Annals of the Great Recession I.

In a column in the New York Times, Neil Irwin takes up an important, under-analyzed topic.[1] He doesn’t take it very far, but it’s better than a poke in the eye with a sharp stick.

He begins by reporting on a new book on the “Great Recession” by the University of California-Berkeley economic historian Barry Eichengreen.[2] The book is 500 pages long and came out in early January 2015, so I don’t think that Irwin has fully digested what Professor Eichengreen has to say. (I sure haven’t.) All the same, he brings out several important points.

First, the Great Depression of the 1930s and—more importantly—the Second World War legitimized Keynesian counter-cyclical spending to moderate the economy. Thus, when the American economy began to plummet in early 2008, both Republican President George W. Bush and the Democrat-led Congress agreed on a $150 billion to cover the credit markets (the TARP). Within a year, however, Republicans had turned against big deficits. When the newly-elected President Barack Obama called for a $787 billion stimulus bill, scarcely any Republicans could be found to vote for it. For the next several years the Republicans kept up their assault on deficit spending. By 2011 Democrats also were running away from deficits.

Second, in the absence of spending action by Congress, responsibility for countering the recession fell to the Federal Reserve Bank (the Fed). Here again, Eichengreen finds too little effort made too late. The Fed’s stimulation mostly came a day late and a dollar short. “Quantitative Easing” through bond-buying pumped money into the economy. It just never pumped in enough money until the ambitious program that began in September 2012 (and which has now come to an end).

The result of these lamed policies came in an excessively-long recession that has just ground the spirit out of many Americans. Irwin is good on pointing out the events. He’s less good at explaining them. Why did Republicans turn against Keynesianism?[3] Why did Democrats, of all people, turn against the legacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt?

What is missing in Irwin’s explanation is any analysis of the rise of the “Tea Party.”[4] Not everyone responded well to the stimulus bill. A Seattle-area blogger named Keli Carender organized a protest against the bill in February 2009, then talked it up on-line. Soon, protests took place in other cities. Then Rick Santelli’s on-air rant against bail-outs went viral. Then Fox News pushed the cause. April 15, 2009 provided a forum for lots of protest rallies. ObamaCare added fuel to the fire.

This “Tea Party” movement was largely made up of previously apolitical ordinary citizens who had been energized by their economic concerns. Underneath this concern is a feeling that they have “lost” their country to “elites.” At the same time, many Tea Party people had “social conservative” views on gay marriage, the Second Amendment, hostility to the expansion of government authority by the courts). Illegal immigration formed another concern. Finally, some of the Tea Party supporters were just nuts: “birthers” and “Obama = Hitler” types. The specific targets of the “Tea Party” were the rapidly expanding federal deficit, the growth of “big government,” and taxes. The agenda of the movement appeared to be unrealistic and impossible to achieve: lower taxes combined with a balanced budget.

The “Tea Party” pressured Republicans. The Democratic abdication is harder to figure. Nobel Prize economist Paul Krugman argued that the Obama Administration’s stimulus program was half the size it needed to be, was spread over two years instead of front-loaded into one year, and contained a lot of tax cuts that were a waste. However, Irwin (and apparently Eichengreen) still trot out the tired excuse that the administration under-estimated the scope of the problem. More importantly, perhaps, President Obama felt no commitment to stimulus. Bob Woodward has quoted him as saying “Look, I get the Keynesian argument, but the American people just aren’t there.” But why didn’t he use the “bully pulpit” to get them there? And why didn’t Democratic leaders tell him—as Al Gore once told Bill Clinton, to “get with the program”? There is a lot of blood on the floor from this unnecessary disaster and a lot of blame to go around.

[1] Neil Irwin, “The Depression’s Unheeded Lessons,” NYT, 11 January 2015.

[2] Barry Eichengreen, Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses and Mis-Uses of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[3] Richard Nixon once remarked that “We are all Keynesians now.” Republicans may yet come to rue the day they tossed over the ideas of Nixon for those of Ronald Reagan. Nixon also had proposed national health care, only to have it sunk by the petty personal jealousy of Teddy Kennedy.

[4] “The Rise of the Tea Party,” The Week, 19 February 2010, p. 13.

 

The economic mess

Every–bored-to-tears–schoolboy knows who propounded the idea of a “social contract”: Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.  The idea of a social contract on the distribution of income has formed one of the pillars of “neo-capitalism” since 1945.  However, that basic idea has witnessed several successive versions.  From 1945 to the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, the US combined high tax rates on the wealthy with the channeling of the gains in productivity to employees.  Eventually, business people pushed back against what they saw an an unfair deal.  A new social contract emerged in which much higher incomes for the wealthy were accepted so long as the real incomes for the middle class continued to rise.  (All this is just my opinion.  In all likelihood, many of my historian friends would rain-down good-humored abuse on this interpretation.)  The financial crisis and the “Great Recession” then ruptured this second version of the social contract.

In 2007-2008 we had the financial crisis and the “Great Recession.”  In 2009 we started back up the road to prosperity.  American Gross Domestic Product (GDP, OK, cue Mort Sahl here) is up 6.7% over 2007.  Per-capita disposable income rose 4.2% between June 2009 and June 2014.  Well, some of us started back toward prosperity, but not all of us did.  In June 2009 the median family income was $55,589; in June 2014 it was $53,891 (in inflation-adjusted dollars).  That’s a 3.1% decline.

How can that be?  Well, the stock market is doing very well.  If you’re the kind of person who puts their  savings  into Vanguard accounts, then your the kind of person who probably has profited from the recovery.  (On the other hand, you’re also the kind of person who took a bath in the recession.  Not that the people at the New York Times give a rip about your experience.)  If you’re the kind of person who depends on wages or salary and your home is your chief investment, there is good reason to feel like the “recovery” is a joke.  (Like a bucket of water propped on top of a partly-open door.  “Hey, can you come in here for a minute?”)  Worse still, the 1999 peak in real household income was a little higher than the 2007 (pre-recession) peak in income.  Five years into the “recovery” and we aren’t even back to the 2007 level and the 2007 level wasn’t as high as the 1999 level.  In sum, we’ve actually had fifteen years of things not working right, rather than five or seven years of things not working right.  There’s probably something in the Bible about this.

One great challenge of the day is to figure out a new version of the social contract.  There has to be a way of achieving broadly-shared economic growth.  There isn’t much political consensus about what to do.  George W. Bush and Barack Obama, Republicans and Democrats all had or have high disapproval levels in public opinion polls.  A big chunk of voters seem to have swung from supporting Obama and the Democrats in 2008 to supporting the Tea Party faction of Republicans in 2010.  The 2014 mid-terms loom next month with no certain outcome.

Saying that there is no political consensus on action isn’t quite the same as saying that professional economists couldn’t come up with some solutions.  It’s just that neither the right or the left seems much interested in listening to what they have to say.  The flight from Keynesian solutions to the recession actually was widely shared.  It is inexplicable in rational terms, especially by Democrats who were going to be left holding the bag in future elections.  Yet it happened.  Probably the same goes for constructive policies aimed at building a better American future.

Paul Krugman, “How to Get it Wrong,” NYT, 15 September 2014.

Neil Irwin, “A Crisis of Faith in the Global Elite,” NYT, September 2014.

Neil Irwin, “Why the Middle Class Isn’t Buying the Talk About a Strong Recovery,” NYT, 22 August 2014.