The Present Danger.

Competition between states provides the fundamental dynamic in international relations.  Economic wealth and –especially–industrial power translate into military, political, and cultural power.  In alliance with other countries, the United States fought a “Fifty Years’ War” (1940-1990) against aggressive tyrannies.  In the end, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union all were laid in the dust.  After 1945, Germany and Japan were reconciled with their foes and became vital pillars of the “West.”  Reconciliation failed with post-Soviet Russia.[1] 

Some countries reacted against the most recent Western victory, and especially against the United States.[2]  China, Russia, and Iran hold pride of place among the “revisionist” states hoping to un-do American leadership (or “hegemony” or “empire”).[3]  China’s headlong drive toward economic power began to pay-off in a dramatic military build-up.  Russia both balked at the American propensity for regime-change and sought to restore much of the territory lost in the break-up of the Soviet Union.  Iran pursued both nuclear weapons and the use of Shi’ite and related groups throughout the Middle East.  Contemporary conservatives tend to blame the Barack Obama administration (2008—2016) for a loss of focus on great-power politics during a critical moment.[4]  However, almost twenty years of botched relations with the “revisionist” states on the part of both the United States and the European Union preceded the arrival in power of this bunch of highly-intelligent, well-educated fools.  Donald Trump then bolted from the multilateral executive agreements crafted in Obama’s second term, leaving both the deal with Iran and the Paris Climate Accord; and alienated America’s European allies. 

The Biden administration seems to have believed that things would snap back into place once the adults regained control in 2021.  Instead, the “revisionist” states doubled-down on their pursuit of national advantage while tightening the bonds between them.  Their bet seems to be that there is something fundamentally wrong with America these days.  That’s a big gamble. 

It took until 2023, but the Biden administration now seems to realize the nature of the situation.  Gone is the open hostility to Saudi Arabia.  India, for all the flaws of its leader Narendra Modi, is being courted.  Engagement with Ukraine deepens, to the point where Americans are increasingly telling Kyiv exactly how to fight the war.  The visit of the Taiwanese leader to the United States, like President Biden’s summit meeting with the leaders of Japan and South Korea are important steps in opposing Chinese expansionism.[5] 

Could this new conflict spiral out of control into catastrophe?  After 9/11, the danger from “radical Islam” was over-played.  Is this crisis the same or different?  A clear discussion leading to a bi-partisan consensus would support American efforts. 


[1] Why the former Soviet Union did not follow the same path remains an important question for historians.  People who invoke the Marshall Plan analogy don’t know anything about what made the Marshall Plan work. 

[2] Worth a read: James Headley’s essay “Post-Communist Russia and the West: From Crisis to Crisis?” in Steven Fish et al, eds., A Quarter Century of Post-Communism Assessed (2016).  

[3] The future stance of the European Union remains open to question. 

[4] Walter Russell Mead, “Geopolitical Climate Denialism,” WSJ, 10 August 2023. 

[5] Walter Russell Mead, “Power Matters More Than Diplomacy,” WSJ, 22 August 2023. 

Waiting.

            Victory in the Cold War left the United States as the sole remaining superpower.  The Western-led open world economy spread into much of the rest of the world.  Western countries claimed their peace dividend by reducing defense spending.  Yet not all were happy with the outcome.  Expanded international economic integration disrupted established industries in Western countries, even as they raised hundreds of millions of people elsewhere out of abject poverty.  Social division strained democratic politics, especially in the United States.  China, Russia, and Islamic radicals declined to be chained to the chariot of American-led “progress.”  They and others sought to increase their own power. 

Until recently, in these efforts they mostly had to contend with the rhetorical disdain of the West.  The leader of the pack, the United States, began to play a less influential role.  In large measure, this change in role can be blamed on the disastrous invasion of Iraq.  The decision to proceed with a “coalition of the willing,” rather than paying attention to what important international partners said by their refusal to participate; the gruesome civil war that the American invasion made possible; and the repercussions throughout the Middle East of the flunked war both diverted American attention from real issues and left the American people disgusted with international relations.  President Donald Trump’s then well-founded disdain for the Continental European allies, his hostility to Iranian adventurism, and his determination to coerce China alarmed both America’s foreign policy elite and many foreign leaders.  From both these adventures, the United States ended up in a very different place than had been the case at the end of the Cold War. 

            Now many in the West are truly alarmed.  In the absence of reliable American leadership, some of the traditional allies are “tightening their relations with the U.S., increasing their defense spending, and intensifying efforts to strengthen the network of alliances that underpin the world order.”[1]  What they are doing, really, is waiting to see if the Americans are going to shake it off and come back to the center of the ring for the next round. 

            What if the Americans don’t shake it off?  What if other countries value the American-created and American-led world order more highly than do the Americans themselves?  In that case, many countries will find themselves confronting a loose and temporary, but momentarily potent, coalition of predators.[2]  What then?  The Serpent Prince of Saudi Arabia seems to think that the question already has been answered.  President Joe Biden has failed to come up with any suitable response to Iran, so Saudi Arabia has been open to Xi Jinping mediating a truce for the moment in the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict, while also exerting pressure on the world oil market.[3]  He’s an early adopter of the post-American world.  Lots of people are not yet ready to make that jump, and don’t want that jump to become necessary.  Nevertheless, they are watching to see how it shakes out. 

            At the heart of this dilemma is a more fundamental question.  Is American weakness on the international scene only perceived or is it real?  Only Americans can answer that question. 


[1] Walter Russell Mead, “America Shrugs, and the World Makes Plans,” WSJ, 28 March 2023.

[2] For a historian, there are inescapable questions about parallels to the period between the two World Wars.  Analogical thinking can be dangerous.  You have to pick the right analogy, not just the one at hand. 

[3] Which doesn’t do any good for any democratic politician in any country. 

Franco Still Dead.

            Back in the day, “Saturday Night Live” had a long-running gag about a news anchor reporting that “Spanish dictator Francisco Franco is still dead.”  Wasn’t funny then (unless you were high) and it’s meaningless now.  The reference offers the chance to think about an important issue.  Is the chief objective of American foreign policy to defend American democracy or to create a democratic world? 

            In a straight fight between two countries, allies don’t matter.  The wars of the 20th Century spread far outside such boundaries.  They were most commonly wars of coalitions: the First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1939-1945), and the Cold War (1945-1990).  An entire century convulsed over issues of national independence, representative government, and human rights.  In the end, the champions of democracy triumphed over the champions of authoritarianism. 

            Yet it wasn’t that simple.  In the First World War, the parliamentary governments of France and Britain made common cause with Russian autocracy and the Italian and Japanese monarchies.  In the Second World War, the United States and Britain joined with the Soviet Union and Kuomintang China to form a “Grand Alliance.”  During the Cold War, America’s allies included some very undemocratic countries: Greece under occasional dictatorships, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran for a time, South Vietnam, and many African and Latin American countries.  The reasons for these alliances were pragmatic: America needed allies, but many countries were not democratic.[1] 

            Now the Biden Administration is being criticized for taking a more puritanical view.[2]  President Joe Biden talks a lot about a global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.  Well, the democracy is all on one side in the twilight struggles with China and Russia, but there’s authoritarianism on both sides.  The catalogue of authoritarian states not aligned with Russia or China is long: in Africa there are Angola, Nigeria, and Ethiopia; in Southeast Asia there are Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar; in South Asia there are India, Indonesia, Malaya, and Sri Lanka; and in Central Asia and the Middle East there are a host of unfree countries. 

            Is democratic government a natural and inevitable stage of social, political, and economic development?  If it is, then it can be held back for a time by a dictator or monarch, but it also can be swiftly brought into being by toppling the dictator, provided the country is sufficiently “developed.”[3]  Or is each country or civilization the unique product of historical developments in government and culture?  If it is, then democratic countries will have to tolerate diversity and practice inclusiveness while seeking common ground in shared real interests.  Failing that, a country could wall off sin by aligning with and trading with only real democracies. 

            Conservative “realist” critics of the Biden foreign policy see it pushing an advanced and extended one-size-fits-all view of Democracy.  This alarms or alienates potential allies whose real interest lies in countering the rise of Russian and Chinese power.  Many observers can’t help but notice current American weakness.  So, the old plan may be the best plan. 


[1] “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least find a few kind words to say about the Devil.”—Winston Churchill. 

[2] Walter Russell Mead, “The Cost of Biden’s ‘Democracy’ Fixation,” WSJ, 4 April 2023. 

[3] As in Iraq in 2003.