Has the post-Second World War period of ever-increasing “globalization”[1] come to an end? If it has, then what will replace it? Will it be a return to widespread “protectionism”?[2] Will it be a restricted and managed globalization within large economic blocs protected by a high common external tariff?
Some will attribute the troubled state of international affairs to President Donald Trump’s rash and unsteady imposition of tariffs on anyone who crosses his line of sight. In this view, “more trade is better, especially for the United States.”[3] Trump’s tariffs will push up prices for consumers while slowing down economic activity. It will make it “more costly for U.S. manufacturers to source vital parts and machinery.” The result may be “stagflation” (stagnation plus inflation), such as what beset America in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[4]
One could also attribute the smoldering crisis to a long-running combination of Chinese aggression with American complacency.
Chinese aggression should and does strike fear in the hearts of men. China has used hard work, the mobilization of national talents, the repression of consumption below what might have been, the conversion of a vast population of under-employed peasants turned into tireless industrial workers, borrowed Western expertise, intellectual property theft on a grand scale, manipulation of the international trade regime, the repression of individual liberty by an autocratic state, and appeals to national pride. Economic power has been transformed into military and diplomatic power. China has begun to throw its weight around in the Far East and beyond. The goal seems to be to evict the United States from the Western Pacific. That would be a first step to establishing Chinese hegemony over South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.[5] On the other hand, there’s a particularly American character to China’s policy. As the political philosopher George Washington Plunkitt once said, “I seen my opportunities and I took ‘em.”[6]
The manifestations of American complacency appear in the triumphalism following victory in the Cold War;[7] the misinterpretation of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man Standing; the combination of a long decrease in defense spending to yield a “Peace Dividend”; and the cornucopia of material benefits unleashed by ever more free trade. Toy shops and coffee shops and retirement savings will now suffer. Nobody wants discomfort.
[1] Defined as progressive rounds of reducing barriers to trade, finance, and migration.
[2] Defined as individual nations or blocs of nations raising up tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, combined with restrictions on the movement of capital and people.
[3] Republican Yoda Karl Rove in the Wall Street Journal, quoted in “Global order: Goodbye to the age of free trade?”, The Week, 18 April 2025, p. 34.
[4] Tom Orlik in Bloomberg, quoted in ibid.
[5] Strategists refer to Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines as the “First Island Chain.” South Korea and Vietnam can be considered the mainland anchors of this chain. Together, they provide the geographic positions from which to limit Chinese power projection. The loss of that island chain to Chinese domination would cripple both American trade relations with those countries and power projection. For some idea of how the United States reached this advantageous position, see Evan Mawdsley, Supremacy at Seas: Task Force 58 and the Central Pacific Victory (2025).
[6] “I Seen My Opportunities and I Took ‘Em.”: An Old-Time Pol Preaches Honest Graft
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