Category Archives: The Economy

Playing Chicken.

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Architects of the Euro-zone sought a stronger, more prosperous, and more harmonious union.[1] The inauguration of the Euro in 1999 began a period of low interest rates for member countries. Low interest rate led to heavy borrowing by both public (Greece) and private (Spain, Ireland) sectors. When the world economy slowed down after the American financial crisis, debt-service became a problem.

The architects had not then—and have not yet—resolved all of the problems. One worm in the apple is that the single currency serves 19 sovereign states. Those states do not pursue uniform economic policies. Nor do all national cultures celebrate the same values.[2] German hostility to budget deficits closed off large-scale counter-cyclical spending as a policy tool. Instead, states were to pursue limiting deficits as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The pursuit of austerity policies has had different effects in different countries.[3] The GDP of Germany has risen about 10 percent from 2009. The GDP of Portugal, Spain, and Italy are all down about 10 percent. The GDP of Greece is down more than 20 percent. The decline in GDP has increased the burden of the government debt financed by taxation. Government debt as a share of GDP has risen from about 30 percent to about 70 percent in Spain; from 90 percent to about 110 percent in Italy; and from 60 percent to about 120 percent in Portugal. Greek government debt as a share of GDP has risen from about 110 percent to about 170 percent. (Thus, austerity has pushed Italy and Portugal into the same territory from which Greece began.) This raises the danger that bigger, more severe crises lie over the horizon.

The the creditor countries could pursue expansionary policies that might fuel demand for goods from the debtor countries. Once again, different national politics and cultures come into play. The northern creditor countries don’t want to abandon the policies that they associate with their own success, least of all to bail out the improvident.[4]

The concept of the Euro-zone was that—like Mr. Lincoln’s theory of the Union—the members had formed an indissoluble bond.[5] The Greek crisis threatens that idea. If Greece was to be forced out, then any other country that got into serious financial difficulty in the future might suffer the same fate. Countries at risk would have to pay extremely high risk premiums for financing public debt. The whole Euro-zone could unravel from the bottom like a sweater. Crisis after crisis would gnaw at a union that seeks the benefits of stability.

Hard-liners have not said so, but it might turn out to be a way of finally enforcing the economic doctrines of the northern creditor countries on the southern debtor countries.[6] Any country that did not wish to pay high risk premiums to lenders would have to pursue “sound” finances. That, in turn, could force a reform of social and economic policies.

The Greek “Syritza” and Spanish “Podemos” parties have drawn strong support for demands to end austerity and for debt repudiation. Many American observers seem to think that the Germans and other creditors should be happy to get robbed by the Greeks and other debtors for the greater good. The long Republican counter-attack against high taxes since the Reagan Administration shows something different. People who feel victimized will fight back. Right now, the focus is on angry Greeks and Spaniards. In the future it’s likely to be angry Germans.

[1] Eduardo Porter, “Local Politics Are Fracturing European Unity,” NYT, 3 February 2015.

[2] Flexibility, thrift, and probity, for example.

[3] See the charts in Porter, “Local Politics.”

[4] The limited historical knowledge of many economic commentators leads them to make frequent references to the post-First World War inflation as a formative experience. They ignore the “cigarette economy” that flourished after the Second World War and the heavy burdens carried by West Germans after absorption of the defunct German Democratic Republic in 1989. Germans today have a far more vivid set of memories shaping their behavior.

[5] Stephen Fidler, “Europe Weights Costs of Casting Greece Aside,” WSJ, 6 February 2015.

[6] As Voltaire quipped after the Royal Navy executed Admiral John Byng, “They shoot one to encourage the others.”

 

Inequality 1.

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In December 2013 President Obama called income inequality “the defining issue of our time.” He’s agin it. Soon afterward Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) garnered many accolades and some readers. This added academic fuel to the populist fires.

Already by Summer 2014, however, there were reasons to doubt the substance behind the passions aroused by the issue. Eduardo Porter raised two issues.[1] First, the problem of income inequality isn’t that important compared to other problems facing the United States. Social scientists have been trying to demonstrate that the rise of the “One Percent” has harmed society. They haven’t been able to prove it. Second, it may not be a problem with a practical solution.

What we think of as “globalization” (technology + open world markets) has polarized people toward the extremes of income: high-earners and low earners, but fewer and fewer people in between. The relationship between one’s job and technology is key. Someone who has a job that is not easily replaced by a machine, but which requires the manipulation of technology, is in a good place. In contrast, anyone with a job that can—or one day could be—done by a machine is in a bad place.[2] Generally, higher incomes are flowing toward people with higher education.[3] That’s true both within the United States and within the global economy. From this perspective, the “defining issue” is how to promote enough economic growth to insure a rising standard of living for the low-earners. Gregory Mankiw, a Harvard economist who served as an economic advisor to both George W. Bush and Mitt Romney, argues that raising the amount of education of American workers offers the best path to higher incomes.

Seen dispassionately, the best solution would be to help the people at the bottom of the income ladder without preventing the people at the top of the income ladder from doing the stuff that generates income for all. Allowing the gains from growth to flow only to those at the top of the income pyramid will not head off political trouble.  More could be done to take the rough edges off the state in which we find ourselves. For one thing, cuts in public aid to state colleges and universities has shifted a heavier burden onto parents and students seeking the higher education that is supposed to allow them to climb out of the pit. Restoring that aid would be a valuable step. Increasing the Earned Income Tax credit is another way. Developing policies to make the urban cores of the dynamic cities affordable to low-income workers by is another way. Still, reducing inequality by higher taxes on the well-off and an ever more generous social welfare system[4] cannot turn back the tsunami of change.

However, dispassionately isn’t how most engaged people are seeing the issue. Both the political parties have a stake in stirring up passions by misrepresenting the realities. The Right sees President Obama as an anti-business zealot. The Left sees Republicans as pawns of corporations.

How long will it take to make a more educated and better educated workforce? In the meantime, how does the country manage the social costs of the transition?

[1] Eduardo Porter, “Income Inequality And the Ills Behind It,” NYT, 30 July 2014.

[2] A 2012 poll of economists showed that the great majority believed that the uneven impact of technological change best explained the rise of income inequality. Reagan, Bush II, “deregulation,” and the other usual suspects didn’t figure

[3] Scholars have compared the college graduation rates for those born in the early 1960s with those for 1979-1982. People in the top 20 percent of incomes rose from 36 percent to 54 percent, while it rose from 5 percent to 9 percent for those in the bottom 20 percent. Furthermore, even the real incomes of people with a BA have hardly risen since the mid-1970s. NB: There is a lot you can do with this basic set of statistics.

[4] “Free sandals for foot fetishists,” as the Democratic columnist Mark Shields once described the policy prescriptions of the Democratic Party of the 1980s.

Annals of the Great Recession IV.

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Recession and recovery are supposed to follow a pattern.[1] Recessions lead to higher unemployment; recovery leads to higher employment. Thus, during the 1990 recession, the share of the working-age population with a job or looking for one fell from just under 67 percent to just over 66 percent. Labor force participation then rose to over 67 percent by 2000. However, since 2000 the pattern has changed. Between the recession of 2000 and the recession of 2007-2008, labor force participation trended downward from 67 percent to just over 66 percent. Since that recession began, the labor participation rate has pursued an even more rapid decline. By September 2014, the rate had fallen to 62.7 percent. It hadn’t climbed any by the end of the year. New entrants to the job market get absorbed, but many of the long-term unemployed remain off the labor market.

Where did the missing 3-4 percent of the potential labor force go? Many of them retired permanently. We can see here the leading edge of the “baby boom” taking up the rocker on the front porch. For anyone born between 1950 and 1954, getting laid off in the recession just sent them into a slightly early retirement. It probably doesn’t make sense to these people to try to fight their way back into a job so that they can work for another year or three. Less than 20 percent of those who are over 65 are still in the work force.

In addition, psychological fragility has replaced resilience as an American character trait. At least, that’s the idea you could get from some economists’ explanations. “Labor market scarring” of workers seems to reflect a belief that job-hunting is a traumatic experience. The unemployed would rather adapt by other means. They move in with aged parents to provide care; they file for disability under the currently easy conditions for gaining it; they probably do a bunch of work off-the-books; and they’re not going to leave anything to their kids.

What are the effects of them not working? The Federal Reserve Bank wants to sustain low interest rates until the labor participation rate rises to “normal.” What if the current rate is the “new normal”? It’s an awful lot of productive labor going to waste. It sets a ceiling on the growth of the economy. Fewer workers paying taxes tightens the screws on federal revenue.

The trend toward a lower over-all labor market participation rate masks other changes.[2] The female labor participation rate has fallen from about 74 percent in 1999 to about 70 percent today. One could conjecture that if over-all labor participation was about 67 percent in 2000 and the female rate about 74 percent, then the male participation rate would have been about 60 percent. Similarly, if the over-all rate is about 63 percent today and the female rate is about 70 percent, then the male participation rate would be about 56 percent.

Certainly, the labor participation rate for men has been trending downward since the 1970s.[3] Back in the 1950s and 1960s, only 10 percent of men of working age were not in the labor force. Another trend masked by the over-all data is the shift of better jobs toward women. That trend springs from the shift away from manufacturing (traditionally male work) toward a knowledge and service economy which requires more education. Men are less likely, women more likely, to stick with school. The quality of jobs held by women has steadily improved.

There’s an old joke about a guy in Maine who lost his job. A friend asked him how he was going to get by. The man replied “Well, the t.v. works and the wife works.”

[1] Josh Zumbrun, “Labor-Market Dropouts Stay on the Sidelines,” WSJ, 29 December 2014.

[2] David Leonhardt, “The Distinct Geography of Female Employment,” NYT, 6 January 2015.

[3] In the 1970s the “oil shocks” disorganized the economy and foreign economic competition first became a serious challenge.

Shock Waves.

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The implications and possible effects of the drop in oil prices are complex and hard to predict.[1]

One effect of falling oil prices is to hammer oil producing countries at odds with the US (Russia, Venezuela, Iran). The fall in oil prices is putting far more pressure on Russia than are the international sanctions imposed over the unpleasantness in Ukraine. Both the Saudis and the Americans are quietly amused by the difficulties being encountered by the Iranians and the Russkies.

At least over the short-term (but likely over the longer-term) the fall in oil prices will reduce the revenues earned by the established oil producers. The effects could ripple through Middle Eastern politics. Saudi Arabia buys off domestic discontent with a high standard of living paid for by oil sales. Less revenue could translate into more discontent. When the United States scaled back aid to Egypt after the overthrow of the Morsi government, Saudi Arabia stepped in with generous assistance. Egypt plowed ahead with its suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and other dissidents in open defiance of the United States. How long and how generously will Saudi Arabia be able to continue to support Egypt and other conservative regimes if the money stream starts to fall? Other Muslim states—like Algeria—are in something like the same boat in their dependence on oil revenues to fend-off unrest.

What does this suggest about climate politics in the United States? Will falling gasoline prices lead to more driving in bigger vehicles—with more emissions? Will the deflation of predictions about having passed “peak oil” reduce the pressure for the development of alternative energy sources?

What are the implications for the business-government relationship going forward? Eduardo Porter argues that government support for the development of the technology behind “fracking” endorses smart industrial policy. He suggests that this can offer a model for the development of new technologies to limit climate change. In particular, he endorses raising the gas tax during the period of low oil prices. The revenues “could be leveraged into a boon in tax revenues that the government could use to pick some of the winners that will help solve the [environmental] problems.”

The problem with “industrial policy” is that it’s just like other forms of politics. Established interest groups have a stronger position than do rising interest groups. The winners “picked” by the government are likely to be big campaign donors or the pet causes of political leaders. When government picks winners, we get farm subsidies and Solyndra. Porter’s own account of the development of fracking technology emphasizes the importance of research into new technologies paid for by the government, not that government picked winners. One thing that goes unmentioned by Porter is that government labs and subsidies were spread over a wide area. They didn’t focus on one technology or energy source. Continued investment in research certainly sounds like a good idea. So does an increase in the gas tax. Within that framework, however, would it be better to let the market pick the winners?

Why was this a surprise? Between 2008 and 2015 American domestic production of oil doubled. The European economy has been stagnant for a bunch of years. “Fracking” has been a loudly contested issue in American domestic politics for years. These are the key factors in the price decline. Yet markets, media, environmentalists, and politicians all seem equally surprised. Did no one see the rise in production/fall in prices coming? It’s a sort of Pearl Harbor in reverse.

[1] Eduardo Porter, “Behind Drop in Oil Prices, A Federal Role,” NYT, 21 January 2015.

Seismic Shift.

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It’s probably hard for most people to accept this, but economic growth raised incomes all around the world by 28 percent between 2005 and 2013. All that growth required a rise in oil production of 19 percent. That rise in oil production never happened. In large part, it never happened because Saudi Arabia and other major producers never increased their production.[1] They preferred a stable target price of $100 a barrel. Instead, oil prices held steady. By June 2014, West Texas crude was selling for $107 a barrel. Revenues flowed in to oil-producers. But, as the Germans said about the Greeks, “they’ve had their fun.” Nemesis was at hand.[2]

It has been a long time coming. In October 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) launched the first “oil shock” against the industrial democracies. The target countries responded in a variety of ways. Some of the responses were ludicrous, but some had important long-run consequences. In the United States, Congress approved construction of a pipeline from Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay, tried to foster nuclear power generation, first imposed fuel-economy standards on car manufacturers, and created the Energy Research and Development Administration. All these were efforts to prepare a long-term strategy.

Eduardo Porter has argued that federal support for research and development paid big dividends.   In particular, Porter touts the role of government “industrial policy” in the developments that led to the recent shale revolution. The government helped pay for the development of “directionally deviated drilling,” the antecedent to the horizontal drilling that is used in “fracking.” The government pioneered large-scale hydraulic fracturing. The government subsidized the “polycrystalline diamond compact bits” that do the drilling. Micro-seismic imaging, originally developed in government labs to trace coal mine collapses, found application in identifying fracturing sites. The Reagan administration ended obstructive price regulations that had hindered investment.

The shale revolution took decades to develop. Recovering natural gas from shale formed the initial target. When natural gas produced by “fracking” entered energy markets in large quantities a few years ago, natural gas prices started dropping. The drillers’ effort shifted to releasing oil. By 2013 it began to pay off. That year American producers generated 3.5 million barrels of oil derived from shale. From June 2014 to January 2015 the price of oil fell from over $100 a barrel to $45 a barrel.

Why didn’t OPEC cut its own production to push the price back up? Probably because they could not cut back enough to off-set the rise in American production. Cutting production would just cede market-share to the Americans. They are hoping that prices will bounce back up in the future. A revival of world economic growth will increase the demand for energy. This will off-set the expansion of American production to a degree. Shale oil is expensive to produce in comparison to “regular” oil. The current low price will cause many American producers to shut down their operations until prices rise to a profitable level. However, no one now expects oil prices to rebound to anywhere near $100 a barrel. A ceiling of $70 a barrel is more likely.

Falling oil prices have dragged down prices for gasoline, diesel, heating oil, and natural gas. Consumers all around the world are enjoying the equivalent of a tax cut, which in the US amounts to $1,000 a year. That is a valuable prop to growth when strong growth tarries.

[1] Excluding a brief fun-up to counter the 2008 economic collapse.

[2] Eduardo Porter, “Behind Drop in Oil Prices, A Federal Role,” NYT, 21 January 2015.

 

QE by the ECB.

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The United States, Britain, and Japan all eventually responded to the “Great Recession” with “Quantitative Easing”—central bank purchases of public and private bonds in order to pump money into the economy.[1] Europe resisted this policy[2] and its economic recovery has trailed most other places. The ECB’s goal has been to see an annual inflation rate of 2 percent. It hasn’t worked. In December 2014 the inflation rate hit minus 0.2 percent. Economists feared that Europe would descend into a deflationary spiral. Therefore, on 22 January 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced an initiative to buy 60 billion Euros worth of public and private bonds every month :until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation.”[3]

Will the ECB action be sufficient to propel the European Community on the road to a solid recovery? When combined with the unanticipated fall in world oil prices and a depreciation in the exchange value of the Euro, Quantitative Easing might get the European economy moving. Still, there is a great deal of uncertainty going forward.

At the same time that he announced the program of bond-buying, ECB chief Mario Draghi urged the need for “structural reforms” to create the basis for the “confidence” among investors that is needed to encourage investment.[4] Will European governments be willing to implement such reforms after resisting them for so many years in crisis conditions? Or will they hope that QE can provide enough stimulus to allow them to ignore unpleasant choices? Jens Weidmann, president of the German central bank, worried in public that this might be the case.

How will the ECB initiative affect exchange rates between the Euro and other currencies? The dollar has been rising against the euro and gained another 2 percent after the ECB policy announcement; the Swiss ended their “peg” of the franc against the Euro and the franc rose 17 percent in value in one day. The change in exchange rates will make Euro-zone goods more competitive in foreign markets, but they will make Swiss and American goods less competitive in those same markets. Countries that borrowed in dollars will find it more difficult to repay those loans now that the value of the dollar is rising. In short, it creates a drag on the world economy at a critical time for the recovery.

One thing that now seems impossible to foretell is the effect of important central banks creating so much liquidity. Will it affect the basic stability of the world economy over time? No one is talking about this problem at the moment. They have more pressing business at hand.

[1] In the United States, “QE” pushed up asset prices like those for stocks and homes. This had the unintended effect of adding to the sense of an unequal sharing of the economic recovery.

[2] In large part the resistance stems from people in the northern “creditor” countries who feel that they “were had” by the Greeks and fear that southern “debtor” counties may try to stick them with the real costs of the bail-outs. This feeling comes on top of a long-standing belief that weaker economies suffer from the self-inflicted wounds of overly generous welfare states and a hostility to business.  The complicated governing system for a central bank serving nineteen sovereign states, each with their own central bank, allowed the “creditor” countries to hold the “debtor” countries at bay for years.  Both the emotional and the institutional components to economic policy-making seem incomprehensible to some leading American academic economists.

[3] Neil Irwin, “Fear That Eurozone Stimulus May Be Too Little or Too Late,” NYT, 23 January 2015.

[4] German Chancellor Angela Merkel immediately emphasized this point to the Italians. Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte then piled-on to the same effect. See: Jack Ewing, “Compromise and Persuasion Won Grudging Support for Bond Buying,” NYT, 24 January 2015.

Annals of the Great Recession III.

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Years ago, back before the world economic slowdown, Germany overhauled its economy to make it more competitive and flexible. This overhaul built on earlier German strengths: an excellent educational system, a commitment to quality production, and a cultural predisposition to sound finances. The successful reforms put Germany in a strong position to first weather the initial storm and then exploit the inflationary policies pursued by other countries.

Not everyone pursued similar policies. Many European countries opted for social protection over economic growth. Their labor and management systems are encrusted with regulatory barnacles that slow growth and hinder employment; they run high levels of debt that become increasingly difficult to support with stagnant economies; and they are broadly change-averse. In the worst case, the Greeks spent years living off grants and loans from the European Community while cooking their books to disguise the fact that the money was being consumed rather than invested. The demographic crisis of an aging population across much of Europe bodes ill for the survival of the welfare states. Reforms to increase innovation, productivity and competitiveness are essential for the long-term future.

With the onset of economic crisis in 2009, the Germans seized upon the crisis as a device to force other countries to make fundamental reforms to improve the long-term position of the whole group.[1] Germany rejected expansionary policies at home while leading the imposition of severe conditions upon Greece in exchange for further aid. Behind the disreputable Greeks stood the more reputable Spaniards, Italians, and Frenchmen. Many countries didn’t want anyone saying that they resembled the Greeks, so they went along with the German policies.

However, even under pressure most countries have not made the kinds of reforms to entitlements, labor market regulations, and budgeting needed to create dynamic economies. Europe continues to limp along behind the United States in recovering from the “Great Recession.” Indeed, the danger that Europe will slide into a deflationary-spiral is very real.

From a dispassionately economic perspective, the best solution appears to be a combination of monetary stimulus by the ECB, higher public spending by Germany and other creditor countries, deficit-reduction in the debtor countries, and a wide application of the reforms that the Germans have been pushing.        The rival policy to that of Germany has been inflation by the European Central Bank (ECB) and higher spending by the creditor countries in order to ease conditions in the debtor countries. The hard times have led to the rise of “anti-austerity” parties, like the Syriza party in Greece and the Podemos party in Spain. Commentators can’t prove it, but they suggest that the growth of anti-European parties like the French Front National and the British United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and of anti-immigrant feeling are all tied to “austerity.” Until recently, Germany managed to fend off calls for inflation.

The German strategy is founded on a misconception. The Germans have assumed that other countries could alter their politics and culture to become German-like. Most countries are not like the Germans and do not want to pay the costs of becoming more German-like. They have aging populations that are set in their ways. They have lived for decades with public discourse that disparages entrepreneurs and American-style capitalism. The costs of transition will be paid by entrenched interests and will benefit chiefly their descendants.[2]

Will the Greeks be forced out of the European Community? Or will the Germans?

[1] Marcus Walker, “Analysis: Double Blow to Germany’s Leadership,” WSJ, 26 January 2015.

[2] As Groucho Marx once asked, “What’s the future ever done for me?” The United States faces something of the same dilemma. See: “College costs: the old eat the young.”

Getting a fat lady into a girdle.

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It is way too early to tell how the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is going to shake-out. Neither Republican doom-saying nor Democrat triumphalism seems warranted at this moment. There are signs of gains that need to be consolidated and issues that may need to be addressed.

During the first year of the ACA the uninsured rate fell by thirty percent/10 million people.[1] That means that seventy percent/20 million people of the previously un-insured are still un-insured. Between 2002 and 2012 a rising number of Americans told Commonwealth Fund pollsters that medical bills caused them financial troubles.[2] Medical debt became one of the leading causes of people filing for bankruptcy. Many people (43 percent in 2012) decided against seeking some sort of medical care because of the cost. The Affordable Care Act intended to address this problem as one part of its effort to make health care more broadly available. The number of Americans reporting trouble with medical debt peaked at 41 percent in 2012. Then the number began to fall, hitting 35 percent in 2014. The number of those who did not seek medical care because of cost also fell to 36 percent. So, is the glass full, half-full, or empty?

The big problem is health-care costs and, thus, health-insurance costs.

Between 2003 and 2013, insurance premiums rose faster than did median incomes.[3] Between 2003 and 2010 insurance premiums rose by an average of 5.1 percent per year. In thirty-seven states the total employer + employees contributions equaled at least 20 percent of median income. Thus employers’ labor costs also rose. From 2011 to 2013, the pace of increases slowed, but continued to rise at a rate of 4.1 percent. By 2013 the average insurance premium had reached a national average of $16,000. Employers started looking for a way to limit the rise in their labor costs.

What they have hit on, in many cases, is shifting the cost to employees. In 2003, 52 percent of workers had employment-provided insurance with a deductible. By 2013 the number had risen to 81 percent. Furthermore, the deductibles have also risen by an average of 146 percent. They now average $1,000 per person in most states. According to a Commonwealth Fund study, the out-of-pocket costs for employees (insurance premiums + deductibles) rose from 5.3 percent of median household income in 2003 to 9.6 percent in 2013.

On the one hand, according to one report, 58 percent of Americans polled want ObamaCare repealed.[4] Why? Job-creation and wage increases have both been lagging for several years. This has left people feeling like the Great Recession never ended. Perhaps the shifting of medical costs to their consumers makes people feel like ObamaCare never happened.[5]

On the other hand, although health-care costs have risen more slowly since passage of the ACA, most economists—as opposed to political spokesmen—attribute this to the recession. They are likely to start back upward as the economy recovers. This will increase the pressure on employees for out-of-pocket expenses and premiums.

In short, we’re not yet done with health insurance reform. Maybe we’ll get it all the way right the next time.

[1] “Obamacare: Why, in Year Two, it’s still so unpopular,” The Week, 16 January 2015, p. 6.

[2] Margot Sanger-Katz, “Distress Appears to Ease Over Cost of Health Care,” NYT, 15 January 2015.

[3] Tara Siegel Bernard, “Health Premiums Rise More Slowly, but Workers Shoulder More of Cost,” NYT, 8 January 2015.

[4] “Obamacare: Why, in Year Two, it’s still so unpopular,” The Week, 16 January 2015, p. 6.

[5] However, it is possible that what they don’t like is Obama, rather than the Care. People often disapprove of a President in his lame-duck years.

 

Looking Backward and Forward.

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Expert predictions for economic developments during 2014 turned out to be off-target in several important areas.[1] Try, try again. What do they say 2015 will look like?

The rest of the world had a lousy year in 2014, so the American economy looked good in comparison. Unemployment fell from7 percent at the end of 2013 to 5.8 percent at the end of 2014.[2] US employers added 2.7 million jobs during the year. New jobs are running near the highest point since 2001. However, there are still about 2 million fewer workers with full-time jobs.[3] So, it will be a while before there is much upward pressure on wages.[4] As a result, the American stock market had a much better year in 2014[5] than did foreign markets.[6]

Why did the American economy do better in 2014 than most other places? A combination of factors were at work, but one thing was more important than all other things. During the second half of 2014 the price of oil dropped by fifty percent. Partly, this reflected a long-developing increase in American production of oil and gas. Partly, it reflected a decision by the Gulf countries not to reduce their own production in response to falling prices.

Low oil prices should encourage world economic growth in 2015. Low energy prices also are a powerful reason to expect low inflation for a long time; expectations of low inflation may add to this dynamic.[7] Low inflation for a long time means that the Fed will not be under heavy pressure to raise interest rates.

Long-term interest rates have fallen[8] in spite of a strengthening American economy and the end of “quantitative easing.” The falling cost of borrowing will lead to lower rates for mortgages and for borrowing by business. These too should stimulate the American economy.

So, what’s the down-side of all this good news? First, countries that depend on oil for their export earnings (not just Middle Eastern countries, but also Russia and Venezuela) are going to be pinched.

Second, the Fed’s ending of quantitative easing and its expressed willingness to raise interest rates in the future have combined with economic stagnation elsewhere to raise the value of the dollar against other currencies.[9] The dollar is so central to the world economy that its rising value is likely to slow growth elsewhere.

Third, the Asian economies started to slow down in 2014. There is a certain contradiction there. China, Indonesia, and India all tightened on the money supply to rein-in the development of bubbles, while Japan has been trying to stimulate its economy after a long period of stagnation.

The point here is that we are still walking on a knife’s edge. The Europeans are pursuing a fool-hardy policy that will prolong stagnation. China is trying to walk-back some of its heady growth. The US recovery remains vulnerable to unexpected problems at home and abroad. .

[1] Neil Irwin, “Market Trends of 2014: What They Mean for 2015,” NYT, 1 January 2015.

[2] Economists regard 5.2-5.5 percent unemployment as the normal “full employment” rate. You may guffaw, but you haven’t met my brother-in-law. Hire him? HA!

[3] Even that disguises the situation. About seven million people have part-time jobs, but would prefer full-time jobs.

[4] “The Year in Review,” WSJ, 31 December 2014.

[5] The S&P rose 30 percent in 2013 and 11.4 percent in 2014.

[6] However, stock prices are rising faster than corporate profits, so a correction is likely.

[7] At the start of 2014 inflation was running at 2.65 percent per year; at the start of 2015 it is down to 2.14 percent per year.

[8] Interest on 30-year Treasury notes has fallen from 3 percent in late 2013 to 2.8 percent in late 2014.

[9] The euro lost 12 percent against the dollar and yen lost 14 percent.

By the waters of Babylon.

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There was a weird and grim story in the New York Times on Sunday.[1] The story starts with two “old money” brothers: George Seymour Beckwith Gilbert (born 1942) and Thomas Gilbert (born circa 1944).[2] Their father ran a company that made textile machinery, back when America still had a textiles industry. The parents sent the boys to Philips Andover and then to Princeton (Beckwith ’63, Tom ’66). Both went on to get MBAs (Beckwith from NYU, Tom from Harvard). Both went into finance. Thereafter their career tracks diverged. The older brother worked for firms that bought and turned-around poorly performing companies. There were a lot of these in the America of the Seventies and Eighties. Eventually he founded Field Point Capital Management Company. Later, he got interested in science and medicine. This led him to get an MS in Immunology from Rockefeller University (2006).[3] He’s on a bunch of boards, corporate and academic. You could read this as an example of how people get to the top of American society and how subsequent generations stay there: a combination of brains, hard work, and the opportunities that come from social networks.

            Tom Gilbert’s career seems to have run down a different course. People from Princeton remember him as affable and athletic, rather than as highly intelligent. He worked in a bunch of jobs at Wall Street, including a seven-year stint at Loeb Partners that ended in 1991. In 1998 he founded Knowledge Delivery Systems (KDS) to provide on-line education materials.[4] In 2010 he co-founded Syzygy Therapeutics LLC. He stuck with that for a little over a year, and then founded his own private equity firm, Wainscott Capital Partners LLC, in April 2011. He was sixty-seven years old and starting a new venture.
Should we see this new venture as admirably lively or as desperate? Possibly the latter. Tom Gilbert, Sr. left an estate worth $1.6 million. Oddly, and my saying this will infuriate most people, that isn’t a lot of money.[5] About a third of his assets were his stake in his new fund. He had a house (not a “mansion”) in the Hamptons; he belonged to a couple of clubs (River in New York, Maidstone in East Hamptons); he was selling the house in the Hamptons; he and his wife had given up a brownstone on the Upper East Side for a smaller apartment on Beekman Place. He put in twelve-hour days at his new business and never took vacation. You could read this as an example of how people get to the top of American society and how subsequent generations struggle desperately to stay there: more social than smart; hard work; and the lack of social networks as the economy goes through revolutionary changes.
Beneath the surface of this little bit of social history a la Louis Auchincloss is a sadder tale that also speaks to other contemporary concerns. Tom Gilbert was (apparently) a loving, doting father who had a troubled child. Tom Gilbert, Jr. (born 1984) had followed in his father’s footsteps: he graduated from Deerfield and then from Princeton, with a degree in economics. He loved sports and had a wide circle of friends. However, something was wrong. He graduated from Princeton in 2009, when he was twenty-five. Something slowed him down. He never managed to start a career. Instead, he lived off his father: the $2,400 monthly rent on an apartment and an allowance of $600 a week.[6] Meanwhile, his friends from Deerfield and Princeton pressed on with the usual careers in business, law, and government. He went to parties, saw them, and what could he say when they asked what he was doing?
About a year ago, perhaps in late 2013, things started to get dramatically worse for the Gilberts. Tom, Jr. got barred from the Maidstone Club for giving one of the employees a bad time.[7] He had a fight with a friend (possibly over a woman); the friend got a restraining order; Tom Jr., violated the restraining order and got arrested; somebody burned down the family summer home of the friend; the police wanted to talk to Tom Jr. about this episode, but never charged anyone with setting the fire. More and more friends stopped seeing him. Tom Jr. got a gun and started spending time at a range.[8] Some of Tom Jr.’s friends told Tom Sr. that they were worried about his son. Undoubtedly, Tom Sr. was worried as well. He had paid for a lawyer to resolve some “minor matter.” He may have persuaded his son to get medical help and paid for that. Tom Jr. doesn’t seem to have appreciated the help. He became critical, even mocking, of his father.
The two strands of Tom Gilbert Sr.’s life came together in early January 2015. He was making sacrifices to get his fund up and running by downsizing his own life-style. Truth be told, he wasn’t getting any younger and there was no guarantee that he would be able to build his fund into a real fortune. He probably wasn’t going to be able to leave a huge inheritance to his family. Tom Jr. may have seemed stuck in a life going nowhere and in need of some kind of help. Either because the financial pressures he faced were becoming grave or because he hoped to nudge his son toward becoming self-sustaining, Tom Sr. told his son that he would have to reduce his allowance. On Sunday, 4 January 2015, Tom Sr. was shot once in the head in his apartment. Police arrested Tom Jr. later that day.
Some in the media want to make the story about the harmful effects of “privilege.” That isn’t what it’s about. Instead, the story is about two things. One is that inherited “privilege” is nowhere near as reliable as it once may have been. The differential fortunes of the two older Gilbert brothers illustrate that point. The structure of the American economy has been changing fast. The decline of old industries has wreaked havoc with blue-collar and middle class incomes. Did it do the same with upper-class inheritances, forcing a whole generation to seek opportunities to restore or shore-up their assets? The composition of the American financial elite also appears to be changing in response to the rise of new industries. Adapt or disappear.
A second thing is that a troubled adult is hard for anyone to assess, help, or control. It’s hard to tell how far a person will fall. It’s difficult to get anyone institutionalized after they hit fourteen unless they do something that makes people say that they should have been institutionalized before they did it. It’s easy to say that someone needs help, but harder to find help that works. It’s easy for people to get their hands on firearms, even when there is a restraining order against them for one thing and they’re suspects in a crime for something else.
Of the two themes, the second seems far the more important, the outcome the most tragic. Parents of all social classes and races have struggled with troubled children. Sometimes things work out. Life for everyone gets progressively better. Sometimes they don’t and there flows a river of tears.

[1] Landon Thomas, Jr., “The Price of Privilege,” NYT, 18 January 2015.

[2] Are they related to the Seymour Parker Gilbert who was a New York investment banker and later was Agent-General for Reparations in the Twenties?

[3] http://www.pa59ers.com/potpourri/folders/g05-Gilbe/g05.html

[4] If you look at the current leadership team at KDS you can’t help but get the feeling that they are not “old money” or “old school.” BAs from Tufts, Yeshiva, Wake Forest, Gettysburg, UCLA, Kenyon, George Washington, North Texas State, and Howard. Blacks, women, and Jews. http://www1.kdsi.org/about-kds/kds-team.htm

[5] Well, it isn’t a lot of money for a 70 year-old guy who came from money, got a first-rate education, and spent his working life on Wall Street.

[6] So he’s costing the father $60K a year. Do all rich families subsidize their children in this fashion while the kids get their feet or is this an exception to the rule?

[7] The incident may have been really egregious or not the first time if it got him banned.

[8] Glock 22: .40-cal. pistol favored by big-city police departments and the DEA. Ugly piece of work.