Grim Anniversary: The Atomic Bombings.

            We fast approach the seventy-eighth anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[1]  Could Imperial Japan have been forced to surrender unconditionally without either an American invasion or the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? 

Certainly. 

In early Spring 1945, the Army Air Force shifted from high-altitude, daytime, precision bombing to low-level, nighttime “carpet-bombing” with incendiaries.  The first such attack, “Operation Meetinghouse,” in March 1945, killed more than 80,000 people in Tokyo.  Thereafter, American bombers worked steadily down the list of Japanese cities, destroying homes, industry, and infrastructure.  In the aptly-named “Operation Starvation” Army Air Force bombers sowed 12,000 mines that sank 670 ships and annihilated Japanese imports and inter-island trade.[2]  All you had to do was to wait while the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” trampled over Japan.  In the end, the conventional bombing killed 210,000 people, the atomic bombings 120,000. 

Could the United States have escaped the moral culpability of being the only country to use nuclear weapons? 

What culpability is that? 

Atomic weapons were developed as part of what Anglo-American leaders understood as a nuclear arms race with Nazi Germany.  If the weapons had been ready in 1942, would it have been immoral to atom bomb Nazi Germany?  Or was it only immoral to bomb Japan? 

The two atom bombs were not “worse” weapons than the alternatives of fire-bombing cities or starving huge numbers of people to death through a blockade.  Dead is dead. 

Was saving even one American soldier’s life worth killing 80,000 Japanese?  How would you answer if you were the mother or father of that American soldier?    

If there is moral culpability here it lies with the Japanese government of the time.  First, that government began the Second World War in the Pacific as an escalation of its effort to conquer China.  Second, it waged that war in an atrocious fashion which elicited atrocity in response.[3]  Third, it continued to wage war long after it became impossible to avoid eventual defeat.[4]  The Japanese government’s essential strategy lay in accepting the mass death of Japanese in hopes of inflicting mass death on American soldiers.  Their “hope” or “plan” lay in the belief that the Americans would not accept high casualty totals.  Indeed, the Americans understood Japanese intentions and they would rather not suffer such casualties.  That’s why they had so many bombers—and terrible kinds of bombs. 

People seem to view the bombing of Japan through the filter of the subsequent nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and through the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hands of many other countries.  Would it be immoral to begin a full-scale nuclear war today?  Yes, that would probably be immoral.  That isn’t what happened in 1945. 


[1] And it coincides with “Oppenheimer” (dir. Christopher Nolan, 2023) and Evan Thomas, Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II (2023). 

[2] See: Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. V: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945, pp.  662-673. 

[3] Race hatred played a powerful role on both sides, and not merely that of the Americans.  See: John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (1986). 

[4] When did Japan “lose” the war?  Possibly at Pearl Harbor (December 1941).  Probably at Midway (June 1942).  Certainly with the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and the American capture of Saipan (June-July 1944).  The Battle of the Philippine Sea destroyed what remained of Japan’s naval offensive power.  Saipan put American bombers within range of the Home Islands.  That’s more than a year before Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

China Gazing.

            Very rapid economic growth is not uncommon in modern history.  It runs with Industrialization.  The key lies in shifting huge numbers of people out of a low-productivity agricultural sector into a high-productivity industrial sector.  Generally low industrial wages are often better than in agriculture, so workers are relatively tranquil for a long time.  Low wages plus technology produce lots of goods for sale at a low price.  Manufactured goods are then sold in large numbers both on domestic and international markets. 

Generally, this rapid growth doesn’t last forever: the population shift runs out of peasants; labor starts to demand better conditions, leading to pressure for unionization; foreign later entrants to industrialization follow the same path and under-cut the leaders’ initial cost advantage; the economy moves into “higher” stages that require more educated people; and a complex economy is more difficult to manage.[1] 

            China offers a text-book case of this process.  In less than half a century, China moved from relying on a very inefficient peasant agriculture to become the second largest economy in the world, with a gigantic industrial sector that produces a lot more than just cheap textiles.  Growth made other things possible: the pacification of domestic conflicts; the build-up of great financial and military power; and the preservation of one-party rule.  Now, some observers are beginning to ask if the era of rapid growth has come to an end and, if so, what may follow.[2] 

            Four big issues confront contemporary China.  First, China has an aging population and no hope of immigration.  Where is it going to find workers and how will it support a non-working population?  Second, there is a widening gap between the old-industrial areas of the northeast and the much more dynamic areas of Shenzhen and Shanghai.  Is China’s “Rust Belt” going to be subsidized by other areas or is it going to be treated as a new labor and resource swamp that has to be drained?  Third, other countries have become alarmed at Chinese power and assertiveness.  The United States has imposed tariffs and is imposing restrictions on exports of sensitive technologies.  Fourth, it is much easier to centrally control a simple economy than a complex economy.[3]  Zi Jinping has committed the country to tightening central control. 

            These problems may create opportunities and problems for the United States.  Zi may tighten his grip on power and hold to his present course, or a powerful faction may arise in the Party to force a return to the policies of Deng Xiaoping.  China may reallocate resources from its military to dealing with its internal problems, or it may believe that enough guns can deal with the problem of not enough butter.  A slowing Chinese economy may reduce both China’s power over neighboring economies and the fears that run with it.  Or a return to sustained international economic growth may allow China to continue its current policies. 

            All this is uncertain.  Two things are certain.  First, bad and dangerous as he is in American eyes, Zi Jinping possesses great determination and political skill.  It isn’t impossible for him to master a tough situation. 

            Second, the current United States is no model of political health or good governance.  Whatever China’s future, Americans need to start setting their own house in order.  Soon. 


[1] David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus (1969). 

[2] Walter Russell Mead, “China’s Economy Hits the Skids,” WSJ, 18 July 2023. 

[3] See: The Soviet Union. 

Wild Fires.

            In mid-May 1780, the skies over New England, New York, northern New Jersey, and eastern Canada appeared yellow in color and the sun red.   On the morning of 19 May 1780, the skies began to darken as if night was coming on.  By noon people had to light candles to see what they were doing.  One witness recorded that “the fowls went to their roosts, the cocks crew and the whip-poor-wills sung their usual serenade” at mid-day.  Then, after a few hours, the darkness began to recede as quickly as it had arrived, but it lasted long enough to compound night’s natural darkness.  Scholars now believe that this “Dark Day” resulted from wildfires in Ontario, Canada.[1]  Westerly winds drove the smoke from enormous fires eastward over the northern Colonies. 

            This story will seem excessively familiar in Summer 2023.[2]  Big wildfires spring from the combination of fuel (dry vegetation), ignition (commonly lightning strikes and human error), and “red flag” conditions (high temperature, low humidity, and wind).  All of those came together across Canada in Spring 2023.  The Canadian fires now burning are much greater in scope than those of 1780.  They are much bigger than the now-forgotten fires of 1989, which burned 18 million acres.  They have burned 25 million acres so far.  It’s still early in the fire season, so the final total is sure to be even more staggering. 

One factor may be the simultaneity of the Canadian fires.  With normally sequential fires, crews can work to contain a fire before moving on to another new blaze.  Simultaneous fires over-stretch limited resources (i.e. mostly young men in big boots with Stihls).  Really remote locations may compound the difficulties.[3] 

            Reasonably and persuasively, however, experts chiefly attribute these wildfires-run-wild to climate change.  A warming planet dries out the vegetation (fuel), triggers more lightning storms (ignition), and destabilizes the pattern of winds (“red-flag” conditions). 

            Climate-change skeptics could point out that the United States has not suffered a comparable disaster.  According to the National Interagency Fire Center, just under 750,000 acres have burned so far in 2023.  In comparison, the 2014-2023 average for fires as of July 10, is almost 2.6 million acres.  In 2022, a skosh over 4.8 million acres had burned by 10 July.[4] This slow start to the season has allowed 1,800 U.S. firefighters to be sent to Canada.  Furthermore, as is the case in Canada, Mediterranean wildfires are common, rather than something new.  Finally, you don’t need to have climate change to have big wildfires. 

As was the case with the Lisbon earthquake of 1755,[5] many people saw the hand of God in New England’s “Dark Day,” fearing that it heralded the “Day of Judgement.”[6]  Also as with the Lisbon earthquake, others thought not.  They sought some rationally comprehensible explanation in the powerful functioning of the Natural world.  These skeptics didn’t yet have such an explanation.  They just thought it the most likely place to look.  They were proved right. 


[1] See: The New England Dark Day, May 19, 1780 – New England Historical Society 

[2] Nadja Popovich, “What Is Fueling Canada’s Epic Wildfire Season,” NYT, 19 July 2023. 

[3] It’s a seven hour drive from Calgary to the Peace River area, about half way up the province. 

[4] See: 2023 wildfire season in US off to the quietest start in at least a decade | Watch (msn.com) 

[5] See: 1755 Lisbon earthquake – Wikipedia 

[6] KJV, Matthew, 24, 29-31.  “Immediately after the tribulation of those days the sun will be darkened, and the moon will not give its light; the stars will fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens will be shaken.” 

One Reader Asks.

Re: What If Joe Biden Is Right?

“What if and why? In such a wealthy and relatively well educated population, why aren’t there individuals willing to step up to run?”

Run against a sitting president of your own party? Teddy Roosevelt ran against William Howard Taft, Bobby Kennedy ran against Lyndon Johnson, and Teddy Kennedy ran against Jimmy Carter. Ugly divisive experiences in ugly, divisive times.

Both parties are gerontocracies. In the case of the Democrats, Biden, Schumer, Pelosi (still in Congress despite giving up the Speakership. People hang on because they don’t have any “real” life. Mostly, they’ve never done anything except be politicians. “Spending more time with the family” is something you do only after a scandal breaks. The bipartisan phenomenon of “safe” constituencies lets them pile up seniority and fend off the young people.

Both parties are coalitions filled with tensions. In the case of the Democrats, there are the Progressive and Moderate wings, along with Joe Manchin. Biden has this very unhappy marriage papered-over for now. The representative of one faction primarying the president seems to me like it would draw in a representative of the other faction. So, a two or three-way fight for the nomination with each candidate offering distinctly different agendas. (JMO and I come in peace, but all you have to do is put Jayapal’s sneering face on television to send most voters streaming for the Republicans.)

Could the party have time to patch up the wounds from such a fight in time for a general election? Maybe, IF the whole process had started a year ago with Biden announcing that he would not seek a second term. Or with him telling Kamala Harris privately that he would appoint her to the next vacancy of the Supreme Court, but he would not accept her as a Vice Presidential candidate. Then he could have replaced her with a person whom he regarded as having presidential qualities.

Personally, I wonder if he is going to make it through the end of his first term without being 25th Amendmented. I doubt very much that he can make it through an entire second term. Well, maybe he can: Reagan completed his second term while being first one, then two, and then three bricks short of a load. Took a bunch of Wizard of Oz little-man-behind-the-curtain stuff. That what we want in this case? Failing that, we could end up with President Harris.

Early on, I had thought that Biden might use his cabinet as a proving ground for younger successors. If that’s what he did the Harris and Pete Buttigieg have flopped badly.

As a “Never-Trump-Deplorable,” this puts me in an awkward position. My own preference for a Democratic candidate would be either Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo (See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gina_Raimondo ) or Colorado Governor Jared Polis (See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jared_Polis ). That probably dooms the both of them. Such are my magical powers, alas.

What If Joe Biden is Right?

What if Joe Biden is right? What if his decision to run for re-election as President is NOT the ego-gratification of a long-suffering second-tier politician who accidentally made it to the White House? What if he is NOT saying “I told ya so” to “all the people who’ve looked down on me all my life” (including Barack Obama)? What if he is NOT just trying to find some way to protect his son Hunter from the demons–both Hunter’s own and the Republican ones–by controlling the Executive Branch for another four years? What if it is NOT a decision foist on him in a semi-senescent state by “Dr. Jill and the Inner Circle”? What if it his own well-reasoned decision?

What if there are no other Democratic Party politicians capable of winning the next presidential election against whomever the Republican Party nominates. Doesn’t matter who: Trump or DeSantis or Haley or Christie. What if there are no Democratic Party politicians capable of handling the duties and responsibilities of President of the United States of America? What if there are no Democratic Party politicians who can defend the United States from all enemies, foreign and domestic? What if there are no Democratic Senators, Congressmen or Congresswomen, Governors, Cabinet Secretaries, or wives–scorned or adored–of former presidents who could get elected or, if elected, make a decent president?

That is what Joe Biden is saying by his decision to run for re-election at an advanced age.

What if he is right?

The Run.

            A “run” is an old-timey word for a creek or stream, like Bull Run.  Kingsbury Run is a winding creek and valley in southeastern Cleveland, Ohio.  It fed into the Cuyahoga River near the city’s main industrial and railroad area, the “Flats.”  The valley had served as a transportation route, an industrial site, a drainage route for rainwater, and as a kind of boundary between different communities on the higher ground.  By the late 1920s, it had returned to Nature to some extent.  Up on the east side above the “run,” there grew up a working-class entertainment district: bars and brothels, gambling joints and cheap hotels.  When the Depression hit, Kingsbury Run became home to one of Cleveland’s shanty towns housing poor people. 

            Between 23 September 1935 and 16 August 1938, all or parts of ten dismembered bodies were discovered.  Most were in the area of Kingsbury Run, one on the city’s west side, and one in Columbus, Ohio.  Only three of them could even be tentatively identified.  Six men and four women who shared anonymity in a grisly fate.[1] 

            To make matters worse, other murders in other places and at other times bore a marked resemblance to the Cleveland killings.  In September 1934, part of a dismembered woman’s body had been fished out of Lake Erie outside the Cleveland city limits.  At various times between 1921 and 1942, dismembered or decapitated bodies were found in waste ground near railroad yards in western Pennsylvania.  A Baltimore and Ohio Railroad line (B&O) connected Pittsburg with Cleveland (and with Columbus).  The police were willing to consider the possibility that all these were the handywork of one person.[2]  All things considered, it might be better for the public’s peace of mind if only one uncatchable demented killer existed. 

            The manhunt for the killer dragged on.  Although the police never caught the killer, their investigation solved 1,000 other crimes.[3]  Perhaps reasonably, perhaps out of desperation, some detectives focused on Dr. Francis Sweeney (1894-1964).  He fit the bill for a demented disassembler of humans.  Sweeney was a doctor who had worked at a hospital near the Run; an apparently “shell-shocked” (PTSD) veteran of the First World War, where he had served in a medical unit doing lots of amputations; a gas casualty suffering nerve damage; a severe alcoholic who had ruptured many relationships; and the cousin of a bitter critic of Cleveland Public Safety Director Eliot Ness.[4]  Confronted by Ness in 1938, Sweeney checked himself into a veterans hospital.  The killings specific to Kingsbury Run stopped. 

            One of the lead detectives wasn’t so sure.  Both the murders in Cleveland and the similar ones elsewhere along the B&O lines suggested to him that the killer might be one of the many hobos or tramps “riding the rails” during the Depression.[5]  Equally possibly, the killer might have been a railroad man, the “Headless Brakeman of Demon Run” so to speak. 


[1] Daniel Stashower, American Demon: Eliot Ness and the Hunt for America’s Jack the Ripper (2022). 

[2] Elizabeth Short–the “Black Dahlia”–killed in Los Angeles in 1947, also suffered wounds very similar to those of the Cleveland victims.  Perhaps the killer, like so many other people, had gone West to help with the war effort. 

[3] Sort of like in “M” (dir. Fritz Lang, 1930). 

[4] Ness had made a name for himself fighting Al Capone and organized crime in Chicago in the 1930s.  In 1936, Ness became the Public Safety Director in Cleveland.  Cleveland wasn’t Chicago, but it was bad enough and in the same ways.  There was multi-ethnic organized crime running gambling and prostitution, while both the police and the city government were riddled with corruption.  Ness got to work on all fronts, making many enemies. 

[5] On “Tramps,” see: Tramp – Wikipedia; on “Hobos,” see: Hobo – Wikipedia 

Adjusting the Overton Window.

            Joe Overton,–“he of the Overton window,” as Howard Cosell would have said—saw “think-tanks” as a prime mover of the range of acceptable ideas.  They advocate for opening, closing, and moving or not moving the “window.” 

Inspired by Overton, political scientist Daniel Drezner examined the development of this “ideas industry” with regard to his own academic specialty, international relations.[1] 

            Drezner argues that times have changed.  Once upon a time, the general public received enlightenment and guidance from “public intellectuals.”  Commonly, these were subject-area experts, often academics who wrote fluently.  What they wrote provided a kind of small-ball explanation of the events at the center of attention and controversy at any given moment.[2]  Newspapers and journals of opinion read by the next several tiers of regional and local opinion-leaders received the fruits of this expertise, then communicated it to the larger readership.  Generally, various levels of the public could respond through “Letters to the Editor.” 

            Those days are, to an extent, gone the way of the Blackberry.  The “public intellectuals” have been shouldered into the second rank by what Drezner calls “thought leaders.”  They differ from their predecessors in two ways.  First, commonly they are not generalists with opinions on all sorts of things.  They are One Big Idea people.[3]  They provide a context for thinking about “all the frequent troubles of our days”[4] within some framework.  Examples of such thought leaders would include Francis Fukuyama and Tom Friedman.[5]  Second, they reach their audiences in new venues: TED talks, blogs, Twitter.  Experienced editors don’t make a selection of reader responses to illustrate the diversity of reactions.  You just get Likes and much yelling. 

            Drezner argues that the creation and dissemination of Ideas now reflects several decades of accumulating changes.  The era of globalization and tech booms created immense new fortunes.  Once upon a time, much of that wealth might have flowed to building libraries or art galleries.  Now, privately-funded–and to a degree opaque–“think tanks” adopt the ideological perspective of their patrons.  Finally, there’s been a general decline of Authority in favor of individual Liberty.[6]  Arguably, audiences on left and right seek voices who tell them what they want to hear, regardless of competence or wisdom.  Arguably, there are far too many people who tailor their commentary to what people want to hear.[7] 

            Thee are symptoms, more than causes, of America’s bitter partisan quarrels. 


[1] Daniel Drezner, The Ideas Industry: How Pessimists, Partisans, and Plutocrats are Transforming the Marketplace of Ideas (2017). 

[2] It’s not completely fair to offer Walter Lippman as the “beau-ideal” of the public intellectual as described above.   On Lippmann, see Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (1980).

[3] This is not so different from what historians do when they write books on the “Age of…” this, that, or the other period.  It’s just that Thought Leaders are writing mid-stream without any knowledge of how things will play out. 

[4] Stole that from the title of Rachel Donner’s biography of Mildred Harnack. 

[5] See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992); Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (1999); The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (2005). 

[6] I’m not sure that Drezner understands how pervasive the change has been.  He is preoccupied with subject-area expertise.  Much of this disdain springs from revelations of incompetence and corruption on the part of Authorities. 

[7] For an example from one side, but readers can find the same stuff on the Right: Robert Reich – The goal is to deflect and distract – to use… | Facebook

Just asking.

Can we distinguish between laws that receive universal or near-universal approval/assent and laws which are contested by a large share–even if a minority–of the population? Murder and drunk driving happen, but they are pretty much universally condemned. And commonly repented by people who do them. Prohibition and the War on Drugs did not enjoy such broad support. As a result, they didn’t/haven’t worked. Abortion seems to me to fall into the same category. So do Second Amendment issues. These all can be seen as attempts to police cultural divisions. Nineteenth Century “temperance” campaigns did a lot to reduce excessive alcohol consumption. Much more effective than Prohibition and getting the cops into the question. They were persuasive, not coercive, in nature. Perhaps those campaigns, like the very successful one that reduced smoking in the late 20th Century, offer a better path forward. 

The Overton Window.

            Joe Overton (1960-2003) died young, but left a durable legacy in American practical political thought.  His Dad worked for Dow Chemical, so the family ended up in Midland, Michigan.  Joe got a B.S. in Electrical Engineering (Michigan Technological University).  Like his Dad, he went to work for Dow Chemical, as an engineer and project manager.  Later on, he earned a J.D. from Western Michigan University.[1] 

            Overton was a Libertarian.  He went to work for the recently founded think-tank The Mackinac Center for Public Policy.  The Center describes itself as “socially tolerant, economically sophisticated, desiring little government intervention in either their personal or economic affairs.”  It advocates for lower taxes, less government regulation, school choice (i.e. charter schools), and right to work laws.  On the other hand, it will not involve itself in socially conservative causes like abortion (ending legal abortion), marriage (i.e. marriage equality), or book-banning. 

            Being economically “free market” and socially liberal, this particular mix of policies fell neither within the Democratic or Republican ideological camps.  In short, it couldn’t get a hearing.[2]  As a part of his work, Overton worked up a brochure that explained how think-tanks could alter public attitudes toward public policies.  He argued that policies were characterized in public discussion roughly on a range from “Unthinkable” to “Acceptable” to “Popular.”  Only policies described as “Acceptable” got any discussion; only policies that could be discussed could become “Popular.”  Anything that achieved sufficient “Popular” support could become “Policy.”  This narrowed range of possibility became known as the “Overton window.”[3] 

The resolution of the debt ceiling stand-off leaves the United States on course for a financial catastrophe at some point in the future.[4]  With the deficit at 5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the United States has the highest ratio of the seven largest advanced economies.[5]  Total debt amounts to 97 percent of GDP; in a decade it will increase to about 115 percent.  The rise in interest rates that is being used to combat inflation is expanding the weight of government debt on public finances.  Those rates have increased the cost of government borrowing from a long period of near zero to five percent; the higher rates may last for a while. 

            How did we get into this mess?  Fundamentally, the country itself is both united on some things and divided on others.  It is united on the untouchability of the big drivers of government spending: Defense, Social Security, and Medicare/Medicaid.  It is divided over reducing spending, or increasing taxation, or both as a solution to the problem.  Clearly, this combination of policies cannot be sustained over the long term. 

In short, solving our problems will require shifting or widening the “Overton window.”  Neither party seems interested in doing that.  It may take “the prospect of being hanged.”


[1] Reportedly “the worst law school in America.”  Michael Cohen (yes that Michael Cohen) went there.  See: Western Michigan University Cooley Law School – Wikipedia 

[2] “Why am I short of attention?/Got a short little span of attention”—Paul Simon, “You Can Call Me Al” (1986).

[3] For two takes, see: How the Politically Unthinkable Can Become Mainstream – The New York Times (nytimes.com) and An Introduction to the Overton Window of Political Possibility – 101 Recommendations to Revitalize Michigan – Mackinac Center 

[4] Greg Ip, “A Debt Deal That Doesn’t Deal With Debt,” WSJ, 1 June 2023. 

[5] Britain is at 3.5 percent, Japan at about 2.5 percent; and Germany has a surplus of about 0.5 percent. 

A Modern National Industrial Strategy.

Historians ask three essential questions.  First, What happened?  This question is about assembling a richly detailed Chronology of events.  Second, Why did it happen?  This is about Causation and historians never accept single-factor explanations for why things happened.  Third, What difference did it make that it happened?  This is about Consequence and, as with Causation, there is never just one result.  This can be mantra-fied as either What?/Why?/So What? Or as Chronology/Causation/Consequence. 

William Galston provides a good example of historical thinking in a rapid overview of the politics and economics of the last thirty years.[1] 

What Happened?  From 1990 through 2000, the American economy expanded rapidly and the fruits of growth received a wide distribution as real wages increased.  Growing industrial productivity did not reduce the manufacturing labor force; instead it raised wages. On New Year’s Day 2001, there were about 17 million people holding down manufacturing jobs in the United States.[2]  Between January 2001 and June 2009, the United States lost 5.4 million manufacturing jobs.  That’s just shy of one-third of the industrial manufacturing jobs.  Gone in less than a decade.  American manufacturing had long been dispersed into smaller cities and rural areas.  The biggest shocks were felt in areas outside the main media consumer markets. 

Why did it happen?  First, the Clinton Administration (1992-2000) adopted a policy mix of extending the open world market economy that had been created under American leadership after the Second World War.  It would reach out from its core American, Western European, and East Asian strongholds to the lands where Marxist economics had been discredited.  In practice, this meant Eastern Europe and Russia, China, and leftist governments inthe Developing World. 

Second, contrary to their intent, these policies actually harmed American interests.  Capitalists didn’t invest in ways that were entirely productive and efficient; industries that were essential for American national security and/or supply chains languished or were off-shored; and China, in particular, took advantage of its favored position in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The result of these policies came in a “hollow[ing] out” of American manufacturing. 

Why does it matter?  For one thing, these developments stimulated a “populist revolt” in the United States.  This ran from the “Tea Party” dissidence within the Republican Party during the Obama Administration to Trumpism.  In Democratic rhetoric, this threatens democracy. 

For another thing, Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, has announced a new “modern national industrial strategy.”  The goals of that strategy will be to strengthen the industrial foundations of national security, promote economic growth, and create a lot of well-paying jobs to replace those lost in the lost decades that began this century.  The instruments will be strategic, rather than general, agreements on tariffs and trade, and subsidies.  Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s shepherdessing of the Biden Administration’s semi-conductor manufacturing efforts foreshadows these larger intentions. 

            It’s an honest piece of History.  It is far from being a complete account of what happened or why it happened.  It endorses, perhaps too easily, one party’s program of great consequence. 


[1] William Galston, “Biden’s ‘Foreign Policy for the Middle Class’,” WSJ, 31 May 2023.  The customary American blurring of middle-class and working-class is here on display. 

[2] Total civilian labor force was 143 million.  See: U.S. labor force 1990-2022 | Statista