For decades after the death of Mao Zedong, China’s national policies were set by Deng Xiaoping and his like-minded successors.  China opened itself to the world, carried out major reforms, and pursued rapid economic growth.  An enhanced international power would surely come as a result of these policies.  Yet, it seemed to many foreign observers, that China would progressively integrate itself into a larger world system.  These hopes have been abridged.

How should we understand Xi Jinping, leader-for-life of contemporary China?  A recent book on Xi’s political thought as revealed in his speeches and writings cast some light on the issue.[1]  Xi possesses—or is possessed by—vast ambition for China.  He aims at the “rejuvenation” of his country by a Leninist dictatorship.  He wants to return China to its one-time status as the greatest nation in the world.  On the one hand, Xi’s aims mean asserting the power of the Communist Party as the guide of the nation in all political and economic matters.  He found the Chinese Communist Party demoralized by a loss of purpose.  He found it riddled with corruption.  Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns began by purging many of his enemies or rivals, but they seem not to have stopped there.  Xi’s reassertion of party primacy gives him a powerful lever to guide and to mobilize the Chinese people.   

On the other hand, Xi’s aims require displacing the United States from its long role as guardian of what might be called “American Asia”: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.  As one of the means to this end, China has carried out a massive military build-up.  China has been asserting its claim to the South China Sea as a kind of Chinese lake, rather than an open international waterway. 

            Xi’s ambition is bad for the United States and bad for the states of “American Asia.”  Among these states, Japan serves as the linch-pin of the American position and it is a natural bete-noire for Xi.  Japan’s brutal behavior in Asia during the Second World War gives Xi’s propaganda a lot to work with in mobilizing Chinese opinion.  China’s battering of the fishing fleets and coast guards of the peripheral states around the South China Sea aims at controlling one of Japan’s main lines of trade. 

            Xi has been at this for a dozen years.  He has set his target date for the completion of China’s rejuvenation as 2050.  The end date is well after Xi will have shuffled off the scene.  He has been working hard to instill “Xi Jinping Thought” as the guiding ideology for his country. 

            The United States has been struggling to respond to the new China.  The presidential transition from the Democrat Joe Biden to the Republican Donald Trump requires a review of the essential questions.  How widely understood is the seriousness of China’s challenge?  Can anyone craft a plan for a successful response to China’s challenge?  Is it possible for the United States to mobilize the military and diplomatic resources needed to meet the challenge?   

            Countries close to China seem to profess the most confidence in the American alliance.  Perhaps they have no choice but to believe it.  Countries farther away in Southeast Asia are more skeptical.  One theory is that the evident inadequate level of American military power gives them pause.  So, is America bluffing when it claims that it will support its allies?  If so, then Asian countries will spot that like a leopard spots a limp. 

[1] Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung, The Political Thought of Xi Jinping (2025), brought to my attention by Walter Russell Mead, “Does Biden Take China’s Threat Seriously?” WSJ, 9 April 2024.