How the US Lost Manufacturing 1.

            How did the United States rise to economic and industrial predominance in the world?  First, the North American continent held a vast trove of natural resources of many kinds.  All that was needed was finding ways to extract and transform those resources.  Second, the country suffered from a perennial labor-scarcity.  Even massive immigration in the “long 19th Century” could not fill the breach, so Americans turned to technological and organizational innovations to increase productivity.  Third, all this took a great deal of capital.  The “Founders” created a pro-business environment that both helped generate American capital and attracted foreign (especially British) capital.  By the dawn of the 20th Century, the United States had the greatest industrial economy in the world.  The two World Wars laid low every other industrial country, while they strengthened that of the United States.  By mid-century, American industry (and agriculture, and finance, and science and technology) bestrode the world.  In one symbol of both the industrial power and the diversity of the American economy, about a third (35 percent) of all private-sector jobs were in manufacturing.[1]  This situation lasted through the end of the 1950s. 

            What were some results of that rise to predominance? 

            In the wake of the Second World War, the United States held a uniquely favorable position.  All of the other major industrial nations were either bankrupt or war-ravaged and bankrupt.  The Stalinist command-economy could compel Russians and conquered Eastern Europeans to make painful sacrifices to rebuild their economies without American aid.  Elsewhere (Western Europe, Japan) relied upon American assistance.  Later, the Americans added military protection against Soviet aggression. 

            The Americans used their leverage to remake the international economic system.  The “Bretton Woods System” (International Monetary Fund, World Bank); the first steps that would lead to the European Union; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor the World Trade Organization (WTO) all came from American designs.  A progressively more “open” world economy came about between 1945 and 2025. 

            The Western European and Japanese economies revived with a speed that astonished people who had seen the wrecked economies and societies at war’s end.  They not only recovered, but generated an unprecedented and widespread prosperity.  It should be obvious, but may not be to most Americans, that the vast majority of this recovery and progress sprang from the hard work of the people who received American aid.  Especially in Germany and Japan, hard work, ready adaptation to new circumstances, and self-restraint became cultural values and not merely the harsh necessities of the moment.  These countries also built government systems of “social provision” that shocked many Americans. 

            How did the United States fall from that predominant position? 

            The economies that the United States had helped to revive began to become competitors.  This had always been expected, if only in some misty future.  First, they began to supply many of their own needs, then they began to compete in “third markets” (neither Western Europe, not America).  In Asia and Latin America, countries began to emulate the earlier industrializing countries.  Their initial advantage lay in very cheap labor.  They began by producing simple, non-durable goods at a very low cost for export to foreign markets, especially the American market. 

At the same time, from the mid-1960s onward, the American economy began to shift its center of gravity.  The service sector[2] began to grow rapidly.  Manufacturing held steady in numbers of employees until about 1980.  At the same time, manufacturers began the long trend toward shifting new production to the “Sun Belt,” especially the Southern states.[3] 

With an expanding service sector, Americans seem to have been ready to surrender the lowest level of manufacturing to foreigners in return for more stuff bought cheaper.  Those countries didn’t stay at the lowest level.  Having earned and learned from low-level industrialization, many of them sought to move up the food-chain.  South Korea, for example, developed a steel industry and a ship-building industry. 

            Then, beginning in 2001, China was admitted to the World Trade Organization.  China has an immense population.  Through the end of the Mao Zedong period, they were mostly trapped in low-productivity farming.  Post-Mao governments set out to change China in a more revolutionary and constructive way than Mao had ever imagined.  China would open its markets to foreign business, draw in foreign investment, shift its population from “the idiocy of rural life” to the “dark, Satanic mills” of new industrial cities, and conquer foreign markets for manufactured goods.  It took China less that a decade to surpass the United States as the world’s leading exporter of manufactured goods.  What the United States has retained and developed is its role as the leading exporter of services, including intellectual property.[4] 

In this account, the American economy shifted its chief function from extracting primary products (so, primary sector) to transforming them into finished goods (secondary sector) to providing diverse services (tertiary sector).  It’s easy to see this as a normative evolution of all capitalist economies.  American aid to Western Europe and Japan after the Second World War helped those places get back on track.  Similarly, American development aid assisted developing economies begin the path on which others were well-advanced.  Over the years, America shedding low-value industrial jobs and shifting people up the hierarchy into high value service jobs facilitated the global rise in development and living standards. 

Only in the case of post-Mao China did the institutions and policies created by the United States after the Second World War succeed all too well.  The “China Shock” wreaked havoc on American industry (and not only American industry).  That had painful social and economic consequences.  From one point of view, it had been impossible to foresee the scale and rapidity of China’s growth in manufacturing power.  So, is the problem how to return China to the old post-war model through practicing self-restraint and focusing on domestic consumers?  To become a “normal” nation in American terms? 


[1] Justin Lahart, “How the U.S. Slipped From Top Manufacturing Perch,” WSJ, 14 April 2025. 

[2] Doctors, lawyers, bankers, teachers, and so on, rather than just people “flipping hamburgers” as Mike Dukakis seemed to imagine. 

[3] In a sense, the Southern states were “developing economies” within America’s own borders.  Wages were lower, labor unions weren’t well-established, and state governments were pro-development.  For more, see: American Union, stay away from me uh. | waroftheworldblog 

[4] Justin Lahart, “How the U.S. Slipped From Top Manufacturing Perch,” WSJ, 14 April 2025.   

China Tariff Shock.

            Once upon a time, people harbored high hopes for post-Mao China.[1]  The country adopted “market socialism,” invited Western capital and experts to facilitate its transition to participant in the global economy, and sent many of its own best and brightest to study and work in Western countries.  Employing a very simplified understanding of the West’s own history, people conjectured that a market economy would grow, enrich, and make assertive a middle class that would insist upon a more responsive government.  China would “Westernize.” 

            To accelerate this process, in 2001, China won admission to the World Trade Organization (W.T.O, successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, G.A.T.T).  “It did not have the effect that Long Shanks planned.”[2]  Instead, for ten years, cheap Chinese goods deluged foreign markets.  In the United States, 2.4 million jobs were lost, a million of them factory jobs.  All this happened between 2001 and 2011, and it kept happening at a slower pace afterward.  In 2019, China earned a trade surplus with the rest of the world of more than $500 billion.  Nobody did anything about it.  Why not?  Well, the price of many consumer goods fell.  Consumption increased for many people.  The number of service jobs increased, so lots of people weren’t working in factories, “dark, satanic” or otherwise.  “We’re doing better, right?”[3] 

            Since 2020, China has pursued a major export offensive on top of this already large volume of exports.  It has done so by subsidizing manufacturers of its already low-cost products to the tune of $1.9 trillion over four years. 

In one sense, the offensive has succeeded: in 2024 it earned a surplus of almost $1 trillion.  Since 2013, China has deployed much of its new-found wealth to entangle other counties in a complicated relationship that makes tariff retaliation against China difficult.[4]

In another sense, the offensive has failed: it has aroused international alarm and resistance.  Beyond the United States, the affected industries range from Indonesian textile factories to the German auto industry.  The first phase of the counter-attack against China’s trade offensive appeared in President Donald Trump’s first term with tariffs on China.  These were retained by the Biden administration.  The Chinese responded by moving some of its production “off-shore’ to other countries like Vietnam and Thailand, Turkey and Hungary, and—of course—Mexico.[5]  Trump’s second term began with new and gigantic tariffs on China, but also on many other countries. 

The American tariffs close off an estimated $400 billion in sales to the American market.  If China can’t cut back production, those goods will have to go elsewhere.  Other countries have begun to follow Trump’s lead.  They are hampered by those previously-established economic relationships with China. 

            Trump’s tariff barrage is best understood not as the start of a “Trade War.”  It’s best understood as a counter-attack in a trade war that has already been going on.  It’s a trade war which the United States and many other countries have been losing.  Through not fighting back. 


[1] “China Shock 2.0” The Week, 25 April 2025, p. 11. 

[2] Reference to another Mel Gibson historical wish-it-had-been-this-way mess. 

[3] To belabor the obvious, both the job losses and the failure of solidarity eventually had large political effects. 

[4] See: Belt and Road Initiative – Wikipedia 

[5] See: How Chinese firms are using Mexico as a backdoor to the US 

“The System Is Blinking Red” 3.

            In 1989-1990, the Soviet Union collapsed.  With it went the credibility of autarkic, centrally-planned economies.  Determined to maintain its monopoly on power, the Communist Party of the Peoples’ Republic of China hastened to adopt a new course.  It opened China to the global market and capitalist methods.  Essentially, use foreign-supplied capital and technology to become the workshop of the world.  Start by making cheap simple stuff, then climb up the ladder.  Pull its people out of impoverished rural life into urban prosperity.  Pull China out of Developing Country status into global power. 

American business and political leaders took an optimistic view of these developments.  China would be a cheap producers of consumer goods for Western markets, raising living standards for Western peoples by lowering costs.  China would become a consumer of high-end  Western products and expertise.  An economic revolution in China would create a growing—and increasingly assertive—middle class.  This would nudge China toward political democracy.[1]  Naturally, there would be some job losses suffered in the West.  Experience with the rise of Japan in the 1970s and 1980s showed that displaced workers would shuffle into new jobs. 

In 2001, China won admission to the World Trade Organization.  Many restrictions on Chinese exports were removed.  Things did not work out as planned.  China moved much faster than expected and on a much larger scale than had been expected.  “Many U.S. manufacturing towns couldn’t compete.”[2]  Factories downsized.  Manufacturing shrank as a source of employment in many towns.  Some workers were laid off, but most were attritted through retirement.  They were not replaced.  Most of the displaced workers were White and Black men without a college education. 

Then, it seemed, the hard-hit areas bounced back.  They didn’t return to the original state.  Instead, “affected areas recover[ed] primarily by adding workers to non-manufacturing who were below working age when the shock occurred.  Entrants are disproportionately native-born Hispanics, foreign-born immigrants, women, and the college-educated, who find employment in relatively low-wage service sectors such as medical services, education, retail, and hospitality.”[3] 

Readers may question the argument that “towns” came back, while “workers” did not.  “Those communities experienced higher unemployment, lower wages, higher use of food stamps, higher disability payments, higher rates of single parenthood and child poverty, and elevated mortality.”[4]  Would make a good movie if John Sayles was still working.[5] 

The natural response is to connect all this distress to the rejection of globalism and—eventually—to the rise of Donald Trump.  What stands out, though, is the failed hopes of the people who set China policy and their failed sense of social solidarity when the choices they made had a harmful impact on ordinary people.  Now US AID is on the block. 


[1] That’s how it had worked in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th Centuries.  Why wouldn’t it be the same with China? 

[2] Justin Lahart, “How ‘China Shock’ Upended U.S. Workers,” WSJ, 5 February 2025.  Lahart is reporting on a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper by David Autor, et al. 

[3] Places versus People: The Ins and Outs of Labor Market Adjustment to Globalization | NBER 

[4] Justin Lahart, “How ‘China Shock’ Upended U.S. Workers,” WSJ, 5 February 2025. 

[5] See: “Sunshine State” (2002) and “Casa de los babys” (2003).