Tag Archives: Hamas

Netanyahu.

Posted on by
Reply

            Benjamin Netanyahu was born with the State of Israel.  He was born in Tel Aviv in 1949, the son of the brilliant Revisionist Zionist fanatic Benzion Netanyahu.  He spent much of his youth in the United States,[1] then returned to Israel for military service.  No shirker he: Netanyahu spent five years in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), much of it in combat with the special forces.[2]  Then back to the United States to pursue a degree in Architecture at M.I.T.[3]  He eventually received the BA, plus an MA in Management.[4] 

            Netanyahu made a rapid ascent in politics.  One way and another, he had a lot of connections in Israel.  In 1984, those connections, brains, a familiarity with the United States, and a really good war record led to his appointment as Israel’s representative to the United Nations.  Back in the US, he gave good interview to television reporters.  In 1988 he entered parliament (the Knesset); in 1993 he won the leadership of the Likud party; in 1996 he became prime minister.  In 1999, voters gave Likud, and Netanyahu with it, the heave. 

            Since then, Netanyahu’s career has been linked to Gaza and the West Bank.  He got a cabinet position when Likud regained a majority, then, in 2005, resigned when Ariel Sharon ordered an end to the occupation of Gaza.  Hamas soon evicted the Palestinian Authority from Gaza, creating a radical anti-Israel and pro-Iran bastion on the border.  In 2009, as Israeli voters confronted these harsh new conditions, Netanyahu returned as Prime Minister.  Since then, he has campaigned for a regional alliance with Sunni Arab states to contain (at the least) Iran.  At the same time, however, he has had to juggle the rivalry between the Palestinian Authority (governing the West Bank) and Hamas.  In the case of Hamas, he has allowed Qatar to send millions of dollars in aid to Gaza.  He’s also had to bargain with the tiny, far-right parties who make his parliamentary majority possible.  This has forced (or allowed) him to permit expanding settlements in Arab territory on the West Bank.  He had a lot of irons in the fire. 

            Perhaps his skill at managing those irons made him complacent.  Iran had armed and advised clients all around Israel’s borders.  Hamas in Gaza, but also Hezbollah in Lebanon,[5] and the Assad regime in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen.  In any event, on 7 October 2023 Hamas launched a devastating surprise attack that killed 1,200 Israelis and captured a couple hundred others before the Hamas troops scuttled back into Gaza.  There they hid among the Palestinian civilians in anticipation of an Israeli counter-attack.  They may also have expected Netanyahu to have been tossed out of power after this disaster.  They may have expected Hezbollah and even Iran to have joined in the war.  But Netanyahu refused to resign.   He was inventive, ruthless, and brave as a special forces soldier.  Now he’s that again.  He held onto power, while launching a “savage war of peace” against Hamas, then Hezbollah, and then Iran. 

            Now Gaza lies in ruins with scores of thousands dead.  The architect, the special forces soldier, and—for the moment—the dominant force in the Middle East. 

[1] He didn’t much like the American culture of the 1960s.  It was fun at the time, but he may have a point.  He doesn’t think much of recent American presidents.  Who would: three adolescents, a dotard, and a feral child. 

[2] So, no bone spurs, no asthma, no “politically viable,” no Air National Guard.  More like JFK and Bob Kerry. 

[3] Look at the realities, develop a vision, work to make it real. 

[4] His studies were interrupted by a return to the IDF during the 1973 war.  Must have been interesting sharing a dorm room with him.   

[5] To the point that the country might better be called Hezbollanon. 

From the river to the sea, Zion will be free. Alas.

Posted on by
Reply

            The surprise attack of 7 October 2023 on Israel by Hamas continues to send out shock waves.  However, those psychological and social shock waves strike a restricted area of world opinion.  First and foremost, there is the quarrelling within Israel.  Roughly, one might divide opinion into the “rally ‘round the government” party and the “hunt for guilty men” party. 

For the “rally” group, the most important issue right now is the defeat of Israel’s enemies.  First, this means Hamas, then it means Hezbollah in Lebanon, and ultimately Iran.  In the eyes of this group, the multiple blows rained down on Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran restore faith in Israel’s ability to defend itself.  It seems not to matter how long this mission will take or what collateral damage it inflicts.  It is a war unlike any other. 

For the “guilty men” group, Israel’s resilience as a nation rests upon Israeli “faith in the decency of our society…and trust in the integrity of our leaders.”  These elements matter at least as much as does armed force.  How is that faith and trust possible when the current leaders bear the responsibility for the security failures that made the attacks possible and who are now escalating the war?  Moreover, they are alarmed by the duration and savagery of the war.  Israeli journalist Amir Tibon has written that, in the wake of the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas, he would have expected the government to produce a radically better situation in short order.[1]  This better situation would have involved a swift recovery of the 200-plus hostages seized by Hamas and the creation of a new government for Gaza comprised of moderate Palestinians.  Instead, the war grinds on in Gaza, it has begun to extend into Lebanon, and many of the hostages are still in the hands of Hamas—or dead.  Most of all, the government has no “clear strategic endgame.”[2] 

            Second, there is the quarrelling within the United States.[3]  Elite Young Boobs (EYBs) at some leading American universities immediately sided with Hamas and the Palestinians.[4]  In September 2024, an F.B.I. report on Hate Crimes declared that more than two-thirds of reported religion-based hate crimes were anti-Semitic and the total number of such incidents were greater than any previous level.  Universities that accommodated such actions suddenly found themselves assailed by alumni, donors, and politicians.  Still, “let kids be kids.”[5]  More importantly for American politics, the attack on Gaza by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) aroused Arab Americans against Israel and against the Biden Administration which has backed Israel’s war effort.  In 2016, Joe Biden won the “battleground” state of Michigan by 154,000 votes.  The state’s 200,000 Arab-American voters are believed to have voted overwhelmingly for the Democrat.  Now, many of them are threatening to vote against Kamala Harris.  Common sense will surely reassert itself.  Putting Donald Trump into the White House will not produce a more humanitarian Gaza policy.  Trump is an admirer of Israel’s prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu. 

            Lost in all these quarrels is any recognition that Hamas could have stopped Israel’s attack by surrendering, possibly even to the International Criminal Court.  Why blame only the Jews? 

[1] “Israel: A sense of security forever shattered,” The Week, 18 October 2024, p. 15. 

[2] Oh, but it does if you would but see it.  Force out the people of Gaza, then turn to the West Bank. 

[3] “Oct. 7: How Hamas’ massacre changed the world,” The Week, 18 October 2024. 

[4] Although those are not necessarily the same thing.  Probably they should read Thucydides. 

[5] The phrase turns up all the time on my “Nextdoor” feed after adults complain about acts of petty vandalism or harassment by minor or near-minors. 

Eliminating Hamas,

Posted on by
Reply

            As a practical matter, how would Israel eliminate Hamas? 

            First, what does “eliminate” mean?  Does it mean forcing all Hamas fighters to leave Gaza for somewhere else more distant from Israel?  Israel has tried this before.  In 1972, the government of Jordan got fed up with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which used Jordan as a base for attacks on Israel and which threatened to take over Jordan.  Under military pressure, the PLO evacuated to Lebanon.  South Lebanon and Beirut became the PLO’s bases going forward.  In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and drove on Beirut.  The goal was to force the PLO to leave Lebanon.  This part of the operation proved successful.[1]  Popular support for the PLO declined substantially during this exile.  The 1993 Oslo Accords allowed the PLO to return to Gaza and the West Bank. 

Where would the Hamas fighters go?  It is hard to imagine.  Most Arab states have made some sort of peace—formal or informal–with Israel, so the old sympathy for the Palestinian cause may have shrunk.  Many of these countries have their own plates full of problems.  Whose situation would be improved by taking in thousands of Iran-related militants?  Also, it would have to be a country without a shared border with Israel.  Otherwise, it would just recreate the current Gaza situation or maybe something even worse for Israel’s security.  It would need to be at a remove from most of the Palestinian population.  Iran might be the ideal choice. 

Or does it mean killing or capturing most or all Hamas fighters?  This would be hard to choke down, even for a justifiably enraged Israel.[2]  Foreign countries, even the United States but especially the other Arab countries, would gag on what would soon be called Israel’s “final solution to the Hamas problem.”  There is much to be lost, as well as gained from this approach. 

            Second, regardless of what “eliminate” means, how would Israel bring about this goal?  One answer would be to besiege Gaza until it surrenders on Israel’s terms.  This seems to be where Israel is headed at the moment.  Cut off food, water, electricity, and fuel.  Bomb the place until the rubble bounces.  One problem is that this is already creating a highly public humanitarian catastrophe.  Furthermore, it is indiscriminate in punishing all Gazans.  It will generate enormous pressure on Israel from abroad to compromise.  Compromise would leave Hamas able to claim a form of victory.  No doubt worthless international “guarantees” of Israel’s security would be offered. 

            Another answer would be to invade Gaza.  There is the potential for an Arab Stalingrad, but with huge numbers of civilians present.  As is the case with the United States, Israel doesn’t like to take high casualties.  Rather than engaging in door-to-door fighting, Israel might prefer air strikes and artillery fire.  One goal might be to herd everyone toward the beaches.  Israeli soldiers advancing across the rubble could identify, disarm, and capture surviving Hamas fighters.  It might bring Israel a form of victory faster. 

            “Sympathy has a short half-life,” so Israel needs to move quickly. 

[1] On “Operation Peace for Galilee, see 1982 Lebanon War – Wikipedia  On one awful related incident, see Sabra and Shatila massacre – Wikipedia 

[2] The population of the United States is about 330 million people; the population of Israel is about 10 million people.  The current estimated Israel death toll is about 1,200 people.  The equivalent death toll in the United States would be something like 35,000 people.  There were 2,977 victims on 9/11. 

Two State of Denial Solution.

Posted on by
Reply

Creating the state of Israel was a mistake. It was an injustice for European settlers to create a new state on Arab territory without the consent of the Arab peoples. It would have been better to admit all the European Jews who survived the Holocaust to the United States. However, it was a mistake made more than sixty years ago. People often learn to live with awkward circumstances. People in the democratic, capitalist West came to accept the existence of the Soviet Union without wanting to take long, soapy showers with Communism.

In 1948 Israel’s war for independence created many Palestinian refugees in camps in Egypt’s Gaza Strip and the West Bank that was absorbed into Jordan. Had Egypt and Jordan so desired, they could have created a Palestinian state out of these territories. Thus, the “two state” solution initially failed because of the ambitions of predatory Arab states.

In 1967 Israel’s armed forces over-ran the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the course of fighting a preventive war against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In 1974 the UN proposed ending the conflict by creating two states, with Israel transferring sovereignty over the occupied territories to new Palestinian state. This became the accepted solution for the next forty years.

Late in his second term, President Bill Clinton worked out a peace offer from Israel to the Palestinians. Israel would transfer Gaza, 95 percent of the West Bank (eventually), and a big chunk of East Jerusalem to a Palestinian state. In return, the Palestinians would end the struggle with Israel and accept its right to exist, and also abandon the “right of return” for Palestinians displaced in the 1948 war. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rejected the deal, insisting that Israel had to evacuate all of the West Bank, including Jerusalem.

In 2005 Israel ended its occupation of Gaza. In 2007, Hamas—the rival to the PLO for leadership of the struggle against Israel—seized control of Gaza. Hamas soon launched missile attacks on Israel. In response, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) battered Gaza until Hamas cried “uncle.” Then they clamped a tight blockade on Gaza meant to starve Hamas of military resources and to make life so miserable for the people inside the “world’s largest open-air prison camp” that they might re-think their support for Hamas. It didn’t work. Moreover, the “Arab Spring” rebellion in Egypt brought to power a government of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas is an off-shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, so long-standing Egyptian border controls were relaxed. Hamas rushed to bring in thousands of missiles in preparation for a new attack on Israel. Hamas then began the war in Gaza in Summer 2014. That war put the final nail in the coffin of a two-state solution to the Palestine conflict.

The Palestinian situation on the West Bank soon deteriorated following Arafat’s rejection of the peace deal. Israeli settlements increased in number and size. This created “facts on the ground” that will shape any future peace negotiations. In sum, in any future peace settlement, the Palestinians will have to accept less than they were offered in 2000. Fat chance.

Israel is a small place, but Gaza is relatively remote from the centers of Israeli population. The West Bank in contrast, is close to these centers. A West Bank that came under Hamas rule would pose a mortal danger to Israel. There is little reason to think that the PLO could put up much more of a fight against a Hamas coup in the West Bank than it did in Gaza.

In addition, states have certain rights under international law. It would be impossible to impose effective disarmament on Palestine. It would be difficult for Israel to respond to terrorist attacks out of Palestine without bringing down a hail of criticism and international action.

Solving this problem is going to take a lot of new thinking, not old nostrums.

“Giving up on the two-state solution,” The Week, 12 December 2014, p. 11.

Clueless in Gaza.

Posted on by
Reply

Israel captured the Gaza Strip from Egypt in the 1967 “Six Days War.” In 2005 Israel ended its military occupation of the Strip, handing over government to the Palestinian Authority. In 2007 Hamas won elections in the Strip (although not among all Palestinians), then followed up electoral victory by seizing control of the government in Gaza from the Palestinian Authority.   Israel saw this development as a grave danger. Hamas does not recognize the right of Israel to exist. Hamas militants backed up words with deeds by firing rockets into Israel. Israel responded by imposing a tight blockade on Gaza. All sorts of things–from computers to food–were barred from entry, and most Palestinians were barred from leaving Gaza.

The blockade wrecked the economy of Gaza. In early Summer 2014, there were 1.8 million people living in the Gaza Strip; 40 percent of them were unemployed; almost half of them received food aid from the United Nations; and 80 percent of them lived under the level defined by the UN as in poverty. At the same time, Hamas circumvented the blockade by digging many tunnels into Egypt which allowed the import of all sorts of goods. (It is difficult to believe that there wasn’t also a large “black” economy that never figured into UN calculations of living standards.)   So long as the Egyptians tolerated the Hamas tunnels, Israel’s blockade could not have full effect as a form of non-military coercion. However, Hamas had begun as an extension of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. When the Egyptian military overthrew the government of Mohammad Morsi, the new government cut-off the Hamas tunnels. The people of the Gaza Strips suddenly began to suffer a great deal more than before.

In April 2014 Hamas went so far as to form a unity government with its old rival Fatah, which rules the West Bank (after a fashion). This got Hamas nowhere. Israel sank the peace-talks being pushed by the United States rather than deal with Hamas.

Hoping to force an end to the blockade, Hamas went onto the offensive in Summer 2014. Hamas could not hope to coerce Israel directly. Hamas could hope to provoke a humanitarian crisis that would lead to international pressure on Israel to ease or end the blockade. Hamas had imported a large stock of missiles through the tunnel system before the coup that put Morsi in prison. Now these missiles began to rain down on Israel. The Israelis struck back with air attacks, artillery fire, and a ground incursion. In the process, the Israelis discovered many tunnels that ran not into Egypt for smuggling, but into Israel. Between 2001 and 2005 Palestinian suicide bombers had killed 800 people in Israel until the Israelis walled themselves off from the Palestinians. Finding this defense penetrated by the tunnels, the Israelis went wild.

Israel’s air and ground offensive against Hamas certainly provoked a huge humanitarian crisis. It killed about 1,900 people; destroyed 10,000 homes; and forced the emergency relocation of perhaps 400,000 people within the confines of the tiny area. Criticism of Israel’s actions came from all around the world. Israel has been pushed back toward revisiting the situation of April 2014 in the sense that it will negotiate through the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. On the other hand, Hamas also came in for much criticism for using Palestinian civilians as human shields as they fired their rockets from the midst of civilian areas. Much of this criticism, little noticed in the West, comes from other Arab governments. Moreover, Israel demands the effectively-supervised disarmament of Gaza as a prerequisite to ending the blockade. Fatah sees a chance to make gains against its rival, Hamas.  Hard to make a deal when no one wants a deal.

“Misery in Gaza,” The Week, 22 August 2014, p. 11.)