The Taiwan Clock.

            For much of the Thirties, some foreign observers of Germany posited that “Nazis” could be best understood as an umbrella term under which gathered “radicals” and “moderates.” Adolf Hitler arbitrated their differences while keeping a wary eye on what traditional elites would tolerate.  Eventually, it became apparent that Hitler utterly dominated German policy.[1]  It seems apparent that Xi Jinping utterly dominates Chinese policy.  Moreover, he intends to continue doing so for the foreseeable future. 

            Taiwan now garners close attention.  The island had long been a province of historical China.  In 1895, a Westernizing Japan had seized the island as a prize of war with the decaying Qing dynasty.  Japan held Taiwan until its own defeat in 1945.  Then China, in the form of the Kuomintang (KMT) government of the Republic of China, regained possession.  Having regained the island province, the KMT then lost the mainland to the Communists by 1949.  Taiwan became the “last ditch” of the KMT.  The Korean War (1950-1953) brought the United States squarely in opposition to the Communist Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and in support of the defeated KMT.  The Americans built a chain of strong societies around their chief Asian enemy.  Over time, these American allies became prosperous and democratized their governments.  Then, the Nixon Administration’s opening to China compelled all parties to live with a situation of “strategic ambiguity.”  China maintained its claim to Taiwan, but did nothing to make good on it.  The United States acknowledged China’s claim on Taiwan, so long as Beijing did nothing to make good on it.  Taiwan asserted its independence while trying hard not to provoke China.  In short, all agreed to kick the can down the road.[2] 

            The PRC has never–formally or informally–accepted the weakening of central authority over peripheral areas or the loss of traditional Chinese territory to foreign imperialists.  Hence, both Tibet and Xinjiang have been heavily repressed.  Hence, China has been determined to recover Hong Kong and Macao.  Taiwan hits both those buttons. 

            These efforts have greatly intensified under Xi Jinping.[3]  Under his direction, China asserted its claims over the seaways and airways of the South and East China Seas.  Under his direction, China ruptured its agreement with Britain on the special status of Hong Kong. 

China’s support for Russia during its attack on the once-Russian Ukraine shows where Xi’s intentions lie.  The Russo-Ukraine War may have created an opportunity to speed up the pace of recovering Taiwan for China.  In June 2022, Xi denounced the very idea of the Taiwan Strait as an international waterway.  China’s harassing air and naval operations led President Joe Biden to state that the United States will defend Taiwan if it is attacked. 

Nothing daunted, Xi seized upon the visit to Taiwan by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to order military operations around Taiwan.  These operations threaten not only Taiwan, but also the United States and its other Asian allies.  Is the clock ticking down? 


[1] The tedious historical novel by Robert Harris, Munich (2017) nevertheless asks the fascinating question “What would Western leaders have done at Munich in 1938 if they had known about the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937?”  That record of a conference of Nazi leaders made it clear first, that Hitler had a profound grasp of European politics and, second, that he was bent on war in the near future, if not immediately. 

[2] Mostly.  In the mid-1990s, President Bill Clinton ordered a show of naval force to cool Chinese assertiveness. 

[3] Tiffany May and Mike Ivey, “A Drumbeat of Pressure on Taiwan, Explained,” NYT, 9 August 2022. 

Biden on a Roll, with Mayo.

            The New York Times crows that “Now Biden Is on a Roll…. Policy Paralysis Ends With Midterms Near.”[1]  Deeper in the paper, cooler heads offer a more serious appraisal.[2] 

            President Joe Biden’s original tax plan called for undoing the tax cuts passed in 2017 during the administration of President Donald Trump.  Corporations and high-income earners would bear the brunt of plans to reap an additional $1.5 trillion in revenue.  Most of this fell by the wayside.  The final bill set a minimum 15 percent tax on corporations and a just-for-show 1 percent tax on stock buy-backs by companies. 

President Biden’s original social policy program sought to greatly expand federal spending to support families at either end of the life spectrum.  It proposed federal paid family and medical leave, expanded child-care, and home care (for aging adults).  It also hoped to spend a lot on financial aid for college students.   The Democratic majority in the House of Representatives added money to extend the payments to families with children which had been introduced during the Covid emergency.  The total cost of these programs was designed to meet the demands of “reconciliation” legislation.  It came in at $2.2 trillion.  “Need” would not factor in eligibility for most of these programs.  The entire package had to be scrapped. 

            President Biden’s original climate proposals were intended to reduce emissions of green-house gases by 50 percent below the 2005 levels by 2030.  Administration plans included limits on off-shore drilling for oil and gas in order to limit the availability[3] of carbon-based fuels; plans to close coal and gas-fueled power generation plants; and plans to encourage individual and corporate consumers to shift toward “renewable” energy sources (solar, wind).  In November 2021, the House of Representatives passed a bill allocating $555 billion to support these proposals.  The law allocates less than $400 billion. 

            President Biden’s original medical proposal sought to expand Medicare to cover dental, vision, and hearing care.  It also sought to beef-up the Affordable Care Act (ACA) passed during the administration of President Barack Obama.  In particular, it planned to expand subsidies for insurance premiums under the ACA and to enroll an additional four million people in Medicaid.[4]  In the end, the program will extend the current subsidies for the ACA premiums for three years (2023-2025).  In addition, Medicare has been granted a limited right to negotiate on drug prices with pharmaceutical companies.  The expansion of Medicare has been dropped. 

            What went wrong?  The Constitution, that’s what.  Laws must pass both houses of Congress, then be signed by the President.  The Democrats have a small, but real, majority in the House of Representatives.  The Senate is divided 50-50, with Vice President Kamala Harris casting a deciding vote.  Senate rules allow this sort of majority to operate only on “reconciliation” votes.  Democratic Senators Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema gave Republicans the majority in the Senate until they got the changes they wanted.  See: sausage-making. 


[1] Peter Baker, NYT, 9 August 2022, page 1, above the fold.  The story is labeled “News Analysis,” but it more hopeful speculation.  Not to be mean, but perhaps they might call the paper the “New Yorkie Times”?  See: Yorkshire Terrier – Wikipedia 

[2] Emily Cochrane, “Path of a Shrunken Bill: From Grand Ideals to Compromise,” NYT, 9 August 2022. 

[3] Thus artificially raising the price.  We could just tax carbon, but Americans love their cars and air conditioning. 

[4] The ACA had tried to coerce states into expanding Medicaid to provide coverage for poor people.  The Supreme Court had clapped a stopper on this, so a bunch of Republican states had refused to expand Medicaid. 

National Security and the Economy.

            Seen in historical perspective, different concepts of international trade and economic prosperity have served as organizing principles of national policy.  In the Early Modern Period (c. 1450-1750), Western governments pursued “mercantilism.”  They sought to enhance national prosperity through self-reliance.  During the Modern Period (c. 1750-2020), Western governments reversed course to pursue an open world economy based on comparative advantage and the exchange of goods and services.  Now, the Trump Era seems to have ushered in a movement toward semi-mercantilism. 

Are the tariffs slammed on China by the Trump administration, and maintained by the Biden administration, and the subsidies for American-made semi-conductors promised in the recent bipartisan bill a bad idea?  The answer to those questions depends upon context.[1] 

On the one hand, the Covid pandemic sent shock waves through the world economy.  Economic fluctuations disrupted global supply chains.  Some, perhaps much, of what we are seeing is transient and the product of accident, rather than long-term and of enemy action. 

On the other hand, to batter its enemies of the moment, Russia and Iran, the United States has resorted to its favorite moral equivalent of war, economic sanctions.  States like Russia and China have responded in kind by exploiting their own economic advantages for political ends. 

Semi-conductors, the key component of so many modern products, have become a center of attention.  Most countries that produce them—or want to produce them—have long been subsidizing the producers.[2]  The European Union is headed down this path as well.  To ignore reality in favor of ideological purity seems a fool’s game.  One purpose of the China tariffs imposed by the Trump administration,[3] was to force American companies away from Chinese suppliers and toward other sources.[4] 

The path is not without real dangers.  First, there is the danger that every other industry is going to show up in Washington to argue that it, too, is an “essential” industry.  “If we’re going to protect micro-chips, then why not potato chips as well?”  Second, and much more seriously, there is the danger that many countries will sponsor national chip industries, leading to a huge glut of chips, sooner rather than later.  This prospect leads observers to foresee some kind of international cartel involving the United States, the EU, and other willing participants.[5]  Third, the recent bill on micro-chips deals with one essential component of a larger and highly-complex set of industrial products.  American discussion and financial support have focused on high-end products like artificial intelligence and robotics.  There is a much larger low-end range of products touching things like magnetic resonance imaging and automobiles.  The recent bill does nothing about Chinese dominance in these areas. 

            So, are we at a tipping point? 


[1] Greg Ip, “China Changes the Calculus on Free Trade,” WSJ, 28 July 2022. 

[2] Regardless of the substantial profits earned by such producers.  It’s like subsidizing steel-makers during the era of the World Wars.  If you didn’t want to end up having to learn German, then…  You can’t help thinking that Bernie Sanders objects to corporate subsidies because he objects to corporations.   

[3] Whether President Trump himself understood this is still an open question. 

[4] As a result, since 2017, US imports from Mexico have risen 52 percent, imports from South Korea have risen 67 percent, imports from Taiwan have risen 124 percent, and imports from Vietnam have risen 195 percent. 

[5] With Taiwan joining from considerations of military security more than economic interest. 

Drive By 7 August 2022.

See the source image

Bulletproofing kit for cars woos middle class in Brazil – BBC News 

Guy Trebay had a story in the NYT on 4 August 2022.  “Seeking Flair At the Gate: A touch of fashion stands out inside airports, where dressing down is so rampant.  Some miss travel’s luster before the onslaught of athleisure.”  How about before the onslaught of flight cancellations, shoving in more rows of seats per plane, endless security lines, and baggage fees?  Thing is, aspiring passengers need to start treating air travel like what it has become.  Think about the news-value of lines of thousands of people all dressed this way.   

https://collections.museumsvictoria.com.au/items/1718481

Trump Was Right 1.

            “[I]n critical areas, the Biden administration has not made big breaks [from the Trump administration], showing how difficult it is in Washington to chart new courses on foreign policy.”[1]  Nonsense.  It isn’t hard to change course.  Trump broke with the long-established policies without breaking an orange-tinged sweat.  It enraged many people, but their opposition didn’t matter to the president or the people in put in charge of things.  So, if President Biden is following many of President Trump’s policies abroad, it is because people have come to see that Trump was right about many things.  It is hard for most people to come right out and say. 

            Take Europe.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) had grown up in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the specific context of the European front of the Cold War.  NATO had been created to “Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”  Twenty years after Western victory in the Cold War, none of these elements appeared to make much sense.  Germany had become the dominant economic power in the EU, but it was deeply committed to de-militarization.  Russia seemed to have become little more than a major petro-state.  The Americans had “interests” all over the world, but their chief interest seemed to be in Asia.  NATO no longer served a purpose. 

As for the EU, it had become the very model of the modern administrative state (of Republican nightmares).  Unable to compete on cutting-edge technologies, the EU has taken to trying to regulate big American tech companies.  If Russia is a petro-state, it is Germany’s petro-state.  All the pipelines from Russia, but especially the most recent one, have been built in defiance of American recommendations.  The shift of power away from elected national governments toward a (German-dominated) bureaucracy has given pause to many newer member states.  The British have already bolted, and the migrant crisis of several years ago has put Poland and Hungary on a collision course with the EU.  Neither France nor Germany wanted Ukraine admitted to either the EU or NATO.  It would anger Russia while increasing the “Eastern” orientation of the EU.[2] 

            There is a difference between allies and free-riders.  Most of NATO, but especially Germany, had become free-riders.  All of this is to say that Trump wasn’t off target in giving Angela Merkel the cold shoulder.  Biden would likely be doing the same if Russia had not invaded Ukraine.[3]  That got the attention of the NATO members, even of Germany.  No free riders in this situation.  However, it appears that it is the EU dissidents Britain and Poland who are making most of the European effort.  France and Germany, not as much as you might have expected.  Will NATO stay revived—and worth an American commitment—after the war ends?    


[1] Edward Wong, “Biden Is Charting a Similar Course to Trump on U.S. Foreign Policy,” NYT, 25 July 2022.  Both the Biden administration and the New York Times are embarrassed by the similarities.  One can read Wong’s article as part of a campaign to rationalize the liberal collapse before Reality. 

[2] This is reminiscent of Bismarck not wanting the German-speakers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire included in a united Germany in 1866-1871.  It would create a rival, Habsburg pole of loyalty when Bismarck wanted the Prussian Hohenzollerns to rule the Empire.  It would greatly increase the number of Catholics inside Germany, when Prussia was overwhelmingly Protestant.  Or See William Walkers hopes of bringing Central American and Caribbean territories into the American union to offset the industrial, abolitionist North. 

[3] Whether Trump would now be doing what Biden is doing in support of Ukraine/opposition to Russia is an open question. 

Rain on the Parade.

What is “normal”?[1]  For decades before 2020, “normal” was a slow-growth economy; an aging population moving out of the labor force to begin drawing on retirement savings; a world awash in such savings; and an international demand for dollars as a safe-haven. 

The financial manifestations of this “normal” were “negative” real interest rates (i.e. below the low rate of inflation); real bond yields below 1 percent; rising prices for stocks and housing;[2] the cost of borrowing for businesses were low and corporate debt expanded relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and nobody worried much about expanding government deficits and debt because the cost of servicing that debt did not grow.  So it would continue: The Biden administration’s early budget projections foresaw a decade of near-zero real short-term interest rates and a real bond yield of 1 percent. 

Then inflation surged to unexpected heights.  The Federal Reserve Bank raised interest rates sharply and says that it will go on raising them; and a “soft landing” may be impossible.  Nothing daunted, people now say that temporary rate hikes and a recession are the price you have to pay.  By 2024, we ought to be back to “normal.”  Financial markets seem to anticipate that the Fed will raise interest rates another 2 percent by Spring 2023.  After that it will begin working them down. 

But what if this isn’t what happens?  What if inflation remains stubbornly high?  What if the Fed has to push nominal interest rates (interest rates without inflation rate subtracted) as high as 7 percent and perhaps hold them there for longer than people currently expect? 

According to one projection, the ordinary person could get caught in a vise with the prices of houses and stocks and bonds down by as much as 5 percent, while private-sector debt service ate up another 3 percent of income. 

But wait!  There’s more!  Specifically, the federal government[3] borrowed a lot of money when the costs were low.  Back in the day, publicly-held debt amounted to 35 percent of GDP; now it is up to 98 percent of GDP.  Falling bond-yields off-set the rise in debt, so no one has felt the pinch yet.  Short-term debt has to be constantly renewed, so rising interest rates will push up the interest cost pretty quickly.  A Congressional Budget Office estimate projects that a 1 percentage point increase in real interest rates will increase the deficit by $250 billion.  Sooner or later, this would force our polarized (almost paralyzed) political system to find a solution involving spending cuts and tax increases.   

Recently, a friend related to me his sad tale of woe.  He had had borrowed $150,000 when interest rates were low.  He was paying 3.5 percent to the bank, with a monthly interest component $416.26.  Then the interest rate went to 3.75 percent and he paid $438.59 in interest.  Then it went to 4.25 percent and he paid $512.94.  Then it went to 5 percent and he owed $541.11.  So, he’s out an extra $125 a month.  He finds this “concerning.”  

Still, why would inflation remain stubbornly high?  Perhaps it will not. 


[1] Greg Ip, “Interest-Rate Pain Has Barely Begun,” WSJ, 21 July 2022. 

[2] Great if you already owned a bunch of stocks and bonds in your retirement account and a paid-off house.  Which I did. 

[3] That is, the American public borrowed the money, mostly to finance wars, and tax cuts I think.  There’s probably a squalid argument to be had over the stupidly-phrased “Makers versus Takers” theme launched by Mitt Romney. 

The National Emergencies Act.

            In 1933, newly-elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt claimed the right to declare a national emergency without reference to any law, without Congressional approval or oversight, and without setting any limits to what he could do or for how long he could do it.  Looking around at a country with thousands of bank failures, tens of thousands of business bankruptcies, an unemployment rate of 25 percent, and farmers in extreme poverty, most people went “Looks like an emergency to me.”  Other emergencies came along in the next forty years.[1] 

            As part of the Watergate era reaction against the “Imperial Presidency,”[2] in 1973 Congress passed the “National Emergencies Act.”  The Act, as amended, authorizes the President to activate emergency provisions of laws through an emergency declaration.  When activating the emergency provisions, the President must specify the provisions being activated and notify Congress.  An activation expires if the President declares the emergency terminated, or does not renew the emergency annually, or if Congress passes a joint resolution.[3] 

            A president can do a lot with emergency powers.  There are 123 different laws that contain emergency provisions that can be invoked simply by a presidential emergency declaration.  For example, s/he can suspending any Clean Air Act implementation plan or excess emissions penalty upon petition of a state governor or authorize military construction projects and use any existing defense appropriations to pay for such projects. 

            In the immediate aftermath of passage of the National Emergencies Act, presidents were cautious about declaring emergencies.[4]  Jimmy Carter declared two; Ronald Reagan declared six and George H. W. Bush declared four.  All related to foreign policy matters, chiefly economic sanctions.[5]  Then the dikes of self-restraint broke with the arrival of the Boomer presidents.[6]  Bill Clinton declared seventeen; George W. Bush declared twelve; Barack Obama declared thirteen; Donald Trump declared seven; and Joe Biden has declared six.  All of President Clinton’s emergency declarations dealt with foreign policy issues, again mostly imposing sanctions and the same was true of President George H.W. Bush.  Essentially the same was true of President Obama, but a couple of declarations reflected the emergence of new problems.  One declaration dealt with the H1N1 flu pandemic, while a second addressed international cyber-crime.  President Trump might be said to have extended the line begun by his predecessor.  Most of his declarations dealt with sanctions (chiefly directed against China), but he also declared emergencies in response to Covid-19 and the torrent of illegal immigrants on the southern border.  President Biden has maintained the sanctions on China, while adding ones on Russia. 

            Traditionally, national emergency declarations have dealt with foreign policy.  Recently, pandemic diseases threatening all Americans have been added to the list.  Not yet partisan goals. 


[1] The Korean War, inflation in 1971, postal workers walking off the job, that sort of thing

[2] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (1973).  Schlesinger was a former Imperial scribe.  I’m sure many people thought of that before me.  Doesn’t make it less true. 

[3] See: National Emergencies Act – Wikipedia  Well, where were you going to look if you got curious? 

[4] See: List of national emergencies in the United States – Wikipedia  See also: War Powers Resolution – Wikipedia  The evangelist Billy Graham once responded to the observation that being “saved” didn’t seem to last for many people.  “Yes, it’s like taking a bath,” he said. 

[5] Particularly on Iran, an American bete noire since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 

[6] “No surprise there” you’re thinking. 

Excoriating Twenty Years of American Foreign Policy.

            Riffing on Edward Gibbon, Walter Russell Mead judges that “At the beginning of the 21st Century, the world seemed more peaceful and American power more solidly entrenched than ever before.”[1]  With the Soviet Union defeated and its empire dissolved, with the whole laughable idea of Communism discredited even in the eyes of leftist academics, the Western leaders tried to understand the new world.  Mead argues persuasively that American leaders believed that “traditional forms of great-power competition and balance-of-power diplomacy” had done their duty, had their day, and now could take up the rocker at some Old Soldiers’ Home,[2] to be wheeled-out only for July 4th celebrations.  America appeared the unchallenged and unchallengeable leader of the world, the “last man standing.”  So it would always remain. 

In place of the “long twilight struggle”[3] against aggressive tyrannies, other issues had to be addressed.  The nation-state, it was argued, served well for the solution of national problems.  New problems, however, were trans-national.  The climate know no borders.  If global warming continues unchecked, we may all fry like eggs.  Population and wealth imbalances between the Global North and the Global South spur large-scale migration that can test, even overwhelm, traditional national boundaries.  Western liberal ideals have always been universal in their claims.[4]  Now the duty of American foreign policy lay in seeing these rights extended to all peoples.[5]  Finally, the means to all these ends lay in the creation of ever more powerful international institutions and ever-more comprehensive international law. 

Then things blew up in the Middle East with the 9/11 attacks, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and Iranian assertiveness. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the invasions morphed into attempts at nation-building that merely set off gory civil wars between American clients and American opponents.  Then American leaders failed to act in any effective way against Vladimir Putin’s effort to resurrect Russian power in the former Soviet Empire.  On top of this, the same leaders grossly misjudged the future development of China.  They appear to have believed that China, could be integrated into an American-designed global economy as a willing partner.   

Mead sees in all of this a “disastrous mix of mission creep and strategic incompetence.”  He wants foreign policy elites to have a “road to Damascus” experience.  He wants them to turn back to great-power politics.  There is a lot of good sense in this analysis.  However, the Afghan and Iraq wars have been wound up with Americans now (hopefully) vaccinated against more nation-building.  Putin is one man, not a global movement, and nuclear weapons alone make Russia a serious power.  The truth is that both China and climate change are grave problems that demand global solutions.  Those solutions can be both great-power politics and international action. 


[1] Walter Russell Mead, “A Feckless Foreign Policy’s Legacy,” WSJ, 19 July 2022.  See Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. I, Chapter One, “The Extent of the Empire in the Age of the Antonines,” Introduction. 

[2] Said home to be located in coastal South Carolina, close to excellent golf courses. 

[3] I know, at this point your cliché-o-meter is running wild.  Sorry.   

[4] “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,…”. 

[5] One very real blessing of our liberty has been the continual extension of rights to marginalized groups and in the expansion of the list of rights.  So I’m OK with flying the gay flag outside city hall.  Whether we should fly it over the US embassy in a conservative foreign country is another issue. 

Two Approaches.

            Different national cultures extend beyond welfare provision.  Historically, the American government paid unemployment benefits directly to displaced workers, rather than to companies experiencing a down-turn in business.  Europe, in contrast, tended to pay companies to retain their workers during a down-turn.  From some sort of bird’s-eye view, the very dynamic American economy tended to shift assets from dying industries to growing industries, while the European economy labored under the burden of assets trapped in old industries.[1] 

            The Covid pandemic imposed an odd sort of shock on the world economy.  The disruption did not spring from serious economic problems.[2]  Serious economic problems sprang from the virus and from government responses to the emergency.  The economies could rebound once adequate responses had developed (vaccines, testing).  In the meantime, governments pumped in money.  In Europe, this took the form of governments paying companies which “furloughed” their workers.  In the US it mostly took the form of expanded and extended unemployment benefits, along with Economic Impact Payments. 

The American stock markets soared.[3]  Since, just over half of Americans own stock (mostly through their retirement plans), net worth and market income increased for many people.  For a bunch of older, but still working-age Americans, an early retirement beckoned.  Many others built up their savings to the point where they could ride out extended unemployment.  On top of this, the United States suffered a much worse hit per capita from Covid than did Europe, Japan, or Canada.[4]  This may have made many Americans skittish about going back to work if they don’t absolutely have to.  Many others got sick and had to call in sick to work. 

In any event, America’s labor participation rate has not recovered as well as have either other economic indicators or the participation rates in other countries.  With a booming economy, American employers are not able to find enough workers to fill the jobs that need doing. 

What to do?  First, work the people you do have longer and harder.  The number of hours worked actually increased from late 2019 to mid-2021.  Second, they have raised the pay for those who do work in hopes of pulling more workers back into paid work.  Labor costs have risen more in the United States than in other countries.  Third, one would expect employers to pursue mechanization as much as possible.  Will this close off the possibility of return to work for many of the now-unemployed?  Or will economic growth and innovation provide new jobs for those who want them? 

In the meantime, while excess money creation provides the basic force driving the inflation,[5] the supply-chain disruptions, the war in Ukraine, and labor shortages are making worse that basic inflation.  In turn, the inflation is providing ammo for those who oppose plans for a further expansion of the social safety net to more closely resemble that of Europe. 


[1] Greg Ip, “The Mystery of Low U.S. Labor Participation,” WSJ, 5-6 February2022. 

[2] Like, say, the collapse of a housing bubble with a devastating impact on financial systems. 

[3] I realize that I’m supposed to refer only to the S&P, but the Dow went from 26,000 in July 2020 to 36,000 in January 2022. 

[4] The death rate per 100,000 people: US, 311; Italy, 281; UK, 269; France, 233; Germany, 172; Canada, 114; and Japan, 25.  See: Mortality Analyses – Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (jhu.edu) 

[5] The basic money supply, the M2, rose from about $15 trillion in 2020 to about $22 trillion in 2022. 

Welfare State.

In arguing for his Social Security program, Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that taxes paid by all beneficiaries would “give contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions.”  Americans once accepted that rationale.  Does that rationale still command assent?[1] 

            The welfare state grew by stages in response to new developments in society.  It can be said to have begun in the later 19th Century when European industrial societies responded to a combination of new needs and political conditions.[2]  The crises of the Great Depression and the Second World War generally led to an expansion of services provided to citizens and a more aggressive management of the economy to achieve high employment.  A third great expansion began in the 1960s and 1970s to both share out increased prosperity and to respond to new issues.[3]  In the course of the second and third waves of the welfare state, significant differences emerged between the United States and other “advanced” nations. 

            Many “advanced” countries had a problem with child poverty.  They addressed the problem with direct government payments to families with children.  Many “advanced” countries had a problem with what to do when pregnant women left the work force.  They addressed it by paying for a median of sixteen weeks of maternity leave.  Many “advanced” countries accepted the need to provide day-care (so that women could return to work) and early childhood education.  On average, they pay about $5,200 per child per year. 

            In contrast, among “advanced” countries, the United States spends the third lowest share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on direct benefits to families with children; the US doesn’t offer paid maternity leave; the temporary Covid emergency was the first time the US offered paid sick leave; and US public spending on child-care and early education is about half of the median in “advanced” countries.  It’s probably not a coincidence that the US has a high child-poverty rate and a lower rate of female participation in the economy. 

            How do other “advanced” countries pay for this generous social provision?  Ordinary people pay far higher taxes than is the case in the United States.  In Germany, Italy, and France, it is 47-49 percent of total compensation.  Other countries tax consumption through a Value Added Tax (V.A.T.).  On top of this, most “advanced” countries impose carbon taxes.[4]   In the United States, people pay 30 percent of total compensation in taxes.  At the national level, the US doesn’t tax consumption.  The US doesn’t tax carbon emissions.   

            Perhaps one explanation lies in the different economic histories of the US and Western Europe.  In Western European countries, much of the welfare state came into being after the Second World War.  Shared hardships and the general discrediting of conservative political parties allowed the European left and center to forge new institutions.  In contrast, the US enjoyed widely shared prosperity until the 1980s.  So the US is only now trying to figure out the issues.  It is doing after decades of a high-consumption, low-responsibility, weak solidarity mind-set. 


[1] Greg Ip, “Echo of Europe’s Benefits, Not Taxes,” WSJ, 30 November 2021. 

[2] The historian John McKay called this the “responsive national state.”  Its common features included public schools, urban reconstruction, and social insurance for the industrial working class. 

[3] For example, medicine made dramatic advances, but the fruits of those advances could be too expensive for the individual to pay.  So, Medicare and Medicaid. 

[4] Ip describes carbon taxes as “the most efficient way to curb fuel use and spur increased investment in renewables.”