In the judgement of one expert,” the “Iranian economy has long been riddled by endemic mismanagement, corruption, cronyism, and brain drain. Sanctions make all these problems worse.” However, the flaws are innate to the regime, rather than springing from the sanctions.
American economic sanctions against Iran have a long history. They began with President Jimmy Carter; were tightened by President Ronald Reagan; were greatly strengthened by President Bill Clinton, then were slightly eased by Clinton after the election of an Iranian president seen as “moderate” in the West; then were renewed under President George W. Bush.
In 2005, Iran announced that it would begin enriching uranium for its nuclear program. At the behest of the Bush administration, the United Nations began imposing international economic sanctions. In 2010, the Congress passed and President Barack Obama signed a law greatly strengthening sanctions. Eventually, the pressure from the sanctions forced Iran to negotiate with an American-led coalition. In 2015, the negotiations produced an agreement on delaying Iran’s march towards nuclear weapons in return for relief from some of the sanctions.
The agreement aroused controversy. On the one hand, Iran remained under sanction for other actions. Incomplete relief from sanctions continued to hamper improvements in the living conditions of ordinary Iranians. Iranian hard-liners could argue that the sanctions relief hasn’t been worth giving up the chance at nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran remained an active opponent of the United States and its regional allies. Conservative critics of the Obama Administration could argue that only limiting Iran’s nuclear program, without addressing its other behaviors, hasn’t been worth sanctions relief.
The Trump Administration falls heavily into the latter camp. It has sought to re-open the negotiations with Iran with the intention of getting a better deal. On 8 May 2018, Trump .withdrew the United States from the agreement. Trump also announced that the United States would re-impose the previous sanctions and sanction any European companies that traded with Iran. Within a year, Iran’s oil exports had declined by more than 50 percent.
On 8 April 2019, Trump designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist group. The designation carried with it further economic sanctions.
On 5 May 2019, after Iran had designated the U.S. Central command as a terrorist organization and after the U.S. had discerned Iranian preparations for action against American forces, a carrier battle-group and bombers were ordered to the region.
On 8 May 2019, the US increased sanctions on Iran’s exports and ended “waivers” granted to some countries to continue buying Iranian oil.
On 12 May 2019, four oil tankers were attacked in the Persian Gulf. The Trump Administration claimed that Iran had attacked the tankers. Iran soon .announced that it would return to enriching uranium.
On 13 June 2019, external explosions badly damaged two tankers in the Gulf.
The 2003 Iran War suggests a need for caution in all long-term projections.
 Helene Cooper, “How the U.S. Ratcheted Up Pressure on Iran and How Iran Responded,” NYT, 16 June 2019.
 The parallel to Venezuela is striking.
 The IRGC handles terrorism abroad.