Some Choices.

            Walter Russell Mead, who comments on foreign affairs for the Wall Street Journal, discerns several long-term shifts underway in international affairs.[1] 

            First, Europe continues to decline as a force in world politics.  This can be seen as the latest stage in a long-running process.  The “European Civil War” of 1914-1945 wrecked the basis of European global power.  The Eastern and Western parts of the Continent then found themselves bound to alliances with the Soviet Union and the United States.  However, in Western Europe, dramatic post-war economic modernization and the construction of the European Union (EU) allowed a revived role.[2]  

Now it seems that the wheels have come off in a serious way.  It’s possible to point to all sorts of current problems: the collapse of French influence in Africa; the EU’s confrontation with a Turkish Republic that uses refugees as a weapon; and the dangers to Germany posed by China’s automobile industry, and to all Europe by its trade practices.  More fundamental, says Mead, are the rapid aging and eventual shrinking of Europe’s population; all the policies and incrustations that have produced a low growth economy; the follow-on effect of robbing national security to pay for social security; and the surrender to wishful thinking in diplomacy. 

            Second, there is the “emergence of India as one of the world’s leading powers and as an increasingly close partner of the U.S.”  This should not be misunderstood as a real reflection of Indian economic or military power.  What matters much more is that Europe’s long-term decline has created a tension between the rising nations of Asia and the “South,” on the one hand, and international institutions in which European countries are over-represented, on the other hand.  The advance of India represents an entering wedge for other countries.  Their ambition is a “reform” that shoulders aside the doddering countries of Europe. 

            Third, China, Russia, and some follower-countries are intensifying their challenge to the “American-led”[3] post-1945 world order.  Part of their effort—as it was in the Cold War—is an attack on the existing, Western-dominated, international institutions.  This is intended to play to the ambitions and frustrations of the Indo-Pacific and Global South. 

This convergence of factors creates a dilemma for American policy makers.  It is likely to take some time to resolve because it requires making painful choices.  Mead, a not-unfriendly critic since the start of the Biden Administration, chooses to emphasize the “woke” agenda of current American diplomacy.  The Administration assigns great importance to the Democratic causes of climate-change, human-rights, and democratic government.  The trouble is that most of the countries that need to be courted don’t assign the same importance to these issues as does the Administration.  If anything, they resent being harped-at by American progressives.  Which will you have? 

There is also the far more important issue of American national reconstruction.  No one seems to speak for higher taxes, lower spending, trying to shift values and culture, and pursuing national reconciliation.  Yet those issues matter too, and perhaps most of all. 


[1] Walter Russell Mead, “The G-20 Reveals a Shifting World Order,” WSJ, 12 September 2023. 

[2] All the same, the post-war fantasies of Charles de Gaulle seem absurd.  Even French historians and policy-makers must be circumlocuting their way around calling him “not very realistic,” to use Stalin’s judgement. 

[3] “American-led” always makes me think of “first among equals,” a label claimed by Octavian. 

Looking Forward in December 2020 2.

            President Joe Biden will face three chief problem areas in foreign policy.[1]    

            First and foremost, there is the problem of Asia.  “China is sort of the radioactive core of America’s foreign policy issues.”[2]  The phrase “U.S.-Chinese relations” offers an umbrella for two main issues.  The first is economic, covering trade and technology.  The second is China’s current and projected outward reach, meaning—for the moment– Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.  Donald Trump replaced the long-term American policy of co-operation with one of confrontation.  The central pillars of this approach have been tariffs, harassing the Chinese tech giant Huawei, and talking about building up the over-stretched U.S. Navy.  The Chinese government’s crackdown on the Uighurs, Hong Kong, and internal critics of its response to the Corona virus show the direction Zi Jinping intends to take on internal affairs.  Will the same be true in foreign policy?  To what extent will President Joe Biden change course from the Trump administration?

            There is no good solution in sight to the problem of a nuclear armed North Korea.  Plastering the little country with economic sanctions didn’t work.  Trump’s initiative to open direct contact with North Korea didn’t work.  Somehow (or from someone) North Korea acquired ICBM rocket engines and the ability to stop the US from messing up its missile test launches.  Biden has roundly denounced Trump’s appeasement of North Korea, but hasn’t suggested any alternative beyond rhetorical initiatives.  If the Obama administration wouldn’t bomb Iran to stop its nuclear program, would a Biden administration bomb North Korea? 

The second is the Middle East.  For a long time, America’s Middle East policy sought to limit Soviet influence in the area and to gain security for Israel through a resolution of the Palestinian problem.  Events have by-passed by far this policy.  The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the scale of that danger.  However, the Sunni-Shi’ite civil war[3] took its place. 

The Obama administration negotiated an agreement to limit Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons for a time, but left other aspects of Iran’s assertive behavior for some future day.  President Trump abandoned that agreement and restored unilateral, but painful for Iran, sanctions.  President-elect Biden has said that he will reverse course by rejoining the agreement, but he also has said that Iran must commit to additional negotiations.  “Iran is desperate for a deal.”[4]  How desperate? 

Trump’s aggressive stance toward Iran strengthened both Israel and Saudi Arabia, which felt threatened by the more accommodationist policy of the Obama administration.  An Israel-Sunni Arab coalition is well under construction, with knock-on damage to the long-term Two States solution to the Palestinian problem.  Will the Biden administration reverse course on the Sunni-Shi’ite civil war within Islam?  Will it restore support for a Two State solution?  How will it deal with the Crown Prince (and likely future king) of Saudi Arabia?[5] 

            The third is relations with America’s European allies.  In 1949, the United States created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter the existential threat from a Soviet attack on Western Europe.  Forty years later the Soviet Union disintegrated.  NATO faced a new existential threat: what was its purpose?  No one has come up with a good answer. 

Trump openly and repeatedly disparaged our Continental European allies, while hoping for better relations with post-Soviet Russia.  Will the Biden administration find common interests with Russia in areas like arms control, even if it means throwing overboard the kleptocracy in Ukraine?  Will the Biden administration bear with the continual post-Trump whining from E.U. leaders to “prove you love me”? 

Seeing Britain’s departure from the European Union (E.U.) through the same optic of “tribalism” and “nationalism” as they saw Donald Trump, both former President Obama and presidential candidate Biden opposed “Brexit.”[6]  Trump thought that he saw a kindred spirit in British prime minister Boris Johnson.  Now Trump will be replaced by Biden, but both Johnson and “Brexit” are still there.  Will the Biden administration really want to make things difficult for America’s most reliable ally now that “Brexit” is a done deal?    

Joe Biden seems adept at dealing with realities as they exist.  It is at least possible that there will be an uncomfortable degree of continuity between the foreign policies of the Trump and Biden administrations. 


[1] Rick Gladstone, “Biden to face a Long List of Foreign Challenges, With the Chinese at the Top,” NYT, 9 November 2020. 

[2] Orville Schell.  On Schell, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orville_Schell 

[3] Essentially this pitted Shi’ites in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon against Sunnis everywhere else, with Saudi Arabia taking a leading role. 

[4] Cliff Kupchan.  On Kupchan, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cliff_Kupchan    

[5] The man appears to be a very able psychopath. 

[6] “Brexit” seems to me to be an understandable bad idea with much deeper historical roots than is often recognized.