Introduction.
The First Indochina War (1946-1954) sprang from the collision between Indochinese desires and French whim. On the one hand, there existed a long-standing and deeply-rooted desire among the people of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) for independence from French rule.[1] Many elements divided the people of Indochina about what to put in place of French rule. They disagreed about whether to seek complete independence or membership in a “French Union”; whether to fight or to negotiate; whether to create a Communist or a non-Communist state. These questions had not been resolved in 1945 and would not be resolved for many years.
On the other hand, the French emerged from the Second World War humiliated and confused about what the future held for their country. They clung to empire as a way to not be shoved further downhill, while also fumbling toward a new and different France.[2]
The war began in a haphazard and improvised kind of way. As the Second World War drew to a sudden end in Summer 1945, the British, Americans, and Soviets had agreed that France was to be restored to power in Indochina. It would be hard to do. Japanese troops occupied Indochina. The Japanese had replaced the French colonial system with several puppet-states. The most important of these was the “Empire of Vietnam” led by the compliant Emperor Bao Dai. The French military had been disarmed. Indochinese nationalist groups of various stripes had been tolerated. It would take time for the French to get even modest forces to Indochina. In the meantime, foreigners—China and Britain–had to assume responsibility for the immediate occupation of French Indochina. Neither country wanted to be embroiled there for long. Each had their own attitudes toward European empires. The realities opened a window of opportunity for the nationalists. Blood soon flowed.
Potsdam.
In July-August 1945, the British, American, and Soviet leaders met in Potsdam, Germany to confer on important post-war matters.[3] The fate of French Indochina did not rise to the level of an “important” matter. However, the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff did devote some attention to the question. The French had offered to send two army Divisions to the Far East. The Chiefs agreed to accept this offer. It would take some time to move the troops to Asia. If the war were to end before their arrival, the Combined Chiefs agreed that troops from the Army of Kuomintang China would move in to accept the Japanese surrender north of the 16th Parallel, while troops from the British-led Southeast Asia command would do the same south of the 16th parallel.[4]
From Plans to Action, August 1945.
On 6 August 1945, the Americans atom-bombed Hiroshima; on 8 August, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and immediately invaded Manchuria; and on 9 August the Americans atom-bombed Nagasaki. On 15 August 1945, Japan’s resistance ended with the Emperor Hirohito’s announcement of Japan’s surrender. American troops began arriving in Japan on 28 August. The formal surrender took place on 2 September 1945.
Japan’s “surprise surrender” ended the war, but it caught the Allies before they had all of their preparations for Indochina completed.[5] While they hastened to launch their occupation of the two zones, local actors took matters into their own hands. Among them was Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Communist-dominated Viet Minh.[6]
In early August 1945, only a tiny handful of people in the United States and Britain knew the technology of the “atom bomb” and hundreds of thousands of Japanese knew the reality of it. Most people remained in the dark. They did know that something terrible had been done to the Japanese. That, combined with the Soviet entry into the war, was driving Japan toward surrender. In southeast Asia, the end of the war would come within a few days or a few weeks.
Ho Chi Minh meant to make the most of the ending of Japanese command in Indochina before the French could return to power. Even before Japan had announced its surrender (and probably before he knew anything of the decisions taken at the Potsdam Conference, Ho had begun preparations to seize power in as much of Indochina as possible. Here he built upon the steps taken in response to the Japanese occupation of March to August 1945.
As a first step, Ho sought to rally all the Indochinese nationalist groups under a single banner. On 13 August 1945, representatives of several groups joined the Viet Minh at Ho’s headquarters in Tan Trao, in the mountains north of Hanoi. They had a busy few days: on 14 August 1945, they created a “National Insurrection Committee” dominated by the Viet Minh; over the next few days they called for a national uprising, convened a “National People’s Congress,” and created a “National Liberation Committee” with Ho as its chairman. Realizing (or at least suspecting) that foreign power might assist the French in re-establishing their power. Ho argued for rapid action. He wanted to both seize urban centers of power and to mobilize the peasantry.
Ho and the others had to maneuver around certain realities. First, there remained a large French population in the major cities. The French in Indochina had been abandoned by Vichy France. Their army had been soundly defeated by the Japanese, who had taken over the administration of the country. The Japanese had created an Indochinese puppet regime under Bao Dai, but had tolerated some activity by other nationalist groups. Humiliated and enraged by their wartime experiences, the local French would welcome the return of French troops and French power with open arms. They were spoiling for a fight to watch.
Second, the Japanese Army remained a potent military force if they cared to use it and for some limited time to come. The Japanese forces were, like the French, defeated, humiliated, demoralized, and eager to go home. They were not necessarily anti-Viet Minh, so they might be a help to the Viet Minh. They were to be disarmed. Could the Viet Minh get possession of some of their weapons in order to arm themselves? At the same time, the Japanese were a powerful irritant of Indochinese nationalism. At least limited conflict with the Japanese could bolster the Viet Minh’s nationalist credentials.
Third, the Viet Minh was much stronger in Tonkin in the north than in Cochinchina in the south. In the south, a complex mix of royalists and religion-based groups rivaled the Viet Minh for leadership of the nationalist cause.[7] They had, so far, resisted all the Viet Minh’s blandishments. They were far away from the Viet Minh’s base of power. Ho didn’t want a civil war if it could be avoided. The Viet Minh might lose.
Ho opted to roll the dice. The Viet Minh went into action all across Tonkin and wherever they could manage in Annam and Cochinchina. What followed came to be called the “August Revolution.” On 19 August 1945, Viet Minh troops marched into Hanoi, seizing key sites. Other Viet Minh troops seized other places around Tonkin. On 20 August, at Thai Nguyen, north of Hanoi, they got into a fight with Japanese troops. Thai Nguyen had a fort built by the French and now garrisoned by the Japanese. The Viet Minh were too lightly armed to make headway against the fortifications or its well-armed defenders. At the same time, no one on the Japanese side wanted to be the last man killed in a lost war. After five days of desultory skirmishing, the two sides reached an agreement. The Japanese would confine themselves to the fort and the Viet Minh would take control of the rest of the town. The Viet Minh publicized this as a Japanese “surrender” and a Viet Minh “victory.”
Elsewhere, the Viet Minh appeared to have the wind at their back. On 22 August, in Saigon, the Japanese commander told two representatives of the Viet Minh that Japanese forces would not interfere with their actions. On 23 August, in the old imperial capital of Hue, the Viet Minh seized power. On 25 August, Bao Dai abdicated, transferring power to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He became a “counselor” to Ho. That is, he was a captive and a puppet.
Viet Minh leadership had the least sure grip in Cochinchina. There, multiple anti-communist nationalist groups had deeper roots and more support. These included two religious movements with political objectives, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai.[8] Although the Viet Minh had claimed power in Hanoi, it wasn’t clear that they could hold onto it.
On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed a new “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” and declared independence from France. This first-draft of the DRV would soon be scribbled-out by more powerful forces. However, it showed Ho’s speed of action when he saw an opportunity. The future would give evidence for his tenacity.
[1] David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925. (University of California Press, 1971); William Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941 (Cornell University Press, 1976).
[2] Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
[3] Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton University Press, 1960); Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2007). On Feis, see: Herbert Feis – Wikipedia
[4] See: Historical Documents – Office of the Historian; Historical Documents – Office of the Historian; Historical Documents – Office of the Historian; Historical Documents – Office of the Historian.
[5] Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia (Random House, 2007), pp. 73-137, provides a first-rate scholarly analysis of events in Southeast Asia and particularly of French Indochina.
[6] Biographies of Ho include Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography (Random House, 1968); William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life (Hyperion, 2001); and Pierre Brocheux, Ho Chi Minh: A Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[7] A small group of Trotskyists also existed chiefly in the south. There could be no serious bargaining with these people. They would have to be killed.
[8] On these groups, see: Bernard Fall, “The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam,” Pacific Affairs, v. 28, #3 (September 1955), pp. 235-253; David W. P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: revolution and social change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975 (M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
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