At the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the defeated Nationalists withdrew from Chinese mainland territories.  Some entered the remote border areas of Laos and Thailand.  Most of them crossed the Formosa Straits to the island of Taiwan.  Here they created their own country. 

The Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) has never recognized Taiwan as independent.  In similar fashion, it refused to recognize any of the territorial losses during the age of European imperialism.  Where it could do so, it made good its claims: Shanghai and Tibet.  Other places had to wait for their “liberation.”  Recently, China has retaken Hong Kong and Macao.  Now, attention has shifted to Taiwan. 

            As part of President Richard Nixon’s “opening to China,” American policy toward Taiwan became more ambiguous.  In 1979, the United States ended diplomatic relations with Taiwan while re-establishing them with the PRC.  In 1982, the Reagan administration said that it would not pursue “a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or [of] ‘one China, one Taiwan’.”  All subsequent administrations have made clear American opposition of a declaration of independence by Taiwan.  They have believed that such a declaration would trigger an invasion by the PRC.  If that happened, then the United States might be drawn into a wart with China.  This would upset many apple-carts.[1]  So, American policy effectively has been to trust in the eventual evolution of the PRC toward the kind of society which Taiwan would willingly join.[2] 

            For the United States, the situation is more complicated than before.  For one thing, some serious observers of military affairs doubt that the United States now could win a conventional war with China in the Western Pacific.  Rearmament and rebuilding the defense industrial base could take some time.  What id China pounces before then?  For another thing, there is a suspicion that China’s aims extend well beyond merely regaining “lost” territory.  Taiwan forms the center of what strategists call the “first island chain” cutting off China from easy access to the Pacific.  Japan and the Philippines are the two other links in the chain, but it is anchored at either end by South Korea and Vietnam.  What if the Chinese determination to “restore” Taiwan forms merely an entering wedge for a larger plan of aggression?  For yet another thing, Taiwan has become a major industrial economy.  In particular, it is home to the Taiwan Semi-conductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC if you want to go check the contents of your IRA).  Chinese rule would both mark a further shift in the balance of power and harm America’s economy. 

            In 2023, the CIA assessed that Xi Jinping had instructed military leaders to “be ready [to invade Taiwan] by 2027.”[3]  In mid-December 2025, the navy of the PRC carried out maneuvers in the waters around Taiwan.  The 90-ship group was, in the view of the Taiwanese military, practicing a “blockade exercise.”[4]  Blockade would be one way of bringing Taiwan to its knees.  Bombing would be another.  Invasion—amphibious and airborne–would be yet another. 

            All this is worth public discussion.  Now and not later.  We don’t have much “later.” 

---

[1] See David Sacks in While Pledging to Defend Taiwan from China, Biden Shifted on Taiwan Independence. Here’s Why That Matters. | Council on Foreign Relations 

[2] See: Wilkins Micawber.  Sounds like goofy American optimism, until you consider the alternative. 

[3] “The World at a Glance,” The Week, 14 February 2025, p. 9. 

[4] “The World at a Glance,” The Week, 20 December 2024, p. 9.