totally modernized.  Also, the defenses of the Singapore Base were hurried to conclusion as a stop-gap defense against Japan.  The Army largely got skint.  It could field only five divisions for service on the Continent.  Finally, industrial production saw improvements, both through the increased spending for the Royal Ordnance Factories (essentially bullets and shells), and through “Shadow Factories” (government-aided factories to expand aircraft production).[5] 

Britain had to try to avoid war until the program had been completed.  Until then,…


[1] Which would suggest that the “Ten-Year Rule” should have foreseen war in 1929.  But that is ridiculous.  It shows how fast things can change in human affairs. 

[2] Neville Chamberlin served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from November 1931 to May 1937, when he became Prime Minister. 

[3] Michael M. Postan, British War Production, Official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, Chapter II, p. 12, at HyperWar: British War Production [Chapter II]  On Postan, see: Michael Postan – Wikipedia 

[4] The prioritization of the RAF over the Army, but not over the Navy, reflected a fear of the danger from enemy bombing.  See: Chain Home – Wikipedia, especially the section “The bomber will always get through.”  It also demonstrates the initially defensive and deterrent nature of British rearmament. 

[5] British shadow factories – Wikipedia 

Why did Britain hesitate to rearm in the Thirties?

            Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany at a particularly difficult time for Britain.  The decision to re-arm, to prepare for another great war—even if could be limited to a merely “European War”[1]—proved agonizing and divisive. 

On the one hand, Britain faced the Great Depression which drove up unemployment, forced Britain off the Gold Standard (21 September 1931), and began the process of converting Britain from a policy of free trade to a system of protective tariffs.[2]  The tariffs went into effect in February 1932.  They encouraged import-substitute re-industrialization.  By one later estimate, the tariffs led to a rise of real annual GDP by 4 percent (1932-37), on a par with Nazi Germany.  These events marked a dramatic turning point in Britain’s national policies. 

The ship’s pilot guiding this turn was Neville Chamberlain.[3]  Having devoted his political career to domestic reform, he foresaw the GDP growth serving to revitalize the British economy through industrial modernization and a social policy that eased old divisions, rather than preparation for another world war.[4]  Threatened by Japan in the Far East, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule” (March 1932).  Even so, the government remained preoccupied by the “very serious financial and economic situation.”  It was determined to resist big increases in military spending. 

On the other hand, the forces opposed to war and the preparation for war occupied a strong position in political.  These forces coalesced around the League of Nations.  Although the League had been the brain-child of American President Woodrow Wilson, it found its strongest popular support in Britain.  Britain’s League of Nations Union acted as a powerful pressure-group.[5]  Its goals were to promote international justice and human rights; disarmament and the settlement of international conflicts by peaceful means; and reliance upon collective security, rather than alliances.[6]  Membership rose from about 250,000 in the mid-Twenties to over 400,000 in 1931. 

Anti-militarism became a public fixture in the early Thirties.  Examples include the Oxford “King and Country” debate (February 1933); the East Fulham by-election, in which the peace candidate thrashed the rearmament candidate (October 1933); the “Peace Ballot,” (results June 1935), which strongly endorsed League membership, universal disarmament, abolition of air forces and the arms industry, and collective security against aggression; and the ferocious opposition to the Hoare-Laval Pact (December 1935).  This only worked if everyone played.    

            Hitler’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference (October 1933) ended real hope. 


[1] John Lukacs, The Last European War: September 1939-December 1941 (1976). 

[2] See: Import Duties Act 1932 – Wikipedia  This Act formed a first step in a much larger plan.  In Summer 1932, representatives of Britain and the Dominions met in Ottawa.  They agreed upon a policy of high tariffs around the Empire; low tariffs within the Empire; and Keynesian ideas about demand management (low interest rates, increased government spending).  See: British Empire Economic Conference – Wikipedia for an under-developed sketch. 

[3] Neville Chamberlain – Wikipedia 

[4] For some of the National government’s social reforms, see: Unemployment Act 1934 – Wikipedia;

 Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934 – Wikipedia; Special Areas (Amendment) Act 1937 – Wikipedia; Factory Acts – Wikipedia; Coal Act 1938 – Wikipedia; Holidays with Pay Act 1938 – Wikipedia;

[5] Members of the Liberal Party provided much of the leadership for the group, but important Conservatives also joined.  At the same time, many Conservative politicians and voters saw the League as ridiculous.

[6] See: Collective security – Wikipedia, and Disarmament – Wikipedia.  Both have useful bibliographies.   

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 10.

            Elon Musk kept swinging his scythe through the federal workforce, firing 7,000 people at the IRS and an additional 1,400 from Veterans Affairs, while warning the Environmental Protection Agency to expect a 65 percent reduction in force from its current 17,000 employees.[1] 

            Then, at the end of February 2025, Elon Musk had the Office of Personnel Management e-mail, oh, several million federal civilian employees.  The message instructed them to submit a five bullet-point list of the major stuff that they had done the previous week.  Failure to comply would be taken as a resignation. 

            Federal employees, their union representatives, and the Democratic Party responded with their competing imitations of Albert Goldman.[2]  About a dozen Secretaries of Departments rallied to the defense of their employees.  The latter seemed to some observers like the leaders being captured by their followers.  President Donald Trump may have seen it in that light because he gave Musk pride of place at a televised Cabinet meeting. 

            The themes in the criticism were as before: Musk is an “unelected” person culling the ranks of the unelected employees wielding the power of the federal government; and lots of Americans—Republicans and Democrats alike–depend upon the federal government for income or medical care or education.  The appeal to elected politicians to keep things as they are against the actions of the unelected man-child genius seeking to avert national bankruptcy captures the spirit of the enterprise.  It is disruption of the Old Order and NOT kicking the can down the road that arouses resistance.  In addition, it is argued that cutting employees from Veterans Affairs will harm veterans.  In reality, for at least twenty years people who deal with Veterans Affairs have been complaining that it is the most messed-up organization that they have ever seen.  A string of good leaders (e.g. Eric Shinseki) have failed in their efforts to fix it.  Finally, it is asserted that the cuts to the IRS will just hinder efforts to get the rich to pay their “fair share.”  This is an ever-green political issue.  Democrats like having it as an issue with which to bash the Republicans, but they will not actually raise taxes on the rich when they could.[3] 

            Then, to be asked to briefly state what work one did last week doesn’t seem unusual or difficult.  Corporations—both in America and around the world—carry out reductions in force whenever the balance sheet tips too much into the red.  Often, they’re not too strategic about where the axe falls.  It isn’t regarded as the end of the world. 

            On the other hand, government isn’t a business.  Ideally, the government does things for society that are essential or highly desirable, but for which there is no reasonable private sector provider.  The Departments of Defense, State, Justice, the Treasury, and the CIA and NSA for example.  Then there is the government’s role in funding and coordinating scientific and medical research, and managing a system of air traffic control.  Moreover, the “bureaucracy” isn’t staffed only with drones.  It recruits many specialist experts.  Sweeping purges will cause a bunch of things to go wrong soon.  And once the experts get the heave, it will be hard to lure them back. 


[1] “DOGE slashes workforce with Trump’s backing,” The Week, 7 March 2025, p. 5. 

[2] The character played by the great Nathan Lane in “The Birdcage” (dir. Mike Nichols, 1996). 

[3] The Biden administration’s “American Rescue Plan” passed the Senate 50-49; its “Inflation Reduction Act” passed the Senate 51-50.  Both used “Reconciliation” to by-pass the filibuster.  Higher taxes easily could have been included if they actually wanted to make the rich pay “their fair share.”  Same for repealing the “debt ceiling.” 

British Disarmament in the Nineteen Twenties.

            Britain’s military spending had soared during the First World War.  It remained high in the immediate aftermath of the war: £766 million in 1919–20.  Then, in August 1919, led by the Secretary of State for War and Air,[1] the Cabinet’s Committee of Imperial Defence adopted the “Ten Year Rule”: the government would base its defense budgets “on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” 

            From January 1920 to July 1921, Britain suffered a severe recession.  In 1921, the media titan Lord Rothermere founded the “Anti-Waste League” to pressure the government.[2]  It worked: the government appointed a budget-cutting Committee on National Expenditure with Sir Eric Geddes as chairman.  What followed became known as the “Geddes Axe.”[3]  In the end, total defense spending fell from £189.5 million (1921–22) to £111 million (1922–23), before rebounding to £114.7 million in 1924–25.[4] 

            Then a series of international agreements altered the context.  The Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) prevented a naval arms race between Britain, the United States, and Japan.  The Dawes Plan (1924) conceded to German objections on reparations.  The Locarno Pact (1925) stabilized relations in Western Europe between Germany and its former opponents.  In 1925, the new—and very popular in Britain–League of Nations began pushing for a World Disarmament Conference that would reduce “offensive” weapons almost out of existence.  The Versailles treaty had substantially disarmed Germany; now it was time for the other powers to follow suit.  A reduced chance of war would justify deep cuts in military budgets.  In 1928, in light of all these developments, the Chancellor of the Exchequer[5] persuaded the Cabinet to make the “Ten Year Rule” permanent unless specifically changed by the government.   

In the early Thirties, the Great Depression forced still more economies: defense spending fell to £102 million in 1932.  In April 1931, the First Sea Lord told the Committee of Imperial Defense that “owing to the operation of the ‘ten-year-decision’ and the clamant need for economy, our absolute [naval] strength also has … been so diminished as to render the fleet incapable, in the event of war, of efficiently affording protection to our trade.”  Moreover, if the Navy had to move the bulk of its strength to the Far East to deal with Japan, it would have the means to defend neither Britain’s overseas trade nor Britain itself. 

            In September 1931, Japan seized the Chinese outlying province of Manchuria.  On 23 March 1932, the Cabinet formally abandoned the “Ten Year Rule.”  However, it stipulated that “this [change] must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation” of Britain. 

Then, in January 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany.  War was less than seven years, not ten, away.  Much rearmament would have to be done in great haste. 


[1] Winston Churchill. 

[2] See: Anti-Waste League – Wikipedia and Harold Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Rothermere – Wikipedia  Comic in light of current events.  However, it was his rival, Lord Beaverbrook, who was the immigrant. 

[3] On Geddes, see: Eric Geddes – Wikipedia   On the Committee on National Expenditure, see: Geddes Axe – Wikipedia 

[4] For its part, social spending (education, health, housing, pensions, unemployment) fell from £205.8 million (1920–21) to £182.1 million (1922–23) to £175.5 million (1923–24), before rising to £177.4 million (1924–25). 

[5] Winston Churchill. 

“I hate rude behavior in a man.”–Woodrow F. Call, “Lonesome Dove.”

What is a “manly man”?  My grandfather pretty much abandoned his wife and two sons during the Twenties.  My Dad grew up in the Depression.  He picked fruit in California; logged in Montana; worked on a government survey ship in the Gulf of Alaska; was the assistant manager of a movie theater in Portland, Oregon; soldiered on Guadalcanal and Bougainville; was a ski-bum in Sun Valley and a cab driver in Seattle and Anchorage; and—eventually—owned a small business that put a roof over our heads and food in our bellies, along with many other things.  He smoked two packs of Camels a day.  He read a lot of high-end trash.[1]  He knew many “colorful” expressions, but he did not use them indoors or in front of women and children.  He never raised his voice to–let alone hit–my Mom or me and my siblings.  (He did punch out a tug-boat captain who disrespected my Mom.)  He taught me to sail, to ski, to drive a car (with a manual gear-shift), and to shoot both long guns and pistols (which we had around the house in an unlocked rack) and gun safety (“always check in the breech”).  He believed in individual achievement and personal responsibility.  He always voted straight-ticket Republican, except for the time he voted for McGovern because he was so angry about the waste and lies of the Vietnam War.  He intensely disliked rich swells, especially rich swells who went into politics and took up the cause of the “common man.”  (This meant FDR and all the Kennedys.)  He and my Mom believed that “a woman’s place was in the home” and that “a man had to provide for his family.”  He and my Mom were casual racists, just like most other White people of the time outside the South.  He was the finest man I’ve ever known. 

He offered an example of “traditional masculinity,” rather than “toxic masculinity.”  That distinction began when the term “toxic masculinity” was taken up by men’s movements in the 1980s and 1990s.  Gender differences are essentially hard-wired, rather than socially constructed.[2]  “Toxic” masculinity could appear where men had lost contact with real or “deep” masculinity.  Masculinity became “toxic” when men lost comradery with other men and when they repressed emotions.  From there, the term crept into academic studies and, from there, into the media in the 2010s.  Along the way, however, it became generalized to describe ALL masculinity.  In part, this seems to have occurred among people—feminists, gay-rights activists–struggling courageously for their own liberation.  In part, this sprang from “gray wolf” behavior among academics.[3]  In part, this seems to have resulted from the intellectual laziness of people in the media.[4]  There followed a moral panic over behavior attributed to many men.[5] 

Social movements swing like a pendulum, taking ever more extreme positions.  So it was with “toxic masculinity.”  Recent studies find that many male Trump voters support abortion rights, gender equality, and openness about emotions, but don’t believe that women’s progress has come at the expense of men.  They’re just sick of being stigmatized.[6]   

Believing a man should provide for his family is preferable to abandoning that family. 


[1] Kenneth Roberts, C.S. Forester, and John D. MacDonald. 

[2] On “Social Construction” see Social construction of gender – Wikipedia  Lots of jargon. 

[3] Pack hunter – Wikipedia 

[4] See: Toxic masculinity – Wikipedia, “Terminology.” 

[5] Moral panic – Wikipedia 

[6] Claire Cain Miller, “Many Trump-Voting Men Feel Under Fire, Yet Defy Stereotypes,” NYT, 5 March 2025. 

Diary of the Second Addams Administration 9.

New York City Mayor Eric Adams had been critical of President Joe Biden’s policy on illegal immigration.  He became so after the administration’s “Remain in Texas” policy had collapsed, flooding Democratic cities in the North with illegal immigrants.  Adams and newly-elected President Donald Trump drew together.  So far, so good.  Bipartisanship is still possible! 

However, a problem existed.  Federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York had accused Adams of various serious crimes.  It seemed possible, if not certain, that Adams would be out as mayor. 

In mid-February 2025, Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove declared that the mayor’s parochial legal difficulties were harming his ability to assist the President’s national immigration policy.[1]  Bove ordered Danielle Sassoon, the acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, to drop the charges against Adams “without prejudice.”  Sassoon requested a meeting with Attorney General Pam Bondi to discuss her concerns that this was a corrupt bargain; Bondi declined to meet with Sassoon, who then resigned.  Bove then ordered Sassoon’s deputy to dismiss the charges.  He got a less politely phrased response than Sassoon had provided, and the deputy resigned.  So did a bunch of other lawyers who wouldn’t be caught dead doing what Bove wanted.  Finally, the charges did get dismissed.  Then four deputy mayors of New York City resigned.[2] 

At the moment, Adams remains Mayor.  Perhaps not for long.  Voters will have a chance to turf him out at the next election.  They’re likely to do so.  Adams is besmirched by the deal, so the chances of him losing re-elections are increased.  New York Governor Kathy Hochul has contemplated removing him from office even before an election.  The Department of Justice retains great leverage over Adams.  The charges were dismissed “without prejudice.”  This means that they can be reinstated whenever the Trump administration finds Adams insufficiently co-operative with something (anything) in the future.  Or even when he is no more use to them. 

What does the Trump administration get out of this deal?  It gets unrestricted access to the denizens of New York City’s vast jail system.  Any illegal immigrant who is arrested for something is liable to find themselves on a federal government airplane bound for a banana republic.[3]  In effect, the NYPD becomes an extension of the effort to expel illegal immigrants. 

Trump, Bove, and Adams have come in for much abuse in the media for their apparent deal.  So they should.  If the sweeping pardons for the 6 January 2021 rioters[4] are added to this deal, then the administration can’t escape being called for its own “weaponization” of the law. 

Nor is Adams out of the woods even over the short-term.  Bove may have requested that the charges be dropped, but the presiding judge has to agree to it.  It isn’t certain that he will agree.  On the one hand, the whole thing stinks to high Heaven.  On the other hand, prosecutors cut deals with criminals all the time.  They do so when the alleged criminal agrees to cooperate with the government in pursuit of some larger goal.  The government can argue that there’s no difference between Adams and a drug-dealer.  OK, not a good re-election campaign slogan. 


[1] “The U.S. at a Glance,” The Week, 21 February 2025, p. 7. 

[2] “Justice Department: Condoning corruption under Trump?” The Week, 28 February 2025, p. 6. 

[3] I can just hear people saying “You mean ANOTHER banana republic!” 

[4] “Cop-beaters” in the frank words of the Wall Street Journal.

Diary of the Second Addams Administration.

            Is the bureaucracy of the Executive Branch of the government of the United States lean, agile, innovative, and filled with able idealists?  Or is it bloated, hide-bound, unwieldy, and ill-suited to the needs of the new century?  It’s a fair question to ask. 

President Donald Trump and Court Wizard Elon Musk appear to believe that it is the latter, rather than the former.  For Trump, there seems to be the added flaw in the bureaucracy’s hostility to him during his first term.  He may well want “revenge” both for their past hostility and to prevent anticipated resistance in his second term.  For his part, Musk portrayed himself as battling an “unelected bureaucracy” in order to “restore the will of the people.” 

Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has taken on the task of reducing the federal workforce.[1]  In mid-February 2025, DOGE began firing people in big chunks and very rapidly.  In addition to the thousands of US AID workers on the chopping block, the Department of Agriculture took a heavy hit: 4,000 at the Department and a further 3,400 at its subordinate National Forest Service.  Health and Human Services lost 5,200; the Energy Department lost 2,000; and the Department of Veterans Affairs lost 1,000.[2]  Within these departments, some areas were hit particularly hard: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Nuclear Security Administration.  More lay-offs took place at the Federal Aviation Agency and the National Park Service.[3]  All this is alarming to terrifying. 

At the same time, and with murky intent, DOGE went after the vast troves of data on ordinary Americans held by the federal government in the data centers of the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Treasury, and other agencies.[4] 

In his first term, Trump caught a lot of criticism for treating China as a real danger by plastering it with tariffs, trying to build a wall at the southern border to resist massive illegal immigration, and denigrating our NATO allies.  Then Joe Biden kept the tariffs, Russia’s attack on Ukraine revealed that the European allies have been pacifists for decades, and the failure to resist illegal immigration helped cost the Democrats the 2024 election.  Now, some Democrats are admitting that a problem exists, even while they drag on Trump’s coat-tails.  One journalist at the Washington Post accepted that problems did exist with the federal bureaucracy, but objected to indiscriminate mass firing.  On the other hand, others stuck to their last, claiming that the firings were part of “a coup.”  Competent civil servants would be driven out to make space for incompetent Trump loyalists.  That argument is hard to refute when Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Kash Patel, and Peter Hegseth can be offered as evidence. 

Two questions arise.  One, is Trump just trying to scare the bureaucracy into compliance?  Two, how can a log-jammed legislature reform and reduce a behemoth? 


[1] “Trump makes mass layoffs across government,” The Week, 28 February 2025, p. 4. 

[2] Currently, the federal government employs about 2.1 million civilians and about 600,000 military personnel. 

[3] For context, the Department of Agriculture which includes the National Forest Service, employed 93,000 people at the end of the Biden administration, so the cuts amount to about 7.5 percent of the workforce; Health and Human Services employed about 83,000 people, so the cuts amount to about 6 percent of the workforce; The Department of Energy employed 14,000 civilians and 93,000 contractors, so the cuts amounted to 14 percent of the civilian workforce; and the Department of Veteran Affairs employed over 400,000 people, so the cuts are microscopic. 

[4] Why do they need such information?  They aren’t saying.  Why not?  They’re up to something. 

No more coals to Newcastle.

            By the mid-Thirties the international situation had begun to darken.  It was not yet Desperate.  The worst—another World War—might still be avoided.  Serious men had to deal with situations in a realistic way.  What were the situations? 

First, there was the conflict between the “democratic” and “status-quo” powers (Britain, France, and the United States) and the “authoritarian” and “revisionist”: powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, and Imperial Japan.  Each of the “revisionist” powers desired to expand its territorial control over adjoining areas.  To accomplish these goals they would have to overthrow the system of international order—often called the Versailles settlement—created after the First World War.  Beyond that common goal they were often at odds among themselves. 

            Second, there were the military realities.  The conventional economic policy adopted to respond to the Depression (1929-1939) combined lower taxes with spending cuts, while limiting international trade (autarky).  Where countries stuck with this policy, military budgets suffered.  Where they did not stick with this policy, they rearmed faster.  Meanwhile, autarky spurred both isolationism and aggression.

            Third, Britain had three enemies threatening its global position: Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Far East.  It had the military resources to fight one major war at a time.  Britain lacked good allies.  America was deeply isolationist; Communist Russia hated capitalist counties—democratic or authoritarian; and France had been “bled white” in the First World War, while the Depression intensified partisan polarization.  If Britain fought one major power, the other two enemies would pile on.  Unless they were bought off or deterred. 

            In July 1934, Austrian Nazis had tried to seize power.  Hitler’s fingerprints were all over the failed coup.  The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ordered four army divisions to the border with Austria to deter German intervention.  In London and Paris, this seemed a good omen. 

            In March 1935, Nazi Germany declared that it would begin rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty.  In April 1935, representatives from Britain, France, and Italy met in the resort town of Stresa.  They agreed to resist any further German violation of the Versailles Treaty.  During the conference, the Italians raised the issue of Ethiopia.  Italy wanted to take over a big chunk of Ethiopia.  This was Italy’s bill for helping contain Germany.  The demand embarrassed the British, so it never made it into a written agreement.    

Mussolini had not abandoned his goals.  In October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia.  Public opinion, but especially “progressive” opinion, in both Britain and France went wild.  Demands rang out for support for the League of Nations and economic sanctions on Italy. 

British and French leaders still hoped to save the Italian alliance against Germany.  In December 1935, British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare met secretly with French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval.  They agreed on a plan that gave most of Ethiopia to Italy while leaving a fragment independent.  News leaked, public opinion revolted, the plan was abandoned, and Hoare resigned.  King George V said “Ah well Sam, no more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris.” 

Lesson: If you want the “status quo” in one area you may have to accept “revisionism” in another.  Who is the main enemy?  What are the alternatives? 

War with China.

            At the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the defeated Nationalists withdrew from Chinese mainland territories.  Some entered the remote border areas of Laos and Thailand.  Most of them crossed the Formosa Straits to the island of Taiwan.  Here they created their own country. 

The Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) has never recognized Taiwan as independent.  In similar fashion, it refused to recognize any of the territorial losses during the age of European imperialism.  Where it could do so, it made good its claims: Shanghai and Tibet.  Other places had to wait for their “liberation.”  Recently, China has retaken Hong Kong and Macao.  Now, attention has shifted to Taiwan. 

            As part of President Richard Nixon’s “opening to China,” American policy toward Taiwan became more ambiguous.  In 1979, the United States ended diplomatic relations with Taiwan while re-establishing them with the PRC.  In 1982, the Reagan administration said that it would not pursue “a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or [of] ‘one China, one Taiwan’.”  All subsequent administrations have made clear American opposition of a declaration of independence by Taiwan.  They have believed that such a declaration would trigger an invasion by the PRC.  If that happened, then the United States might be drawn into a wart with China.  This would upset many apple-carts.[1]  So, American policy effectively has been to trust in the eventual evolution of the PRC toward the kind of society which Taiwan would willingly join.[2] 

            For the United States, the situation is more complicated than before.  For one thing, some serious observers of military affairs doubt that the United States now could win a conventional war with China in the Western Pacific.  Rearmament and rebuilding the defense industrial base could take some time.  What id China pounces before then?  For another thing, there is a suspicion that China’s aims extend well beyond merely regaining “lost” territory.  Taiwan forms the center of what strategists call the “first island chain” cutting off China from easy access to the Pacific.  Japan and the Philippines are the two other links in the chain, but it is anchored at either end by South Korea and Vietnam.  What if the Chinese determination to “restore” Taiwan forms merely an entering wedge for a larger plan of aggression?  For yet another thing, Taiwan has become a major industrial economy.  In particular, it is home to the Taiwan Semi-conductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC if you want to go check the contents of your IRA).  Chinese rule would both mark a further shift in the balance of power and harm America’s economy. 

            In 2023, the CIA assessed that Xi Jinping had instructed military leaders to “be ready [to invade Taiwan] by 2027.”[3]  In mid-December 2025, the navy of the PRC carried out maneuvers in the waters around Taiwan.  The 90-ship group was, in the view of the Taiwanese military, practicing a “blockade exercise.”[4]  Blockade would be one way of bringing Taiwan to its knees.  Bombing would be another.  Invasion—amphibious and airborne–would be yet another. 

            All this is worth public discussion.  Now and not later.  We don’t have much “later.” 


[1] See David Sacks in While Pledging to Defend Taiwan from China, Biden Shifted on Taiwan Independence. Here’s Why That Matters. | Council on Foreign Relations 

[2] See: Wilkins Micawber.  Sounds like goofy American optimism, until you consider the alternative. 

[3] “The World at a Glance,” The Week, 14 February 2025, p. 9. 

[4] “The World at a Glance,” The Week, 20 December 2024, p. 9.