Between 2011 and 2014, unanticipated events in the Middle East created problems that are now moving toward critical phases. In 2011 a long, complicated civil war broke out in Syria. By and large, the Obama administration evaded involvement. Also in 2011, the Obama administration believed that it had escaped the Iraq quagmire. The United States and Iraq could not agree on terms for the continued American presence in that troubled country. American troops pulled-out. Various forms of Hell marched in. In 2014, the troops of Islamic State (ISIS) drove east out of civil war-torn Syria. They soon over-ran the Western (largely Sunni) areas of Iraq. Iraq’s Shi’ites toughened-up; Iran sent arms and men; and the United States supplied air-power. In 2014, Russia seized the chance created by a political crisis in Ukraine to re-take the Crimea and to sponsor rebel groups in two districts of eastern Ukraine. International economic sanctions on Russia followed.
In 2016, Russia forged an alliance with Iran to defend the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. The joint intervention of the two powers now seems to have confirmed that the regime will remain in control of western Syria at least. The 2016 Obama/Kerry agreement with Iraq fended-off a war between the United States and Iran while facilitating an American-Iranian war against ISIS. Victory over ISIS appears to be at hand.
President Trump ran on a platform of opposing Iran. Doubtless, Secretary of Defense James Mattis has done his best to rein-in the President until the CrISIS is over. Still, the day will come when ISIS has been beaten and the Americans and Iranians can think anew about their relationship. Iraq will find itself a pawn in that relationship.
What happens next in Iraq and Syria? Iraqis are divided over which “friend” to support. Do they favor the United States or Iran? Iran has real advantages: Iran is Shi’ite and the majority of Iraqis are Shi’ite; Iraq’s Iranian-armed militias have played a large role in the defeat of ISIS. The government of Iraq is full of pro-Iranian Shi’ites. The argument for keeping America engaged in Iraq after the defeat of ISIS springs from this same Iranian domination. Keeping the Americans involved offers the best guarantee that Iran won’t just turn Iraq into a puppet. Also, there will have to be some kind of reconciliation between Sunnis and Shi’ites of post-ISIS Iraq. An American presence might limit Shi’ite oppression of their none-too-loyal Sunni countrymen.
Russia and Iran disagree on the final outcome in Syria. Russia chose sides in the Sunni-Shi’ite civil war inside Islam, but wants to limit its involvement in the struggle. To avoid becoming mired in the larger conflict, Russia favors a compromise in Syria that would meet the demands of some Sunnis (although not the Westernized young people beloved of Westerners). Iran hopes to see Bashar al-Assad turn Syria (or his portion of it) into a Shi’ite bastion.
Iran and Russia will stick together; America and Iran—and Russia—may fall out. Still, room exists for pragmatic diplomacy. People just have to seize the chance. But what chance?
 Iraq’s Shi’ites wanted the Americans out so that they could go about the business of misgovernment unimpeded. Iraq’s Sunnis wanted the Americans to stay as a check on the Shi’ites, rather than out of love for the country that had destroyed their country and their own place at the peak of that country. The Americans were—and are—weary of war in the Middle East. President Obama sought to meet this desire of the voters.
 Until the memoirs come out, when it may be renamed the Clinton-Kerry or Clinton-Obama deal with Iran.
 Count no man happy until he is dead.
 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Iraq Faces Balancing Act Between the U.S. and Iran,” WSJ, 17 March 2017; Yaroslav Trofimov, “Russia, Iran Need Each Other, Despite Differences,” WSJ, 17 February 2017. .
 Over the long-run an Iranian client-state in Syria on the frontiers of Israel—a sort of super-Hezbollah—would challenge the security of Israel in a profound way.