Monthly Archives: October 2015

Combative Women.

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“Il y a etait un fois” (“Once upon a time), ambitious women military officers wanted to rise in rank, perhaps all the way to Chair-person of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, to get to that level, one had to have had combat experience. The military was not granting the highest ranks to people—male or female–who had only commanded office buildings. So a campaign began to allow women to serve in combat.[1]

Now we have the question directly before us. Should women be allowed to branch combat arms in the U.S. military? Liberals—most, but not all, of whom avoid military service like the plague—say “Yes!” Conservatives—most, but not all, of whom avoid military service like the plague—say “No!” So, it is difficult to see this question in an objective fashion. Isn’t there some kind of objective measure to help us decide?

Well, yes, there is such a measure.[2] Kinda-Sorta. The Marine Corps ran a nine-month study comparing the performance of all-male units with the performance of gender-integrated units. In the study All-male units out-performed gender-integrated units on 93 of 134 specific categories. Gender dimorphism played a big role in this evaluation—as it does in infantry combat. Men are bigger and more heavily muscled than are women.[3] Where women fell short was in the multiple physical tasks of combat infantry. The combat load—weapons, rations, water, and other equipment—is standardized, rather than scaled for body mass. It has to be if soldiers are to fight effectively in the field. Smaller bodies shoulder a proportionately heavier load than do bigger bodies. Smaller bodies have a harder time keeping up on the march or in running an obstacle course. It isn’t that women are less mentally tough than are men.[4] The study found that about 40 percent of female Marines suffered injuries striving to keep up with their unit. That is, they pushed themselves beyond safe limits. In the process, they exerted a drag on their own comrades. Other jar-heads slowed down to help their lagging sisters-in-arms. So, if you rely on the Marine Corps study, women can’t branch combat arms without undermining the essential combat performance of the units in which they serve.

Liberal abuse rained down on the Marines after the study was published. What about the two women who graduated from the Army’s elite Ranger School? Well, what about the many more men whom graduated from the school? Conservatives answered that “the facts are the facts.” So, if all but the exceptional woman[5] cannot become an infantry-person,[6] does that mean that they cannot branch combat arms?

But wait! Marines are the quintessential light infantry.   They are troops with flat noses and flat guts. However, among ground forces, infantry are only one of the combat arms. The others are artillery, armor, and combat aviation. Then there is the Air Force and the Navy. Basically, all of these people ride around in death-dealing vehicles. How many gunners, tankers, Apache pilots, carrier fighter-jocks, let alone guys controlling drones from an air-conditioned trailer in Nevada or practicing Armageddon at a missile silo in Nebraska could match the USMC standards for physical performance? Is it possible to use an extreme case to make a judgement about the whole? The question of women in combat arms remains open.

[1] Doubtless, this movement opened a gap between female career officers and short-term females soldiers.

[2] “Women in combat: flunking a Marine test,” The Week, 25 September 2015, p. 16.

[3] “Testosterone! Hero of song and story, Testosterone!”

[4] Otherwise guys would be signing up to attend their wife’s child-birth like it was fantasy football. Nor should they. It’s like that scene in “Aliens.” Jus sayin’. JMO.

[5] See :G.I. Jane.” (dir. Ridley Scott, ). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ObR1c1Nza4

[6] OK, I admit I’m being a jerk here.

The Iran deal after the shouting.

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Once upon a time, Iran signed up for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[1] Under the treaty the development of nuclear power was acceptable, but the pursuit of nuclear weapons was not acceptable.[2] After n1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran pursued a secret program to develop nuclear weapons—not just nuclear power—until 2003. Then the hunt eased up, without entirely stopping. By 2006, Western nations had grown suspicious of Iranian actions, so they slapped on a series of increasingly painful economic sanctions. The vise kept tightening until the Iranians agreed to negotiate with a coalition of powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, the European Community, Russia, and China.

The Iran deal that was recently technically-not-disapproved by Congress does certain things. It does not seek a permanent end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. It does try to extend Iran’s “break out” time to a nuclear weapon from the current estimated three months to one year.

What’s the up-side? The agreement imposes controls on Iran for ten to fifteen years. Some of this involves Iran backing away from its current level of development by surrendering 97 percent of the enriched uranium it already possesses, dismantling two-thirds of its existing enrichment centrifuges, and reconstructing its existing heavy water reactor. Some of this involves “intrusive”[3] inspections of Iranian sites all along the supply-chain from mines and centrifuge factories to enrichment facilities.

What’s the down-side? Iran fended-off really intrusive inspections that would have allowed inspectors to look wherever they want. Only certain sites are open to free inspection. Other sites where Iran might seek to reconstitute its program out from under Western eyes can be visited only with Iranian permission. Refusal sets in train an appeals process; rejection of the Iranian position—in theory—triggers a “snap back” of the sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place. Then, the agreement suspends the sanctions regime. Iran stands to earn up to $150 billion a year.

So, this deal will delay the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons for ten to fifteen years. What happens then? Both the Americans and the Iranians are wagering that people in the future will see their best interests clearly. The Obama administration appears to hope that Iranians in the future will see things differently than do members of the revolutionary generation that overthrew the Shah. Iranians appear to be thinking that the survival of the current regime depends on ending sanctions and that the future will take care of itself.

Will Iran try to cheat? Probably, but they are going to have spies all over them thicker than ticks on a hound.

What happens in 2025-2030? The Iranians may rush to “break out.” Or they may not care about nukes anymore. It’s hard to say.

How much confidence should people have in this agreement? Some. However, the opinion polls appear to show that Americans don’t want a big war right now. Give it ten years, and….   Then, neither Russia nor China has an interest in denying nukes to Iran.

So, take the deal, put the clutch down on war for ten to fifteen years, but don’t get confused about the possibility of hitting Iran if things don’t work out.

[1] “The Iran deal,” The Week, 9 October 2015, p. 11.

[2] Yes, there is gross hypocrisy in countries with nukes telling countries without nukes that they can’ t have nukes. Welcome to life.

[3] UN inspectors, video-cameras, and sensors.

Quagmire.

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President Barack Obama has long insisted that any solution to the Syrian civil war will require President Bashar al-Assad to yield power to his “moderate” opponents. Russia and Iran don’t care what President Obama thinks.[1] The Russians decided to intervene on behalf of Assad in late Summer 2015.[2] Planes and personnel began arriving in September. Now the Russians have expanded their firepower in Syria with a long-range artillery system, while Iran has sent a small force that may be a spear-head for a larger contribution. Early Russian airstrikes chiefly have hit the non-ISIS opponents of Assad. Meanwhile, the American effort to raise, train, and arm a force of “moderates”[3] to fight just ISIS has turned into a highly-public exploding cigar.

For their part, both Turkey and the Sunni Arab states insist that Assad has to go as part of any negotiated peace. Neither Shi’ite Iran nor the Shi’ite Hezbollah group in Lebanon will agree to one of their chief allies being sent off, to be replaced by conservative Sunnis. Then there is the whole problem of ISIS, which is equally dangerous to the Shi’ite regimes in Iraq and Syria.[4]

All this is deeply frustrating for President Obama, who has had several chances to involve the United States more deeply in Syria and wisely did not take them. Equally frustrating is the torrent of abuse that he has suffered from Republican critics.[5] President Obama described the recent Russian intervention in the civil war as born “not out of strength but out of weakness.” In an obvious allusion to the “Arab Afghans” who flocked to oppose the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the President argued that attacking non-ISIS forces as well as attacking ISIS will “turbocharge ISIS recruitment and jihadist recruitment.” President Obama went on to say that “an attempt by Russia and Iran to prop up Assad and try to pacify the population is just going to get them stuck in a quagmire and it won’t work. And they will be stuck there for a while if they don’t take a different course.”

Perhaps spurred by the Russian intervention, the Obama administration began touting a new initiative of its own.[6] A projected 3,000 to 5,000 Arabs in northeastern Syria will be armed in order to co-operate with the much larger Kurdish forces and both will be better supported by air strikes from Turkey. The objective of the offensive will be to isolate the ISIS capital city of Raqqa. The U.S. also hopes that its Syrian clients can cut off a 60 mile stretch of the border with Turkey between Kilis and the Euphrates River to end the influx of foreign fighters to ISIS. However, the new plan seems intended to counter Russia as much as ISIS: an expanded area of air operations might cause the Russians to restrict their own strikes.

One possibility is that the Russo-Iranian intervention will not turn into a quagmire. Additional fire-power might turn the tide against the non-ISIS opponents of Assad. It could reduce the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS. It could presage a greater involvement of Iranian forces in opposing ISIS in Iraq. Another possibility is that the Russians aren’t opposed to a protracted struggle against ISIS. Russia has been fighting Islamists in Chechnya for a long time. Success could give the Russians diplomatic leverage over their intervention in Ukraine.

[1] Peter Baker and Neil MacFarquhar, “Obama Sees Russia Failing In Syria Effort,” NYT, 3 October 2015.

[2] See: “The Teeter-Totter.”

[3] See: “Arming the Moderates.”

[4] It is possible that the current Syrian refugee crisis in Europe was facilitated by Turkey in an effort to exert pressure on the Europeans to demand action against Assad. See: “the Syrian Refugee Crisis.” At the same time, Turkey is equally unable to prevent the crossing of its territory by foreign fighters going to join ISIS. Perhaps the Turkish state is just really weak. Or perhaps not.

[5] They seem to have learned nothing from the Iran disaster.

[6] Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Aims To Put More Pressure on ISIS in Syria,” NYT, 5 October 2015.

Strategic Leaking.

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Early in life, Jason Chaffetz (R, Utah) had a notion that he could be a Secret Service agent. Or maybe an outfielder for the Yankees. Or maybe Superman. (But I repeat myself.) So, in 2003, he filled out the Secret Service application. (May have worked on his fielding skills or bought a spandex costume for all I know.) Kids often don’t have a sense of their own real talents or inclinations. Chaffetz didn’t make the cut as a Secret Service agent. He got a letter that said that “better qualified applicants existed.”[1] Then they go on and do something better suited to themselves. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkX-TPaodoM For his part, Chaffetz went into politics, ending up—so far—as a Congersman. (See: Pogo). Chaffetz serves on the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.[2]

Then the Secret Service (which is mostly charged with protecting the President of the United States), got in the glue. In April 2012, it was alleged that eleven members of the president’s security detail (and some U.S. military personnel) hired prostitutes while protecting the President at an international conference at Cartagena, Colombia. More revelations of frat-boy behavior followed. Worse, there have been several incidents in which White House security has been breached without much difficulty. Then, in early 2015, a couple of senior Secret Service officers went out “for a taste,” as they delicately phrase it in “The Wire.” Upon returning to duty at the White House, they crashed their car into one of the security barriers. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform investigated the widely-reported incident.

One of the scathing interrogators on that committee was Jason Chaffetz. He issued a bunch of subpoenas for more information. In the wake of that interrogation, a bunch of Secret Service officers began digging for information (i.e.”dirt”) on Chaffetz. Some gained access to Chaffetz’s failed application for the Secret Service. Doubtless, the files contained information explaining the rejection of Chaffetz.[3]

Then Faron Paramore, the head of public affairs for the Secret Service sent the information to Edward Lowery, an assistant director. Lowery replied that “Some information that he might find embarrassing needs to get out. Just to be fair.” Two days later, the story about Chaffetz’s failed application to join the Secret Service appeared in “The Daily Beast.”

This led to an investigation by the Inspector General (IG) for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Paramore stated that he did not reply to Lowery’s e-mail; Lowery stated that he did not order anyone to leak the information to the press. The IG could not determine who among the “likely…hundreds” of Secret Service agents who had received the information leaked it to the press.

Why does this squalid little story matter? It matters, first, because of the misuse of damaging or embarrassing information by the late long-time director of the F.B.I, J. Edgar Hoover. His “Personal and Confidential” files were used to intimidate politicians and government officials. It matters, second, because of Edward Snowden’s initial revelations about the bulk interception of phone and other media communications of Americans by the NSA.[4]

The chilling effect could run from Congressional critics to ordinary citizen activists.

[1] That’s nothing. I got a letter from Harvard that said that “many (my emphasis, although actually it might have been their emphasis) better qualified applicants existed.” My life-course supports their judgment.

[2] Michael Schmidt, “Senior Secret Service Official Proposed Embarrassing a Critic in Congress,” NYT, 1 October 2015.

[3] I have no idea what that information might be. What do you want people to not know about you?

[4] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution

The Teeter Totter.

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During August 2015 the Russians decided to increase their support for their Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad. This decision came into the open in the first days of September 2015 when an advance team of Russians appeared at a Syrian air force base near the port city of Latakia. Signs of things to come included pre-fabricated housing units for a thousand men and an air-traffic control system separate from the one in use by the Syrians.[1]

Really heavy equipment in large quantities would have to come by sea through the Bosporus. More immediately, the fastest way for the Russians to get men and weapons to Syria lay in an air-lift. The U.S. got Bulgaria to reject a Russian request for over-flight rights. With the Balkan flight route closed, the Russians turned to Iran and Iraq. On 5 September 2015, the U.S. “asked” Iraq to reject any Russian request for over-flight rights from Iran into Syria. Iraq declined to bar the flights. The advance team then welcomed a half-dozen battle tanks, 35 armored personnel carriers, 15 howitzers, and the personnel to operate and service them. One American expert described the Russian moves as “risky.” He didn’t say for whom.[2]

Beginning in mid-September 2015, Putin widened his efforts with suggestions that he and President Obama meet in New York during a U.N. conference on Syria; that the militaries of the two countries hold talks on Syria, and announcing his intention to lay out a peace plan for Syria.

American observers described these efforts as part of an effort by Putin to worm and slime his way back into the good graces of the U.S. after the costs of his intervention in Ukraine a year ago had begun to bite. The Russian view is that the Americans have wreaked havoc in the Middle East in recent years by sponsoring—or forcing—the overthrow of tyrants who were keeping the lid on explosive situations. Other voices suggested that the American problems in the Middle East (Iran, ISIS) would be difficult to resolve without Russian assistance. This would be all the more true if the Russians could expand their influence beyond the Syrian regime.[3]

In the first half of September 2015 Russia deployed two to three air-defense systems to the Latakia base, along with four fighter aircraft. In mid-September 2015, two dozen Russian ground-attack aircraft arrived at the Latakia air base.[4]

Then, in late September 2015, Russia formed an intelligence-sharing agreement with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. On the surface the agreement is directed only against ISIS. The announcement caught the Americans by surprise. It seemed just as likely that non-ISIS opponents of Assad will be targeted.[5] The early reports on bombings bear out this fear.

There are two questions worth asking.

First, the Russians are joining the Sunni-Shi’ite civil war within Islam on the side of the Shi’ites. The U.S. has been trying to straddle that conflict with “allies” in both camps (Shi’ite dominated Iraq and Sunni Saudi Arabia). Will the Russian move force an undesired clarity on American policy?

Second, Iraq’s embrace of the Russians caught the U.S. flat-footed. Did Iraq launch a big rat-hunt for spies the minute the Americans withdrew? Did CIA know it was blind?

[1] Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Moves in Syria Pose Concerns for U.S.,” NYT, 4 September 2015.

[2] Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Moves in Syria Widen Role in Middle East,” NYT, 14 September 2015.

[3] Neil MacFarquhar and Andrew Kramer, “Putin Sees Path to Diplomacy Through Syria,” NYT, 16 September 2015.

[4] Eric Schmitt and Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Expands Fleet in Syria With Jets That Can Attack Targets On the Ground,” NYT, 21 September 2015.

[5] Michael Gordon, “Russia Surprises U.S. With Accord on Battling ISIS,” NYT, 27 September 2015.