In this age of rising authoritarianism.

            Journalism professor Peter Beinart refers to “this age of rising authoritarianism.”[1]  In what sense is this an “age of rising authoritarianism”? 

The history of Russia is a history of authoritarianism.  The appalling Tsarist monarchy gave way to the even worse Communist era, which gave way to the appalling Putin dictatorship.  The point is, Russia has been an authoritarian state for virtually its entire history.  The history of China is the history of authoritarianism.  The Qing monarchy gave way to the “age of the warlords” until the Kuomintang (KMT) established a national dictatorship.  The Communists replaced this dictatorship with their own—even worse—dictatorship in 1949.  Much has changed in China since the 1980s, but it remains a highly effective authoritarian state.  Since gaining independence from Britain in 1949, India and Pakistan have been, at best, false-front democracies hiding real authoritarianism.  The list of Less Developed Nations that are anti-democratic horror stories is as long as your arm and has been for decades. 

“Well, well, authoritarianism is rising in places like Europe.”  No, it isn’t.  If anything, we have been witnessing are nationalist revolts against threatening authoritarianism.  Poland and Hungary have resisted the encroachments of the anything-but-liberal and German-dominated administrative state of the European Union (EU).  In 2003, French President Jacques Chirac said that Eastern European countries who supported the American invasion of Iraq had “missed the chance to shut up.”[2]  One particular flash-point in this resistance came when semi-authoritarian Turkey used the refugee/migrant weapon against the EU.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel responded by issuing quotas of illegal immigrants to be absorbed by each EU member state.  It is possible to see Ukraine’s resistance to Russian’s invasion in the same light, even if the situation and the Ukrainian response are both more extreme.  Yet no one questions the legitimacy of Ukraine asserting its own independence against clanking, rather than creeping, authoritarianism. 

Then there is “Brexit.”  That went well beyond whatever the Poles and Hungarians have done.  It is best understood by an upwelling of English patriotism among an older generation for whom nationality still has some meaning.[3]  In contrast, the much-feared “Grexit” never happened because the Greeks bent before EU (and especially German) pressure. 

If authoritarianism isn’t “rising,” why claim that it is?  I suspect that is because it allows Progressive people to set Donald Trump in a particular framework.  “[T]oday you do not need to have a dictatorship or a one-party state in order to accomplish your goals. You can take a democracy and change it through expansions of executive power and other repressions until you have the same effect on the subject population and a quasi-rubber-stamp parliament, without declaring a dictatorship….Now with Trump, he uses fascist tactics.”[4] 

What might worry some people is that such a characterization might be used to justify exceptional measures in defense of “our democracy.”  


[1] Peter Beinart, “Has the Right Against Antisemitism Lost Its Way?” NYT, 28 August 2022.  The op-ed piece itself is really good on its subject. 

[2] See: CNN.com – Chirac lashes out at ‘new Europe’ – Feb. 18, 2003 

[3] I suspect that it really began with the referendum on Scottish independence.  In the background of television news reports I noticed growing numbers of “Cross of St. George” flags.  That’s the English half of the more familiar “Union jack” created after the Act of Union (1707). 

[4] LISTEN: Ruth Ben-Ghiat on how Trump is already using “fascist tactics” | Salon.com 

Two Weeks in Philadelphia.

            The mountains on the Peloponnese peninsula in southern Greece are steep-sided and forested at the upper levels.  They yield a host of narrow valleys.  From November to April each year, their streams fill, but then dry up.  The valley soil is badly eroded; much of the vegetation is scrubby laurel and myrtle; small-scale farming is possible, but goat herding is much more common; and no Greek government has ever seen much gain in spending money on schools, roads or reservoirs.  In short, it’s a poor place, one where it is “good to be from.”  Many are. 

            One of them was Savvas Paraskevopoulos (b: c. 1880).  He got together the money for a steerage-class ticket, gave up goat herding, and came to America in 1901.  He worked on railroads, moving West, Americanized his name to “Mike Mitchell,” ended up in Galveston and settled down.  He opened a shoe-shine shop, made a success of it, got married and had a family.

            Parents want children to make them proud.  His son George Phydias Mitchell (1919-2013) did.  In 1940, George graduated from Texas A&M as the class valedictorian with a degree in petroleum engineering and geology.  The Army Engineers immediately grabbed him for the duration.  After the war, he worked for one of the major oil companies, then formed a company, Mitchell Energy & Development Corp to find and develop oil wells.  He was good at this.  By 2004, he was estimated to be worth $1.6 billion.  So, the son of an immigrant Greek goat-herder becomes one of the richest people in the world. 

            In 1973 came the first of the “oil shocks” that turned the world economy and its politics topsy-turvy.  People started looking for ways to enhance America’s energy independence through new sources, fuel efficiency, and conservation.  George Mitchell gave the issue a lot of hard thought.  He knew that people had been investigating “massive hydraulic fracturing” (or “fracking” in the lingo of the business) for quite a while.  He wondered if it would be possible to apply “fracking” to the huge Barnett Shale of north Texas.  He wasn’t a guy to just “wonder if.”  By one estimate, between 1981and 1997, Mitchell plowed $250 million into finding out, then making it work on a cost-efficient basis.  That is, Mitchell unlocked a huge amount of natural gas at a low cost.  The Brookings Institution estimated that it has provided a net benefit of $48 billion per year to consumers and industry.  Soon, the methods were applied to other shales in the United States and Canada, then in China and other parts of the world. 

            Irving Yergin (1907-1986) did the sensible thing for a Jew born in tsarist Russia.  He went to America.  He worked his way west, ending up in Hollywood, where he went into the movie business, settled down, and had a family.  His son Daniel (1947- ) shone as a student (BA, Yale; MA, PhD, Cambridge University).  His dissertation turned into a successful book Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (1977).  Headed for tenure in the Ivy League, events redirected him.  When, in the 1970s, the two “oil shocks” roiled the global economy and politics, Yergin made himself into an energy industry expert with compelling opinions and a fluent manner of expressing them.  Yergin wrote a series of highly readable door-stops.[1]  Now Yergin has turned his attention to the “fracking” industry and some of its implications for renewable energy.[2]  George Mitchell is one of his protagonists. 


[1] The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (1991); The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy (2002); The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (2011). 

[2] Daniel Yergin, The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations (2020). 

My Weekly Reader 22 August 2022.

            For obvious reasons, historians like to quote William Faulkner’s remark that “the past isn’t dead; it is not even past.”  It applies to so many contemporary situations.  Take the case of Xi Jinping’s China.  In some ways it resembles the Soviet Union.  It is a Communist Party dictatorship that persecutes both dissidents and minorities.  It remains a state-capitalist, rather than fully capitalist, economy.  The decision-making by its leader is so opaque as to make it a “black box.”  Outsiders straining to understand the future direction of China resort to what used to be called “Kremlinology.”  That is, they have to give a very close reading to the public pronouncements of Party leaders or their approved mouth-pieces.[1] 

China drew the lessons of the collapse of the Soviet Union and sought to fend off similar dangers.  First, it confirmed the Chinese leadership in its shift from a fully Communist economy toward a more capitalist economy integrated into the world market.  Second, it made the Communist Party very hostile to up-wellings of discontent.  Third, it left the United States as the sole super-power.  The diplomacy of balance between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China could not be sustained.  There was no counter-force to hold the Americans in check.  The ways in which America used that power has set the teeth of many foreigners on edge. 

            Under these circumstances, thirty years ago, Deng Xiaoping adopted the motto “hide capabilities and bide time.”[2]  In essence, China would build its power outward.  Its military would concentrate on strengthening China’s defenses against American power before developing the ability to contest American military power at a distance.  Its diplomacy would build influence in the Western Pacific/East Asia before extending China’s reach into more distant realms.  Its economic policy would build trade links in the same region, while using membership in the World Trade Organization and Most Favored Nation status to entangle American economic power in the trammels of its own “rules-based order.”[3]  China’s goal is something very like Imperial Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” 

            American mis-steps and mis-adventures facilitated a Chinese policy that seeks not merely to raise China, but to diminish the United States.  The disastrous invasion of Iraq, the financial crisis of 2008-2009, and the long political turmoil stemming from those events may lie at the root of the current sense among the American public that the country is on the wrong track in some way. 

            From this point of view, Xi Jinping is less turning from China’s long-term policy than he is taking the long-considered next step.  One thing that we still lack is a clear sense of how the Chinese leadership understands the Trump administration (as pure circus or as circus with substantive policies opposing China).  Another is how Americans—now apparently divided, pessimistic, and largely pre-occupied with domestic issues) will respond to Xi’s new phase.[4]

            Still, the first step in solving a problem is recognizing that you have a problem. 


[1] Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (2021).  On Doshi, see: Rush Doshi – Fellow – The Brookings Institution | LinkedIn 

[2] Consider the motto of Nazi Germany’s National Political Academy: “Mehr sein als scheinen”—“be more than you appear to be.”  As good as anything offered by Polonius.  Without, you know, me endorsing Nazism. 

[3] Analogical thinking can be either productive or destructive depending on whether one chooses the appropriate analogy.  So it is worth people learning something about Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929) to figure out if he fits. 

[4] See the intelligent remarks by David Wilezol in his review, WSJ, 10 August 2021.   

Journal of Trump Studies vol 1 #2.

            Before and after Donald Trump’s election as president, the Justice Department was investigating him over allegations that the campaign had links to the Russian government.[1]  Indeed, the FBI team conducting the investigation told judges that there was a “well-developed conspiracy of co-operation between [the Trump campaign] and the Russian leadership.”  Trump fought back furiously against the allegations.  In May 2017, Trump’s dismissal of FBI Director James Comey backfired by leading to the appointment of Robert Mueller as a special counsel to investigate the allegations. 

            In his first year of investigation, Mueller indicted the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) for having bought anti-Clinton ads on Facebook; indicted Russian military intelligence (GRU) for having hacked into Democratic Party internet servers and revealed the embarrassing secret text of Hilary Clinton’s well-paid speeches to industry groups; indicted former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort for financial misconduct while working in Ukraine in the years before he joined the Trump campaign; and obtained a guilty plea from former campaign aid George Papadopoulos for having lied to investigators.  What they failed to do was to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Trump campaign [had] coordinated with Russia…” 

            Then, in November 2017, came a ray of hope.  White House Counsel Donald McGahn told investigators that Trump had ordered him to fire Mueller.  Although McGahn had refused and had talked down the president, perhaps this would serve to charge Trump with obstruction of justice?  Mueller persuaded Trump to be interviewed in January 2018, but Trump refused to follow through.  Mueller rejected the option of issuing a subpoena to compel his testimony. 

            Nor did Mueller try to run down Trump’s alleged financial ties to Russia, or try to get his tax returns, or investigate his personal finances.  In May 2018, his people told the White House that Trump would not be indicted.  “Mueller’s caution and restraint remain an enigma.” 

            Actually, they don’t.  Robert Mueller was a highly experienced prosecutor and former Director of the FBI.  Across a lifetime of distinguished public service, the law has been his guide.            “[W]hat do you do when you uncover acts that don’t explicitly violate the law but that clearly seem wrong?”  Katie Benner identifies this as the recurring stumbling-block of the Mueller investigation.  In her view, Jeffrey Toobin “rightly argues that the investigation was an utter political failure.” 

For Mueller apparently, if not for Trump’s opponents, the investigation was a judicial inquiry, not a political act.  For Mueller apparently, if not for Trump’s opponents, you can’t charge people with crimes or go on fishing expeditions in hopes of finding crimes just because you think someone is a “narcissistic scoundrel.” 

            Benner makes no mention of the Department of Justice Inspector General’s Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation that was released in December 2019.  That report began the official discrediting of the “Steele Dossier” which had under-pinned the conspiracy belief of the Democrats. 

            Investigations continue and may turn up some crime that can be proved.  Until then, while all right-thinking people despise Donald Trump, just being Donald Trump isn’t a crime. 


[1] Katie Benner, “How Mueller Failed,” (review of Jeffrey Toobin, True Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Investigation of Donald Trump (2020)), NYTBR, 23 August 2020. 

Playing with Paste.

            Will the newly-passed “Inflation Reduction Act” actually reduce inflation?  No, it will not.[1]  First, it does nothing to reduce inflation now and isn’t even intended to do so.  Over the course of a decade it will reduce budget deficits by about $300 billion.  Excess money, compounded by supply chain problems and delays in restarting oil refining, are what drives the inflation we have.  The Fed is tightening interest rates to reduce that inflation.  Most of Inflation Reduction Act’s deficit reduction will come between 2027 and 2031.  The Inflation Reduction Act is just a time-sensitive label plastered onto a bill dealing with other matters.[2] 

Second, in the last year Congress has passed bills[3] that increase deficits over the next decade by about $614 billion in the estimate of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).[4]  As they taught us in elementary school, “612 take away 300 leaves 312.”  Is that reality dangerously inflationary?  No it is not.  In 2021, US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell just short of $23 trillion.[5]  Spread over a decade, the $312 billion amounts to about 0.1 percent of GDP. 

So, is it just pretty much a wash given the size of the American economy?  Not in the eyes of conservative critics.[6]  The abandonment of the “small government” Reagan Revolution since the start of this century has renewed the expansion of government programs without seriously expanding the taxation to pay for it.[7]  Businesses have one responsibility: to make a profit for their owners within the law.  For them, economic efficiency is—or should be—a little tin god.  However, governments act from a complex of motives, not all of them purely economic.  National security is one such imperative.  A Navy Carrier Strike Group is a big, complex, and expensive operation.[8]  Now, nobody needs a Carrier Strike Group.  Until they do.  Then they need it in a hurry, not in ten years’ time.  The United States Navy has eleven of them.  Efficient?  No way in Hell.  Something to think about if you’re Xi Jinping?  You betcha’.  The same rationale applies to things like climate change. 

In one sense, a question becomes how much we want the inefficient-by-necessity federal government expanding into new areas to shape production and consumption.[9]  Eventually, over time, the addition and expansion of programs with subsidies, regulations, and the impact of lobbyists can slow the economy.  The underlying economy has provided much of what makes America different from other places.  It is stronger, of course, than other states and able to influence change.  It also has—mostly–provided the chance for individual improvement. 


[1] Greg Ip, “Fiscal Agenda Doesn’t Help With Inflation,” WSJ, 12 August 2022. 

[2] See: The treachery of images (This is not a pipe), 1928 – 1929 – Rene Magritte – WikiArt.org 

[3] Either in a bipartisan fashion or through reconciliation. 

[4] $278 billion for the veterans affected by toxic “burn pits”; $257 billion for the infrastructure bill; and $79 billion for the semi-conductor aid bill.  That doesn’t mean that these things aren’t worth doing.  Just means that we are going to put a big chunk of the cost on the credit card. 

[5] United States (USA) GDP – Gross Domestic Product 2022 | countryeconomy.com 

[6] Conservatives are the only critics of these policies.  Back in the 2020 elections season, Progressives talked openly of “running the economy hot” to achieve their social policy goals.  Our current experience is what they meant. 

[7] See: A Time of Change. | waroftheworldblog  OK, citing myself.  How self-reverential. 

[8] See: Carrier battle group – Wikipedia 

[9] See: Apoorva Mandavilli, “States Blame Federal Mix-Ups As Monkeypox Shots Are Lost,” NYT, 16 August 2022; David Fahrenthold, “Pandemic Fraud Claimed Billions Meant for Relief,” NYT, 17 August 2022.  Front page stories in the Times two days running for pity’s sake. 

With Astonishing Suddenness.

            Walter Russell Mead is a political scientist who writes for the Wall Street Journal; not a journalist whose idea of the “long-term” is the next presidential election.  Mead’s chief academic interest lies in international relations and American foreign policy.[1]  Like the historian Paul Kennedy,[2] Mead emphasizes the underlying bases of national power as well as the will and wisdom involved in using that power.  For him, economic dynamism, innovation, world trade in a globalized economy, and strong multi-faceted alliances all form the building blocks of strength. 

For some time, he has been critical of the direction of China’s policies foreign and domestic, and of America’s China policy.  In February 2020, Mead wrote a column very much in this vein for the Wall Street Journal.  An editor titled it “China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia.”  The government of China denounced the title as racist and demanded an apology.  Various American academics attacked the article as insensitive and reinforcing stereotypes.[3]  The Wall Street Journal refused to apologize.[4]  In March 2020, China expelled three WSJ journalists.  Rupert Murdoch, the feisty owner of the Journal (and many other things) has had the paper beating the tar out of the Chinese government ever since. 

            Mead doesn’t respond well to authoritarian-figures.  He penetrates to the heart of China’s current problem.  At least since the beginning of this century, China has used a part of its great economic power to develop great military power.  The instinct of Xi Jinping (and perhaps the whole leadership group) has been to use China’s strength to threaten its neighbors, rather than to use its power to entice.   Having re-taken Hong Kong and stifled freedom there, Xi now is fixed on Taiwan.  China is the largest single market for Taiwan’s exports.[5]  Various impediments to trade now can be expected as China seeks to make the Taiwanese and its allies recognize their dependence.  The naval exercises, air force flights into Taiwanese airspace, and the missiles were hardly necessary as a riposte to Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit.  It just shows how Xi instinctively responds to a challenge. 

Mead is equally critical of democratic leaders who fail to sustain the foundations of their own nations.  Thus, he lashes “the strategic passivity and incompetence that blinded a generation of American political leaders to the growing threat of great-power war in the western Pacific.”[6]  In particular, “the U.S. and its allies allowed their overwhelming military superiority in the region to fade slowly away.”  (There’s a little “if they had only listened to me” in this.)    

One pressing question is whether American leaders can focus the American people on the dangers at hand in time.  Our domestic problems and divisions are so dauting.  Or, even more grimly, is there still time, at least before we have to re-run the Cuban Missiles Crisis? 


[1] See: Walter Russell Mead – Wikipedia 

[2] See: Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987) and Preparing for the 21st Century (1993). 

[3] The phrase “Sick Man of…” originated with the Russian tsar Nicholas I in 1852.  He labeled the Ottoman Empire “the sick man of Europe” because it was disintegrating through remarkably bad government and economic stagnation.”  The term came into widespread use.  In 1863 the phrase “sick man of Asia” got applied to the equally rotten Qing dynasty.  The term never had the connotation of deriding the people who lived in these failing states.  Xi Jinping probably knew exactly what Mead meant; his American critics probably didn’t because they were in fields like ethnic studies rather than history. 

[4] “Refused to apologize” as in Barry Lyndon – The Duel – YouTube Start at 1:17 if you want to cut to the chase. 

[5] Some 42 percent of Taiwan’s exports go to the mainland, another 15 percent to the United States. 

[6] Walter Russell Mead, “A Costly Passivity Toward China,” WSJ, 9 August 2022. 

A Time of Change.

            A history of government intervention in the economy might run something like the following.  “Liberal” (small government, free markets, free enterprise, free trade, and devil-take-the-hindmost) economics dominated the world during the 19th Century.  Then, from 1914 to 1945, a series of crises made this system intolerable to most in a democratic age.  All advanced countries witnessed a dramatic expansion of government power and responsibility.  From 1945 to 1980, a new system developed in which government managed the broad performance of the economy and insured against various individual catastrophes, while leaving markets free to do what they do best.  Along the way, however, the state regulated and taxed more and more, while failing to master new problems.  In the 1980s and 1990s, ideas and political interests came together to rebalance the relationship between governments and markets.  Thatcherism, Reaganism, and Monetarism culminated in Britain’s “New Labor” and Bill Clinton’s “the era of big government is over.” 

            That didn’t last long.[1]  It ran counter to popular expectations whenever a crisis hit.  The share of Americans who favored a more active problem-solving state rose from 32 percent in 1995 to 57 percent in 2020.  The government responded to new problems by jettisoning the new conventional wisdom.  On the one hand, the 21st Century began with a series of ever-greater economic crises.  First came the bursting of the “tech bubble” almost the instant Clinton was out of the White House; then the bursting of the “housing bubble” and a huge financial crisis less than a decade later; and then the covid pandemic which derailed much of the world economy a decade after that.  The government repeatedly flooded the economy with money (loans, credits) to stave off recession, bankruptcies, and high unemployment. 

On the other hand, the increasing salience of more fundamental problems of American society and economy also pushed for bigger government.[2]  The Obama administration expanded the role of government by passing the Affordable Care Act in health care and pushing through a rationalization of the automobile industry.  The rise of China as an economic rival led the Trump administration to impose, and the Biden administration to maintain, tariffs.  The Trump administration spent prodigiously to pay for the development of Covid vaccines, while the Biden administration has added $280 billion of funding for the semi-conductor industry.  Climate change has elicited a large government intervention ($234 billion) in the form of tax credits for “green” energy generation and consumption (electric vehicles).[3]  Similarly, the effort to roll-back the regulation-writing state also has gone by the boards.  The annual average of “economically significant new regulations” has risen from 20 under Reagan; to 45 under Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II; to the low 60s under Obama and Trump, to the high 60s under Biden. 

Industrial policy always turns into industrial politics.  Established industries defend themselves against threatening new-comers.  They have the deep pockets to lobby politicians for what they want.  Political intervention can increase inefficiencies.  “We’re going to have bad [economic] growth” warns one critic.  Security and freedom can be antagonists. 


[1] Jon Hilsenrath, “Recent Legislation Expands Role of Government in Private Markets,” WSJ, 13-14 August 2022. 

[2] I’m a fool not to label the financial services industry as a “fundamental problem.” 

[3] The use of tax credits forms part of another longer pattern.  Adjusted for inflation, tax credits have risen from $729 billion in 1996 to $1.4 trillion in 2021. 

The Journal of Trump Studies v 1 #1.

            It’s bad enough that there are Republicans at all.  It’s worse still that—inexplicably except through gerrymandering and voter suppression—they win so many elections.[1]  It’s just beyond belief that Donald Trump could win the White House in 2016 thanks merely to the antiquated Electoral College clause in the Constitution; and that he could survive repeated investigations that some how failed to turn up evidence of wrong-doing by the Wrong-Doer in Chief.[2]  But what really smokes my ham is that the whole Republican elite[3] rallied to the elected President merely because he gave them the means to achieve their long-term goals. 

Some people, scummy Republican word-smiths mostly, would argue that these goals were to put a stop to government by Executive-branch rule-writing, end the making of international commitments by executive agreements that didn’t have to be submitted to the Senate for ratification, and to pack the Federal courts for a generation to come with judges who had been curry-combed by the Federalist Society.  In their analysis, beginning in Summer 2016, mainstream Republicans[4] faced a choice between accepting or rejecting an alliance with the “MAGA true-believers.”  They could have renounced Trump and all his works and his pomps.  They could have urged Republican voters to sit out the election, even if they didn’t vote for the better candidate.[5]  Faced with the daunting challenge of having fielded two losers in races against Barack Obama and now facing the formidable Hilary Clinton, they opted for a “big tent.” 

Then they were “shocked, shocked to discover” that clowns came with the circus.  Rather than recoiling in horror at the “pure and feral rascal,” they decided to try to hem-in Orange Man with adults.  This failed of course.  Any Democrat could have told them that it would.  Once elected, he went on a tear.  The response of the Republican elite?  “It was always rationalization followed by capitulation and then full surrender.”[6]  Meanwhile, they focused on getting their judges and tax cuts

            The truth is, in my opinion,[7] that their long-term goals are to live in Washington, have a nice house, wear excellent suits, and play a lot of golf.  In the words of journalist Mark Leibovich, they are “saps and weaklings” and “careerists who capitulated to Trumpism to preserve their livelihoods.”   

Happily, a few principled Republicans redeemed themselves.[8]  At least until the danger of Trump has disappeared and their basic commitment to Evil can be acknowledged once again. 


[1] Note to self: how do you gerrymander a Senatorial or Presidential election?  Must ask Chuck. 

[2] I tried WOTUS, WdOTUS, and WDOTUS.  Just didn’t seem to work.  Sigh. 

[3] Note to self, “Republican elite” is redundant because only Republicans have an elite.  Democratic “politicians, leaders, fixers and influence-peddlers,” along with community-organizers, activists, and spiritual advisers are all simply “doing the People’s business.”  Further note to self: edit this before posting.  In Mario Puzo, The Godfather, one of Don Corleone’s henchmen reflects that “doing the business” is a metaphor used both for murder and sex. 

[4] “Normies” as the Proud Boys et al called them. 

[5] Like all those Alabama Republicans who sat out the election between Roy Moore and Doug Jones. 

[6] Mark Leibovich, Thank You for Your Servitude: Donald Trump’s Washington and the Price of Submission (2022).  There’s an admiring review by Geoffrey Kabaservice, NYTBR, 7 August 2022.  Coincidentally, Kabaservice wrote Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party (2013). 

[7] “And I am unanimous in this”—Mrs. Slocombe (Molly Sugden) in “Are You Being Served?” many times between 1972 and 1985.    

[8] The Graceful Loser, Liz Vader, and the Maverick. 

The AK-47 of Missiles.

            Before and during the Second World War, Germany made dramatic advances in rocketry and missiles.  At the end of the war, the Americans, British, and Soviets grabbed up as many German scientists, technicians, and samples as they could lay hands upon.  In the competition of the Cold War the military rocket programs of all three advanced by leaps and bounds.  All passed beyond German capabilities by the late 1940s. 

            By 1951, the Soviet Union had developed nuclear weapons.  The strategic question became how to use these weapons in war.  The German V-2 had a flying range of 200 miles.  Soviet missiles based on the V-2 would have to be fired from western East Germany and Czechoslovakia to bring Western Europe under fire.  In fixed firing position, they would be highly vulnerable to air attack; in a Red Army advance, they would need to follow the frontline forward.  Thus, mobile launchers offered the best solution.  The V-2 launchers had been very cumbersome, so something more svelte would be welcomed.[1] 

            In 1951, the Soviet high command issued a requirement for a V-2, but half as big.  By mid-1955, the new missiles were starting to become available.  Western intelligence agencies that figured out that the missiles were manufactured at the SKB-385 factory in Chelyabinsk oblast designated the new weapon as the SS-1B, and—I’m guessing–called it the Scud A.  In any event, it could carry a nuclear warhead, but not very far: maximum range was 100 miles. 

            With this weapon in hand, the Soviets then got to work on a more robust successor.  By 1964, the SS-1C Scud B had begun to enter service.  It had double the range (c. 180 miles), much greater accuracy, and could be armed with a wide range of warheads for varied purposes.  Over the years, the Soviets manufactured 7,000 Scud-Bs. 

            The Soviets transferred Scuds to clients.  As part of their build-up of Egyptian forces in the early 1970s, the Soviets transferred some Scud-Bs for use against Israeli forces.  Beginning in 1974 and continuing to 1988, the Soviet Union transferred over 800 Scud-Bs to Iraq. 

            Recipient countries then transferred them elsewhere.  In 1979 or 1980, the Egyptians transferred a Scud-B to North Korea.  The North Koreans then figured out how to make them for themselves.  They tweaked the original design to improvement it, then called their missile the Hwasong-5. 

            In 1985, North Korea transferred to Iran perhaps 100 Hwasong-5s.  The Iranians then did the same reverse-engineering as had done the North Koreans.  They called their missile the Shahab-1. 

            In 1989, the Soviets transferred a large number of Scud-Bs to their client-state in Afghanistan. 

            Reverse-engineering is an education in itself.  It enhances the technical capabilities of the people doing the work.  If you put smart people to work, they start having ideas of their own.  As a result, both North Korea and Iran have developed more highly capable successor generations of the original Scud-B.  These, too, have been transferred. 

            So far, the AK 47 has killed more people in Third World Wars than has the Scud.  So far. 


[1] Kyle Mizokami, “How Soviet SCUD Missile Launchers Took the World By Storm,” The National Interest, 21 December 2021 How Soviet SCUD Missile Launchers Took the World By Storm | The National Interest; Sergio Pecanha, “Concerned About North Korea?  The List of Missile Powers Keeps Growing,” NYT,11 February 2018. 

The Gaza Fighting.

            In 1979, Egyptian Islamists formed the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).  The EIJ wanted to overthrow the Egyptian dictatorship and set up an Islamist regime.  The EIJ included a faction of Palestinians living in exile.  In 1981 the EIJ participated in the assassination of Egyptian dictator Anwar Sadat.  Many EIJ members fled the subsequent repression, while the Palestinians were expelled to Gaza.  They re-branded themselves as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).  PIJ aims at the destruction of the state of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state encompassing all of pre-partition Palestine.   

            By the late 1980s, PIJ had moved into the orbit of Iran through its client in Lebanon, Hezbollah.  Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority have opposed PIJ.  Between 1987 and 2002, PIJ claimed 17 attacks (mostly bombings and ambushes of public transport buses); from 2002 and 2014, PIJ claimed 14 attacks (mostly bombings of public places). 

Mid-stream in the second period of PIJ attacks, another, larger Islamist movement, Hamas, won the Palestinian elections.  Hamas evicted the defeated Fatah-led faction from Gaza.  Fatah then evicted Hamas from government positions in the West Bank.  Since then, Hamas and PIJ have maintained an uneasy relationship, competing for advantage within Gaza while co-operating against Israel. 

The co-operative stance of the two parties may be eroding.[1]  On the one hand, the on-going Muslim civil war between Shi’ite and Sunni forces people to take sides.  Hamas is a Sunni Islamist movement.  Iran and Hezbollah are Shi’ite.  Since 2014, Iran has greatly increased its financial and arms support to PIJ, leading to a growing role for PIJ in Gaza and the West Bank. 

On the other hand, the responsibilities of governing Gaza may be sapping the intransigence of Hamas.  The government led until recently by Benjamin Netanyahu slammed tight economic constraints on Gaza in response to Hamas attacks.  It repeatedly pounded the living daylights out of Gaza in retaliation for rocket attacks.  Those restrictions–generally supported by Egypt, so no one is coming to help the Gazans–have made life in Gaza miserable for the two million people trapped there.  Since the fall of Netanyahu, Israel has modified its policy.  It has eased restrictions on imports and exports.[2]  It has also offered work-permits for 14,000 people.  It has dangled the possibility of raising the number of permits to 20,000 under the right security conditions.[3]  With a 50 percent unemployment rate in Gaza, Hamas may see some benefit in greater co-operation.  As more and more Sunni Arab states normalize relations with Israel, it must be occurring to many Islamists that the “Jewish entity” isn’t going anywhere. 

That is one way of understanding the recent outbreak of fighting in Gaza.  In April and May 2022, PIJ launched a new round of attacks inside Israel.  Israel responded with arrests of PIJ leaders on the West Bank.  PIJ countered with rocket attacks directed at Israel.  Israel countered with attacks on PIJ members in Gaza.  In all this, Hamas did not involve itself in the fighting and Israel did not target any Hamas sites.  The West Bank government did not interfere with arrests. 

Slowly, radicals may be getting shoved to the margins.  Or perhaps not. 


[1] See: Isabel Kershner, “After Three-Day Conflict In Gaza, Cease-Fire Holds,” NYT, 9 August 2022. 

[2] Not necessarily by a lot.  The recent fighting led to a cut-off of imports for a week.  By the end of that time, Gaza was almost out of fuel for its electric generators. 

[3] The limits on Arab workers in Israel sprang from the Arab terrorism, especially suicide bombings, of past times.